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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the relationship between human rights and the principle of mutual 
recognition as applied in criminal matters. It examines the impact of the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) on human rights and highlights the importance of human rights 
for the success of mutual recognition measures. Having embarked on the mutual 
recognition programme, on the basis of largely theoretical presumptions, an attempt by 
the EU to reposition human rights and to ensure that a genuine area of justice exists for 
all, can be witnessed through recent Directives on defence rights,. 
This research addresses the scope and method of human rights protection with focus on 
the implementation of the EAW. In the first part, mutual recognition and the EAW are 
defined. The second part considers the practical effect of the EAW on human rights, 
setting out the ECHR minimum standards and the extended EU scope. The third part 
evaluates the defence measures adopted to date by the EU under the Stockholm 
Roadmap.  
The final part summarises the main research findings which show that human rights are 
key to promoting mutual trust. The scope of some rights has already been extended and 
reinforced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the EU defence rights measures.  
The thesis argues that the best method for reinforcing these rights in practice is a 
tripartite collaborative approach between the EU, Member States and the Council of 
Europe. In order to address the tension between human rights and mutual recognition, 
work needs to continue beyond adoption of the Stockholm measures. It requires genuine 
commitment on the part of the EU institutions and Member States for the necessary 
amendments, adoptions, implementation and human rights protection to take place and 
be reflected in practice.
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Introduction 
An unwelcome outcome of the four freedoms of the European Union (EU) is what 
Professor Spencer classifies as the ‘fifth freedom’ that of crime and criminals moving 
freely between Member States (MS).
1
 This ‘fifth freedom’ is one reason why the EU 
deemed it necessary to broaden their scope from the original economic mandate to 
include the criminal sphere. More generally this new field is referred to as the creation 
of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).
2
  
Justice 
The concept of an AFSJ
3
 is relatively new in the EU and covers a broad and diverse 
range of areas including asylum, immigration, civil procedure, police cooperation, drug 
trafficking, counter terrorism, HRs and criminal matters. The focus of this thesis will be 
on the final two areas; criminal law and human rights (HR)
4
 and the impact of the 
principle of mutual recognition (MR) on these.
5
 This will be illustrated by putting under 
the microscope the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 
As early as1977 the then French President Giscard d’Estaing envisaged EU cooperation 
in criminal law giving protection of the four freedoms as a reason for the need to focus 
on security and justice.
6
 It was not until 1992 in Maastricht that reference was made to 
                                               
1 John Spencer, ‘EU Criminal Law – the Past and the Future?’, in Anthony Arnull, Catherine Barnard, 
Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa (Eds),  A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in 
Honour of Alan Dashwood, Hart Publishing, 2011. The four freedoms are free movement of goods, 
capital, services, and people. 
2 The Commission considers freedom, security and justice as integral key values of EU society. 
3 Full consideration of developments in the AFSJ is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is set out here is 
only a brief and general introduction to the field. For a more detailed account see Steve Peers, EU Justice 
and Home Affairs Law, (3rd Edn), OUP, 2011, Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, Hart Publishing, 
2009. 
4 Throughout HRs and fundamental rights will be used interchangeably. 
5  An indicative list of different measures passed in this area can be found in, K.Lenaerts, The 
Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, (2010) ICLQ 
Vol. 59, 255-301 
6 Oreste Pollivino, EAW and Constitutional Principles of the Member States: A case law-based outline in 
the attempt to strike the right balance between interacting legal systems, GLJ, (2008) Vol.09 No.10 1316. 
He also lists as the only significant achievement between 1977 and the 1990s as the Dublin Agreement 
1979 relating to the implementation of the 1977 Strasbourg Treaty on the repression of terrorism, is 
followed by an overview of the European integration of criminal law.  
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the creation of an AFSJ in a Treaty.
7
 In 1997, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, creation of 
an AFSJ became an objective for the EU and in 1999 the Tampere programme “set out 
policy guidelines and practical objectives”8 for an AFSJ.9 
As for EU Criminal Justice, it exists in the loosest sense of the word. There is no 
European Criminal/Penal Code or anything similar to that proposed by the Corpus Juris 
project,
10
 but instead it is a collection of organisations
11
 and of instruments
12
 working 
simultaneously with national criminal justice systems of MSs. Creation of criminal law 
or its reform within the EU differs from the traditional process at the national level of 
states. The AFSJ is not an autonomous system but, “a conceptual creation for the 
cooperation between such autonomous systems of criminal justice set up for the specific 
purpose of adapting these systems to the realities of a borderless Europe” whilst the 
only two parameters at the national level are “the need for effective enforcement of the 
criminal law and the just limits to state power over the individual”.13  
Trust  
The principle of MR provides the primary framework for EU measures in criminal 
matters. The adoption of this principle is regarded by many as an alternative to 
                                               
7 EU, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht , 7.02.1992, OJ C 325/5, 
24.12.2002 
8  Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and Future Orientations 
(COM(2004) 401 final), 2.06.2004 
9 At this point, transparency of decision-making was affected due to lack of equal co-legislator powers of 
the European Parliament and the fact that once adopted there was very limited ability to evaluate whether 
implementation was effective. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) also had a “limited role” and the 
Commission itself had “restricted powers” with regards to police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. 
10 A proposal in 1997 presented by a group of legal experts proposing the development of a European 
Criminal Code. The text and various commentaries are available  at 
<http://people.exeter.ac.uk/watupman/jha/jha/corpjur> accessed 17.05.2013 
11 Such as OLAF, Europol and Eurojust. See Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (n 3). 
12 These instruments include mutual recognition measures (such as the EAWFD); instruments on 
substantive criminal law (i.e. the Council Framework Decision on human trafficking) and criminal 
procedure (such as the measures set to be adopted in accordance with the Stockholm Roadmap). 
13 Robin Lööf, Shooting from the Hip: Minimum Rights in Criminal Proceedings throughout the EU, ELJ, 
(2006) Vol. 12 No 3, 421-430, 422 
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harmonization of the EU MS criminal justice systems, preserving their sovereignty in 
this politically sensitive area (although future harmonization remains a possibility).  
MR is founded on a mutual trust in the existence of due process and ability of another 
MS’s legal system to safeguard HRs. This mutual trust is essentially based on the fact 
that all MSs are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); whilst 
in theory this is correct, this is not reflected in the practice of MSs.
14
  
In addition to mutual trust between MSs, the trust that citizens place in states to protect 
their rights also needs to feature in the equation. Individuals submitting to the 
jurisdiction of a state do so in the expectation of a certain level of protection which 
respects the rule of law. States have an obligation to ensure that an individual within 
their jurisdiction is protected even when ejected from their jurisdiction. 
The EAW  
The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAWFD)
15
 is a unique instrument 
operating throughout the EU. It is the flagship MR measure, replacing extradition 
between MSs. In comparing the EAW to extradition there are similarities but also 
differences. Similarities lie in the end result; transfer of an individual by one state to 
another to stand trial or serve a sentence. Differences relate to the means employed to 
achieve this end and include the fast-track nature of the EAW and its near automatic 
enforcement. An EAW is issued by way of a judicial decision in one MS and is 
enforced, without nationalization or internalization, by the judicial authorities in another 
MS; the process is judicialised with no political involvement. On the basis of this 
                                               
14 Subsequent chapters set out the protection of human rights in practice, showing the HRs violations of 
MSs.  
15 Council of the EU, Council Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
Surrender Procedures between Member States, 13 June 2002, -002/584/JHA as amended by Council of 
the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending 
Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, 
thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ 2009 L 
81 of 2009-03-26, 24-36 (EAWFD) 
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decision an individual is arrested and sent (surrendered) within a short time period and 
with an exhaustive set of grounds upon which they can resist or challenge their 
surrender.  
Dissecting elements of the EAW will reveal the holes left, in particular by the 
superficial handling of HRs relegating obligations to assumptions. Current analysis and 
commentary found in literature on the topic will be advanced through detailed 
consideration of relevant HRs including their scope and applicability to the EAW 
procedure. The partnership between the EU and the Council of Europe in protecting 
HRs will also be examined, as will attempts to date to reconcile and reinforce protection 
at the EU level. 
HRs are important in the context of the EAW for all the reasons set out above. As the 
blueprint for MR measures, it needs to stand the tests of trust, sovereignty and 
reciprocity. Besides securing its own success, it is of equal and interrelated importance 
that EU citizens are also protected.  
Can the EAW survive on the same basis envisioned by its framers and the original 
attitude towards HRs? HRs problems have already been broached in EAW cases, a 
detailed look at the applicable rights indicates that there are further issues which have 
yet to be addressed or raised by individuals before courts. It is thus no longer a question 
of should the EAW operate without appropriate respect for HRs but whether it can 
afford to ignore the importance of actively ensuring due respect for HRs.  
Acknowledging the fact that action is needed, the EU has begun to take steps to fill 
potholes in HRs protection left by the EAW. An attempt to reposition HRs can be 
witnessed through recent Directives on defence rights and decisions of the CJEU, which 
have the aim of enabling the EAW to survive. However to what extent does EU law 
address these challenges? 
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The Importance of Human Rights 
As noted it is widely accepted that for the system of MR in criminal matters to continue 
to function, protection of HRs needs to be fortified. The unsatisfactory situation 
concerning HRs is linked to the tension between HRs and MR and their different 
positioning of the individual. Focus of HRs is on the individual, under MR the focus 
shifts to the state. 
The impact of the EAW on the life of an individual caught up in its web is profound; its 
implementation interferes with an individual’s liberty, family and private life, EU 
Treaty rights and draws them into the criminal justice system which is daunting whether 
domestic or foreign. Judges are there to not only enforce the criminal law but to also act 
as guardians of rights – MR measures need to do the same, state mechanisms need to be 
accompanied by mechanisms which actively guard the individual. Existence of these 
active mechanisms, rather than passive assumptions, creates faith in the system as well 
as a back-up plan for when things go wrong. The individual requires an arsenal to 
protect them from the might of a fast-tracked cross-border mechanism. To counter the 
David and Goliath situation, there needs to be procedural guarantees in place to protect 
the individual, in particular when resisting surrender in the E-MS and before the I-MS. 
The individual needs to know what HRs should be respected; furthermore MSs also 
need to be aware of their obligations. What protection do these existing rights offer in 
practice, what are the thresholds that need to be met and to what standard of proof? 
Safeguards and procedural guarantees need to be in place across the EU in order to 
accurately mirror the mutual trust imposed upon the judiciary by the principle of MR. If 
reality leads to a distorted mirror image, then practice will begin to reflect these 
uncertainties gradually undermining mutual trust and implementation of MR measures. 
What remains to be ascertained is how is it best to promote this improved HRs 
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protection, whether reliance solely on the ECHR mechanism is enough and what 
additional EU measures are necessary? 
The purpose is therefore to assess the impact of the EAWFD on HRs, existing rights, 
what has been done to address the imbalance and what further is required. 
Research Methodology 
This research will identify both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources 
include legislation and cases
16
 and official documents of the EU. The secondary sources 
will include NGO reports, other documents and academic writings on European 
criminal justice as well as on relevant HRs principles. Selection of sources was guided 
by knowledge acquired and informal communications the author has encountered 
during the course of her professional life, including: officials of the EU; Judges; 
Lawyers; Legal experts and Academics.  
These sources will be subjected to analytical procedures consisting of four steps. The 
first step includes the definition of key EU components which provide the framework 
for adoption of the key measure under consideration (the EAWFD). These include the 
AFSJ, the principle of MR and its application in criminal matters. As the blueprint MR 
measure, the EAWFD is the selected case study to test the viability of the principle of 
MR and the necessity for tangible HRs protection. The second step will involve 
dissecting the EAWFD and a close inspection of its provisions will be undertaken in 
order to piece together the EAW procedure. This is then cross-referenced with the 
implementing law of the United Kingdom (UK), once again dissecting the 
implementing law, the Extradition Act 2003(EA) and mapping out the procedure. The 
UK is restricted to the law as applicable to England and Wales and is selected as the 
central case study country based on the fact that it has become a key player in the EAW 
                                               
16 As set out in the table of legislation and table of cases respectively. 
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system. Experience of other MSs will be referred to where relevant. Details of the EAW 
procedure will reveal gaps in HRs protection.  
The third step is to identify relevant HRs applicable to the EAW procedure. HRs are 
defined by reference to the ECHR and CFR, with the case law of the ECtHR, CJEU and 
domestic courts (in particular those in the UK) as a further tool of interpretation. The 
ECHR has been selected as the reference HRs instrument since it is the most relevant to 
the domestic HRs protection of MSs as well as for its relevance to the EU, both as a 
basis of the CFR and also as part of its fundamental principles and values. In 
researching the case law, the facts are important in order to identify similarities and 
distinguishing characteristics as indicators of its relevance and applicability to the EAW 
procedure. Of equal importance is the principle set out in the case and how the court 
applies it to the particular set of facts; this is instructive as to its applicability to the 
EAW. As far as possible the ECHR cases referred to concern EU MSs. This will in turn 
support the assertion that membership of the ECHR is not a sufficient guarantee. 
Once the specific HR has been defined, its application to the EAW is examined and the 
extended scope explored where relevant.  Further justification of the necessity and 
applicability of a particular HR is provided by analysis of the European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 
reports, statistics and reports of other international and regional organisations.  
Having established the key HRs, in the fourth step the focus shifts to the action being 
taken by the EU to fill in the HRs protection gap and which rights are being addressed. 
Finally, the findings are drawn together to show that survival of MR in criminal matters 
is reliant on proper protection of HRs. Recommendations are made with the aim of 
promoting mutual trust thereby guaranteeing the future of MR measures in criminal 
matters.    
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The research will be consolidated into three parts. The first part introduces the key 
components to be assessed; the AFSJ; the principle of MR; and the EAW. Part II 
identifies the relevant HRs, setting out the minimum standards as set out by the ECHR, 
their extended EU scope and applicability to the EAW. Part III considers the EU 
attempts to improve HRs across the EU, including the relationship with the ECHR and 
MSs. Finally Part IV includes a summary of the key findings and recommendations for 
ensuring that HRs are protected in the implementation of the EAW, which instils 
genuine mutual trust, validating MR whilst ensuring that justice serves the accused, the 
victim and the EU. 
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Part One: Mutual Recognition and the European Arrest Warrant 
Given the establishment of the principle of MR as the ‘cornerstone’ of EU development 
in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, its suitability in the criminal 
sphere is considered followed by the continued role for harmonization. Once these 
foundations are laid, the EAWFD will be explored including its scope, implementation, 
benefits and limits. The next phase of its examination will be the positioning of HRs 
protection within the MR framework and specifically the EAW. The EAWFD as the 
blueprint for MR in European criminal law is a good illustration of the policy in 
practice. This analysis will identify gaps in the protection of the individual vis a vis the 
MSs and EU procedures. The balance is tipped in favour of expedience and state 
convenience to the detriment of the indispensable and vital HRs. The importance of 
HRs within this evolving framework has a critical role to play. 
Chapter One:  On the Principle of Mutual Recognition 
According to Professor Mitsilegas, in the EU the relationship between the individual 
and the state is one based on “citizenship and territoriality”.17 However, in relation to 
HRs, this relationship is wider based also on jurisdiction and control. Within the EU 
criminal justice system there is also the introduction into this relationship of third 
parties (the EU and other MSs), and also of mutual trust which not only forms the 
central element of MR measures within the AFSJ but also demarcates boundaries of 
non-inquiry around MS systems. This triangular relationship between the EU, the MSs 
and citizens is an important element, as is the broader scope when HRs are engaged. 
The boundaries are demarcated by almost impenetrable walls, within which the criminal 
justice systems of MSs are trusted virtually unreservedly. Judicial authorities of one MS 
                                               
17 Valsamis Mitsilegas, Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European Criminal 
Law, E.J.L.R., (2007) Vol. VIII, No. 2/3, 301-323, 316 
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are obliged to respect, almost unconditionally, decisions, views, integrity and respect for 
the rule of law in other MSs. Adoption of this “new transnational judicial mechanism 
signifies a deep transformation of the traditional territories of justice”.18 
Whilst the EU is promoted as an area of dissolving borders, in contrast, the principle of 
MR, as the foundation of an AFSJ, "validates the sovereignty of the Nation State as a 
territory, people, and system of governance enclosed by borders ... [t]hese borders are 
boundaries of the legal orders for the purposes of criminal law”.19 So whilst the borders 
have been removed for the free movement of goods, services and workers, the criminal 
law of MSs remains ring-faced. 
1.1 As an Alternative 
In 1998 the EU had hit a T-junction in terms of which direction to steer criminal law. 
The decision was to appoint MR as the cornerstone of its policy thereby providing a 
detour from harmonization.  
In an attempt to avoid handing over any further sovereignty to the EU, the idea was to 
shelve harmonisation plans, leaving the substantive criminal law of MSs untouched and 
instead to focus attention on MR as a preferred mode of governance.
20
 This is reflected 
in the 1998 Presidency Conclusions of the Cardiff European Council where it 
recognizes the importance of “effective judicial cooperation in the fight against cross-
border crime…[and]…the need to enhance the ability of national legal systems to work 
                                               
18 Antoine Megie, Replacing and Displacing the Law: The Europeanisation of Judicial Power, CEPS 
Special Report, (2009) 3 
19 Elspeth Guild, Crime and the EU's Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, 
ELJ, (2004) Vol.10 No.2, 218-234, 219 
20 Sievers considers mutual recognition as an alternative mode of governance to that of territoriality and 
harmonisation which whilst it worked well in the Single Market, requires additional support in the 
criminal sphere. For greater discussion on these see, Julia Sievers, Managing Diversity: The European 
Arrest Warrant and the potential of mutual recognition as a mode of governance in EU Justice and Home 
Affairs, EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference in Montreal, Canada, 17-19.05.2007, available at: 
<aei.pitt.edu/8036/> accessed 18.05.2011 
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closely together and asks the Council to identify the scope for greater mutual 
recognition of decisions of each others’ courts.”21 
The acceptance of the idea to apply MR to the criminal law sphere marked the start of 
the blossoming relationship between MR and the development of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Within a year the principle of MR was declared by the Tampere 
Council in 1999 as the “cornerstone of judicial cooperation” in criminal matters. 
In 2000, the European Commission (the Commission) agreed that the then process of 
cooperation was slow and cumbersome and instead promoted MR which it defined as 
meaning, 
that once a certain measure, such as a decision taken by a judge in 
exercising his or her official powers in one Member State, has been taken, 
that measure -– in so far as it has extranational implications - would 
automatically be accepted in all other Member States, and have the same or 
at least similar effects there.
22
 
The 2000 Commission Communication paved the way to automatic acceptance of a 
judicial order issued in another MS requiring minimal harmonisation of standards and 
laws.  
What the adoption of MR as the cornerstone for judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
did, was to act as the required stimulus and to give momentum to what was till then a 
slow process. It became “the motor of European integration in criminal matters”23 and 
led to the adoption with unprecedented speed of the EAWFD and also a number of other 
MR measures. Another perceived advantage of MR was the ability to ignore differences 
that exist amongst MSs, leaving national systems largely unaffected and preserving the 
                                               
21 EU: Council of Europe, Cardiff European Council, Presidency Conclusions, SN150/1/98 REV 1 EN, 
15-16.06.1998, §39 
22 Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM(2000) 495 final, 26.07.2000, 2 
23 Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice?, 
Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 33/2009; E.L.Rev, (2009) Vol. 34 No. 4, 
537. See also Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal 
Matters in the EU, (2006) 43 CML.Rev 1277  
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much guarded sovereignty. Thus in addition to accelerating the cumbersome 
cooperation process it also dealt with the existing diversity without needing to engage 
with full harmonization. In the process of establishing an AFSJ, Guild sees “an 
inversion of an area without borders into an area that respects without question borders 
(i.e. mutual recognition)”.24   
Off-the shelf solutions rarely provide satisfactory resolutions and the principle of MR 
still requires further modification, approximation and reinforcement before it can be 
fully effective in criminal matters. The text of the Tampere Conclusions
25
 illustrates that 
the intention from the start was that MR measures in the field of criminal law would be 
accompanied by trust-enhancing measures, requiring mechanisms for safeguarding 
rights and requesting definition of common minimum standards. The enjoyment of 
freedom also requires a genuine area of justice where victims can avail themselves to 
the Courts and authorities in any MS whilst at the same time ensuring that criminals do 
not exploit the differing judicial systems and their ability to freely cross borders. The 
Tampere European Council also anticipated the establishment of minimum standards to 
ensure an adequate level of legal aid, simplified extradition procedures, an integrated 
prevention of crime, common definitions and sanctions on limited sectors,
26
 increased 
support for Europol and the establishment of Eurojust. 
In advance of agreement on a programme for the 5 years after Tampere, the 
Commission made a set of recommendations in terms of priorities for the future of the 
AFSJ. As regards the promotion of a coherent criminal justice policy, the Commission
27
 
                                               
24 Guild, Crime and the EU's Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, (n19) 
25 European Council, Council of the EU, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 1999.  
TheTampere Programme was the first stage in implemeting the principle of Mutul Recognition to the 
expnding European Criminal law. 
26
 The ones listed were financial crimes (money laundering, corruption), drugs trafficking, trafficking in 
human beings, sexual exploitation of children, high tech crime and environmental crime. 
27  Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations, COM 
(2004) 401 final, 2.06.2004 
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set out 4 priorities: keeping the principle of MR as the cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation;  strengthening “mutual trust by assuring all European citizens of a high-
quality of justice based on common values” by adopting a series of measures to cover 
“the definition of fundamental guarantees, the conditions for admissibility of evidence 
and measures to strengthen the protection of victims” in addition to training and 
evaluation of the systems; developing a coherent crime policy across the Union 
including approximation in some areas; and placing Eurojust at the centre of this policy.  
The Commission further emphasised the need for strengthened monitoring and 
evaluation of practice in the national criminal justice systems with the aim of 
strengthening crime prevention action. This together with HRs and the highlighting of 
good practices can aid the promotion of mutual trust; the two are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.
28
 
1.2 Origins 
The principle of MR can be seen at play in different forums including the WTO.
29
 At 
the EU level, the principle of MR itself stems from the internal market, emanating from 
two cases of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), one concerning whiskey and the 
other Cassis de Dijon
30.
 In both these cases, the CJEU held that products imported from 
one MS should be accepted by other MSs as if they had been lawfully produced 
according to its own standards. MSs were therefore obliged to accept standards in the 
exporting state. It added that free movement of goods and MR of national standards did 
not require harmonization. This statement is mirrored in a decision of the same court 
                                               
28
 For a synopsis of the AFSJ in the EU see Bedanna Bapuly, The European Arrest Warrant under 
Constitutional Attack, 3 Vienna Online J. on Int'l Const. L. 4 (2009), 8-11 
29  See, Joel P. Trachtman, Embedding Mutual Recognition at the WTO, (2006), available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=923903>  
30 C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG [1979] ECR 00649 
Chapter One: On the Principle of Mutual Recognition 
41 
 
almost 30 years later in the cases of Gözütok and Brügge,
31
 Van Esbroeck
32 
and 
Advocaten voor de Wereld which state that the EAWFD “does not seek to harmonise 
the criminal offences in question in respect of their constituent elements or the penalties 
which they attract”.33 
1.3 Misplaced Internal Market Analogy and Equivalence 
The suitability of transplanting the principle of MR from the internal market into the 
sphere of criminal law has not been without criticism. The fundamental objection 
centres on the very nature of criminal law; it “regulates the relationship between the 
individual and the State, and guarantees not only State interests but also individual 
freedoms and rights”.34  
What has been seen in the field of European Criminal Justice is the incorporation of 
principles from the EU single market acquis unaltered. Simply because a principle 
functions in one area, does not guarantee that it will function equally well in a different 
sphere. The principle of MR has worked well in other fields
35
 because of the existence 
of common markers of real benchmarks for minimum standards and the willingness of 
MSs to accept common standards agreed at the EU level as dictating the standards 
within their own systems. This reality has been summarised by Nicolaides and Schaffer,   
In practice, mutual recognition, in all its incarnations, is conditional. Mutual 
recognition regimes set the conditions governing the recognition of the 
validity of foreign laws, regulations, standards, and certification procedures 
among states in order to assure host country regulatory officials and citizens 
that their application within their borders is “compatible” with their own, 
and that incoming products and services are safe.
36
  
                                               
31 Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01 Criminal proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus Brügge 
[2003] ECR I-01345 §33 
32 C-436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-02333 
33 C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW [2007] I-03633 §52 
34
 Mitsilegas EU Criminal Law (n3) 118 
35 Including the internal market, mutual recognition of qualifications, mutual recognition of driving 
licenses, etc... 
36  K.Nicolaides and G.Schaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global 
Government, LCP, Vol. 68:263, 2005 
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Sievers summarizes the literature on this matter as listing four conditions which are 
required to be met before MR is able to properly function in the criminal law sphere. 
These are: (1) reciprocal trust and confidence; (2) accepting that the others’ legal system 
is equivalent; (3) legal systems which are compatible with the laws; and (4) procedures 
of the other MSs and an institutional support structure to address issues which arise 
when the other three conditions are not met.
37
 These elements not sufficiently present in 
the criminal justice field and there does not appear to be any conditions placed on MR 
in the EU criminal justice sphere. Assumptions are made as to the safety of decisions 
based solely on the fact that all MSs are signatories to the ECHR and as members of the 
EU have an allegiance to common values and principles. 
The success of the MR principle in the internal market was due to the fact that 
equivalence between standards applied in MSs existed. As will be illustrated in 
subsequent chapters such equivalence is absent in both the criminal sphere and in the 
protection of HRs. 
Other key differences between the application of MR in criminal law and in the internal 
market further illustrate the undesirable attempt to equate the two spheres.  Amongst 
others, Peers believes that the analogies of the MR principle in the internal market and 
recognition of civil judgments with its functioning in criminal matters are ‘deeply 
flawed’. He believes that “the Council has made the error of assuming that the 
underlying law need not be comparable”.38 
MR seeks to avoid harmonization of criminal laws and for this reason the criminal law 
across the EU is not harmonised. Abolition of the dual criminality requirement in 
criminal matters has the entirely opposite effect of comparability. MSs are asked to not 
                                               
37 Sievers (n20) 8-9  
38 Steve Peers, Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the EU: Has the Council got it Wrong?, CML 
Rev, (2004) Vol 41 5-36,14 
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compare their national laws governing the relevant offence with that of the I-MS, but 
instead to accept their assertion that the acts fall under the named offence for which dual 
criminality is abolished. The same applies to non-inquiry into the nature of the relevant 
offence.   
1.4 Cooperation with a slice of Sovereignty  
A key reason for opting for MR over harmonisation was the avoidance of surrendering 
any further sovereignty, however every time a MS enforces an EAW request it 
relinquishes a slice of sovereignty – even if only transiently.  
The use of MR instead of the more invasive alternatives of harmonization and 
approximation has not meant that MSs retain full sovereignty over their criminal justice 
systems.  Whilst cooperation principles do not traditionally require the decision of a 
State requesting assistance to form part of the requested State’s legal system, the 
principle of MR does exactly that. It requires the executing State (E-MS) to internalise, 
unmodified, the issuing State’s (I-MS) decision. In some instances it may require the 
recognition of a decision which goes against the grain of its own decisions.
39
 
Criminal law, by its nature evolves in relation to a State’s culture and in accordance 
with the democratic processes. While those opposing approximation or harmonisation 
do so in the interests of maintaining sovereignty, MR in its own way, through the near 
automatic acceptance of other MSs’ decisions, takes away a slice of sovereignty. With 
MR of a judgment or order issued nationally and not negotiated on an EU-wide 
platform by MSs, States are accepting the legitimacy of the national system which 
                                               
39 Arts 1(1) and (2) (Council, 2002/584/JHA) 
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issued them, thus representing a ‘journey into the unknown’40 and complete confidence 
in the other’s system. 
With criminal law striking to the heart of a MS’s sovereignty, the application of MR 
results in the loss of some of the MS’s “sovereign power over the full control of the 
enforcement of criminal decisions on its territory”.41 MR leads to a “horizontal transfer 
of sovereignty”.42 
Further evidence that “another little piece of their national sovereignty”43 was 
transferred through the implementation of the EAWFD are the constitutional 
amendments that were required in some states.
44
  
1.5 Individual free movement 
It is worth remembering that the object of previous EU legislation and policies was to 
promote the free movement of individuals, so as to further its economic ambitions. MR 
measures in the sphere of criminal law are the antithesis of this. It is true that free 
movement of individuals is facilitated, but not for their benefit. 
                                               
40 Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (n3) 119. See also, Mitsilegas, The Constitutional Implications of Mutual 
Above Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU (n23) and Maduro Poiares, So Close and Yet so Far: 
The paradoxes of Mutual Recognition, Journal of European Public Policy, (2007) Vol 14, no 5, 814-25 
41 Peers, Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the EU: Has the Council got it Wrong? (n38) 10 
42 Sievers (n20) 9, referring to Kalypso Nicholaides, Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Regimes: Some 
Lessons and Prospects, (1997) Jean Monnet Paper, available at: 
<http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/97/97-07.html>  accessed 18.05.2011 
43 Joanna Apap and Sergio Carrera, Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, European Arrest Warrant, 
A good Testing Ground for Mutual Recognition in the Enlarged EU? (2004) CEPS Policy Brief No. 46 
available at: <www.ceps.be>  4 
44 Apap and Sergio cite the French Constitutional amendement as an example : Loi constitutionnelle no 
2003-267 du 25 mars 2003 relative au mandat d'arrêt européen, NOR: JUSX0200149L, JO, du 26 mars 
2003, 5344. Other, provisions of the EAWFD were clearly drafted to protect sovereignty. For example, 
the specialty rule is closely connected both to the principle of MR and to the sovereignty of MSs, in that 
consent is required from the E-MS before the surrendered individual can be prosecuted for offences other 
than those for which surrendered. The specialty rule is set out under Article 27. The CJEU interprets its 
application, in particular the interpretation of ‘offence other’ than that for which the person was 
surrendered which is to be ascertained according to the legal description given by the issuing Member 
State. Changes to time or place are acceptable where they are a result of evidence gathered during the 
proceedings. Modification of the description (such a as the narcotics) is not enough of itself to equate to 
‘offence other’ than. Where it is found to be an ‘offence’ other than that for which surrendered, consent 
must be requested and obtained if the penalty is deprivation of liberty.  The person can be prosecuted and 
sentenced before consent is obtained, but their liberty cannot be deprived unless the restrictions are lawful 
on the basis of other charges which appear in the EAW.  Case C‑388/08 Criminal proceedings against 
Artur Leymann et Aleksei Pustovarov [2008] ECR I-08993 
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The logic of MR in the internal market and European criminal law may be similar in 
terms of removing obstacles to free movement in a borderless Union. On the other side 
of the coin ensuring that lawbreakers do not benefit from the abolition of borders – the 
’fifth freedom’, the concept of free movement of an individual in MR in criminal 
matters is turned on its head. The original concept aims to facilitate the enjoyment of 
free movement within the EU to the advantage of an individual, enabling EU citizens to 
exercise Treaty rights across Europe. The notion of free movement in the context of 
European criminal law seeks to facilitate free movement of an individual for the benefit 
of MSs, with the counter effect of restricting the liberty and free movement of that 
individual.
45
 It is important to remember that an individual is not a commodity for 
export, but a human being with HRs and with variables involved.  
It is often the case that the rights of individuals in MR measures are secondary to the 
promotion of MR and the facilitation of cross-border cooperation between MSs with the 
aim of securing the surrender of the individual. Whilst the rights of victims are 
important, it cannot be ignored that the requested person can also become a victim of 
state ‘violence’. As will be shown in the next chapters, there is also a distinct lack of 
joined-up thinking across the European acquis and in particular between MR measures 
such as the EAWFD, the Citizens Directive,
46
 the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) 
and the ECHR, creating lacunas in the protection of the individuals in question and their 
dependents or family members. 
                                               
45 See amongst others, Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (n3) 118 and Peers, Mutual Recognition and 
Criminal Law in the EU: Has the Council got it Wrong? (n38) 
46
 EU, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.04.2004, 77–123 (Citizens Directive) 
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1.6 Approximation, Harmonization and Mutual Recognition 
Despite the adoption of MR, there still exists a continued relevance and importance for 
both approximation and harmonisation within the MR framework. 
In its judgments, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) does not regard harmonisation 
as a prerequisite for the application of MR. It states that a,  
…necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their 
criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law 
in force in other Member States even where the outcome would be different 
if its own national law were applied.
47
  
From the literature, there does not appear to be a common understanding and 
application of the terms harmonization and approximation, in fact these terms are often 
used interchangeably. Harmonization is often the creation of a single set of provisions 
or standards in criminal law for all MSs, whilst approximation will have less 
homogenous ambitions; attempting to increase understanding by highlighting and 
reinforcing similarities in systems rather than creating and artificially enforcing these 
similarities. “Approximation in the original spirit of the TEU is therefore an instrument 
to eliminate all the most relevant disparities”.48 Approximation may also be 
accomplished through the adoption of common standards to be applied to their different 
national provisions by MSs. This characterization is in line with Article 67 TFEU. 
Article 82 TFEU is also relevant for approximation ambitions, in particular of  HRs and 
forms the basis for the Defence Rights Directives being adopted and considered in Part 
3.
49
  
                                               
47 Gözütok and Brügge (n31) 
48 Massimo Fichera, The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convinience? 
ELJ, (2009) Vol. 15 No. 1, 70-97,76 citing FM Tadic, ‘How Harmonious can Harmonisation be? A 
Theoretical Approach towards Harmonisation of (Criminal Law)’, in Andre Klip and H van der Wilt 
(Eds) Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Science ( 2002) 
49 See Annex 1. 
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Fichera regards that a “means/ends relationship exists between approximation and 
mutual recognition” with one promoting the other.50 As noted above, the CJEU 
highlights the fact that MSs have opted for MR of decisions emanating from each 
others’ criminal justice systems. This MR is not necessarily based on an understanding 
of legal terms, let alone a deep comprehension of other legal systems. As it stands this 
MR is based on assumed mutual trust with misconceptions remaining unresolved. 
Commentators argue that for MR to continue to function there needs to be some 
harmonization.  Harmonization of substantive criminal law, such as the proposed 
vertical solution of the corpus juris,
51
 is unlikely to receive majority support from MSs. 
As Megie points out, convergence is preferred to harmonisation, as illustrated by the 
rejection of the corpus juris and the support for a European Prosecutor.
52
 MSs have 
accepted MR since it offers an easy option requiring minimal amendments to their own 
systems, increases their powers and is less costly then harmonization. On the other 
hand, in areas where MSs have common domestic policies they have been more 
amenable to reaching a consensus on harmonization.
53
 
In areas where agreement cannot be reached, approximation of some laws may be more 
acceptable for MSs. It is clear that whilst approximation is preferable in order to 
advance the high level of un-questioned cooperation, MSs are still largely hesitant to 
hand over any further sovereignty in particular in an area as sensitive as criminal law 
                                               
50 Fichera (n48) 77 
51 In 1997, a group of legal experts presented this proposal for the development of a European Criminal 
Code. Whilst the proposal focused on budgetary fraud against the EC budget, enforced by a European 
public Prosecutor, the principle was intended for wider application. See John Spencer, EU Fair Trial 
Rights : Progress at Last, NJECL (2010) Vol. 1 Issue 04, 447-457 
52
 Megie (n18)  
53 An example of this would include the treatment of terrorism in Council of the EU, Council Framework 
Decision 2002/475 on Combating Terrorism , OJ L-164, 22.06.2002, 3–7 as amended by Council of the 
European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, 21–23 
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which strikes to the heart of their relationship with their subjects. MR “has been a 
convenient choice for MSs concerned about ceding sovereignty in criminal matters”.54 
Thus whilst even in the field of criminal law a number of mutual recognition 
Framework Decisions have been adopted, it can be concluded from the implementation 
reports of the European Commission that they have either not been implemented or only 
partly implemented by Member States.  The reasons for the poor implementation levels, 
as well as the modest use that these measures are being put to in practice, would support 
the notion that MSs lack the appetite for further incursions into their criminal justice 
systems. 
Weighing up the pros and cons of approximation, some commentators including Guild, 
clearly favour approximation. Whilst the process may take longer, requiring consensus 
across MSs and clearly involving interference with national systems, Guild feels that 
these are outweighed by the benefits inherent in approximation. Guild here is referring 
to the approximation of procedural guarantees seeing that “it has the advantage of 
building into the procedures the guarantees within Union law of compliance with 
fundamental rights.”55 The positioning of the individual within the procedures is also 
emphasized as a benefit; with approximation the individual finds themselves at the 
centre of common rules whereas with MR the common standards are accessible only by 
the MSs. The EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in its review of the Stockholm 
Programme states that for a sufficient level of mutual trust to be sustainable “a strong 
common reading of fundamental rights protection” and the rule of law is needed and 
should include harmonization of procedural safeguards in criminal law.
56
 
                                               
54 Mitsilegas, Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European Criminal Law (n17) 
314 
55 Guild, Crime and the EU's Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (n19) 
227 
56 Fundamental Rights Agency, The Stockholm Programme: A chance to put fundamental rights 
protection right in the centre of the European Agenda, 14.07.2009 
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Another staunch supporter of approximation is Weyemberg, who maintains that 
approximation focuses on the contents of common norms as opposed to the effect alone. 
There is no doubt that as she states, approximation also offers “a stronger model of legal 
integration than coordination and cooperation. In principle, approximation implies 
adjustments of internal laws in order to meet specific objectives.” 57 Harmonization in 
this instance would dictate to MSs the letter of the law. 
MR and approximation are however complimentary and not mutually exclusive.  It is 
important that MR does not become an obstacle to the adoption of common standards 
which will see security continue to prevail over freedom and justice. 
The adoption of MR does not however mean that the laws of MSs have remained 
unaltered. In fact in some MSs the effective implementation of the EAWFD required 
Constitutional amendments and new laws.
58 
It is anticipated that in the near future more 
changes will be necessary, in particular in relation to harmonization of procedural 
guarantees.  
                                               
57 Anne Weyembergh, Approximation of Criminal Laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague 
Programme, CML Rev, (2005) Vol.42, 1567-1597, 1567 
58 Amongst others, Polish and Cypriot Constitutions prohibited extradition of their own nationals, these 
were amended to permit surrender of their nationals under the EAWFD. In Germany Constitutional 
conflict led to adoption of a second implementing law. Consideration of these Constitutional conflicts is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, however a number of articles are written on the subject. For a summary of 
the Constitutional challenges and amendments see Zsuzanna Deen-Rasmany, The EAW and Surrender of 
Nationals Revisited: The Lessons of Constitutional Challenges, (2006)14 Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J. 271; 
Isabelle Pérignon and Constance Daucé, The European Arrest Warrant: a growing success story, ERA 
Forum (2007) 8:203–214, 208-9. See also Daniel Saramieto, European Union: The European Arrest 
Warrant and the quest for constitutional coherence, I-CON, (2008) Vol.6: 171; Angelika Nußberger, 
Poland: The Constitutional Tribunal on the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant, I•CON, 
(2008) Volume 6, Number 1, 162–170; Bapuly (n28); Mitsilegas, Constitutional Principles of the 
European Community and European Criminal Law (n17) 317-21; Elies van Sliedregt, The European 
Arrest Warrant: Between Trust, Democracy and the Rule of Law, European Constitutional Law Review, 
(2007) 3: 244-252; Fichera (n48) 81-4; Jan Komarek, European Constitutionalism and the European 
arrest Warrant: In search of limits of “contrapunctual principles”, CML Rev (2007) 44: 9-40. 
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1.6.1 The CJEU’s View 
Advocate-General Colomer, in Advocaten voor de Werald, states that since it is a new 
concept, the EAWFD “does not seek to approximate pre-existing national laws”.59 On 
the other hand he stresses that the mechanisms used by this new concept already existed 
in MSs, namely the mechanisms to arrest and surrender which have been simply 
harmonised. The EAWFD does not create relationships between ‘hermetically sealed 
spaces’ but between states who share common principles, values and objectives seeking 
the prevention and combat of crime in a “single area of freedom, security and justice, by 
facilitating cooperation between States and harmonising their criminal laws”.60 The 
operative part of the EAWFD harmonises the procedural law of MSs “by harmonising 
the form and content of the decision, the methods of and time-limits for transmission 
and execution, the grounds for non-execution, and the rights which protect the arrested 
person during the procedure and for the purposes of surrender”.61 So whilst the laws and 
procedures leading up to the decision to issue an EAW continue to be hermetically 
sealed; other aspects of the procedure, as set out above, are now uniform. What have 
been harmonized are the rules of cross-border engagement; thus the process of 
requesting and surrendering an individual has an autonomous meaning. 
 In the joined cases of Gozutuk and Brugge
62
, the CJEU considered the principle of ne 
bis in idem under Article 54 of CISA.
63
  It confirmed that for a case to be 'finally 
disposed of' in accordance with Article 54, the decision did not need to be made by a 
judge, a decision of the Public Prosecutor sufficed where certain conditions to punish an 
act had been satisfied.  The emphasis placed by the court is not on the judicial nature of 
                                               
59 Advocaten voor de Werald VZW (n33), Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer 
60 ibid §44 
61
 ibid §49 
62 Gözütok and Brügge (n31) 
63 EU, Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of 
the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on 
the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, OJ L 239, 22.09.2000 P. 0019-0062 (CISA) 
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the decision, but on the “sanctioning character of the settlement/decision". Thwaites is 
of the opinion that the judgment “is an indirect appeal for some harmonisation of MSs' 
criminal justice systems”.64 This assertion is questionable; the Court simply took the 
line that if MSs cannot agree to harmonise their criminal systems but still want to 
increase cooperation, they have no choice but to follow the principles of MR and mutual 
trust, which includes recognition of decisions which may have had a different 
conclusion under their own systems. 
This line of reasoning follows the Court’s own statements on harmonisation in criminal 
matters and mutual trust. A necessary implication is “that the MSs have mutual trust in 
their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force 
in other MSs even where the outcome would be different if its own national law were 
applied”.65 The Court highlights the fact that the operation of the principle is not 
dependant on approximation of procedures, but instead MSs have opted for mutual trust 
and recognition of each other’s criminal justice systems. 
Borgers argues convincingly that the CJEU’s concern is not the “legislative history of 
provisions but focuses on the uniform and autonomous meaning of the relevant rules”.66 
In support he analyses not only the case of Gözütok and Brügge
67
, but also Pupino
68
 and 
Kozlowski
69. The focus on autonomous meanings is in the Court’s view necessary to 
guarantee uniform application of the rules across the EU and is what provides coherence 
to the European system. 
                                               
64 Nadine Thwaites, Mutual Trust in Criminal Matters: the European Court of Justice gives a first 
interpretation of a provision of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, German Law 
Journal, (2003) Vol 4, No 3, 253-262, 261 
65 Gözütok and Brügge (n31) §33 
66 P. M Borgers, Mutual recognition of the European Court of Justice, Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Criminology, 
(2010) 
67 Gözütok and Brügge (n31) 
68 C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-05285 
69 C-66/08 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued against Szymon 
Kozłowski [2008] ECR I-06041 
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Any further approximation which will occur will take place in bite-sized pieces and be 
combined with MR. Harmonization of criminal law should remain at a minimum given 
its deep rooted integration in the democratic process of MSs. Rules of cross-border 
engagement should be harmonised whilst not interfering with the internal systems and 
remaining true to their individual heritages. Instead of standardizing substantial criminal 
law, it is preferable for common minimum standards to be adopted, such as procedural 
guarantees, which instill confidence in the procedures of each others’ systems. The 
suggestion in subsequent chapters is that these common standards should have a basis in 
the ECHR but where appropriate adopt higher standards.  
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Chapter Two: On the European Arrest Warrant Framework 
Decision 
The EAWFD
70
 is the flagship MR measure heralded as a success because of both the 
unanimous implementation
71
 and the frequency it is used by all MSs.
72
 For this reason it 
will also be used as the case study for testing the relationship between the principle of 
MR and HRs. Although it is the most debated of the MR measures, debates fall short of 
getting to the root of the issues, identifying these only at the branch level, (i.e.) HRs, 
legality, constitutional conflicts, etc. Whilst on paper it has been heralded as a success, 
its practical implementation has not been as celebrated, with the main concerns 
centering on issues of sovereignty, HRs and MS constitutional guarantees.  
The terrorist attack in 2001 was taken as demonstrating the importance of the Tampere 
Conclusions and provided the necessary impetus to move what was until then a slow 
process. In response to these events an Extraordinary European Council
73
 was held on 
21
st
 September 2001 where the fight against terrorism was prioritized;
74
 the renewed list 
of priorities saw the EAW jump to position number one in the chart.
75
 This link between 
the EAW and the ‘war on terrorism’ is an often used excuse to explain the HRs deficit 
                                               
70 For a detailed overview of the history relating to the EAWFD see Nico Keijzer, ‘Origination of the 
EAW Framework Decision’ in Elspeth Guild and Luisa Martin (Ed.), Still not resolved? Constitutional 
Issues of the European Arrest Warrant, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009 
71 Here unanimous implementation refers to the fact that it has been implemented by all MSs and not to 
the level of satisfaction with which it has been implemented by MSs. 
72 The Commission considers it a success. See also Pérignon and Daucé (n58) 
73 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action,(2001) SN 140/01 
74 Within a year three important Framework Decisions were adopted. Council of the EU, Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475 on Combating Terrorism, 13.06.2002; Council Framework Decision 
setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, 28.02.2002 and the 
EAWFD (n15). 
75 In the Council of Ministers (JHA), Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual 
recognition of decisions in criminal matters, adopted 30.11.2000, 2001/C 12/02, the EAW was priority 2 
rated with priority 1 been allocated to evidence and asset freezing. See Fichera (n48) 71-2 who also 
highlights the fact that the offences referred to had till that point being limited to ‘serious offences’. 
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in the EAWFD. However this link is neither a justification nor helpful in furthering 
either MR or HRs and is not reflected in the final text of the EAWFD.
76
 
2.1 Scope 
The EAW is defined in Article 1 as a “judicial decision issued by a Member State with a 
view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the 
purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or 
detention order”; MSs shall execute an EAW on the basis of the principle of MR.  
These judicial decisions are not negotiated and adopted at the EU level, but are 
decisions taken at the national level.
77
 Fichera sees this ‘parallel simplification of 
procedures’ together with the abolition of traditional extradition grounds of refusal as a 
reflection of MSs’ increasing confidence in each other’s legal systems.78 The question 
ignored by the adoption of MR is whether the high level of confidence called for exists, 
or if it is work in progress. 
2.2 Changing terminology 
It is worth noting the move away from traditional extradition terminology in favour of 
words such as surrender (to indicate the act of extraditing a person to an EU MS). The 
MSs concerned are known as the issuing state (the MS requesting the surrender of the 
individual) and the executing state (the MS surrendering the individual). 
Plachta considers at great length the birth of the term ‘surrender’ and whether it is in 
fact a misnomer when it comes to the EAW.
79
 He traces its origin to the statutes of the 
                                               
76 For an overview focusing more on the politics of the adoption of the EAW see Christian Kaunert, 
‘Without the Power of Purse or Sword’: The European Arrest Warrant and the Role of the Commission, 
J.Europ.Integration (2007) 29(4): 387-404  
77
 Mitsilegas, Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European Criminal Law (n17) 
314 
78 Fichera (n48) 78 
79 Plachta, European Arrest Warrant: Revolution in Extradition?, Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J. (2003), Volume 
11 Issue 2, 178-194 
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ICTY, ICTR and the ICC
80
 highlighting a key difference with the EAW, namely that 
they concerned a horizontal model of surrender between a state and an international 
tribunal, whereas extradition is a vertical model of extradition between states.  
2.3 Benefits: Deleting the Muddle 
Before critically evaluating this measure, it is worth taking a moment to reflect on the 
EAWFD’s positive aspects.81  
There is no doubt that the system introduced by the EAWFD is a vast improvement on 
the previously slow and complex system of extradition.
82
 Whilst the Council of Europe 
Convention on Extradition
83
 attempted to simplify the process, its poor rate of 
ratification together with the additional bi-lateral treaties entered into by MSs meant that 
the extradition process was a complex matrix of different rules, forms, time-frames and 
authorities. The whole system had turned into a muddle of different rules.
84
 
The EU had also set off on its own mission to speed up and simplify the process through 
adoption of a number of measures, some of which never came into force and which 
were once again layered upon by bilateral agreements between MSs. These measures 
merely added to the complexity of the process. 
                                               
80 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/2-5704 (1993); Statute if 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda UN Doc. S/INF/50 (1994); and Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 17.07.1998, UN Doc. A/Conf. 183/9. 
81 Amongst others, a tour of the key benefits can be found in Plachta (n79) where the abolition of double 
criminality, the grounds for refusal, the judicialisation, simplification and speeding up of the process, the 
rule of specialty, trials in absentia and the treatment of life sentences are considered. See also Nico 
Keijzer and Elies van Sliedregt (Eds), The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, 2009 
82 The EAWFD replaces previous agreements concerning the extradition of individuals between EU 
Member States. Articles 31 and 32 set out the exception permitting bilateral and multilateral agreements 
as long as they further the objectives of the EAWFD, in particular to simplify or facilitate further the 
procedures for surrender of persons who are the subject of EAWs. Their application have been considered 
by the CJEU in C‑296/08 PPU Extradition proceedings against Ignacio Pedro Santesteban Goicoechea 
[2008] ECR I-06307 
83 Council of Europe, European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13.XII.1957 
84 For an overview of extradition agreements leading up to the EAWFD see Bapuly (n28). There is also 
an overview of the thwarted attempts to improve efficiency in Plachta (n79) 
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Having outlined the thwarted attempts to improve the efficiency of extradition, Plachta 
believes that it was only once the evolutionary approach was abandoned and replaced 
by a revolutionary step that progress was made. 
85
 
The EAWFD provides for a single central authority in each MS, a common request 
form, a set time-frame, reduced formalities, abolition of double criminality for 32 
offences and turned the presumption in favour of surrender with only exceptional 
circumstances where it can be refused. This includes exhaustive grounds for refusal and 
also the obligation to surrender one’s own nationals. Deen-Racsmany points out, it is 
not the ‘formal-semantic innovations’ set out above that justify the departure from 
traditional grounds, but the concept of EU citizenship.
86
 In particular it is this concept of 
European citizenship that sees the exclusion of the fiercely guarded exception for a 
state’s own nationals.87  
Perhaps more importantly it moved the entire process from the political realm of MSs 
and placed the procedure into the sole hands of the judicial authorities, as Bapuly and 
Plachta call it, the ‘judicialisation’ of the process.88 The “dialogue is no longer between 
sovereign states, but between independent judges”.89 
Pérignon and Daucé
90
 talk of the changes in terms of the efficiency the simplified 
process has effected, including the uniform format and strictly limiting the grounds for 
refusal to those enumerated. 
The EAWFD was adopted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the USA. The 
priorities at the time were clearly security, even if this was to be to the detriment of 
                                               
85 Plachta (n79) 
86 Deen-Rasmany (n58) 274. Also citing F Impala, The European arrest Warrant in the Italian Legal 
System: Between mutual recognition and mutual fear within the European area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, 1 ULR (2005) 
87 Plachta (n79) 187 
88 Bapuly (n28)14; Plachta (n79) 187-8 
89 Fichera (n48) 78 
90 Pérignon and Daucé (n58)209-10 
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liberty. Before detailing the position of HRs in the new mechanism it is worth noting 
the words of the President of the USA, President Obama, who in his first inaugural 
speech joined the voices that rightly “reject as false the choice between our safety and 
our ideals”.91 Liberty and security are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they are 
complimentary. 
The mechanism of the EAW “is based on a high level of confidence between Member 
States”.92 The effective functioning of MR relies heavily on mutual trust. This mutual 
trust is exemplified in the EAWFD through the limited grounds for refusing to fulfill a 
request, reduction to a minimum of procedural formalities and abolition of dual 
criminality. 
2.4 Is it Different to Extradition? 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this work to consider in detail the precise differences 
between traditional extradition and the EAW, the differences relevant to the 
consideration of the EAW vis a vis human rights are set out here in brief. The goal of 
both extradition and the EAW remains the same, namely to surrender an individual to 
another state for prosecution or to serve a sentence.  
A key difference however is that in extradition the relationship between two states 
involves one state making a request and the other decides whether to satisfy the request. 
In the case of the EAW, a state makes a request, however, for the reasons considered 
below, the decision whether to fulfill it has to a large extent been taken out of the E-
MS’s hands. This may be explained by the changing landscape which Pollivino 
describes as “an institutional scenario where judicial assistance is requested and granted 
within an integrated transnational judicial system”.93  Sanger describes the EAW as 
                                               
91 President Barak Obama, President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address, January 21, 2009 
92 EAWFD (n15) Recitals 6 and 10 
93 Pollivino (n6) 1321 
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“new, more advanced creature that provides a legal basis for individuals to be subject to 
foreign substantive and procedural criminal law rules”.94 
As will be seen, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regards the EAW as 
being equivalent to extradition. Despite the changes, Plachta also does not regard the 
change of name to be a reflection of a change of substance or creation of a new system 
of international cooperation and in fact takes offence to what he regards as a the flippant 
use of the term ‘surrender’ by the EU. He reminds readers that extradition and by 
extension the mechanisms and safeguards that have developed, only make sense when 
considered in terms of relationships between states and their vertical model.
 95
 In 
addition the main impediments to traditional extradition are still present in the EAW 
process including sovereignty, reciprocity and the need to protect individuals from ill-
treatment abroad. There is no disagreement that these continue to be considerations; 
however the later does not act as an impediment to the extent Plachta envisages.  
It is questionable whether the MSs themselves are convinced that the EAW is an all new 
system. The UK implementation does not see the creation of a new mechanism, but 
rather addresses the necessary amendments in the context of its extradition procedure. 
The implementing law in the UK is the EA which contains different procedures 
depending on which ‘Category’ a country falls under. EU MSs fall under Category 1 
and are subject to the EAWFD rules. Part 1 of the Act deals with EAWs received by the 
UK and Part 3 regulates EAWs issued by the UK to other MSs.  
This aside, it is clear that the EU considers the EAWFD as more than a re-branding 
exercise. In Advocaten voor de Werald, Advocate-General Colmar is clear that the 
EAW is not extradition, “[i]t is clear that both concepts serve the same purpose of 
                                               
94 Andrew Sanger, Force of Circumstance: The European Arrest Warrant and Human Rights, Democracy 
and Security, (2010) 6:1, 17-51, 43 
95 Plachta (n79) 191-4 
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surrendering an individual who has been accused or convicted of an offence to the 
authorities of another State so that he may be prosecuted or serve his sentence there. 
However, that is where the similarities end”.96 
2.4.1 Dual Criminality 
Its scope set out in Article 2, including, the abolition of dual criminality for the 32 listed 
offences, is a prime example of MR in the EAWFD, surrender for these offences will be 
“without verification of the double criminality of the act”.97  
What will be noted at first glance is that the list contains a varied spectrum of crimes. 
Whilst some, such as murder, are easily defined and comparable across the MSs, the 
definition and classification of others such as swindling and rape
98
 differ across the 
MSs.  Peers points out that since the assertion by the requesting state that the alleged 
offence falls within the list is non-rebuttable, “this could be considered an "automatic" 
application of the mutual recognition principle”.99   
According to the Extraordinary European Council, the EAW would ‘supplant’ the 
extradition systems which do not ‘reflect the level of integration and confidence 
between’ MSs. The EAW “will allow wanted persons to be handed over directly from 
one judicial authority to another. In parallel, fundamental rights and freedoms will be 
guaranteed.”100  
The preceding Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council
101
 which also 
highlighted the priority to be given to the fight against terrorism, formulating the 
reasons for developing new measures, in particular the EAWFD, with reference to 
                                               
96 Advocaten voor de Werald VZW (n33), Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer §41. See also Fichera 
(n48) 84-87; Komarek (n58) 
97 ibid. For other offences double criminality 'may' still be required, Art 2(4). See Fichera (n48) 79-81 for 
a discussion of the abolition and reliance on mutual trust. 
98 See Julian Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) 
99 Peers, Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the EU: Has the Council got it Wrong (n38) 14 
100 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action (n73) 
101 ibid 
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terrorists, including “the need to overcome the requirement of double criminality in 
terrorist cases”. It is important to note the reasoning provided for the need to fast-track 
extradition, in particular its purpose to permit MSs to deal with threats from terrorism 
and organized crime. The 32 offences are not restricted to the most grave offences 
related to either terrorism or organised crime, and neither has the practice of certain 
MSs when engaging the EAW been limited to these high level crimes.
102
 Before 11
th
 
September 2001, the offences referred to in relation to the then proposed EAW were 
limited to ‘serious offences’, what is adopted after 9/11 is a much longer and broader 
list, containing offences for which no approximation measures have been adopted
103
 and 
those for which no common definition exists at the European level.
104
 This broader list 
does not have an intrinsic cross-border element; the only cross-border element in most 
cases is the location of the person rather than the crime. The fast track nature of the 
procedure means it is crucial that measures are in place to ensure HRs are protected as 
part of the procedure and not simply left to chance that the general protection will be 
engaged. 
Keijer considers the list of the 32 offences as vague
105
 and arbitrary and is critical of the 
abolition of dual criminality.
106
 The abolition of dual criminality alone is not enough, 
during the legislative process MSs had genuine and reasonable concerns relating to this 
list of offences. Ireland was concerned due to the lack of definitions for the offences, 
whilst Italy’s concerns were the need to restrict the list to serious crimes. For different 
reasons MSs were coerced to agree to the final text of the EAW.
107
 
                                               
102 In relation to the UK, Poland provides a particular problem in terms of the volume of requests for 
‘minor’ offences. 
103 Such as drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, fraud against the European 
Communities, etc... 
104
 Fichera (n48) 72 
105 See also Pérignon and Daucé (n58) 207 who talk of the vagueness of the list and the concerns it raises 
in Member States. 
106 Keijzer, Origination of the EAW Framework Decision (n70) 
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Some form of low level approximation of these offences is needed, such as the creation 
of a matrix for each offence illustrating the different elements required by each MS. 
Such a simple matrix would not need to be legally binding, but rather act as a tool to 
assist with linguistic difficulties and avoid tensions identified by Bapuly,
108
 whilst also 
highlighting the similarities between MS thereby promoting understanding and mutual 
trust. 
The CJEU, in the Advocaten voor de Werald
109
 case, was asked to consider whether the 
removal of dual criminality for the 32 listed offences was contrary to the principle of 
legality. In a circular statement relying on mutual trust, the Court dismissed the 
arguments that it was contrary by simply asserting that in the same way as respect for 
HRs is assumed to exist throughout the MSs, so it is assumed that the principle of 
legality is also respected, therefore meaning that the removal of the dual criminality for 
the 32 listed offences was not contrary to the principle of legality. In support, it is 
reiterated that the EU is “founded on values common to Europeans, such as liberty, 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.110 
From this flows the assumption that in the EAWFD MSs have jurisdiction to prosecute 
the 32 listed offences. On the basis of this assumption there is no need to apply the test 
of dual criminality, the principle is not really abolished but rather a presumption is 
established to satisfy the existence of dual criminality for the 32 offences.
111
  The 
EAWFD does not seek to harmonise either the criminal offences (constituent elements 
or penalties), their definition and penalties continue to be determined by the issuing 
Member State’s law which “must respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal 
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principles as enshrined in Article 6 EU, and, consequently, the principle of the legality 
of criminal offences and penalties”.112 
This is how the circular argument is closed. The EAWFD abolishes dual criminality on 
the basis that the EU was founded on the common values of MSs, including the 
principle of legality. This creates the presumption that dual criminality exists and 
additionally the EAWFD says that MSs should respect HRs and principles. 
2.4.2 Limited Grounds of Refusal  
The EAWFD provides for an exhaustive list of grounds upon which a MS can refuse to 
surrender a requested person. The reduced formalities, together with the exhaustive and 
limited list of grounds for refusal to surrender a requested person are the most obvious 
illustrations of MR. Under the EAWFD there are 3 mandatory grounds for non-
execution
113
 and a further 7 optional grounds
114
. It is interesting to note that these 
grounds have not been consistently implemented by MSs.
115
 
Van Sliedregt, does not regard the exhaustive list as a drastic reduction in the grounds 
and believes that they leave room for ‘distrust’.116  
It is however the implementation of the optional grounds which creates disparity in 
practice.
117
 Many of the seven optional grounds for refusal have been implemented by 
                                               
112 ibid §53 
113 Art.3, EAWFD (n15) 
114 ibid, Art.4 
115 Commission, Report on the Implementation of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant under each Member State's Law, (COM(05) 63); and Add 1: Commission Staff Working 
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Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
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Decision of 13 June 2002on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States, COM(2011) 175 final 
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117 For implementation of the EAWFD and the grounds see: Commission, Report from the Commission of 
23 February 2005 based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the 
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States COM(2005) 63 final; 
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some MSs as mandatory grounds and are considered by others as discretionary rather 
than optional.
118
  
The EAWFD was amended to include an additional optional ground. Previously, Article 
5(1) addressed the issue of trials in absentia
119
, this has been deleted and the EAWFD 
amended inserting Article 4a.
120
 This sets out the grounds for non-recognition of 
decisions rendered following a trial in absentia and the conditions for its application. In 
IB the CJEU interpreted conditions which can be placed on surrender in these 
circumstances.
121
 In Melloni,
122
 the CJEU considered the strict application of Article 4a. 
This is discussed further in relation to the right to a fair trial. 
                                                                                                                                         
the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
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120 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 
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decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (Trials in Absentia FD) 
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system, the execution of an EAW issued for execution of a sentence imposed in absentia, “may be subject 
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It is particularly telling to see what grounds are missing and there are notable omissions 
which could create distrust, such as the political offence exception and the prohibition 
against surrendering own nationals. Wouters and Naerts see the logic in precluding 
'political offences' stating that if “the regime of a Member State were worthy of 
rebellion, one should rather have recourse to the mechanism of Article 7 TEU, which 
would justify suspension of the … [EAWFD, adding that]…in cases of persecution, 
surrender should, and under most implementing laws will, be refused”.123  This logic is 
questionable and largely reliant on the political sympathies of the requested MS or the 
EU as a whole. It also fails to take into account the supremacy of mutual trust. What the 
exclusion does is add another notch to the MR scoreboard in the sense that it reflects the 
mutual trust that supposedly exists between MSs. 
Whilst some agree that important grounds for refusal are either missing or much 
needed, others fear that additional grounds, such as proportionality for example, could 
steer the EAW system back towards traditional extradition.  
Grounds are both limited and exhaustive and in practice the surrender appears to be 
almost automatic. However, those MSs that go beyond the exacting letter of the law are 
scorned for undermining the principle of Mutual Recognition and raising issues of 
reciprocity, where if one MS adopts an unmitigated stance that it will not for example 
surrender its own nationals, other MSs will adopt a similar stance towards it.
124
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of these grounds for refusals has altered MR. MR in 
criminal matters is arguably a form of accelerated, almost unconditional cooperation, 
rather than MR in its original (automatic) sense.  
                                               
123
 Jan Wouters and F Naert, Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals: An Appraisal 
of the EU's Main Criminal Law Measures Against Terrorism After "11 September", CML Rev, (2004) 
Vol.41 909-935, 922 
124 See Fichera (n48) 87-88 for a brief overview of reciprocity issues which have already risen in 
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The CJEU has had the opportunity to interpret some of these grounds. The emphasis of 
its case law is that many of the terms contained in the EAWFD are autonomous 
concepts within Union law.  For example the meaning of ‘same acts’ under Article 3(2) 
“must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout”125 the EU and 
not by reference to MS interpretation/laws.
126
 
The terms ‘staying in, or is a national or a resident of, the executing Member State’ 
under Article 4(6), are also to be defined uniformly since they are autonomous concepts 
in EU law. MSs are not entitled to give a broader interpretation, beyond the EU 
definition.
127
 
High importance is also placed by the CJEU to the principle of MR. In interpreting the 
implementation of Article 4(6) it states that it is an optional ground for refusal, and so 
where a MS elect to limit situations where surrender is refused, it “merely reinforces the 
system of surrender introduced by that Framework Decision to the advantage of an area 
of freedom, security and justice.”128 Such limitations further facilitate surrender “in 
accordance with the principle of MR set out in Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 
2002/584, which constitutes the essential rule introduced by that decision”.129  To this 
end MS have a “certain margin of discretion” and the objective of ensuring reintegration 
into society provides a legitimate aim for a MS to limit situations for refusal in a 
manner which is consistent to the essential principle – MR. 
The object of Article 4(6) is to enable weight to be given “to the possibility of 
increasing the requested person’s chances of reintegrating into society when the 
                                               
125 Case C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello [ 2010] ECR I-11477, §38 
126 Although, whether a person has been ‘finally judged’ is to be determined with reference to the MS 
national law under which the judgment was delivered 
127
 Kozłowski (n69) §46-48 which will include an overall assessment considering factors such as, “the 
length, nature and conditions of his presence and the family and economic connections which he has with 
the executing Member State.” 
128 Case C-123/08, Dominic Wolzenburg [2009] ECR I-09621§58 
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sentence imposed on him expires.”130 This objective can only be pursued where it has 
been demonstrated that the requested person has “a certain degree of integration in the 
society of that Member State”. For this reason the condition of residence of a 
continuous period of five years for nationals of other MSs imposed by the Dutch law 
was held to be proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued by the national law and 
compatible with Article 12 EC. Whereas in Lopes Da Silva Jorge, it was held that to 
automatically restrict the operation of Article 4(6) to only French nationals was in 
breach of the non-discrimination principle in Article 18 TFEU.
131
 So whilst MSs are 
given a certain margin of appreciation when implementing Article 4(6), limits have 
been set. 
Related to this line of thinking is the abolition of the ground to not surrender one’s own 
nationals. This was subject to litigation in a number of Member States leading to 
amendments of both national law and Constitutions.
132
 
2.5 Implementation by the UK 
The UK will be used to illustrate how the theory is acted out in practice.
133
  As stated 
above, the EAWFD was implemented by the EA. Section 64 EA, which transposes 
Article 2 EAWFD, does not require the courts to consider whether the alleged conduct 
would constitute and offence under the law of the requesting state.
134
 Nor does it require 
that an EAW be accompanied by a separate document certifying it.
135
 Section 64(3)(b) 
imposes a double criminality requirement in respect of offences which are not listed in 
the EAWFD. 
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 For further information about these challenges and amendments see footnote n.58 
133 See the judgment of Lord Bingham in Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas and 
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With reference to the guarantees in relation to trials in absentia under Article 5(1) 
EAWFD, the UK has introduced additional conditions, not envisaged in the EAWFD. 
Section 20(8) EA provides that if a person has been convicted in absentia, they must be 
entitled not only to a re-trial but also be guaranteed,  
(a) the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his 
own choosing or, if he had not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, 
to be given it free when the interests of justice so required;  
(b) the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him. 
These guarantees have been considered by the House of Lords in Caldarelli
136
 where 
the relevant provisions are summarised, 
14.  Section 20 […] if the judge decides that the person had not been tried in 
his presence, and had not deliberately absented himself and would not be 
entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) a review amounting to a retrial, he must 
order the person’s discharge. 
15.  Section 21 requires the judge to consider whether the person’s 
extradition would be compatible with his Convention rights under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The section is engaged if the person is accused of 
the commission of an extradition offence but is not alleged to be unlawfully 
at large after conviction of it, if the person was convicted in his presence, if 
the person had deliberately absented himself from his trial or if the person, 
not having absented himself deliberately from his trial, would be entitled to 
a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial. 
Section 11 lists the bars to surrender, whilst some are a direct transposition of the 
EAWFD (double jeopardy and person’s age) others have been added by the UK law 
(extraneous considerations and passage of time). According to the fourth round 
evaluation report of the European Council, the UK provisions concerning the rule of 
speciality under section 17 are not compatible with the EAWFD.
137
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Section 13 transposes Recital 12 and provides that a “person’s extradition…is barred by 
reason of extraneous considerations if” it appears that the warrant “is in fact issued for 
the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
gender, sexual orientation or political opinions”, or that if extradited, the person “might 
be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by 
reason of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions.”  
Section 14 EA provides that surrender is barred by reason of the passage of time if it 
appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage 
of time since he is alleged to have become unlawfully at large.
138
 This section goes 
beyond the requirements of the EAWFD and is one ground for refusal which the Courts 
have accepted to refuse surrender.
139
 The distinction between injustice and the 
oppression of extradition is significant. Generally, issues such as the fairness of trial in 
the I-MS will be relevant to whether extradition is unjust by reason of the passage of 
time.
140
 But where the argument is that the extradition would disrupt the appellant’s 
family life (which has developed in the time since the individual is alleged to be 
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unlawfully at large), the issue is whether extradition would be oppressive by reason of 
the passage of time.
141
  
Spencer regards the UK implementation as unnecessarily complex, wordy and 
disconnected from the EAWFD text.
142
 He cites Lord Hope to illustrate that the drafting 
of EA has caused many of the problems which have arisen in case before both the courts 
including the Supreme Court. In Pilecki Lord Hope states,  
Once again, as in Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Arms 
and Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain, it has to be said that 
the fact that the language of Part 1 of the 2003 Act does not match the 
requirements of the Framework Decision has given rise to difficulty.
143
 
Section 21 provides for a review of whether the surrender is compatible with the ECHR 
within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998, thereby providing an additional 
ground upon which surrender may be refused. Spencer regards this as a good thing 
however he is not as fond of the “smug sense of cultural superiority” which lurks 
behind.
144
 
2.6 Responsibility to Act Proportionately  
MSs have a responsibility to ensure that the EAW continues to function efficiently. This 
responsibility includes to use the EAW proportionately
145
 and thus avoiding clogging up 
the system with offences which are not either terrorist, serious organised crime or cross-
border crimes or even ‘serious crimes’. MSs should also not view the EAW as an 
alternative to the more cumbersome mutual legal assistance measures. 
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the ends. 
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Reciprocity is often branded around as a key element of MR usually in terms of the 
potential erosion of MR if MSs ask too many questions or refuse too many EAW 
requests. On the flip-side, if MSs want to continue exercising their new-found powers 
under the MR measures, they must reciprocate by acting with integrity and 
responsibility. MSs must refrain from abusing the system by issuing EAWs for persons 
they want to question as opposed to prosecute. Whilst it is accepted that MSs classify 
acts differently,
146
 MSs also need to ensure that they do not clog up a system which was 
primarily set up to deal with terrorism, serious organised and cross-border crime, with 
‘minor offences’. MSs must be made aware of and be encouraged to use alternative 
measures for mutual legal assistance and enforcement of financial penalties.
147
 The 
disproportionate use of the EAW not only threatens the MR system itself but may also 
give rise to a violation of the individual’s HRs. 
2.7 Human Rights and the EAW 
The positioning of HRs within the EAW system is not explicit but rather vaguely 
implied. Sanger describes the power struggle with an analogy of a sword and shield 
whose equality is challenged by the EAW. The sword in his analogy represents the 
“internal monopoly of force” which the State possesses and uses to impose penalties. 
The shield represents the individual’s defence rights and due process.148  
Pérignon and Daucé, are in the minority when asserting that the EAWFD actually 
contributes to the protection of HRs. They note that the EAWFD was drafted with 
regard to compliance with HRs obligations and includes specific provisions which 
                                               
146 The seriousness of the proverbial Polish doors and Lithuanian piglets come to mind. In Sandru v 
Government of Romania [2009] EWHC 2879, a 3 year custodial sentence was imposed for theft and 
destruction of 10 chickens, in this case Elias L.J. recognised that the appropriate sentence for an offence 
is in part cultural. See also EU Presidency, Proposed subject for discussion at the experts' meeting on the 
application of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant on 17 July 2007 - the 
proportionality principle, COPEN98, 9 July 2007, p.3 
147 Such as the EU, Council Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to financial penalties, 2005/214/JHA, 24.02.2005, OJ L 076 0016 - 0030 
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restate these rights.
149
 These specific rights-based provisions within the EAWFD focus 
on the obligations of the E-MS, they include the right of the individual to be informed 
that an EAW has been issued against them (Article 11(1)), the right to be assisted by 
counsel and an interpreter (Article 11(2)), if consenting to the surrender, they must be 
informed of the consequences in particular on the specialty rule (Article 13(2)) and time 
spent in detention on remand during the EAW proceedings are to be deducted from any 
term of imprisonment (Article 26). As Pérignon and Daucé remind us, they are not an 
attempt to harmonise the level of protection at national level, but merely make reference 
to minimum standards.
150
  
Whilst some of the grounds address specific HRs concerns, the elephant in the room, is 
the obvious absence of a free-standing HRs ground reflecting the dubious positioning of 
HRs and of the true priorities of MSs to date. The mandatory grounds of refusal do not 
include any of those grounds which raise obligations under the ECHR existing 
jurisprudence. For example, the bar to extradition when there is a real risk of torture or 
other Article 3 prohibited treatment.
151
 
HRs are referred to in Recitals 12 and 13 and Article 1(3) EAWFD, however none of 
the provisions provide a specific HRs ground to be considered when executing an EAW 
request. Recital 12 refers us to the text of Article 6 EU Treaty, the CFR and the ECHR 
as general principles to be respected. In addition to the non-specificity of the HRs 
‘protection’ the main problem differentiating what is seen on paper and what occurs in 
practice is the fact that the legal force of Recitals in EU law has not been definitively 
clarified.
152
 The recitals are reassurances that in the global scheme of things, HRs are 
protected. One of the central failings of this assertion is lack of a clear mechanism for 
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the monitoring and enforcement of the rights and also no clear guidance as to the nature 
of the rights to be taken into account. 
So whilst Recital 13 sets out guarantees against the surrender of an individual “to a 
State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.  The legal force of 
such pronouncements in Recitals is not clear.  
Article 1 EAWFD concludes with Article 1(3) stating that the EAWFD, “shall not have 
the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental 
legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
Whilst Keijzer considers Article 1(3) to be a self-standing ground for refusal when 
taken in conjunction with Article 6 EU Treaty and the Recitals, this is not a widely 
accepted interpretation. Article 1(3) lacks force and almost certainly was not meant to 
have the force of a ground to refuse implementation of an EAW. Two points to note at 
this stage are, firstly Article 1(3) does not guarantee HRs as such, but instead prevents 
the EAWFD from modifying existing HRs obligations. In this sense it acts as a 
standstill clause. Secondly it does not provide a ground for refusal to surrender an 
individual. 
Pre-empting difficulties with either their own Constitutions or other international 
obligations, several MSs departed from the strict text of the EAWFD setting out HRs as 
a self-standing ground for refusing to surrender an individual. For example in the UK 
this includes passage of time, extraneous considerations and under section 21 EA 
compatibility with HRs. The ‘uneven’ implementation leads to discrimination 
depending on the powers given to the executing judge to review a surrender for 
consistency with HRs. The scope of the HRs safeguards found in the implementing laws 
is also not consistent. Those states who have sought to convert the general HRs 
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consideration into a mandatory ground have faced harsh criticism from both the Council 
and the Commission who state that whilst they recognize MSs have obligations to 
respect HRs, they view the manner in which these grounds for refusal have been 
adopted risks them going beyond the EAWFD ambit. Whilst it is obvious executing 
judges are obliged to refuse surrender where to do so would violate HRs, the intention 
of the EAWFD was to concentrate the judicial review powers of executing judges. It 
concludes that text in the recitals should not be transposed and those MSs “who are of 
the view that such additional grounds require enactment in their implementing 
legislation should negotiate those clauses as a matter of course during the debate on the 
provisions of the instrument.”153 
This discontent is founded on a prediction that inclusion of a distinct HRs ground would 
give MSs too much room to manoeuvre and opportunities to create appearances of 
distrust. This will lead to disparities and issues with reciprocity with an adverse knock 
on effect on MR. However such anxieties are not sufficient to sideline existing HRs 
obligations. 
MSs have justified this move as necessary for the fulfillment of existing international 
obligations to protect and respect HRs which Article 1(3) specifically states the 
EAWFD leaves unmodified. Concern of the differing levels of HRs review and 
protection offered by some MSs when reviewing EAW requests, would be 
understandable had these MSs been offering a lower level of protection. The reality is 
that they are explicitly taking into account HRs as opposed to accepting mere 
assumptions. The EU states that it is ‘obvious’ judges should not surrender someone 
where there is proof that this would lead to a serious violation of rights. Since it is also 
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the understanding of the definition of “competent judicial authority” and the ‘Italian case’.72 
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acknowledged that there are differing levels of HRs review, surely it would be better to 
state the obvious, rather than leave gaps and risk lower levels of protection.   Given the 
differing practice and the number of cases before the ECtHR against MSs, it is ‘naïve’ 
to assume that the implied protection is sufficient.
154
 
In Advocaten voor de Werald, Advocate-General Colomer states that Recitals 7,12, 13, 
14 and Article 1(3)) illustrate clearly that the EAWFD was adopted with the desire to 
respect HRs and respect Article 6 EU Treaty. To this end “when there are reasons to 
believe, the basis of objective elements, that the arrest warrant has been issued for the 
purpose of prosecuting, punishing or prejudicing the position of a person” on the 
discrimination grounds or would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment, “the surrender of that individual must be refused”.155 It 
is not clear what to make of this statement. If surrender must be refused where there is 
reason to believe that the above HRs would be violated, surely this formulation equates 
to an implicit ground for refusal. This interpretation would however appear to run 
counter to the views of both the Council and Parliament who scorn those MSs who have 
introduced it as a ground. At closer inspection it seems that their issue is with the nature 
of such a ground. They dismiss an explicit ground as necessary, stating that such a 
ground is implicit on the basis of the very foundations of the Union and to explicitly 
state and consider it undermines MR. In fact Colomer himself tells us that the EAWFD 
does not only concern bilateral relationships between MSs but also includes a third 
dimension, the rights of the individual concerned. To that end, had the declaration 
contained in Article 1(3) EAWFD not been included, it would have still been implicit 
“since one of the founding principles of the European Union is respect for fundamental 
rights and fundamental freedoms”. The CJEU in the Advocaten voor de Werald 
                                               
154 N.Vennemann, The European Arrest Warrant and its Human Rights Implications, 63 ZaöRV (2003) 
103-121 
155 Advocaten voor de Werald (n33) Opinion of Advocate-General Colmer, §18. 
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continues with this line of reasoning recalling that MSs must respect HRs as enshrined 
in Article 6 EU Treaty and re-stated in Article 1(3) EAWFD.
156
 The opportunity to 
clarify the value of Article 1(3) and the permissibility of a self-standing HRs ground of 
refusal had been given to the CJEU in a preliminary reference from Belgium. 
Unfortunately neither the Court nor the Advocate-General felt that it is necessary to 
answer this question.
 157
 At the next opportunity, the CJEU was again hesitant to 
introduce or read in an explicit human ground.
158
 
Whilst the CJEU has not taken the opportunity, according to Advocate-General 
Mengozzi in Lopes da Silva Jorge, Article 1(3) EAWFD is a reminder that when 
applying MR in the context of the EAWFD the protection of HRs “must be the 
overriding concern of the national legislature when it transposes acts of the European 
Union, of the national judicial authorities when they avail themselves of the powers 
devolved to them by European Union law, but also of the Court when it receives 
questions on the interpretation of the provisions”159 of the EAWFD. 
The opposition to an explicit ground still remains unclear. Whilst direct reference is 
made to HRs obligations, they are not specifically set out. This is not sufficient and the 
“precise international and EU human rights obligations should have been included into 
the EAW wording without political fear, to avoid any ambiguity in interpretation.”160 
The importance of the explicit presence of HRs in the process will be explored in later 
chapters.  
                                               
156 ibid §53, in its decision the CJEU does not go as far as Advocate-General Colomer’s Opinion. The 
CJEU merely reminds us that the law of the Member State must respect fundamental rights. It falls short 
of stating that the requested state must refuse to surrender.  
157 I.B.(n118) See also: Theodora Christou and Karen Weis, The European Arrest Warrant and 
Fundamental Rights: An Opportunity for Clarity, New Journal of European Criminal Law, (2010) Vol. 
1/1  
158 Case C-396/11 Proceedings relating to the execution of European arrest warrants issued against 
Ciprian Vasile Radu [2013] ECR 00000 
159 Lopes Da Silva Jorge (n131), Opinion of Advocate-General Mengozzi 
160 Apap and Carrera (n43) 13 
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As an ultimate sign of mutual trust, MSs also have the option of making dual 
declarations under Articles 27(1)
161
 and 28(1)
162
 EAWFD which creates a blanket 
waiver amongst those MSs who have made such declaration. This coupled with the 
implied waiver of the specialty rule by the individual when surrendering,
163
 does not 
create uniformity, but rather a multi-tiered framework with differing levels of trust 
between MSs, as well as different levels of protection for the individual. 
In its current application mutual trust appears to enforce on judges a blind obedience 
based on the premise that all MSs adequately respect HRs to a comparable level. Judges 
are asked to have mutual trust in each other’s criminal justice system, whilst there is a 
difference between the minimum standards set out in the ECHR, under which all MSs 
have existing obligations, and the protection afforded in practice. It is this practice 
which affects the mutual trust. Sanger points the finger at the newly acceded MSs as 
representing situations where substantial risks exist that an individual will not receive a 
fair trial.
164
 Whilst it may be true that the legal systems of some newly acceded EU MSs 
may raise concerns, Sanger fails to note that their legal systems have all recently been 
evaluated as part of their accession process. The legal systems of the older MSs have 
not been evaluated for some time and continue to raise issues before the ECtHR. In that 
sense they both represent a ‘journey into the unknown’.165 To this end consideration 
may be given to expanding the scope of the European Union’s Justice Scoreboard, a 
non-binding comparative tool on the functioning of the Member State judicial 
systems.
166
  Its current focus is on the contribution of the justice system to the 
improvement of the business and investment climate, examining efficiency indicators 
                                               
161 Consent is presumed for the prosecution, sentencing or detention of the individual for a crime other 
than that for which they were surrendered. 
162 Presumed consent for onward surrender or extradition. 
163
 Under Article 13 EAWFD 
164 Sanger (n94) 23 
165 Mitsilegas, The constitutional implications of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the EU (n23) 
166 A link to the 2013 Justice Scoreboard can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm 
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for non-criminal cases. It may be useful for it to be expanded to include criminal cases 
and the respect for rights of individuals. 
An assessment of the balance achieved by the EAWFD between ease and speed on the 
one hand and HRs on the other, illustrates that the balance is not tipped in favour of 
HRs. It shows that a lacuna exists, a need further acknowledged and evidenced by the 
fact that the failed 2004 procedural safeguards framework
167
 was meant to be in place 
by the time the EAW entered into force. 
Returning to Sanger’s sword and shield analogy, in an EAW process two swords are 
yielded against the individual. One by the I-MS within the E-MS and the second by the 
E-MS in surrendering the individual, whilst the shield is located out of reach in the I-
MS and sometimes further afield in Strasbourg. 
2.8 Existing Human Rights Protection 
In the context of European criminal law and MR measures, HRs can be potentially 
protected at three levels: international, EU and national. 
At the international level, whilst focus will be on the ECHR, an individual also has 
recourse to the international treaties and mechanisms of the United Nations.
168
 Whilst 
an individual cannot petition more than one international body at the same time, this is 
the only restriction and the option as to which one they chose is entirely theirs. There is 
no obligation for them to petition the ECtHR first. However, in practice the ECHR 
system is favoured by those seeking to enforce their HRs against a European state.  
                                               
167 Commission, Green Paper from the Commission, Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants 
in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union, Brussels, 19.02.2003 COM(2003) 75 final 
168 Beyond the so-called ‘International Bill of Rights’; composed of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and their respective Treaty Bodies responsible for monitoring their effective 
implementation, there are also a number of other Treaties (and their respective Treaty Bodies) on specific 
rights such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Beyond 
the Treaty based protection there is also the Charter based protection in the form of the Human Rights 
Council. 
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At the EU level an individual can apply to the national court to request a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU for clarification on a point of EU law. The EU enforcement 
mechanisms will be briefly considered in Part III. Post Lisbon, an individual can also 
rely on the CFR to enforce their rights when a MS is implementing EU law, in other 
words when an EU nexus exists.
169
 
Last but certainly not least are the national mechanisms available for the protection of 
HRs. The HRs protection offered by the ECtHR and EU are considered subsidiary to 
that of the national courts. The Council of Europe and the ECtHR have on a number of 
occasions stated that it is preferable for HRs to be remedied at the national level. This is 
reflected in the UK when it chose to enact the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) under the 
banner of ‘Bringing Rights Home’. The HRA places an obligation on the legislator and 
the courts to ensure that the law is compatible with HRs. To this end Section 21 EA 
requires that a Part 1 surrender only proceed if compatible with the HRs of the person in 
respect of whom an EAW is sought. 
In theory, the rights of an individual appear to be sufficiently protected via a multi-level 
system of protection. However, as it will be illustrated, once the principle of MR and its 
side-kick mutual trust enter the scene, the practice is very different. 
                                               
169
 The CFR was adopted in 2000 as a declaration with no legally binding effect, however with the 
enntrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, it gained binding legal effect. According to Article 51 
CFR, this means that both EU instiutions and Member States are bound by its provisions when “when 
implementing EU law”.  See Chapter 4 where the scope and justiciability of the CFR are discussed in 
greater detail. 
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Chapter Three: Conclusion 
The principle of MR was not only adopted to facilitate the operation of MS criminal 
justice systems, but also to protect HRs. Nevertheless, with the added impetus of the 
9/11 attacks, what had till then been a slow process has led to the adoption of numerous 
measures in the field including the EAWFD.
170
 Whilst the adoption of MR as the basis 
for procedural criminal measures was a success in terms of speeding up their adoption, 
it has not been without criticism. Originally an internal market principle, some regard its 
unmodified application to criminal matters as ‘deeply flawed’. Reasons for this belief 
include the subject matter (goods and services in the internal market and individuals in 
criminal matters) and the lack of equivalence (the internal market was subject to EU 
minimum standards whereas in criminal matters the reliance is on individual MS 
definitions and their national systems to respect due process and the rule of law whilst 
the HRs protection is also delegated by the EU to the ECtHR and to national systems 
and constitutions).    
The adoption of MR has not negated the need for parallel harmonization.  
Harmonisation has occurred in substantive criminal areas (e.g. human trafficking) as 
well as procedural aspects (e.g. the form used for EAW requests). Harmonisation of 
defence rights and procedural guarantees is also being witnessed through the adoption 
of the Stockholm Roadmap measures. Further harmonisation in the future of other 
aspects of criminal law and HRs has not been discounted and on the contrary appears 
highly likely.  The adoption of minimum standards on HRs is now seen as strengthening 
                                               
170 These include: Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the 
European Union of orders freezing property or evidence; Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 
24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties; Council 
Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to confiscation orders; Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to 
the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions. 
Chapter Three: Part One Conclusion 
80 
 
MR. In addition the creation of a stronger and more joined up framework within which 
the MR measures will operate is also regarded as promoting MR. For example the 
operation of the EAWFD is supported by measures dealing with the ability of MSs to 
accept payment for financial penalties. 
Given its successes in terms of MS implementation and use, the EAWFD is regarded as 
a blueprint for MR measures. The EU regards the EAWFD as an entirely new system 
which replaces extradition between EU MSs. Whilst there are a number of benefits 
flowing from the implementation of the EAWFD (i.e. the deletion of the extradition 
muddle that existed before), there are limits to its accomplishments including the extent 
to which mutual trust exists. For example, the speeding up of the process through the 
reduction of grounds upon which surrender can be refused is muted by the concerns that 
the individual is not adequately protected in the process.  
The negative views of the EAW process largely relate to the inadequate protection of 
HRs. Under the MR mechanism it is not only decisions but also violations which have 
wider jurisdictional reach. Rights (and justice for the wanted individual) appear in 
second place after security and ensuring the free movement of criminal justice. The 
most obvious HRs gap is the absence in the EAWFD of an explicit ground of refusal on 
the basis of HRs. At the time of adopting the EAWFD membership of the ECHR by all 
MSs was regarded sufficient HRs protection. Even though in theory this may be a sound 
policy, the practice of MSs including the numerous findings of violations by the ECtHR 
justifies the questioning of this basis for mutual trust. Through the adoption of the 
Stockholm Roadmap a clear shift is seen with the importance of EU minimum standards 
for defence rights now regarded as a necessary partner for the continued success of the 
EAW and MR measures. 
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In the following chapters the impact of the EAWFD on HRs will be considered together 
with the existing HRs obligations of MSs. 
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Part II: Human Rights 
Chapter Four: On Human Rights 
As detailed in Chapter 1, the operation of the EAWFD raises a number of issues 
concerning the HRs protection of the individual. This Chapter will set out the relevant 
HRs, the appropriate minimum standards according to the ECHR, the differing levels of 
protection in the EU and their applicability to EAW proceedings.  
4.1 Unavoidable Human Rights obligations 
“Slavish adherence to the principle of mutual trust cannot override the positive 
obligation to secure the protection of rights guaranteed under the ECHR irrespective of 
any legal obligation created by EU law.” 171 These obligations do not only exist under 
the ECHR, but also at EU and national levels. 
 
The continued applicability of HRs within the MR framework is important. Peers has 
pointed out the anomaly where in the MR of judgments in civil matters 'public policy' 
grounds, including HRs, are a mandatory ground for refusal to execute the relevant 
order. In criminal matters, where these ‘public grounds’ are central factors, this is not 
the case. MR measures in criminal matters, such as the EAWFD, do not include as one 
of their grounds for refusal ‘public policy’ grounds. On the contrary, public policy 
provides a ground for the execution of EAW requests. 
Mutual trust in criminal matters is of course not without any foundation. According to 
Mitsilegas,  
Mutual Recognition in criminal matters remains a limited form of 
integration which is not devoid of (domestic) constitutional checks and 
                                               
171 Adam Lazowski and Susan Nash, ‘Chapter 3: Detention,’ in Keijzer and van Sliedregt (n81), 49 
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balances...the respect by all EU Member States of fundamental rights, 
provides the foundation for mutual trust.
172
  
Commentators agree that MR is reliant on guarantees of fundamental rights and whilst 
the EU has also recognized this for a long time MSs continued to put their national 
interests first, focusing on security and repeating the mantra that all MS are parties to 
the ECHR thus providing sufficient protection of HRs. Therefore in accordance with 
mutual trust no further work would be required on protecting HRs – to this end mutual 
trust could be seen as anathema to HRs protection. 
It is true that all MSs are parties to the ECHR and Article 6 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam
173
 reaffirms respect for HRs as a key principle of the EU. Therein lays the 
sole justification for MR without further formalities.  Success of MR relies on MSs 
having mutual trust and confidence in one another's criminal justice systems. The 
underlying assumption is that MSs are able to guarantee HRs and trust that others can 
too. The problem is that the premise all MSs fully respect HRs is a political illusion of 
convenience not reflected in the case law either at national level or at regional level.  
Despite different approaches and outcomes, the decisions need to be accepted as 
equivalent to decisions of their own system.
174
 The limited grounds for refusing to 
implement an EAW request means that there will be instances where MS will be 
satisfying the MR requirement but may well be acting counter to their HRs 
obligations.
175
 Article 1 ECHR obliges MS to guarantee the rights of everyone “within 
their jurisdiction”. This is not a territorial jurisdiction, cases have clarified that this 
                                               
172 Mitsilegas, Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European Criminal Law (n17) 
318 
173 As it then was when the EAWFD was adopted, now Article 6 TEU, Treaty of Lisbon amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ C 306 of 17 
December 17.10.2007. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115 of 09.052008 (Lisbon Treaty) 
174 This approach is best illustrated in the jurisprudence of the CJEU in relation to the principle of ne bis 
in idem under Article 54 of CISA. 
175 See amongst others, Guild, Crime and the EU's Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, Security, 
and Justice (n19) 225 
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obligation can have not only extraterritorial jurisdiction,
176
 but that where an individual 
is in their jurisdiction, an act (such as extradition) can have the ability of extending the 
obligations to ensuring protection in another state.
177
 Peers affirms that,  
in the sphere of criminal law, a State which assists another Member State 
cannot simply disown responsibility for what happens on that other Member 
State’s territory, particularly where it exercises coercive power by detaining 
or removing a person, imposing a criminal penalty, searching and seizing 
property, or otherwise confiscating or freezing assets.
178
  
With the obligation on all MS to respect the HRs set out in both the ECHR and other 
sources, how can MR be used as a justification for abrogating from them or allowed to 
trump them.  
The following sections will explore in greater detail the relevant rights and show that 
the obligations stemming from the ECHR oblige States to ensure that the guaranteed 
rights are “practical and effective” and not “theoretical and illusory”.179 MSs need to 
realize that enforcing and reinforcing HRs is not counterproductive to their aims to 
maintain security. On the contrary respect for HRs is an important element of the rule of 
law which in itself is imperative for any democratic and proper functioning State. 
4.2 The Threefold Protection 
This section highlights the existing protection and positioning of HRs within the EU 
legal order. What it highlights is the subsidiary nature in favour of reliance on the 
Council of Europe mechanism and in particular the ECtHR.  
It is accepted that no state, other than the fictional State of Utopia, will achieve perfect 
HRs compliance. Confidence in each other’s systems can however be increased through 
the knowledge that systems are in place, which are at least comparable to a MS’s own 
                                               
176
 See amongst other cases Cyprus v Turkey, 25781/94, [GC] judgment 10.05.2001 
177 Soering v UK, 14038/88, judgment 7.07.1989 
178 Peers, Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the EU: Has the Council got it Wrong? (n38) 24 
179 See also Maria Fletcher, Some Developments to the ne bis in idem Principle in the European Union: 
Criminal Proceedings Against Hüseyn Gözütok and Klaus Brügge, MLR (2003) Vol. 66, 769-80, 778 
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and attempt to ensure a high respect for HRs and to provide a remedy when the system 
fails. Due to a combination of lobbying by NGOs,
180
 the Commission’s own evaluation 
reports
181
 and the developing national and European case law, MSs have slowly realised 
the importance of embracing HRs as part of the MR measures. In its own way that is 
what the Stockholm Roadmap has embarked on, to put in place minimum standards 
applicable across the EU. Questions exist as to whether the measures adopted will be 
sufficient, and whether implementation in practice will be effective.  
In the context of the EAW, HRs at the EU level are protected by Article 6 EU Treaty as 
referred to in both Recitals 12 and 13 and Article 1(3) EAWFD. These provisions 
provide a threefold protection of HRs and is often replicated in other MR instruments in 
the field of criminal law. 
The three-pronged protection refers to Article 6 EU Treaty (its text is only slightly 
amended by the Lisbon Treaty now Article 6 TFEU) which (1) recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the CFR which “shall have the same legal value as 
the Treaties.” (2) the EU is to accede to the ECHR, leaving unaffected “the Union's 
competences as defined in the Treaties.” (3) “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union's law.” All three are clearly complementary 
and not mutually-exclusive. 
                                               
180 In the UK NGOs with notable work on the EAWFD include, Fair Trial International, Justice, Liberty 
and The AIRE Centre. 
181 Commission, Report from the Commission on the implementation since 2005 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States,11.07.2007 COM(2007) 407 final and Commission, Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council, On the implementation since 2007 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States, 11.04.2011, COM(2011) 175 final 
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Individual rights and mechanisms arising from the operation of the EAW are not 
however specified in the text of the EAWFD or Article 6 EU Treaty and so it is 
necessary to turn to the CFR and the ECHR to identify precisely what the individual 
rights are and to the CJEU and the ECtHR case law in order to fill in the details and 
establish how these rights should be protected and how they are enforced in practice. 
Central to this is also the question of the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
4.3 Human Rights in the EU 
Article 6 EU Treaty offers a three layer protection composed of the CFR, ECHR and 
general principles of the EU. The CFR is not a new expression of HRs but a codification 
of existing rights derived from the ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence. The CFR goes 
further than the ECHR in terms of scope and also rights drawing from principles of 
social justice. In addition, the ECHR forms an integral source of fundamental rights in 
the EU. Whilst the EU is not yet legally bound by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the 
jurisprudence of CJEU and the ECtHR have a complementary effect on HRs in the EU.  
The three layered protection set out in Article 6 EU Treaty is the most often cited treaty 
base for HRs protection in the EU; Article 2 provides the constitutional guarantee that 
all acts of the EU will respect HRs. However, it was only from the Maastricht Treaty 
onwards that it was expressly provided that the EU shall respect HRs as guaranteed by 
the ECHR.
182
 Before then, development of HRs in the EU was through the referral of 
questions to the CJEU asking questions concerning the guarantee of rights within the 
                                               
182 Whilst reference is made explicitly to the ECHR, the CJEU has not felt constrained by this and has 
taken into account obligations under other international treaties. For example in Case C-244/06, Dynamic 
Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-00505, §39, 
…the protection of the rights of the child is recognised by various international instruments 
which the Member States have cooperated on or acceded to, such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, […], and the Convention on the Rights of the Child […]. The 
Court has already had occasion to point out that those international instruments are among those 
concerning the protection of human rights of which it takes account in applying the general 
principles of Community law... 
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EU legal order.
183
 The case law of the CJEU on HRs can be traced back to 1969 with 
the Stauder case.
184
  
MSs also remain bound at a national level to international treaties which may also 
impact on the implementation of EU obligations. This multilayer protection acts to 
protect HRs at varying  degrees at the national and EU levels; with enhanced protection 
for certain rights offered at one or other level.
185
 
In protecting HRs the EU also refers to the ‘general principles’ of the EU. These 
‘general principles’ remain undefined in the Treaties, however many can be elicited 
from the case law of the CJEU. In his report Besselink refers to several examples;
186
 the 
one most relevant to the EAWFD is the extension of the right to be heard to proceedings 
which fall outside Article 6 ECHR. For example, in Hoffmann-la Roche, the CJEU 
acknowledged that the right to be heard in administrative proceedings where the 
proceedings “are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person”.187  
The retention of the phrase ‘general principles’ in the Lisbon Treaty despite the legal 
binding effect given to the CFR means that the CJEU is free to recognise and identify 
rights as they arise over time.
188
 
Treaty protection initially saw as a guideline for HRs protection the common 
constitutional traditions as general principles of the MSs together with the international 
                                               
183 Leonard F.M.Besselink, The Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon: The Interaction between 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
National Constitutions, FIDE Congress, 2012.  
184 Stauder (n411), §7; Case 11/70 Internationale Handesgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, §4; Nold (n411); 
Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219; Case 149/77 Defence v Sabena [1978] ECR 1365; Case 44/79 Hauer 
[1979] ECR 3727; Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651; Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG 
v Commission [1989] ECR I-2859; Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609; Case C-260/89 [1991] ECR I-
2925;  Joined Cases C‑465/00, C‑138/01 and C‑139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunkand Others (‘ÖRF’) 
[2003] ECR I‑4989; and Case C‑275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I‑271. 
185 Besselink (183), 4-10 
186 Besselink (n183) 
187
 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-la Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, § 9 
188 For further discussion see: J Dutheil and D Rochère, ‘The EU and The Individual : Fundamental 
Rights In The Draft Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review, 345; F Tulkens, 
Towards a Greater Normative Coherence in Europe/The Implications of the Draft Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, HRLJ, Vol.21, No.8 
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treaties they had signed up to. Constitutional traditions still play a role as evidenced in 
the Omega case and act not only to protect the right of a citizen but may also restrict 
their rights.
189
 The Omega case concerned the banning of a laser game by the German 
police which involved shooting both fixed targets and tags on other player’s jackets 
because it simulated homicide and trivialised violence. The prohibition was based on 
the German Constitutional principle of human dignity.  
… human dignity is a constitutional principle which may be infringed either 
by the degrading treatment of an adversary, which is not the case here, or by 
the awakening or strengthening in the player of an attitude denying the 
fundamental right of each person to be acknowledged and respected, such as 
the representation, as in this case, of fictitious acts of violence for the 
purposes of a game. It states that a cardinal constitutional principle such as 
human dignity cannot be waived in the context of an entertainment, and 
that, in national law, the fundamental rights invoked by Omega cannot alter 
that assessment.
190
 
Because of the existence of an EU nexus, namely that the equipment was supplied by a 
British company and therefore engaged freedom to provide services and goods, the 
question was referred to the CJEU as to whether these freedoms can be restricted under 
national law because it offends values enshrined in the German constitution.  The CJEU 
held that restriction of the freedoms is permitted on a public policy ground. Whilst the 
ground must be determined strictly by the CJEU, it also recognised that the justification 
for recourse to the ground may vary between MSs and also from one era to another and 
therefore afforded MSs “a margin of discretion within the limits of the Treaty”.  
It recalled that the Community’s general principles are drawn from the Constitutional 
traditions of the MSs and in line with the Opinion of the Advocate-General 
191
 the 
Community legal order also strives to ensure respect for human dignity as a general 
                                               
189  Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn, [2004] I-09609  
190 ibid §12 
191 ibid, Opinion Of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl 
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principle of law,
192
 thus finding its protection to be compatible with Community law; 
“the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a 
restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental 
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the freedom to provide services”. However, 
such restrictive measures can only be justified if necessary to protect the intended 
interests and these objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures. A common 
conception amongst MSs, as to how a right is to be protected, is not a necessary 
criterion for assessing the proportionality of a restricting national measure. Thus in 
answer to the question the CJEU held that a national prohibition measure adopted on 
public policy grounds to protect human dignity is not precluded under Community law. 
This conclusion is by virtue of the fact that human dignity is not restricted to the 
German Constitution but rather because it also forms part of the EU general principles. 
The CJEU has also relied on the HRs as they result from the Constitutional traditions of 
MSs to justify MR and in particular the abolition of dual criminality for 32 offences 
under the EAWFD.
193
 
Article 51(1) CFR clearly states that EU HRs obligations are only binding on MSs when 
implementing Union law. The explanatory text of the CFR
194
 refers to three CJEU cases 
including the Wachauf and ERT cases. These two cases are at different ends of the 
interpretation scale.
195
 Wachauf refers to situations where MSs implement an EU law 
mandate, whereas ERT cases “concern autonomous Member State action, so action by a 
Member State authority mandated by its strictly national law, which restricts the 
exercise of an economic Treaty freedom and hence comes within the scope of EU law.” 
In the ERT case the CJEU held that, 
                                               
192 Human dignity appears in Article 1 CFR as well as Article 2 of the EU Treaty. 
193 Advocaaten voor de Wereld (n33) §49 
194 OJ, 2007/C 303/17 
195 Besselink (nError! Bookmark not defined.), 26 
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where a Member State relies on an overriding requirement relating to the 
public interest or on grounds for justification that are stipulated in the Treaty 
in order to justify a national rule which is likely to obstruct the exercise of a 
fundamental freedom arising from the Treaty, such justification 'must be 
interpreted in the light of the general principles of law and in particular of 
fundamental rights'.
196
   
 
Since the Lisbon Treaty granted primacy to the CFR, the CJEU has appeared at times to 
avoid determining the scope of the CFR. For example in Zambrano
197
 it decided the 
case without reliance on the CFR despite the fact that the referred question explicitly 
refers to the CFR. In this case provisions of the primary legislation were adequate to 
answer the referred question and to protect the rights of the individuals concerned. 
Although reference to the CFR and HRs is made extensively in the linked Opinion of 
Advocate-General Sharpston who holds that the granting of HRs to citizens which 
Article 6(1) states is the very foundation of the EU has meant that “the principle that 
citizens exercising rights to freedom of movement will do so under the protection of 
those fundamental rights”.198 She relies on both Article 21 TFEU and HRs to justify the 
proposed prohibition of reverse discrimination. There are also cases post-Lisbon where 
reliance is mainly based on the CFR, with the ECHR being used as a tool of 
interpretation or the starting point. 
As is evident in its case law, the CJEU is developing its own ‘margin of appreciation’ 
principle, referred to as a margin of discretion;
199
 where national measures are respected 
provided that they respect the minimum standards. This is evident in the application of 
the MR principle, where differences in the criminal justice system are accepted and 
accommodated on the presumption that the minimum safeguards are in place. Thus 
respecting the different societal values and legal heritages of the MSs whilst 
encouraging respect for HRs. 
                                               
196  Omega (n189), Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl §42 
197 Zambrano (n505)  
198 ibid, Opinion of  Advocate-General Sharpston, §129 
199 Wolzenburg (n128) 
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The Council of Europe and the EU are not competitors but complementary mechanisms 
for the protection of HRs. This complementary role has been acknowledged by the 
CJEU; for example in Dereci it reminds national courts that they,  
must examine whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines the 
right to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the 
Charter. On the other hand, if it takes the view that that situation is not 
covered by European Union law, it must undertake that examination in the 
light of Article 8(1) ECHR. All the Member States are, after all, parties to 
the ECHR which enshrines the right to respect for private and family life in 
Article 8.
200
 
Through the Şirketi decision the ECtHR has also indicated to the EU that it needs to 
ensure that equivalent protection is offered to individuals. 
The relationship between the ECHR and the CFR is one with which the CJEU is still 
working out. In Case C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj,
201
  a case concerning social security, 
the CJEU held that the ECHR does not have primacy over national laws within the EU 
legal order. In assessing the social security provisions the CJEU refers to Article 34(3) 
CFR, which ‘recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to 
ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with 
the rules laid down by European Union law and national laws and practices’. In addition 
to illustrating the progressive nature of the CFR (this right does not appear in the 
ECHR), it has been taken as an indication of the direction the CJEU is heading with 
fundamental rights – preferring to rely on the CFR. This would seem to be confirmed by 
the case of Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson
202
  which considered 
the ne bis in idem principle in relation to tax. In doing so the CJEU extends the meaning 
of Article 51(1) CFR as not only when ‘implementing’ EU law but also matters which 
fall “within the scope of EU law”. The judgment cross-references the Melloni203 
                                               
200 Dereci (n511) §72-73 
201 (Grand Chamber) 24 April 2012 
202 (Grand Chamber) of 26 February 2013 
203 Ibid n.122 
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judgment (decided on the same day), confirming that when the issue only partly 
concerns EU law, “national authorities and courts remain free to apply national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection 
provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised.”204 It will be interesting to see in 
future judgments whether the CJEU meant to extend the application of the CFR to 
national measures whose objectives are set at the national level on the basis that the 
objectives are in common with EU legislation. 
In the same case, the CJEU also considers the relationship of the CFR with the ECHR, 
stating that,  
the conclusions to be drawn by a national court from a conflict between 
national law and the ECHR, it is to be remembered that whilst, as Article 
6(3) TEU confirms, fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute 
general principles of the European Union’s law and whilst Article 52(3) of 
the Charter requires rights contained in the Charter which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be given the same meaning and scope as 
those laid down by the ECHR, the latter does not constitute, as long as the 
European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been 
formally incorporated into European Union law. Consequently, European 
Union law does not govern the relations between the ECHR and the legal 
systems of the Member States, nor does it determine the conclusions to be 
drawn by a national court in the event of conflict between the rights 
guaranteed by that convention and a rule of national law.
205
 
Here recognition is given to the continuing obligation Member States have under the 
ECHR, but also that primacy of the CFR within the EU legal order, whilst having one 
eye on accession by the EU to the ECHR which will add another dimension to 
fundamental rights adjudication in the EU. 
Thus whilst the CJEU’s shift towards reliance on the CFR has begun it is not consistent, 
with the ECHR continuing to be referred to and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
                                               
204 ibid n.202 §29 
205 ibid n.202 §44 
Chapter Four: On Human Rights 
93 
 
remaining the underlying starting point and guidance. For this reason, the ECHR 
jurisprudence forms the basis of human rights analysis in Part II.
206
 
In addition to the national systems, it is also important to set up and reinforce regional 
and collective mechanisms of monitoring. These will set to rest the minds of national 
judges that they are not the lone guardians of rights within the European criminal justice 
sphere and would also serve as a stronger foundation for their mutual trust.  This has 
been recognised from the start by the Commission and Council.
207
 
4.4 EU Accession to the ECHR 
A significant contribution of the Lisbon Treaty to the protection of HRs, is the legal 
competence of the EU to accede to the ECHR. Whilst a detailed consideration is beyond 
the scope of this research, an outline is provided of the key factors in order to 
understand how the relationship between the two regional courts could work. This 
relationship has an important role to play in the protection of HRs in the context of MR 
measures. 
Article 6(2) of the TEU
208
 opens the road to negotiations between the EU and the 
Council of Europe with the aim of agreeing the terms of EU accession to the ECHR.
209
  
                                               
206
 The CJEU’s attempts to clarify the applicability of the CFR can be see in the recent opinion of 
Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the pending case C-176/12 Union locale des syndicats CGT, Hichem 
Laboubi, Union départementale CGT des Bouche-du-Rhône, Confédération générale du travail (CGT), 
18 July 2013 where this time it looks at the horizontal effect as to whether relationships between private 
parties are governed by the CFR rights. Whilst the Advocate-General notes that the answer will differ for 
the different rights, in considering the Social Rights, the conclusion is that they establish principles which 
govern the exercise of public power and are objectives to be achieved. However the Directive in question 
was to be regarded as an implementing act which cements the principle, forming a right which can be 
enforced by the CJEU. 
207 The Council of Ministers, Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters, 30.11.2000 [2001] OJ C 12/10, highlights the importance of evaluation and 
monitoring. 
208 Protocol 8 to the Lisbon Treaty (n173) sets out a number of additional requirements for the conclusion 
of the Accession Agreement. Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, adopted in 2004 and entered into force on 
1.06.2010, amended Article 59 of the ECHR to enable the EU to accede to it. 
209
 The relationship between the EU and the ECHR as well as the former’s accession to the ECHR has 
been the subject of many discussions and papers. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss in any 
great detail the technical and practical implications of this accession. The legal and technical issues were 
considered in a report by the  CDDH in 2002: Study of Technical and Legal Issues Of A Possible EC/EU 
Accession To The European Convention On Human Rights, Report adopted by the Steering Committee 
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To this end under the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), an Informal 
Working Group on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (‘CDDH-UE’) 210 was set up to see through the negotiations with the 
Commission.
211
 In total there were 8 meetings held including 2 with civil society. At the 
end of June 2011, the Working group deemed its mandate complete and has set out the 
results of its discussions in a Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(‘Draft Accession Agreement’) and the Draft Explanatory Report.212 They were 
examined and adopted at the extraordinary meeting of the CDDH in October 2011.  
In terms of who an application will be made against before the ECtHR, a co-respondent 
procedure is envisaged where both the MS and the EU will be the respondents.
213
 The 
previous proposed format for co-respondent procedure has the danger of being overused 
and placing unnecessary financial and other burdens on applicants. The draft trigger for 
co-respondent procedure is a ‘substantive link with EU legal acts or measures’ and 
where EU law provides the ‘legal basis’ for the act for whose implementation a MS is 
                                                                                                                                         
for Human Rights (CDDH), DG-II(2002)006 [CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2], available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/CDDH-UE/CDDH-
UE_documents/Study_accession_UE_2002_en.pdf. All that is done here is to introduce some of the 
issues which may affect the protection of human rights in criminal matters.  See also: Sionaidh Douglas-
Scott, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon, HRLR (2011) 11 (4): 645-682., 
Tobias Lock, Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the 
EU Legal Order, 48 CML.Rev (2011)1025, Christina Eckes, EU Accession to the ECHR: Between 
Autonomy and Adaptation, MLR, (2013)76: 254–285, Françoise Tulkens, ‘EU Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, at European Judicial Training Network – Human Rights and Access to 
Justice Seminar “Effective Remedies, Lengthy Proceedings and Access to Justice in the EU: Ensuring the 
right to a fair trial under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on 
Human Rights”,  Poland, 1.03.2013, Giuseppe Martinico, Is the European Convention Going to Be 
‘Supreme’? A Comparative-Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts, 
Eur.J.Int.Law (2012) 23 (2): 401-424 
210 The Committee of Ministers adopted, ad hoc terms of reference for the CDDH to elaborate, in co-
operation with representatives of the EU, a legal instrument, or instruments, setting out the modalities of 
accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, including its participation in the 
Convention system (CM/Del/Dec(2010)1085, of 26.05.2010).  
211 The Council of the EU adopted on 4.06.2010 a Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate an 
agreement for the EU to accede to the Convention. 
212
 CDDH Informal Working Group On The Accession Of The European Union To The European 
Convention On Human Rights (CDDH-UE), Final Version Draft legal instruments on the accession of 
the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH-UE(2011)16. Presented at the 
8th Working Meeting of the CDDH-EU with The European Commission, 20 June-24.06.2011 
213 The co-respondent procedure is set out in Article 3 (1)-(5) of the Draft Accession Agreement. 
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responsible. Issues raised by the co-respondent procedure were effectively dealt with in 
the joint submissions to the CCDH-UE by the AIRE Centre and Amnesty 
International.
214
 As one example of where the co-respondent procedure would be 
inappropriately engaged, they include the practical application of the EAWFD where a 
MS surrenders an individual to face detention conditions which do not comply with 
ECHR minimum standards. Here they argue that whilst the subject matter may be EU 
law, the implementation in violation of the ECHR is the responsibility of the MS in 
exercising their discretion and a situation where the EU should not be a co-respondent, 
but rather invited as a third party intervener. Their recommendations centred on 
clarifying where the third party avenue should be preferred.
215
 The draft took into 
account these concerns and states that a third party intervention will often be the most 
appropriate and the co-respondent procedure triggered in a limited number of cases.
216
 
Recalling Article 52(3) CFR, in relation to whether the ECtHR or the CJEU should first 
adjudicate on matters. The provision makes clear that it does “not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection”, it also indicates that the ECHR provides for many 
of the HRs EU law protects. The AIRE Centre and Amnesty International therefore 
conclude that logically in cases concerning both CFR and ECHR, it would be more 
appropriate for the ECtHR to rule first. “Such rulings should not however prejudice a 
ruling from the CJEU or the domestic courts of the EU’s Member States that EU law 
provides greater protection”.217 
The draft accession agreement was then submitted to the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe where negotiations have come to a halt. Besselink summarises that 
the ‘stalemate’ whilst raising serious concerns, were not related to the increased 
                                               
214  AIRE Centre and Amnesty International, Submissions to CDDH-UE March 2011, 20/03/2011. 
Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/cddh-ue/CDDH-
UE_documents/AIRE&AI_comments_March2011.pdf  
215 Draft Explanatory Report, CDDH-UE(2011)16 §40 
216 ibid §44 
217 Submissions (nError! Bookmark not defined.) §15 
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protection of the rights of citizens, “nor about a coherent system that is transparent and 
understandable enough for those same citizens. Actually, the accession negotiations 
give more the impression of a diplomatic game in which MSs and EU institutions 
struggle over their privileges than a process of sincere constitution making in the service 
of the citizens.”218 
On 13 June 2012 the CCDH was given a new mandate by the Committee of Ministers to 
negotiate in an ad hoc group with the EU to finalise the instruments for accession.
219
 On 
5 April 2013 a revised set of draft instruments were agreed.
220
   
The key provisions to consider are those on the co-decision procedure and the 
relationship between the two Courts. On the co-respondent mechanism, it is still 
emphasised that third party interventions will often be the most appropriate way to 
involve the EU with the co-respondent mechanism being applied in limited instances.  
The co-respondent mechanism is triggered in two ways. Firstly under Article 3(2) where 
the application is against one or more EU MSs the test is fulfilled if the State(s) could 
not have avoided the alleged violation without disregarding EU law. This will arise 
where the State has no discretion as to the implementation of the EU law at national 
level. Under Article 3(3) where the EU is notified of an application not a MS, the State 
may become a co-respondent. The mechanism will be applied either at the invitation of 
the ECtHR or by decision of the ECtHR upon request. 
On the relationship between the two Courts, it is first noted that whilst under Article 
267 TFEU national courts are able to refer questions to the CJEU, parties in the case 
                                               
218 Besselink (183) 41 
219 The package of instruments include: a draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR; a 
draft declaration by the EU, a draft Rule to be added to the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the 
supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in cases to which the 
EU is a party; a draft model of Memorandum of Understanding and a draft explanatory report to the 
Accession Agreement. 
220 Council of Europe, Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between The CDDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and 
the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Final report to the CDDH, 47+1(2013)008, Strasbourg, 5.04.2013 
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may only make a suggestion that such reference is made. As such the CJEU is not 
regarded as a ‘national court’ and the procedure is not to be regarded as a remedy which 
applicants must first exhaust before applying to the ECtHR. Instead it is guided by the 
principle of subsidiarity. In situations where the CJEU had not had the opportunity to 
rule on the matter, an internal EU procedure to be developed whereby the CJEU would 
have the opportunity to assess the compatibility, not of the act or omission but the EU 
legal basis (this assessment is not binding). This procedure would apply only where the 
EU is a co-respondent, it would take place before the ECtHR rules on the merits of the 
case, all parties would have the opportunity to submit observations in the CJEU 
procedure and the assessment will not be binding on the ECtHR. The exact internal 
mechanisms to be applied by the EU for both the co-respondent and prior involvement 
procedures have yet to be determined and thus consideration of these is premature. 
Before the instruments are adopted there are a number of political loops to be jumped. 
The first stage is for the CJEU to provide its opinion on the draft Accession Agreement, 
and then the CDDH will approve it and send it to the Committee of Ministers. The 
ECtHR will next adopt its opinion on the draft Accession Agreement after which the 
Parliamentary Assembly will adopt an opinion on it before it is adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers and opened for signature.  
A question raised is whether the Şirketi doctrine of equivalent effect will continue to be 
applied. On the one hand the increased powers of HRs protection under Lisbon merit 
the continuation of those presumptions vis a vis the EU; on the other hand the legal 
significance of accession to the ECHR by the EU is to permit external scrutiny of its 
acts by the ECtHR. This is a decision which too date has been left to the ECtHR to 
determine. 
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4.4.1 Lesser Rights? Absolute and Other Rights 
Before considering the relevant substantial rights it is important to be familiar with the 
general concepts and principles of the ECHR which assist in the interpretation and 
application of the rights. 
Wouters and Naerts submit that “human rights concerns are the main acceptable reason 
for a lack of mutual trust”.221 They refer to the European Parliament's resolutions 
concerning HRs in the EU to highlight the fact that, despite membership to the ECHR 
by all MSs, these reports note violations of the right to a fair trial in almost all MSs. 
However they note that whilst the ECHR prohibits extradition where the person may 
face treatment contrary to Art 3 or ‘a flagrant denial of justice’, ‘lesser’ violations of 
rights - even though not ideal –should not present a bar to surrender.  This is an 
untenable stance; a violation of a HR is a violation and therefore a breach of the ECHR 
no matter how others perceive its seriousness. Those who assert that, where the 
violation of their HRs is not severe, individuals can still be surrendered are mistaken. 
The confusion is between an interference with a right and an ‘interference’ which 
equates to a violation. If a violation is found to exist it means that the interference has 
met the threshold and with qualified rights is not justified, even on public interest 
grounds, in the pursuit of justice or in the fulfillment of international obligations. The 
distinction in the ECHR between absolute and qualified rights provides the necessary 
balance between rights and effective criminal justice systems.  
An absolute right is one which cannot be interfered with in any circumstance. Articles 
2
222
 and 3
223
 are regarded as,  
                                               
221 Wouters and Naert (n123) 923 
222 Right to life 
223 Prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Other absolute rights are 4(1) (slavery) 
and 7 (non-retroactive penalties). 
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the most fundamental provisions of the Convention and as enshrining core 
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. In 
contrast to the other provisions in the Convention, it is cast in absolute 
terms, without exception or proviso, or the possibility of derogation under 
Article 15 of the Convention.
224
 
Interference with substantively qualified rights, those guaranteed under Articles 8-11, 
can in certain circumstances be justified and are capable of derogation under Article 15. 
Provisions guaranteeing these rights set out the right in the first paragraph, the second 
paragraph stipulates the conditions under which interferences with the right in question 
would not constitute a violation of the Convention.  
The Court has established a number of questions which need to be addressed in order to 
ascertain whether there has been a violation of the substantively qualified rights: (1) Do 
the facts disclose a protected right? (2) Is there (or would there be) an interference with 
that right? Is the interference (3) in accordance with the law? (4) in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim? (5) proportionate to the legitimate aim? If the answer to questions 3-5 is 
negative then the interference is not justified and a violation will be held. 
Those rights relating to the administration of justice are limited rights.
225
 Interference 
with these rights will be subjected to a proportionality test. This principle has been 
developed by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and states that a fair balance between the 
protection of individual rights and the interests of the community at large can only be 
achieved if restrictions on individual rights are strictly proportionate to the legitimate 
aim they pursue. 
There are a number of key tests that can be applied when assessing whether or not 
interference has been proportionate: Have ‘relevant and sufficient reasons’ been 
advanced for any interference with an ECHR right? Is it ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ or does it correspond to a ‘pressing social need’? Is there an alternative which 
                                               
224 Pretty v. UK,  2346/02, Judgment 29.04.2002 
225 These include: Articles 5, 6, and Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Protocol 7. 
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would have interfered less? Has it been considered? Have relevant and sufficient 
reasons been given for rejecting it? What is the possibility of abuse? Were procedural 
safeguards both in place and observed so as to avoid the possibility of abuse? Does the 
interference operate so as to ‘impair the very essence of the right’? 
Another principle applied is that of the ‘margin of appreciation’.  Taking into account 
their widely different social, cultural, economic and legal systems the ECHR, unlike the 
EU, does not demand the same standards to be applied uniformly throughout the MSs of 
the Council of Europe. As long as the States have ‘secured’ the rights, as required by 
Article 1 ECHR, they have a margin of appreciation as to how they do so. Whether this 
margin is wide or narrow will depend on the right involved and the circumstances of the 
case.    
Where evidence shows that there is a real risk that an absolute right will be interfered 
with, surrender should be refused. On the other hand where evidence shows that there is 
a substantial risk that a qualified right would be interfered with; this will not always 
mean that surrender is to be refused. The combination of thresholds, proportionality and 
the margin of appreciation, are already in place to deal with the ‘lesser’ interferences 
with HRs. Where the surrender would lead to an unjustifiable interference with an 
individual's right, which equates to a violation, it should not and cannot proceed.  
4.4.2 Systemic, Group or Individual-Specific Violations 
Something that will be explored in subsequent sections is the justification for MSs to 
continue sending individuals to countries where complaints of violations have been 
upheld by the ECtHR. One such example is continued surrenders to Poland despite a 
number of recent findings by the ECtHR that the level of overcrowding in some Polish 
prisons violates Article 3 ECHR. This example highlights the difference between 
systemic problems and the need to show that the individual in question will be subjected 
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to the unjustified risk. Ordinarily, individuals are required to show that the risk will 
affect them directly. For example, if the ECtHR has held that overcrowding in Prison A 
in Country X has reached the threshold of Article 3, an individual resisting surrender to 
Country X will need to show that they will be placed in Prison A.
226
 It is not enough to 
rely on the finding in relation to Prison A to mean that being placed in any prison in 
Country X would violate their Article 3 right. On the other hand, if it can be shown with 
some certainty that the individual will be placed in Prison A they can rely on the 
ECtHR’s finding to resist surrender. The reason for this would be the fact that they 
would become members of the prison population of that institution who are being 
subjected to conditions in violation to Article 3.
227
 This will be subject to the nature of 
violation found by the ECtHR and that complained of, for example if the violation 
related to the inadequate health care offered and the complaint concerned the cell 
conditions, the finding by the ECtHR would not be sufficient. 
4.4.3 The Relevant Rights 
MSs have all been subject to HRs obligations since at least the mid 20
th
 century and 
some for many more centuries. More recently the EAWFD introduced further 
obligations on states. Whilst the EAWFD builds on the existing obligations flowing 
from extradition treaties, the tremendous weight given to the principle of MR coupled 
with the obligation to bring fugitives to justice increases the need for ensuring that an 
individual’s HRs are not entirely nullified. The EAWFD alters the balance between the 
individual rights and the criminal justice mechanisms of the state. Important changes are 
also introduced to the criminal justice framework with an increase in the fluidity of 
decisions at the same time as the erection of a steel veil over the internal systems. The 
                                               
226 See section on Prison Conditions for UK cases where surrender was resisted on the basis of findings 
on overcrowding. 
227 Membership of a particular group is now sufficient following the judgment in Salah Sheekh v the 
Netherlands, 1948/04, Judgment 11.01.2007, where it was sufficient for the individual to show that he 
was a member of the minority clan in Somalia which was being persecuted and subjected to treatment in 
violation of Article 3 in Somalia. He did not have to show an individual and personal risk. 
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practical impact of the EAWFD on HRs is significant, with the judges as the only buffer 
to ensure that justice is done on both sides.  
What is unambiguous is that the EAWFD does not in theory alter the HRs obligations of 
states; to the contrary it clearly states that they are unaffected. Whilst the extended 
scope of some rights, means there has been positives stemming from the MR program, 
in particular relating to fair trial rights; the balance to date has leant towards security 
rather than liberty. 
The rights relevant to the implementation of the EAWFD strike at the heart of an 
individual’s autonomy and liberty, these rights include, the right to life (Article 2), the 
prohibition against torture, cruel and inhuman treatment (Article 3) and the right to 
liberty (Article 5); the right to a fair trial (Article 6) in relation to a trial that has already 
occurred or about to occur and any re-trial in relation to trials in absentia; the right for 
respect of family and private life (Article 8) and the effect that the surrender will have 
on the family and private life of the individual (and related others); and the availability 
of an effective remedy (Article 13). This list of HRs is not exhaustive; other rights may 
also come into play depending on the particular circumstances, for example freedom of 
religion (Article 9) and discrimination (Article 14 and Protocol 12). 
These rights, their interpretation, protection, enforcement and relevance to the EAWFD 
will be considered in greater detail in the following sections. 
In order to illustrate the practical impact of the EAWFD on HRs the following sections 
will consider the manner in which some principles have been stretched to their 
maximum stress limit, and others beyond their limits leading to deformities, in order to 
accommodate the EAWFD and in particular MR. Key terms will be considered in the 
context of relevant rights. For example ‘real risk’ will be considered in relation to 
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Article 3 ECHR, ‘flagrant denial’ under Article 6 ECHR and ‘exceptional’ under Article 
8. There is of course overlap between the rights and crossover in the usage of terms.  
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Chapter Five: The Right to Liberty 
The right to liberty is set out both in the ECHR (Article 5) and the CFR (Article 6).  The 
focus of is the impact of surrender on these rights; looking at the obligations of the E-
MSs and I-MSs with respect to their own internal systems and also the E-MS’s 
extended obligations relating to the I-MS’s the internal system. 
Provided the arrest is lawful, the deprivation will be justified.
228
 Article 5(1) sets out an 
exhaustive and narrowly interpreted list of exceptions of when the right to liberty can be 
interfered with; an arrest can be made on the basis of reasonable suspicion,
229
 to fulfil an 
extradition request under one of the other Article 5(1) exceptions. Article 5(1)(f) 
provides that a person can be deprived of their liberty if done so with a view to their 
extradition.
230
 The ECtHR considers extradition and an EAW as analogous, thus an E-
MS can arrest an individual in order to facilitate their surrender.  For this arrest to be 
lawful it has to be in accordance with the law. This provision is not concerned with the 
lawfulness of the extradition but only of the arrest.
231
  
Article 5(2), 5(3) and 5(4) govern the procedural guarantees which States must provide 
when depriving a person of their liberty. According to Article 5(2) an arrested person 
has the right to be “informed promptly in a language he understands, of the reasons for 
his arrest and any charges against him” in “simple, non-technical language”.232 This 
requirement ensures that an individual is able to enforce the right under Article 5(4); 
Article 5(4) covers the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention. For this reason it 
is important that they understand the “essential legal and factual grounds” for their 
                                               
228 If an arrest is not lawful any subsequent detention will also be unlawful.  
229 Brogan and Others v. UK, s 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84, 11386/85, 29.11.1988 
230
 It is interesting to note that once again extradition is put in the same category as deportation which is 
also governed by this provision. 
231 The same test is applied to determine the lawfulness of an arrest as is applied to the lawfulness of 
detention.  
232 Fox, Campbell and Hartley (n682) 
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arrest. The lawfulness of arrest/detention is to be determined speedily by a court and if 
not lawful the individual must be released. The right to legal assistance upon arrest is 
not governed by Article 5 but by Article 6 (right to a fair trial).  Article 5(3) covers the 
right to bail. 
The explanatory note provides that Article 6 CFR has the same meaning and scope as 
Article 5 ECHR and that “the limitations which may legitimately be imposed on them 
may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR”. Thus the interpretation of Article 5 
ECHR applies equally to Article 6 CFR; however the ECtHR jurisprudence does not 
prevent EU MSs from extending the scope and protection offered to individuals, in 
particular to those involved in cross-border criminal justice proceedings. 
5.1 Arrest 
Whilst not everyone who is arrested is subsequently detained or imprisoned, arrest 
nevertheless concerns the deprivation of the person’s liberty. The assessment of this 
group of rights will focus on the point of arrest by the E-MS on the basis of an EAW 
issued by another MS. 
5.1.1 The Arrest Warrant 
Arrest and detention by the I-MS clearly falls under Article 5 and depending on the 
stated aim could be governed by any of the exceptions under Article 5(1). Under the 
ECHR, only the Article 5(1)(f) exception applies to an EAW arrest carried out by an E-
MS.  
In traditional extradition, the I-MS in effect knocks on the door of another State 
requesting for the wanted person to be handed over. The E-MS engages its own internal 
mechanism to issue a domestic warrant and to authorise the arrest of the individual 
before handing them over.  
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For example, in England and Wales once an extradition request has been certified by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Office, a district judge then issues an arrest warrant if 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the relevant conditions set out under section 
71(2) and (3) are met; the offence is an extradition offence and that the evidence would 
justify the issue of an arrest warrant if the person was accused of the offence within the 
judge’s jurisdiction or convicted within his jurisdiction and unlawfully at large. 
This step is missing in EAW proceedings. According to the EAWFD, the arrest by the 
E-MS is based solely on the EAW pursuant to a domestic arrest warrant issued by the I-
MS. There is no need for a second domestic arrest warrant to be issued by the E-MS. An 
arrest under the authority of an EAW is made in accordance with the law of the E-MS 
only in so far as set out by the EAWFD implementing law, the ordinary procedural law 
governing lawful arrest is not engaged. The principle of MR dictates that E-MSs are to 
execute the arrest warrant as if it were issued by its domestic courts with no further 
internalising. So with no supporting proof that due process was followed, or that 
minimum standards were implemented, the E-MS is asked to ‘pretend’ that the decision 
went through an equivalent process to that in its own system. 
The legal basis of the arrest is the EAW which is itself based on the domestic arrest 
warrant of the I-MS. In the absence of a harmonized process for the issuance of a 
domestic arrest warrant or an assurance that minimum standards were met, an EAW 
should be subjected to similar review as domestic arrest warrants in order to satisfy its 
lawfulness within the E-MS.  
In England and Wales, prior to an arrest being made pursuant to an EAW, SOCA
233
 
must review the form and content of the EAW; this is known as an “administrative 
                                               
233 The Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) “came into force on 1st April 2006]…]Its purpose is 
an intelligence led agency with law enforcement powers, given to it by statute, Serious Organized Crime 
and Police Act 2005[…]In its capacity SOCA acts as the UK point of contact for Interpol, Europol and 
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assessment”. If the conditions set out under section 2 EA are satisfied the EAW is 
'certified' and passed onto the Police who undertake to locate and arrest the requested 
person.
234
  
These are similar requirements for warrants requesting a person to be sentenced or to 
serve a sentence. This administrative assessment considers the validity of an EAW; in 
other words whether the correct boxes are ticked and that the prescribed particulars are 
included and not whether the information contained therein is correct.
235
 
5.1.2 Lawfulness of the Arrest 
The administrative check does not consider substantive issues which may call into 
question the lawfulness of the I-MS warrant and could merit the non-execution of the 
EAW.  Such issues are not considered by a judge before arrest, since there is no check 
similar to that under section 71 EA or at the initial hearing which is again administrative 
in nature (confirming the identity, setting the date for the hearing, asking if the person 
consents to surrender and determining if the person is to be remanded in custody or 
bailed). The first opportunity at which a court can consider whether the I-MS’s arrest 
warrant is lawful is during the extradition hearing, at which point the individual’s 
liberty would have been already deprived if held on remand.  
Whilst in most cases arguments concerning the lawfulness and arbitrariness of an arrest 
are usually swallowed up by the arguments against surrender; a court must accept such 
complaints. Arbitrariness includes acting in bad faith or where an element of deception 
                                                                                                                                         
Schengen Information System (SIS) and has a Dedicated Fugitives Unit acts as the UK Central Authority 
for all EAWs.” Theodora Christou, European Cross Border Justice: A Case Study of the EAW, The AIRE 
Centre 2010. Available at: <http://www.airecentre.org/data/files/resources/11/ECJP-Final-
Publication.pdf>  Section 15, Crime and Courts Act 2013 abolishes SOCA and establishes the National 
Crime Agency. 
234 These procedural requirements relating primarily to the contents of the EAW; which must contain: 
either a statement stating that the person in question is accused in the I-MS of the commission of a 
specified offence, that the warrant has been issued for the purposes of arrest and prosecution and also 
particulars of the person’s identity, any other warrant in respect of the offence, the circumstances it is 
alleged the offence was committed or the sentence imposed. 
235 See Zakrzewski v The Regional Court in Lodz, Poland, [2013] UKSC 2 §8 
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is involved.
236
 For example where a MS requests an individual for prosecution, when in 
reality they are requesting the individual for further investigation or questioning, this 
could be considered arbitrary since they are not using the EAWFD for the intended 
purposes.  English courts have an inherent right to ensure that the process is not abused 
for ‘collateral and improper purpose’237 or to “question statements made in the 
EAW”.238 According to Lord Sumption in Zakrzewski, this is exceptional and subject to 
four observations which include looking only at administrative inaccuracies concerning 
material errors and not factual or evidential challenges of the alleged offence; something 
reserved for the I-MS.
239
  
It appears that as a general rule the E-MS will be satisfied as to the lawfulness of the 
EAW arrest and detention if the EAW is valid in the tick-box sense. Staying faithful to 
the principle of MR EU national courts are unlikely to conduct such an enquiry. In all 
likelihood, it will be left to the I-MS courts to rectify, and if they fail to do so it will be 
ultimately left for the ECtHR to assess. The English courts have made it clear that 
“under the scheme of the Framework Decision the safeguard against the inappropriate 
issue of an EAW lies in the process antecedent to the issue of the EAW”240 and what 
they receive in an EAW will be taken at face value. This is confirmed by the Supreme 
Court which states that there are two safeguards, firstly “the mutual trust between states 
party to the Framework Decision that informs the entire scheme”,241 trusting that the I-
MS has submitted the truth and secondly the restricted abuse of power check discussed 
above. 
                                               
236 Bozano v. France,  9990/82, judgment of 18.12.1986; Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, Judgment 
5.02.2002 
237 Zakrzewski n235 §11 
238
 Per Lord Bingham in Caldarelli v Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Court of Naples, Italy 
[2008] 1 WLR 1724 §24 
239 Zakrzewski n235 §13 
240 Per Lord Philips in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22, §79 
241 Zakrzewski n235 §10 
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Nevertheless, the ECtHR is clear that even where a subsequent favourable decision is 
given, it will not in principle be “sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” 
unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and 
then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention”.242 Thus by ignoring potential 
unlawful arrests and subsequent detention, E-MSs may find themselves before the 
ECtHR. However where a breach is acknowledged and a remedy is provided by the I-
MS upon surrender, it is likely that ‘victim’ status will be lost for the prior unlawful 
arrest. An ECHR review would assess the “lawfulness” of an EAW arrest with reference 
to the “lawfulness” of the I-MS’s decision to arrest and the procedural guarantees in 
place in the E-MS to review the warrant; including the adequacy of relying on the 
principle of MR as a defence.  
Where substantial evidence was presented to the executing national court relating to the 
unlawful or arbitrary nature of the arrest ordered by the I-MS, the ECtHR could 
subsequently also hold that the E-MS violated the individual’s right to liberty in 
executing the unlawful or arbitrary arrest. The violation would not necessarily take 
place at the time of arrest but at the first court appearance, where an individual 
challenges the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent detention. 
In Dabas v High Court of Madrid
243
 the House of Lords considered the UK requirement 
for an additional certificate from the I-MS certifying that the offence fell within the list 
of 32 EAW offences not requiring dual criminality.  This additional requirement 
introduced by the EA read in compliance with EU law to mean that it was not 
mandatory and its absence certainly not fatal, the EAW itself was sufficient 
certification. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the EAWFD and 
                                               
242 Stephens v Malta (No.1),  11956/07, Judgment 21.04.2009, referring also to Eckle v Germany, 
judgment of 15.07.1982, Series A no. 51, p. 32, §§ 69 et seq. 
243 [2007] UKHL 6 
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“inconsistent with the trust and respect assumed to exist between judicial authorities”.244 
Lord Scott dissenting, disagreed that trust is sufficient to ignore an express provision 
and procedural requirement introduced by Parliament.  
Whilst the Court in Dabas reached its conclusion mindful of the fact that the 
introduction of additional requirements would frustrate the EAWFD objectives, this 
should not be at the expense of the individual. A gap exists in respect of ensuring that 
the E-MS is not executing an unlawful arrest. A solution could be the harmonization of 
the domestic process for issuing EAWs which could be achieved by the setting out of 
minimum standards and requirements. This does not propose the introduction of a 
requirement to show a prima facie case as part of an EAW request, but rather a 
guarantee that the issuing court has deemed that sufficient information exists for 
prosecution, similar to the UK requirement under section 1 Magistrates’ Courts Act 
1980. 
5.2 Detention 
Whilst the basis of the arrest is the EAW; once an E-MS executes the arrest it is bound 
by procedural obligations. For example, Article 5(2) obliges E-MSs to promptly inform 
the individual of the reasons for their arrest. Article 3 places additional obligations with 
regards to the conditions of detention which are considered in the next chapter. 
These guarantees apply to the I-MS and also the E-MS upon execution of the EAW and 
when assessing the conditions an individual will face upon surrender in the I-MS. 
                                               
244
 See also the Supreme Court of Cyprus case David Scattergood (2005) 1A AAΔ 142 where a similar 
issue arose. It was argued that because the basis of his arrest was the EAW law and not the Criminal 
Procedure Law under which a domestic arrest warrant is needed and thus unlawful. The Court, not 
surprisingly found that there was no conflict with its EAW implementing law, the Criminal Procedure 
Law or Article 11 of the Constitution. 
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5.2.1 Lawful: Necessity and Length of Detention 
Article 5 dictates that in order for a detention
245
  to be lawful
246
 it must be in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law. Lawfulness is assessed at first instance by the 
relevant national law
247
 and then as to whether the law protects the individual from 
arbitrary detention (or arrest).
248
 The first test concerns the procedural requirement and 
the second the substantive.
249
  
There is no general definition of ‘arbitrariness’ set by the ECtHR, instead it has 
developed case by case. The assessment varies under the different Article 5(1) 
exceptions.  Under (b), (d) and (e) a key factor is whether the detention is necessary to 
achieve the stated aims and it is only justified as a measure of last resort. This 
proportionality test requires a balance between the public interest in achieving the 
objective and the importance of the right to liberty, the length of detention is relevant to 
the balancing act. Under (a) and (f) arbitrariness is approached differently. 
The principle of proportionality is of restricted applicability to arrest and detention 
under Article 5(1)(f), “any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1(f) will be justified 
only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not 
prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible”.250 This is the 
same in extradition proceedings.
251
 The ECtHR has held that as long as the related 
“action” was being taken with a view to deportation (or extradition); there was no 
                                               
245 Imprisonment is the most obvious form of detention, however there are other types of detention which 
may amount to a deprivation of liberty. These have included control orders (A and others v UK, 3455/05, 
[GC] Judgment 19.02.2009), house arrest (Nikolova v Bulgaria (No 2),  40896/98, Judgment 30.09.2004), 
compulsory treatment in a mental health facility (Ashingdane v. UK,  8225/78, Judgment 28.05.1985), 
being refused authorisation to leave a detention centre (Cyprus v. Turkey, 25781/94, Judgment 
10.05.2001), being required to reside on a remote island (Guzzardi v. Italy, 7367/76, Judgment 6.11.1980). 
246 “lawful” has the same meaning under both Articles 5(1) and 5(4). See Chahal v UK,  22414/93 [GC] 
Judgment 11.11.1996 
247 See Lexa v Slovakia, 54334/00, Judgment 23.09.2008 
248
 For a definition of “arbitrariness” see Saadi v UK, 13229/03, [GC] Judgment 29.01.2008  §§67-74 
249 Even in instances where the detention is “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”, it may be 
incompatible with the requirements of Article 5. See Raza v Bulgaria, 31465/08, Judgment 11.02.2010. 
250 Chahal (n246) §113 
251 Quinn v France,  18580/91, Judgment 22.03.1995 
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requirement that the detention be necessary to prevent the person fleeing or committing 
a crime. It has not set an absolute detention period pending extradition, although it has 
set out factors that limit the length. For example it has made it clear that the complexity 
of international cooperation such as that required in extradition cases will not justify 
protracted detention.
252
 The ECtHR is however clear that whilst detention may be 
lawful under the domestic law, it can at the same time be arbitrary under the ECHR. For 
a start, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) must be carried out in good faith. The detention 
has to be closely connected to the grounds for detention relied on by the Government. 
The detention conditions need to be appropriate and the length of the detention must not 
exceed what is reasonably required for the purpose pursued.
253
 
The EAWFD sets a maximum length of detention on remand pending surrender. Article 
26 states that the I-MS shall deduct any periods spent on detention arising from the 
EAW from the total period of detention to be served of a custodial or detention order 
passed by the I-MS. Where a person is requested to serve a sentence following 
conviction, care should be taken to ensure that time on remand does not exceed the 
sentence to be served. If this occurs the detention may cease to be lawful. In practice 
there is no judicial mechanism to prevent or remedy this. Instead administrative 
discussions would need to occur for the EAW to be revoked if appropriate. 
5.2.2 The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention 
Article 5(4) sets out the procedural guarantees governing the review of pre-trial 
detention (including bail proceedings). It applies to all grounds for detention under 
Article 5(1), including detention with a view to extradite.  
                                               
252 Scott v Spain, 21335/93, Judgment 18.12.1996 §83. See also Sardinas and Alba v Italy, 56271/00, 
Judgment 17.02.2005. 
253 See, Saadi v UK (n248) §74; and A and Others (n245) 
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Lawfulness of detention is to be determined speedily by a court which has the power to 
order the individual’s release if the detention is deemed unlawful.254 The ‘court’ must 
also provide procedural guarantees including: access to relevant documents;
255
 access to 
legal assistance to prepare their case; and the ability to participate and be heard either in 
person or through representation.
256
  Also applicable is equality of arms guaranteeing 
equal access to both the case documents and the ‘court’. These procedural guarantees 
are covered under Article 6 ECHR. 
At Reasonable Intervals 
The right to challenge detention is continuous and an individual must have the 
opportunity to challenge at reasonable intervals.
257
 The ECtHR has held that it considers 
1 month intervals as reasonable to review detention on remand.
258
 There are no set time 
periods established for other forms of detention and it will depend on the circumstances 
of the individual case. 
The EAWFD demands that an EAW “be dealt with and executed as a matter of 
urgency”259 requiring an individual be bought promptly before a court. Whilst the 
procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of detention is left to the national laws, MSs are 
bound by the ECHR standards which require that such a review is speedily undertaken.  
Speedily refers to both the speed with which an individual is given the opportunity to 
challenge their detention before a court and also the time taken for a decision to be 
                                               
254 Defined as anybody with a judicial character providing the requisite procedural guarantees, this does 
not include public prosecutors (Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 6301/73, 24.10.1979) or government 
ministers.  (X. v. UK, 7215/75, 5.11.1981; Keus v. Netherlands, 12228/86, 25.10.1990). But does include 
parole boards provided that the members are independent and impartial and capable of providing 
procedural guarantees (Weeks v. UK, 9787/82, 2.03.1987). 
255
 Lamy v. Belgium,  10444/83, 30.03.1989 
256 Winterwerp (n254) 
257 X., (n254)  
258 Bezicheri v. Italy,  11400/85, 25.10.1989 
259 Article 17(1) 
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made. In assessing promptness, the ECtHR has not set any absolute limits;
260
 factors 
which will be considered include whether the authorities acted diligently, as well as the 
conduct of the detainee in particular if they contributed to any delay.
261
 
The first opportunity for an executing national court to review the lawfulness of 
detention is in most cases the EAW hearing. Once the individual has been surrendered, 
the obligation to review the lawfulness of continued detention switches to the I-MS.
262
 
If a court determines a detention to be unlawful, the individual must be promptly 
released.  
5.3 Bail 
In addition to the right to challenge the lawfulness of continued detention, an individual 
also has a right to bail.
263
 Article 5(3) sets the presumption in favour of bail and 
establishes the procedural requirements of Article 5 as applicable to situations provided 
for under Article 5(1)(c), namely to bring an arrested individual before a competent 
court.  
In terms of the E-MS, this section does not explicitly apply to extradition 
proceedings.
264
 However it is arguably that it applies to EAW proceedings. 
First, whilst initially the obligation to consider “less severe measures” to detention is 
not found in Article 5(1)(f), a string of recent ECtHR decisions have applied the 
requirement with a view to deportation or to prevent an unlawful entry.
265
 This 
interpretation could also be applied to situations where a person is detained with a view 
                                               
260 Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 9862/82, Judgment 21.10.1986 
261 Luberti v. Italy, 9019/80, Judgment 23.02.1984 
262 Whilst post-trial detention will be relevant in some cases, it is beyond the scope of this work and will 
not be assessed. 
263 Caballero v. UK,  32819/96, Judgment 8.02.2000 
264 Lynas v Switzerland, 7317/75, Commission Decision 6.10.1976.  
265
 Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium,  10486/10, Judgment 20.12.2011, Čonka v Belgium (n236), 
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium,  13178/03, Judgment 12.10.2006, Riad and Idiab v 
Belgium, s 29787/03 and 29810/03, Judgment 24.01.2008, Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium,  
41442/07, Judgment 19.01.2010, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece,  30696/09, Judgment 21.01.2011 and 
Kanagaratnam and Othersv Belgium,  15297/09, Judgment 13.12.2011 
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to surrender them. Whilst the text of Article 5(1)(f) states that it is not required to show 
that detention is necessary, but detention cannot exceed what is reasonably required to 
achieve the objective. 
Detaining a person on the sole basis that they are to be surrendered could also be 
regarded as arbitrary if no other reason exists and no consideration is given to 
alternatives. This could be particularly poignant where dependants are involved or 
where the proceedings are protracted because an appeal is pending. An argument can be 
made on this basis for bail to be granted when reviewing the lawfulness of the 
detention. 
Second, as set out above, an individual is arrested on the basis of the EAW from the I-
MS and not on the basis of a domestic arrest warrant issued by the E-MS. The E-MS 
law only regulates the implementation of the EAWFD and not the basis of a decision to 
arrest. The domestic law provides the legal basis for the execution of the EAW. The 
legal basis for the issuance of the warrant stems from the I-MS law and procedure.  If 
the legal basis of an arrest is deemed to be the I-MS’s arrest warrant, it can be argued 
that it is not the Article 5(1)(f) exception which applies to EAW arrests, but either 
Article 5 (1)(b)
266
 when requested for the fulfillment of a legal obligation or Article 5 
(1)(c)
267
  when requested for the purposes of being prosecuted.  
The availability of bail for those arrested pursuant to an EAW is foreseen by the 
EAWFD, under section 12 EAWFD, keeping an individual arrested under an EAW in 
detention is optional and to be governed by the national law. It states that the “person 
may be released provisionally at any time in conformity with the domestic law of the 
                                               
266 The lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court (to pay a 
fine, to go to prison when requested to in countries such as Poland who operate a waiting list to serve 
sentences) or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law.  
267 The lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so. In 
other words when a person is requested for prosecution. 
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executing Member State”. The EAWFD thus foresees the possibility of bail being 
granted by the E-MS in EAW proceedings. In the UK the implementing law provides 
that the District Judge at the initial hearing is to determine whether to remand the 
individual in custody or release them on bail.
268
 Further, the requirement to review the 
lawfulness of detention under Article 5(4), indirectly imposes an obligation to grant bail 
where appropriate.  
Arguably under ECtHR jurisprudence, taken together with the integration of criminal 
justice systems. The space has been provided by the EU law for MS to extend Article 
5(3) to cover the EAW. However since it is up to individual MS to determine, there is 
disparity across MSs.  
The focus of the next segment will look at the obligations of the I-MS and by extension 
the extended jurisdiction of the E-MS; mindful of its probable application to the E-MS. 
Detention is authorised under Article 5(1)(c) only if in addition to other grounds 
justifying detention,
269
 there is a reasonable suspicion that the individual may have 
committed the offence.
270
 An EAW can only be issued for the purposes of prosecution 
and not investigation. But at the same time the presumption of innocence is respected 
and that a judicial decision on bail does not reflect an opinion of guilt.
271
 
5.3.1 Grounds for Refusal 
ECHR jurisprudence is clear that pre-trial detention does not automatically follow an 
arrest and that the choice for the courts is not between providing a trial within a 
                                               
268 The EA was amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2009 (c. 26), ss. 77(3), 116; S.I. 2009/3096, art. 
3(t), inserting section 6(5A)(5B) on 25.1.2010 clearly stating that the judge has the power to grant bail in 
EAW surrender proceedings. “(5B)The judge must remand the person in custody or on bail (subject to 
subsection (6)).” 
269 Hibbert v Netherlands, 38087/97, Judgment 26.01.1999 
270
 Labita v Italy,  26772/95, Judgment 6.04.2000 §155 
271 Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v Spain, 10590/83, Judgment 6.12.1988 §91. See also Caballero 
(n263) the UK accepted that a prohibition against the release on bail of an individual, of the offence 
charged with was of the same nature as a different offence he had been convicted of previously, was a 
violation of Article 5(3).  
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reasonable time and granting release.
272
 Article 5(3) requires the reasoning of the court 
to be detailed and specific to the individual.
273
 In Smirnova it was held that the 
procedural requirement to provide specific justifications was not met, where there was 
reference to the individual’s ‘character’ without detailing any what aspect of the 
character or why it justified further detention. In Nerattini v. Greece,
274
 the ECtHR 
noted that the “risk of absconding was just mentioned laconically without being related 
to the specific circumstances of the case.” Any decision to continue detention needs to 
be both reasoned and justified in the circumstances.   
The seriousness of the charge cannot be the sole or decisive factor,
275
 and the ECtHR 
has identified reasons for which bail may be refused. These include: where there is a 
risk the individual will flee (“the character of the person involved, his morals, his home, 
his occupation, his assets, his family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which 
he is being prosecuted”);276 where the individual may interfere with the course of justice 
(destroying evidence, collusion with other suspects or intimidation of witnesses);
277
 to 
prevent the commission of an offence;
278
or to maintain public order (this also covers the 
reaction of third parties to the individual’s release). For all grounds, evidence has to be 
presented proving the real risk. With the passage of time or it will be harder to justify 
continued detention or the previous reasons may cease to exist.
279
  
Despite this clear guidance, bail remains an issue across the EU. An example of the 
difficulties encountered by foreign nationals to get bail is the case of Andrew Symeou. 
                                               
272 Wemhoff v. Germany, 2122/64, Judgment 27.06.1968 
273 Smirnova v Russia, 46133/99, Judgment 24.07.2003 §§68, 70. See also Trzaska v Poland (25792/94, 
Judgment 11.07.2000) where the risk of offending was not explained or expressly referred to. In both 
cases the ECtHR accepted that detention might have been justified, but nevertheless found a violation of 
Article 5(1)(c). 
274  43529/07, 18.12.2008 
275 Hristova v. Bulgaria, 60859/00, Judgment 7.12.2006 
276 Neumeister v. Austria, 1936/63, 27.06.1968; Letellier v. France,   12369/86, Judgment 26.06.1991 
277
 Wemhoff (n272); Ringeisen v Austria,  2614/65, Judgment 16.07.1971; Clooth v. Belgium, 12718/87, 
Judgment 12.12.1991 
278 Hristova (n275) 
279 Jecius v Lithuania, 34578/97, Judgment 31.07.2000; Kudla v Poland, 30210/96, Grand Chamber 
Judgment 26.10.2000. 
Chapter Five: The Right to Liberty 
118 
 
Upon surrender by the UK to Greece, Andrew was denied bail despite having complied 
with every requirement imposed on him by the UK authorities whilst his surrender 
decision was pending. The main reasons given by the Greek court for refusing bail was 
that as a non-national he was a flight risk. The Zakynthos Council of Magistrates 
determination, Number 66/2009, of Symeou’s appeal against the denial of bail, the court 
refused the appeal on the following grounds, ‘in addition to the strong evidence of his 
guilt in respect of the felonious act imputed to him, the accused is not a Greek citizen, 
has no known residence in the country and it is highly likely that were he to be released 
he would abscond abroad’ 280  
5.3.2 Alternatives 
According to Article 5(3), “the authorities, when deciding whether a person should be 
released or detained, are obliged to consider alternative means of ensuring appearance” 
and only when “other, less severe measures have been considered and found 
insufficient” can detention be imposed.281  
Article 14 ECHR prohibits discrimination; courts are thus prohibited from detaining an 
individual solely on their status as a non-national. Whilst it may appear that non-
nationals present a greater risk of absconding this alone is not sufficient to justify 
treating them differently to their own nationals. In the context of the EAW, EU law 
provides further protection against discrimination and specifically on the basis of 
nationality.
282
 Courts have the option to attach conditions to bail including seizing travel 
documents,
283
 making the use of alternatives more viable and harder to dismiss. The 
Symeou example is emblematic of cases across Europe where bail is denied because 
                                               
280 Unofficial translation by author of the original Greek text: ‘περαιτέρω, πέραν των σοβαρών ενδείξεων 
ενοχής του για την αποδιδόμενη σε αυτόν κακουργηματικής φύσεως πράξη, ο κατηγορούμενος δεν είναι 
Έλληνας υπήκοος, δεν έχει γνωστή διαμονή στη χώρα και είναι πολύ πιθανό αν αφεθεί ελεύθερος, να 
διαφύγει στο εξωτερικό’. 
281 Jablonski v Poland, 33492/96, Judgment 21.12.2000 §83 
282 Article 12 EU Treaty and Article 21 CFR. 
283 These guarantees are authorised by Article 5(3). See Dermanovic v Serbia, 4897/06, Judgment 
23.02.2010) 
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authorities rely on the assumption that as non-nationals they lack ties to the country and 
are therefore more likely to abscond.
284
 
The validity of assertions that an EU citizen should not be granted bail because of the 
risk of absconding is dubious given the MR measures that have been adopted. The 
EAW procedure has proven to be a fast and effective way of securing the attendance of 
individuals at trial, so even if they flee, an EAW can be re-issued. 
European Supervisory Order 
Pre-trial detention is an exceptional measure and subject to both necessity and 
proportionality tests.
285
 The European Supervisory Order Framework Decision 
(ESOFD)
286
 acts as a useful flanking measure for the EAWFD and the MR programme 
generally. 
The ESO provides another alternative to surrender during pre-trial stages which can be 
less intrusive. It contains similar provisions to those found in the EAWFD, the Council 
of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and the EU FD 
2008/909/JHA.
287
  
An aim of the ESO is to enhance the right to liberty and presumption of innocence in 
the EU and to minimise the risk that non-residents will be remanded in custody pending 
trial.
288
 By enabling MSs to undertake to impose and supervise orders issued by other 
MSs including requirements such as surrendering a passport or reporting to a police 
                                               
284 For example in Symeou, his mother’s uncle lived in Athens where he had said he would undertake to 
stay. 
285 In addition to the case law set out above see the European Parliament resolution on detention 
conditions in the EU of the 15.12.2011 (2011/2897(RSP)) 
286 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application, between Member 
States of the EU, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an 
alternative to provisional detention, OJ L 294 of 11.11.2009 (ESOFD). It entered into force 1.12.2009; 
and Member States had until 1.12.2012 to implement. 
287
 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures 
involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union,  OJ L 327, 
5.12.2008 
288 ESOFD (n286), Recitals 4 and 5. 
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station periodically, the ESO in effect removes an obstacle to surrender. A viable 
alternative to detention on remand of EAW requested individuals becomes release on 
bail with the option of being supervised by the authorities of the MS of residence or 
nationality. This satisfies the Article 5 proportionality test if an individual will not be 
subjected to a year on remand in custody, but rather surrender is deferred until the I-MS 
is trial ready.  In the meantime, the E-MS supervises the individual subject to the 
conditions set out by the I-MS. This enables an individual to continue working and 
reduces the separation time from his family; it also reinforces the presumption of 
innocence which would otherwise be weakened by many months in pre-trial detention. 
The ESO serves both the interests of the MSs and those of the individual who can 
continue their life in their country of residence whilst awaiting trial, instead of being 
held on remand in a foreign prison.
289
 
5.4 Executing State Obligations Under Application of Article 5 
The EAWFD does not contain an express obligation on E-MSs to ensure that detention 
upon surrender will be in accordance with Article 5. As with other HRs this obligation 
is implicit and stems from the EU Treaty, its general principles, the obligation to 
implement the EAWFD in compatibility with HRs and the extended reach of the ECHR 
and of the CFR.   
The test in relation to Article 5 is whether there will be a flagrant denial, in other words 
will Article 5 be nullified by the acts of the I-MS upon surrender. It requires MSs to 
satisfy themselves that Article 5 rights will be respected in the I-MSs. When an E-MS is 
determining whether to surrender an individual, thought should also be given to the 
conditions that that individual will face upon return. MSs are under an obligation to not 
expose individuals under their jurisdiction to irremediable situations, including outside 
                                               
289 It is unfortunate that the UK has chosen to not implement the ESOFD. It would appear that they are 
awaiting their decision whether to exercise their opt-out by 2014. 
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their jurisdiction.
290
 These should include consideration of whether the right to bail is 
likely to be arbitrarily denied by the I-MSs, the intervals between review of detention 
and whether the period of time in pre-trial detention would be proportionate. Where 
there is evidence that there will be a “flagrant denial” of Article 5, there is a positive 
obligation to refuse extradition (and by analogy surrender).
291
  
The principle of MR requests judicial authorities to trust that upon surrender the 
individual’s rights under Article 5 will be respected. MS practice and the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR paint a different picture. In 2010 and 2011 the ECtHR found a violation 
of Article 5(1)(c) and 5(3) in numerous cases against EU MSs.
292
 These cases concerned 
the duration of pre-trial detention, not being brought promptly before a court to verify 
the lawfulness of their detention and the lack of reasoning for the decision to continue 
detention. These cases provide only a snapshot of the reality in MSs, and would indicate 
that the trust should and can be displaced. 
Where evidence exists of practice contrary to Article 5, the E-MS is under an obligation 
to ensure that the individual is not exposed to such a process. The evidence required 
will normally be high and need to show that the individual themselves will be subjected 
to the specific process. However the burden is not entirely on the individual and a state 
must make use of the resources available to it to satisfy themselves that the risk does not 
                                               
290 Kirkwood v UK,  10479/83, Decision 12.03.1984 
291 Drozd (n567) 
292 See for example: Petkov v. Bulgaria (32130/03, judgment 7.01.2010); Wegera v. Poland, (141/07, 
judgment 19.01.2010); Scundeanu v. Romania (10193/02, judgment 2.02.2010); Malkov v. Estonia 
(31407/07, judgment 4.02.2010); Jiga v. Romania (14352/04, judgment 16.03.2010); Tănăsescu v. 
Romania (25842/03, judgment 6.07.2010); Bujac v. Romania (37217/03, judgment 2.11.2010); Moulin v. 
France (37104/06, judgment 23.11.2010); Svetoslav Hirstov v. Bulgaria (36794/03, judgment 
13.01.2011); Haidn v. Germany (6587/04, judgment 13.01.2011); Schummer v. Germany (No.1) 
(27360/04 ; 42225/07, judgment 13.01.2011); Crabtree v. The Czech Republic (41116/04, judgment 
25.02.2010); Jendrowiak v. Germany (30060/04, judgment 14.04.2011); Gasins v. Latvia (69458/01, 
judgment 19.04.2011);Boguslaw Krawczak v. Poland (24205/06, judgment 31.05.2011); Miroslaw 
Garlicki v. Poland (36921/07, judgment 14.06.2011); Nicut- Tănăsescu v. Romania (25842/03, judgment 
6.07.2010); Degeratu v. Romania (35104/02, judgment 6.07.2010); Bruncko v. Slovakia (33937/06, 
judgment 3.11.2011); O.H. v. Germany (4646/08, judgment 24.11.2011). 
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exist. It is clear that where the breach is systematic, the E-MS will have difficulty 
justifying the surrender. 
Where evidence is provided to the E-MS showing a practice by the I-MS of laconically 
referring to the risk of absconding or any other ground, in particular ones related to the 
individual’s non-national status, it is clear that the E-MS is on notice that the 
individual’s Article 5 right to bail will be violated. It should then act accordingly to 
avoid being complicit in the violation. This can be done by obtaining assurances or by 
applying the ESO until the I-MS is trial ready. 
E-MSs should not be surrendering individuals to MSs where there is a proven 
discriminatory practice of not granting bail to non-nationals. Such practice would be in 
violation of Article 5 and as such the E-MSs could also be held liable under the Soering 
principle. 
5.4.1 To Conclude 
The governing procedural law for the decision to issue an arrest warrant is that of the I-
MS. The presumption that this decision is not arbitrary is rebuttable and subject to a 
review of compatibility with HRs standards by the E-MS, but not until the first 
surrender hearing and will need to meet high thresholds. 
Whether an arrest is lawful under the ECHR is primarily the decision of the I-MS. 
However the E-MS’s decision to implement an EAW detention will also be deemed 
unlawful if at the time they ought to have known (or if evidence was presented 
showing) that the I-MS decision to issue the warrant was contrary to Article 5. 
There is an obligation for the I-MS upon surrender to review at regular intervals the 
lawfulness of detention. There is however a double obligation for the E-MS. When 
assessing the lawfulness and arbitrariness of detention or continued detention for the 
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purposes of surrendering an individual, the E-MS need not show that the detention is 
necessary. However, the requirement for the length of detention must not exceed what is 
reasonably required for the purpose pursued, this together with recent ECHR cases 
relating to asylum law, illustrate a different trend which in effect requires states to show 
that detention is necessary. They must also be satisfied that such regular reviews will be 
conducted by the I-MS. 
In challenging the lawfulness of detention, the individual is likely to request bail. Denial 
of bail must be supported by sound and individualized reasons which are not laconically 
or discriminatorily applied. The duty to consider alternatives to detention applies to both 
the I-MS and E-MSs; with the E-MS once again having a dual responsibility to also 
ensure that bail will not be arbitrarily denied by the I-MS. 
The lawfulness of the arrest appears to be primarily a matter of the I-MS’s domestic law 
and governed in the E-MS by the mutual trust presumption. Nevertheless there are 
procedural obligations for the E-MS regulating the lawfulness of the detention which 
follows arrest, in particular the detention’s necessity, length and speedy review. E-MSs 
are relying on a presumption that the domestic arrest warrant and the EAW are not 
arbitrary and have been issued procedurally in accordance to the law; the governing 
procedural law being that of the I-MS.  
In EAW proceedings the I-MS does not knock, it reaches into the territory of the E-MS 
and engages the authorities to collect the wanted individual. However the due process 
standards applied when reviewing the lawfulness of an EAW arrest should be those of 
the E-MS, which are of course assumed to correlate with those of all EU MSs. Thus the 
lawfulness of an EAW arrest must be capable of review by the courts taking into 
account the I-MS’s decision to issue the EAW, and going beyond the purely procedural 
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conditions of for example section 2 EA. The presumption of lawfulness must be 
rebuttable on presentation of sufficient evidence.  
Whilst bail is essentially an issue for the I-MS; the E-MS retains responsibility to 
review and refuse surrender if arbitrary deprivation of bail is a foreseeable consequence 
of the surrender, otherwise the E-MS is likely to be held complicit in the violation. 
Article 5(3) is arguably also applicable to the E-MS. If it is agreed that the legal basis of 
the arrest is the arrest warrant of the I-MS, then the EAW arrest by the E-MS is different 
to an arrest under traditional extradition. It is part of the I-MS’s arsenal of tools to 
secure the trial of individuals, an ‘extraterritorial’ extension of their domestic 
proceedings and should be assessed accordingly. This argument is further bolstered by 
Article 12 EAWFD which foresees release on bail and whilst optional and governed by 
national laws, the UK gives the power to a District Judge to release a person on bail. 
This means that the Article 5(3) guarantees apply to both E-MS and I-MS detention 
with a presumption in favour of bail also existing pending surrender. There are two 
considerations on this point. As time passes, for example if extensions have been 
granted by the court or if petitions to appeal are granted, the case for bail will 
strengthen. As the length of detention on remand grows, the grounds for refusing bail 
also need to strengthen in order to justify continued detention. 
Under Article 5(4), both the I-MS and E-MSs’ procedures, must fulfill the specified 
procedural guarantees in respects to the review of pre-trial detention. Such reviews must 
be held at reasonable and regular intervals, providing a speedy decision and the court 
hearing the review must have the power to release an individual if their detention is 
deemed unlawful.  Whilst Article 5(4) does not make explicit reference to release on 
bail, in practice it may be unlawful to continue detaining an individual, with release on 
bail the compromise between detention and release. 
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In addition to its own internal system, the E-MS also has obligations with respect to the 
standards in the I-MS. There are thus clear obligations for the I-MS under Article 5 and 
whilst it may initially appear that these procedural guarantees do not all apply to the E-
MS EAW proceedings (in particular the right to bail), further consideration shows that 
the scope has been expanded to encompass these proceedings.  
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Chapter Six: Prohibited Treatment 
The prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment is 
found under Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 CFR. The Explanatory Text to the CFR 
states that the meaning and scope is the same as Article 3.
293
 The prohibition is an 
absolute right
294
 and a peremptory norm of international law.
295
 Neither the principle of 
proportionality nor the margin of appreciation are applicable, there is no balancing act 
to be conducted between the interests of the individual and of the community, including 
when combating terrorism and organised crime.
296
 
Although the provision is framed in negative terms, Article 3 also creates positive 
obligations on States. These procedural obligations are: to have in place measures which 
effectively protect individuals within their jurisdiction from being subjected to the 
prohibited treatment, including taking pre-emptive action,
297
 and to conduct an effective 
investigation into allegations capable of identifying and punishing the perpetrators.
298
 It 
is irrelevant whether state authorities or private actors are responsible for the prohibited 
treatment.
299
 
                                               
293 The focus of this section will be on the ECHR and by extension the CFR; however there are a number 
of other instruments relevant to the issues and to the EAW. These include: European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture (which established the CPT), a series of Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 
recommendations (Recommendation (2006)2 on European Prison Rules and Recommendation (2006)13 
on the use of remand in custody), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7), the UN Convention against Torture (CAT) and its 
Optional Protocol. 
294 Labita v Italy, 26772/95, Judgment 6.04.2000 
295 Al-Adsani v UK, 35763/97, Judgment 21.11.2001 
296 Chahal (n246) A position reconfirmed in Saadi v Italy ( 37201/06, [GC] Judgment 28.02.2003 §139) 
where the ECtHR stated that it “considers that the argument based on the balancing of the risk of harm if 
the person is sent back against the dangerousness he or she represents to the community if not sent back 
is misconceived ...The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does 
not in any way reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may be subject to on 
return.”  
297 X v UK, 29392/95, Judgment 10.05.2001 
298 Assenov v Bulgaria, 24760/94, Judgment 28.10.1998 
299 A v UK, 25599/94, Judgment 23 .09.1998 §22 
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In relation to the EAWFD and MR measures, this Article creates obligations for both 
the executing and I-MSs. They both have to ensure that a person detained within their 
jurisdiction is not subjected to Article 3 prohibited treatment. Additionally, the E-MS 
also has to ensure that they are not surrendering an individual to a destination state 
where conditions or treatment may engage Article 3. There have been a sizeable number 
of violations found by the ECtHR with a significant number against EU MSs. Thus the 
vast majority of cases referred to as setting out the minimum standards are not only 
recent but also include cases against EU MSs, illustrating that it is a live issue which 
needs to be taken into account when surrendering individuals.  
The ECtHR jurisprudence has established a rigorous framework for assessing 
conditions and treatment. The interstate case of Ireland v UK,
300
 sets out the definition 
of the different levels of treatment prohibited under Article 3. Torture is defined as 
“deliberate, inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering”. Inhuman 
treatment or punishment is “intense mental or physical suffering”, including where it 
has been premeditated, applied over a long period of time, and causes bodily injury.
301
 
Degrading is treatment or punishment which causes humiliation rooted in fear, anguish, 
and inferiority; whether the intention was to humiliate or debase an individual is another 
important element to consider, although in the absence of an affirmative intention a 
violation may still exist.
302
 It is primarily concerned with the mental suffering and the 
diminishment of human dignity.
303
 Treatment will need to meet the established severity 
threshold and is determined subjectively taking the following factors into account “the 
nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its 
duration, its mental and physical effects and, in some instances the sex, age, and state of 
health of the victim”. 
                                               
300 Ireland v. UK, 5310/71, Judgment 18.01.1978 §167 
301 See also Kudla (n279) 
302 See Van der Ven v. the Netherlands,  50901/99, Judgment 4.02.2003 §48 
303 see Kalashnikov v. Russia, 47095/99, Judgment 15.07.2002 
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6.1 Negative and Positive Obligations 
6.1.1 Arrest Treatment 
The negative obligation of Article 3 is exemplified when considering the treatment of an 
individual when arrested; under an EAW, the E-MS has to do so in conformity with 
Article 3. Article 3 prohibits the use of force when it reaches the set severity thresholds, 
so since some use of force is permitted, in particular when carrying out legitimate state 
functions such as an arrest;
304
 a violation will not be found whenever injury is inflicted 
upon an individual by the arresting officers, if it “was strictly necessary by his own 
conduct”.305 The case of Douglas-Williams306 provides a controversial example of 
legitimate force in the UK. In this case police had been attempting to arrest the victim 
when he threatened them with a kitchen knife, he was first hit with a police baton before 
being placed in the controversial prone position, 
307
 handcuffed and placed in the police 
van. At the police station, whilst the custody officer was being informed of the 
circumstances, he was in the prone position. Having been removed to a cell he was 
strip-searched in the prone position for part of the search and on his back with his 
handcuffs removed for the later part having complained of breathing difficulties. He 
was then put under constant supervision and a medical officer was called to examine the 
injuries of both the victim and the officers. He died an hour after his arrest, the inquest 
found positional asphyxia as one cause of death returning a verdict of accidental death, 
this was endorsed by the Court of Appeal.
308
 The ECtHR found that the force used was 
                                               
304 In addition to the point of arrest (or soon after), ill-treatment can also occur during police questioning 
and in police custody. In Selmouni v France, (25803/94, Judgment 28.07.1999), over several days the 
applicant was subjected to prolonged abuse by officers including being dragged by his hair, urinated over, 
threatened with a syringe and blowlamp and being beaten. 
305 Ribitsch v Austria,  18896/91, Judgment 4.12.1995 §38 
306 Douglas-Williams v UK,  56413/00, Admissibility Decision 8.01.2008 
307
 In this position the individual is placed on his front with his hands restrained behind his back. Whilst 
an authorise police (and mental health care) restraint method there have been a number of deaths linked to 
its use and inquest findings in the UK.  
308 The Police Complaints Authority also found no abuse of authority by using neither unnecessary 
violence nor neglect on the part of the officers. Following this case, police training on the use of the prone 
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proportionate, not excessive and justified on the basis of the victims own acts. In 
contrast in Rehbock v Slovenia,
309
 where an unarmed man sustained a fractured jaw 
during an un-resisted arrest, the ECtHR found a violation.  
6.1.2 Medical Treatment 
In another case against the UK, the ECtHR also considered the positive obligation to 
provide appropriate medical treatment, the lack of which may amount to a violation.
310
 
The case of Keenan
311
 concerns a death in custody, where it was held that the UK had 
failed to provide adequately informed treatment to the applicant’s son who was a known 
suicide risk. Just because an individual is being arrested pursuant to an EAW and not a 
domestic arrest warrant, this does not absolve the E-MS from their ECHR obligations to 
ensure that the rights of individuals in their custody are respected. 
These obligations are also relevant for I-MSs who need to have confidence in the 
criminal justice system of the E-MS. To ensure that HRs are protected at all stages, it is 
important that the arresting police across the EU all abide by the minimum standards 
and safeguard the integrity of the individual. 
6.2 Detention  
The HRs obligations of the E-MS do not end upon surrender. The extended reach of the 
ECHR means that even where HRs violations occur in the I-MS after surrender, the E-
MS may also be held liable by virtue of their act in surrendering the individual to that 
situation. In addition to the treatment upon arrest, MSs must be mindful of detention 
conditions. 
                                                                                                                                         
position was extended from 2 hours to 2 days and includes coverage of the risks and how to minimise 
them. 
309 29462/95, Judgment 28.11.2000 
310 See Kudla (n279) 
311 Keenan v UK, 27229/95, Judgment 3.04.2001 
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6.2.1 Prison Conditions 
Prison conditions are an example of where lawful acts of State agents can result in 
treatment contrary to Article 3. One aspect of detention conditions which the ECtHR 
has considered is allocation of cell space. In Orchowski v. Poland,
312
 the Court stated 
that “extreme lack of space weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the 
purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were 
‘degrading’.”313 In this case, the ECtHR took into account the guidelines of the CPT 
which require at least 7 m
2
 per prisoner, in Orchowski the applicant had suffered a 
violation of Article 3 having been detained in a space of less than 2m
2
 per person. 
Although the application was filed in May 2004, the Court examined prison conditions 
extending until the date of its judgment in 2009.  The Court found evidence of 
conditions that portrayed ongoing violations of Article 3 and based its decision with 
regard to the general statistics produced by the Polish prison service authorities. These 
statistics revealed that, even though the government and the applicant disagreed about 
certain facts surrounding the applicant’s detention, such as allocation of space, “the 
official general statistics, confirmed by the Government, that the rate of overcrowding 
in Polish prisons and remand centres was still at 8.1% in September 2008 and at 4% in 
June 2009.”314 
In the UK following Orchowski, a plethora of cases argued, with no success, that to 
surrender them to Poland and other states would be in violation of Article 3 because 
they would be subjected to overcrowded prisons. The courts adopted a strict reading of 
their obligations under the EAW and also of the high threshold that had to be 
reached.
315
 Ominously, in the case of Balasevics, the court held that the prison 
                                               
312
  17885/04, Judgment 22.10.2009 § 122 
313 Karalevičius v. Lithuania, 53254/99, Judgment 7.04.2005 
314 Orchowski v. Poland,  17885/04 Judgment 22.10.2009 §130 
315 There are numerous cases on this point, see for example R. (on the application of Brand) v Poland 
[2012] EWHC 379 (Admin) 
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conditions described were not unique to Latvia and similar issues would be encountered 
in the UK.
316
 Here the mutual trust appears to be that HRs respect equally fall short. 
Relying on MR, in Klimas
317
 the Court dismissed the appeal stating that only in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ did the court need to examine allegations about prison 
conditions in Category 1 countries.
318
 
Where lack of space is not an issue on its own, other factors may be taken into account 
which together give rise to a violation.  This includes aspects of the detention 
environment including sanitary conditions, sleeping arrangements, access to fresh air 
and natural light and length of detention. One such factor may be the length of time 
spent in detention. For example, in the case of Alver v Estonia,
319
 the fact that the 
applicant was held for three years and seven months in crowded and unsanitary 
conditions contributed substantially to the ECtHR’s assessment of the violation.  
In Peers v Greece,
320
 in addition to detention in a small cell, other restrictions and 
conditions lead the ECtHR to find a violation of Article 3. In addition to being confined 
to his bed due to the lack of space in the segregation wing cell, it was also extremely hot 
with no ventilation and no privacy to use the toilet. Despite being aware of these 
conditions, the authorities took no steps to remedy or improve them, an omission the 
ECtHR found to imply a lack of respect for the applicant. 
The ECtHR has also found violations of Article 3 as a result of the cumulative effect of 
harsh conditions over time, which in themselves may not amount to a violation of 
Article 3. The ECtHR will consider whether the accumulation of harsh conditions may 
                                               
316 Balsevics v Latvia [2012] EWHC 813 (Admin) 
317 R. (on the application of Klimas) v Lithuania [2010] EWHC 2076 (Admin) 
318
 In doing so the Judge relied on the admissibility decision by the ECtHR in K.R.S. v UK (32733/08, 
Decision 2.12.2008). This case concerned removals to Greece under the Dublin II Convention which has 
been subsequently superseded by the M.S.S. v Belgium.  
319  64812/01, Judgment 8.11.2005 
320  28524/95, Judgment 19.04.2001 
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have severely detrimental effects on the applicant.  In Dougoz v Greece,
321
 the 
occupancy levels were “grossly excessive”, the detainees did not have beds, there was 
no hot water, no natural light, and no chance for exercise or nutritious food.  The 
ECtHR held that the cumulative effect of these conditions amounted to degrading 
treatment. 
In addition to the case law of the ECtHR, the reports of both the CPT and of the UN 
Committee Against Torture (CAT) shed further light on the real risk of individuals 
being surrendered to situations, and in particular detention, contrary to Article 3. 
In 2009, the CPT visit to Latvia
322
 revealed persistent ill-treatment of prisoners by 
prison officials. One prisoner had died in his cell due to excessive force from prison 
guards. In addition, the Committee found that prisoners were held in cramped 
conditions (200m
2
 between 60-70 prisoners). The prisoners had no natural light, no hot 
water, and only had access to showers once a week. Opportunities for exercise were 
limited to activities in concrete cubicles. Access to health care was extremely limited: 
one psychiatrist and one physician were on site for 25% of the time and prisoners had to 
pay for non-emergency care. It is interesting to note that the UK Courts did not find the 
report sufficient to displace the lower court’s finding that Mr Valts would have access 
to adequate health care upon surrender.
323
 Mr Valts was diagnosed with HIV and 
Hepatitis C. The UK Court accepted that the CPT report showed a number of major 
shortcomings (in Riga Central Prison out of 170 prisoners with HIV only 10 were 
receiving anti-retroviral drugs) which were counter to the information provided by 
Latvia. Despite this the UK Courts did not consider that the overall picture was “one of 
seriously deficient health care for prisoners”. 
                                               
321  40907/98, Judgment 6.03.2001  
322 CPT, Report to the Latvian Government on the visit to Latvia carried out by the CPT from 3 to 8 
December 2009, CPT/Inf (2011) 22 
323 Valts v Lativia [2010] ECHC 999 (Admin) 
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In 2008, the CPT visited Bulgaria
324
 where it found evidence of extreme prison 
overcrowding (7 prisoners in a cell measuring 15m
2
 and 14 prisoners in a cell of 40m
2
).  
It further found particularly harsh conditions and regimes for prisoners serving life 
sentences.  These conditions included prolonged handcuffing and lack of exposure to 
the outside. 
In 2009, the CPT reported
325
 overcrowding and inadequate facilities in Greek prisons. 
The Committee found instances of 3 or 4 people sharing a single cell; one prison with a 
capacity for 80 had 217 inmates.  Prisoners were sharing beds or sleeping on the floor 
and the mattresses were infested with cockroaches. Hygiene was lacking, the toilets 
were not working and no health care was offered.  
In Poland, the CPT found in 2009 that individuals arrested under suspicion of 
committing crimes experienced excessive force by police during questioning.  The CPT 
commented that it was of “such severity that it could well be considered as amounting 
to torture”.326 This treatment included blows to the soles of the feet and electric shocks 
to the genitals. Furthermore, the CPT found that disciplinary actions brought against the 
officers for the abuse were conducted by colleagues within the police establishment 
rather than by independent authority. In the prisons, the CPT found evidence of 
overcrowding and lack of adequate hygiene, including at one institution no possibility 
of a shower.  The CPT found a total lack of provision for activities for prisoners held on 
remand, which rendered the experience “more punitive than the regime for sentenced 
persons... oppressive and stultifying”. 
                                               
324 CPT, Report to the Bulgarian Government on the visit to Bulgaria carried out by the CPT from 15 to 
19 December 2008, CPT/Inf (2010) 29 
325 CPT, Report to the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece carried out by the CPT from 17 to 29 
September 2009, CPT/Inf (2010) 33 
326CPT, Report to the Polish Government on the visit to Poland carried out by the CPT from 26 
November to 8 December 2009, CPT/Inf (2011) 20,12 
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In addition to the work of the CPT in this field, the work of CAT also considers 
detention conditions, regimes and policies, highlighting issues and making 
recommendations to the State Party concerned. In June 2011 it published its concluding 
observations on Ireland.
327
 It expressed concern about the overcrowding and continued 
use of “slopping-out” in some prisons, in addition to the deficient provision of 
healthcare in a number of prisons. In May 2010 in its concluding observations on 
France it described overcrowding in prisons as critical and alarming.  
The above cases and reports do not paint a pretty picture of detention conditions across 
the EU. They illustrate that HRs problems exist in relation to prison conditions and that 
it is not simply a moot point but a live issue. Courts executing an EAW are therefore 
under an obligation to examine such allegations, making use of the available material. 
6.2.2 Prison Regimes 
Even in those institutions where the conditions are of a good standard, detention may 
fall foul of Article 3 because of the prison regime imposed on individuals. Whilst the 
regime in principle may comply with the Article 3 requirements, it is the effect on the 
individual and their human dignity which will play a key role in the assessment.  
One example of a prison regime is strip searches. Whilst the ECtHR accepts that strip 
searches may be occasionally necessary for security reasons,
328
 it maintains that they 
require a heightened level of justification.
329
 The ECtHR held that the regime Mr Van 
der Ven was subjected to what amounted to degrading treatment.
330
 He was kept in a 
high security prison and subjected to automatic weekly strip searches including anal 
inspections and were inflicted without any regard as to whether or not the applicant had 
                                               
327 CAT/C/ IRL/CO/1, 17.06.2011 
328 For example, in McFeeley and others v. UK ( 8317/78, Judgment 15.05.1980) the ECtHR held that 
strip-searches of prisoners who had in the past concealed dangerous objects in their orifices was 
reasonable even when performed at intervals of 7-10 days before and after visits and transfer to a new 
wing of the prison. 
329 Lorse v. Netherlands,  52750/99, Judgment 4.02.2003 
330 Van der Ven (n302) 
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been exposed to the outside world. In Lithuania, when a detainee was ordered to strip 
naked in the presence of a female police officer and had his genitals examined by 
guards, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3.
331
  
What will be evaluated is the effect on the individual, other examples include 
segregation
332
 and mandatory work
333
. 
In its 2009 report on Greece
334
 the CPT found that female prisoners were subjected to 
vaginal searches every time they left the prison facility. In its 2010 concluding 
observations on France, CAT expressed concern for the high level of suicides including 
15% being committed whilst in solitary confinement whose use CAT also expressed 
concern.  CAT further expressed concern at the intrusive and humiliating nature of body 
searches, especially internal whose frequency and methods is by the prison authorities 
themselves.
335
 
Once again both the caselaw and CPT reports highlight the real risk of an individual 
being subjected to regimes in the EU falling foul of Article 3. These demonstrate that 
such high-level MR is perhaps premature, requiring further work to be done on raising 
the standards in practice. 
6.3 Executing State Responsibility Under Article 3 
Extradition is another example of where a lawful act of a State authority can indirectly 
amount to an Article 3 violation. There is no right to not be extradited and in fact it is a 
procedure that has been employed legally by sovereign states for many years. 
                                               
331 Valašinas v Lithuania, 44558/98, Judgment 24.07.2001. It is also interesting to note that in this case 
the ECtHR found that the applicant’s detention in cells which measured 2.7m2 and 3.2m2 did not violate 
Article 3 because this restriction was compensated by the freedom of movement granted to him during the 
day. 
332 See Mathew v. the Netherlands (24919/03, Judgment 29.09.2005) where he was kept in solitary 
confinement for 19 months. 
333 Nazarenko v. Ukraine, 39042/97, Judgment 29.04.2003 
334 CPT, Report to the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece carried out by the CPT from 17 to 29 
September 2009, CPT/Inf (2010) 33 
335 CAT/C/FRA/CO/4-6 
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Nevertheless, the responsibility of the State is engaged when extraditing or surrendering 
an individual to a situation which would violate Article 3. 
The obligation stems from the seminal case of Soering, where a German national was 
resisting extradition to the US where if convicted he would face the prospects of years 
on “death row” which the ECtHR held violated Article 3. The question the ECtHR 
considered for the first time was whether the UK’s responsibility was engaged under the 
ECHR. It affirmatively held that “where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
country.”336 
This has since been confirmed in numerous judgments,
337
 In establishing this obligation 
it is not the ECtHR’s intention to create safe havens for fugitives, rather it is ensuring 
that the spirit of the ECHR is complied with and that the absolute nature of Article 3 is 
enforced. This position has been endorsed by the EU. In addition to Article 4 CFR, 
Article 19(2) CFR provides that,  
No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or 
other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
In the CFR Explanatory text, it states that Article 19(2) incorporates the case law of the 
ECtHR regarding Article 3 ECHR, citing the cases of Ahmed v. Austria
338
 and Soering.  
A review of EU legislative documents and other sources shows that the use of ‘serious’ 
                                               
336 Soering (n177) §91. Following the ECtHR judgment, the UK obtained further assurances from the US 
and Mr Soering was extradited to the US where he was convicted of the double murder. Those curious to 
know the fate of Mr Soering may visit his own website at: www.jenssoering.com/ 
337 Chahal (n246). The principle has also been endorsed as applicable under the ICCPR by the UN 
Human Rights Committee in Kindler v Canada (470/1991, 30.07.1991, CCPR/C/48/D/370/1990 §6.2). 
338 Ahmed v Austria, 25964/94, Judgment of 17.12.1996 
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rather than ‘real’ risk is not significant and that these words are used interchangeably 
throughout the EU acquis.
339
   
6.3.1 Burden of Proof 
Where an individual sustains injury whilst in detention, the burden of proof is on the 
State to prove that it was not inflicted by the police officers or that it was inflicted in 
justifiable circumstances.
340
 
However in other situations, despite extradition itself not being equated as criminal, the 
Article 3 standard of proof (burden on individual) equates to a criminal standard of 
proof. The evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a real risk of ill 
treatment exists.
341
 Given the potential impact on an individual, taken together with the 
fact that the I-MS no longer has to show a prima facie case, it is arguable that the 
standard should be lower for the individual. The Irish Supreme Court appears to be in 
agreement. In Rettinger
342
  they state that when considering the level of danger, the 
individual does not have to show that they will probably suffer prohibited treatment but 
that there is a real risk of it; the court dismisses a lower burden of a mere possibility. 
The standard of proof is less then proving it is probable but more than showing it is a 
mere possibility. The court is clear that whilst there is an evidential burden on the 
individual, the court must conduct a rigorous test and if necessary obtain additional 
material on its own motion. Once a risk is established it is up to the I-MS to provide 
evidence to the contrary. The Irish Supreme Court in Rettinger also provides 
                                               
339 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), Opinion no. 3-2006: The 
Human Rights Responsibilities of the EU Member States in the Context of the CIA Activities in Europe 
(‘Extraordinary Renditions’), 25.05.2006, Cfr-cdf.opinion3.2006 
340 Tomasi v France, 12850/87, Judgment 27.08.1992 
341 Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia, 36378/02, judgment 12.10.2005, §338 
342
 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v Rettinger [2010] IESC 45. The test set out in Rettinger 
has been applied in subsequent cases by the Irish courts but with little success on the part of individuals 
resisting surrender; see MJE v Siwy [2011] IEHC 252; MJELR v Mazurek [2011] IEHC 204 (evidence 
provided of historical nature whilst recent government statistics show different story); Minister for Justice 
& Equality v Rajki 2012 IEHC 270 (evidence not sufficiently cogent or related to own region). 
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clarification on the test to be applied stating that the objectives of the EAWFD system 
cannot defeat an established real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. 
Currently, it is normally for the individual to show “substantial grounds” that Article 3 
would be violated.
343
  
It is also not sufficient to point to a general situation alone or to a finding that detention 
conditions in one prison have been found to be in violation of Article 3. Individuals 
must show that there is a real risk of prohibited treatment being inflicted against them 
specifically. In the case of Salah Sheekh it was sufficient to show the threat to a 
minority clan in Somalia and that the individual was a member of this clan. By analogy, 
if it is certain that an individual will be detained in a specific prison where the 
overcrowding levels have been assessed as being contrary to Article 3, this may be 
sufficient. In Targosinski,
344
 the court stated that a finding of the ECtHR of a systematic 
violation could be regarded as clear and cogent evidence of the risk. 
We repeatedly see, in cases where surrender is resisted on the basis of prison conditions 
and the court’s rejection of the argument on the basis that a real risk to the individual 
has not been proven.
345
  
6.3.2 Assurances 
Where such risk has been proven assurances have been obtained from the I-MS that the 
individual will not be placed in that particular prison. Where an international convention 
applies, States are obliged to investigate whether application of the domestic or 
international law would comply with the ECHR.
346
 The ECtHR has imposed procedural 
                                               
343 A mere possibility is not sufficient. See Vilvarajah and Others v. UK, 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 
13447/87, and 13448/87, Judgment 30.10.1991, §107; H.L.R. v. France, 24573/94, Judgment 29.04.1997, 
§37; Hilal v. UK, 45276/99, Judgment 6.03.2001, §60 
344 Targosinski v Judicial Authority of Poland [2011] EWHC 312 (Admin) 
345 See Krzyzak v Poland [2012] EWHC 810 (Admin) 
346 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, 41615/07, Judgment 6.07.2010. In this case the ECtHR 
examined an alleged violation of Article 8 for the return of a child to Israel under the Hague Convention 
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duties on domestic courts to investigate possible violations of Convention articles even 
where diplomatic assurances are supplied.  
Diplomatic assurances and accession to international treaties do not necessarily replace 
this duty “to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical application, a 
sufficient guarantee”. 347 Whilst diplomatic assurances from countries such as Tunisia348 
or India
349
 have not been sufficient to dismiss the responsibility of states, there have 
been instances where the ECtHR has been satisfied.  
In José Alejandro Peñafiel Salgado v. Spain,
350
 the Court recalled its constant 
jurisprudence that extradition may raise an issue under Article 3, and the implied 
obligation not to extradite the individual to the country in question. It reiterated that in 
doing so the State would be acting in a manner inconsistent with the “common heritage 
of political traditions, respect for freedom and the rule of law” referred to in the 
Preamble of the Convention. In the present case the Court stated that Spain should 
consider the dangers involved in the extradition in light of the principles established by 
the ECtHR jurisprudence, to assess if the consequences of sending the applicant to 
Ecuador were likely to invoke Article 3.  The responsibility of a state for exposing 
someone to the risk of Article 3 prohibited treatment is to be assessed on the basis of the 
circumstances which the state in question knew or should have known at the time of the 
extradition, although this does not prevent the Court from considering later information, 
which can be used to assess whether the state concerned considered the merits of an 
applicant's fears.  
                                                                                                                                         
on Child Abduction. While it preserved the role of the Swiss courts in applying its own interpretation of 
international agreements, it found that the family situation revealed emotional, psychological, and 
material factors that weighed against return of the child and would deem the return contrary to Article 8. 
347 Saadi v. Italy (n296) §148 
348 ibid 
349 Chahal (n244) 
350 Salgado (n591) 
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The Court noted that on the applicant’s own admission, his application to the Court 
helped to ensure his own security in Ecuador (knowledge of the Rule 39 interim 
measure was widespread, and various institutions in Ecuador including the President 
were forced to provide assurances to the Court that the applicant’s rights would be 
respected in Ecuador). Accordingly, the Court found that the circumstances of this case 
and the assurances given by the Government of Ecuador were likely to avert the danger 
of abuse that the complainant was afraid of before his extradition. In addition and in 
similar vein to its current stance vis a vis EU MSs, the Court noted that in any event and 
for any alleged infringement of his HRs as the applicant may suffer, Ecuador is party to 
the American Convention on Human Rights since 1977 and had recognized the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1984.  
Before the UK courts, diplomatic assurances and declarations have been deemed 
sufficient to erase the risk of Article 3 prohibited treatment. In S
351
 the assurance that 
sufficient medication would be available for the individual meant that S could be 
surrendered. In La Torre,
352
 a declaration that the individual would not be subjected to 
the Article 41 bis treatment was again deemed sufficient by the UK courts despite the 
practical effectiveness of the declaration being disputed.
353
 
It is likely that assurances from an EU MS be accepted as sufficient. The two key 
reasons for this are firstly mutual trust and secondly that as signatories to the ECHR the 
individual will not lose their right to petition the ECtHR if promises are not kept. 
                                               
351 S v Poland [2010] EWHC 915 (Admin) 
352 La Torre v Italy [2007] EWHC 1370 (Admin) 
353 Article 41 bis referred to the regime in place to tackle the mafia. In the judgment the court states and 
cites that it “operates with the intention of effectively ‘breaking’ people so as to induce them to make 
confessions and co-operate with the authorities.” The lower Court had accepted that the operation of the 
Article 41 bis regime has, in the past, resulted in ‘mistreatment’ of prisoners. The consistency of 
complaints, the number of independent enquiries and the failure of the Italian authorities properly to 
investigate the allegations all give cause for concern. 
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Nevertheless the ECtHR line of jurisprudence remains relevant; in particular the 
requirement that if assurances are sought, the sending state has to have the power to 
monitor compliance. For example, in Egypt, visiting the individual in prison was not 
enough since this was always done in the presence of prison guards.
354
 Likewise 
surrendering a refugee to Italy and only obtaining a guarantee that he would face a fair 
trial will not be sufficient when there is a possibility of onward removal contrary to 
Article 3. Even when surrendering under the EAW, the E-MS must ensure that the 
individual is protected from all foreseeable risks.
355
 
6.4 A Closer Look at Article 3 and the EAW / The threshold 
Failures to fulfill and respect obligations under Article 3 have wider implications for the 
principle of MR in criminal matters and the AFSJ. Article 3 and its jurisprudence sets 
out the standards and benchmarks of acceptable use of force during arrest and the 
conditions of detention. These standards are of equal applicability to both the E-MS 
following an EAW arrest and also the I-MS. The Soering line of jurisprudence links the 
duty of the I-MS, in relation to the surrendered person, to the obligations of the E-MS. 
If substantial grounds exist to believe that there is a risk of Article 3 prohibited 
treatment upon surrender, then the E-MS cannot surrender. This is elaborated in both 
the M.S.S. and N.S. cases considered in the next section. 
In resisting surrender an individual can allege that upon surrender they would face the 
prohibited treatment. Before UK courts different arguments seem to be particularly 
popular at different phases. Their popularity may be due to an ECtHR judgment or due 
to it being successfully run before a UK court. As seen above the ECtHR cases finding a 
                                               
354 Agiza v Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005) 
355 See (1) Habib Ignaoua, (2) Mohamed Salah Ben Hamadi Khemiri & (3) Ali Ben Zidane Chehidi v The 
Judicial Authority of the Courts of Milan, The Serious and Organised Crime Agency, The Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 2619 (Admin). There are two applications pending before 
the ECtHR, one against the UK and the other against Italy. The UK case relates to the risk of onward 
removal to Tunisia by Italy following their surrender under the respective EAWs. The case against Italy 
concerns the immediate issuance of expulsion orders following acquittal for the charges they were 
surrendered for.  
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violation of Article 3 against Poland because of overcrowding in certain prisons, led to a 
sharp increase this argument being run before UK courts.  
Individuals successfully resisting surrender because of a suicide risk also had a butterfly 
effect increasing the number of individuals claiming that if surrendered they would 
commit suicide. What both these examples illustrate is that the UK courts will quickly 
take a strict and stern approach to ‘copycat’ pleadings; meaning that few are successful. 
In terms of the burden of proof it is placed very high for an individual to establish a real 
suicide risk.  Mr Jansons
356
 successfully resisted surrender, the court noted that he had 
previously tried and almost succeeded in committing suicide. In addition evidence 
indicated that surrender would impact on his mental health and that this would lead him 
to trying again. Despite assurances from the Latvian authorities that they would take 
care of him, the UK court found that these were striking and unusual circumstances and 
it would therefore be disproportionate to surrender him. 
The high benchmark is reflected in all cases where Article 3 arguments are made. 
Strong evidence needs to be adduced showing that the authorities would not be able to 
protect an individual
357
 or that they would cause harm to the individual. In 
Ogonwoski,
358
 the fact that several years had passed since the police previously beat 
him up. This taken with the fact that he would spend little time in custody meant that 
the risk he would be beaten when surrendered was low. 
Perhaps the most difficult to reconcile with the E-MS’s obligations are judgments such 
as Mr Symeou’s. Mr Symeou provided evidence that the two key witnesses against him 
had been held incommunicado and subjected to intimidation before agreeing to sign 
identical statements in a language they did not know; statements which were revoked on 
                                               
356 Jansons v Latvia [2009] EWHC 1845 (Admin) 
357 See Nawara v Poland [2011] EWHC 3725 (Admin) 
358 Ogonowski v Poland [2007] EWHC 2445 (Admin) 
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return to the UK. The UK courts held that the matters complained of were for the trial 
judge in the I-MS to consider and not factors which could displace their obligation to 
surrender him under the EAWFD.
359
 Evidence showing previous and recent behavior of 
authorities was not enough to prevent surrender. It needs to be noted that such 
arguments are not about whether the evidence shows a prima facie case, but rather a 
need to assure that the individual will not be subjected to the same treatment. This 
obliges the E-MS to conduct a closer examination of the realities the individual may 
face, where appropriate to obtain assurances and where necessary to refuse surrender, 
despite of MR.  
6.4.1 A Bizarre Alchemy 
24. The passage makes it clear that the desirability of extradition is a factor 
to be taken into account in deciding whether the punishment likely to be 
imposed in the receiving state attains the “minimum level of severity” which 
would make it inhuman and degrading. Punishment which counts as 
inhuman and degrading in the domestic context will not necessarily be so 
regarded when the extradition factor has been taken into account.
360
 
Extradition is not a magic ingredient which when added to the mix makes treatment 
assessed as inhuman and degrading less heinous. How can the search for justice justify 
Article 3 prohibited treatment? Article 3 contains a threshold scale and in spite of the 
classification of the Article 3 treatment it is absolutely prohibited. Complicity in a HRs 
violation which occurred by virtue of a state's decision to surrender an individual works 
two ways. Firstly, it forces states to protect the rights of all those within its jurisdiction 
and to not simply wash their hands of 'undesirables'. As Nelson Mandela said “A nation 
should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but it’s lowest ones” usually 
the ‘undesirables’. Secondly, it helps promote HRs by encouraging/enticing states to 
                                               
359
 Symeou v Greece [2009] EWHC 897 (Admin) 
360 R (on the application of Wellington) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice) [2008] UKHL 72, per Lord 
Hoffman. The application to the ECtHR was struck out when the applicant informed the ECtHR that he 
wished to return to the USA to stand trial. Wellington v UK,  60682/08, Admissibility Decision 5.10.2010. 
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respect HRs. The carrot in this scenario being the promise of greater cooperation with 
other states. If a state wants to provide justice it needs to do so with clean hands by 
respecting due process and providing safeguards. 
28. Treating article 3 as applicable only in an attenuated form if the question 
arises in the context of extradition or other forms of removal to a foreign 
state is consistent with the ECHR’s jurisprudence on the applicability of 
other Convention articles in a foreign context.
361
 
The above paragraph from, Wellington shows that both the ECtHR jurisprudence and 
Lord Bingham's judgment in Ullah in relation to the strength of the alleged treatment 
have been misinterpreted. It is clear that what is said in Ullah is meant for rights “other 
than Article 3”.  
 While the Strasbourg jurisprudence does not preclude reliance on articles 
other than article 3 as a ground for resisting extradition or expulsion, it 
makes it quite clear that successful reliance demands presentation of a very 
strong case.
362
 
Borrowing from the words of Lord Scott,
363
 if it would constitute torture in one EU MS 
it would constitute torture in all EU MS. That is after all the foundation of MR and the 
mutual trust and confidence that HRs are equally protected across all MSs. Thus if the 
treatment equates to Article 3 prohibited treatment in the E-MS, the same will be true of 
the treatment when carried out in the I-MS and thus surrender is not permitted. 
Requiring an ‘attenuated form’ of the same treatment before surrender will be refused, 
only because it is in the context of extradition is a warped sense of justice. 
The Article 3 test of the treatment is subjective and the relativist approach can be 
applied when considering the seriousness of the offence and proportionality of the 
punishment. The meaning of §89 in Soering has been over the years distorted.  
                                               
361 Ibid per Lord Hoffman 
362 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 A C 323, §24 (Emphasis added) 
363 “that that which would constitute torture for Article 3 purposes in Europe would constitute torture for 
those purposes everywhere.” ibid §40 
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What amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment depends 
upon all the circumstances of the case. . . As movement around the world 
becomes easier and crime takes on a large international dimension, it is 
increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee 
abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe 
havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the State obliged to 
harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the foundation of 
extradition. These considerations must also be included among the factors to 
be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the notions of 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition cases.
364
 
For example in an equation, if the person is wanted for theft of a chocolate bar for 
which he can only be prosecuted in the I-MS the weight given to the interest of bringing 
him to justice would not be as strong as if he was wanted for murder. 
Taking Soering back to basics what is being referred to there is ultimately the 
proportionality of the punishment. So once again it could be considered inhuman to 
hold a person in maximum security for 25 years for stealing the chocolate bar, however 
the same punishment would not necessarily violate Art 3 if he had been committed of 
murder. However once the potential treatment has been assessed as prohibited by 
Article 3 (in accordance with the ECtHR jurisprudence) that should be the end.  The fact 
that the assessment is part of extradition proceedings does not raise the threshold bar. 
What Soering does not do is to set a lower threshold in the domestic context and a 
higher threshold if the person is to be extradited. The threshold set by the ECtHR is the 
same in all circumstances. Citing the cases of Chahal and Saadi v Italy, Lord Brown 
disagrees with Lord Hoffman, whilst it is obviously desirable for Mr Wellington to be 
extradited and tried rather than securing a safe haven in the UK, the threshold of what 
equates to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is not heightened.
365
 He 
concludes that there is “...no room in the Strasbourg jurisprudence for a concept such as 
the risk of a flagrant violation of article 3’s absolute prohibition against inhuman or 
                                               
364 Soering (n177) §89 
365 Wellington (n360) §85 
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degrading treatment or punishment (akin to that of the risk of a “flagrant denial of 
justice”).”366 
In addition to the proportionality of punishment Soering lists other circumstances which 
may be relevant, 
...The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it 
depends upon all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and 
context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its 
execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, 
the sex, age and state of health of the victim.
367
 
A state is free to elect a higher national standard. Perhaps the problem is wrongly 
assessing the treatment in accordance with the domestic standards which may be higher 
than the ECHR ones and then feeling the need to adjust this assessment to the particular 
circumstances of the case. It is not required that the higher domestic standard is applied 
to circumstances in other states, their standards are to be assessed (at a minimum) in 
accordance with the ECHR standards. These norms are of equal application to the 
EAW. 
The desirability of not creating safe havens and ensuring that individuals do not escape 
justice are considerations which factor into the assessment of the treatment. Once it has 
been ascertained that the treatment or punishment in the other state would not comply 
with Art 3, the obligation not to submit the individual to that treatment is absolute 
irrespective of whether they would escape justice. As recalled by Lord Carswell, in 
Saadi v Italy
368
 the ECtHR makes clear that “the risks to the expelling state if such a 
person is not deported cannot be weighed against the risk of his ill-treatment in the 
receiving state”. This is one of the modifications to Soering, the undesirability of 
                                               
366 ibid §86 
367 Soering (n177) §100 
368 (n296) §138 
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housing an individual who has escaped justice because of the Article 3 bar to his 
extradition cannot be weighed against the Article 3 assessment of his treatment. 
6.5 Principle of Equivalent Protection  
“Obviously one cannot approach the issue of extradition to a state which is not a party 
to the Convention as if its provisions applied there with full force”369 but the protection 
on offer needs to be comparable. The principle of equivalent protection was developed 
by the ECtHR after Soering. It clearly states that whilst MSs are free to give part of 
their sovereignty to international regimes and agreements, they still remain bound by 
their ECHR obligations. As such they need to ensure that their actions do not violate an 
individual's rights, even when it would be caused by a foreign state. So whilst the 
ECHR does not apply in full force to the USA, Council of Europe MSs need to be 
satisfied that the treatment in the USA would be compliant with the ECHR standards. 
As such paragraph 86 of Soering
370
  has been modified by subsequent ECtHR cases.
371
  
When called upon to adjudicate on the HRs compliance of a MS in fulfilment of their 
obligations under another intergovernmental organisation, the ECtHR will assess 
whether this other system has sufficient built-in protection (both substantial and 
enforcement mechanisms). It will then take one of two avenues; as De Jesus Butler 
describes it where protection is lacking it will revert to a “parochial approach” and 
where it believes it is sufficient it will adopt an “international constitutional 
                                               
369 Wellington (n360) §56 per Lord Carswell 
370 “Article 1 cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that, notwithstanding its 
extradition obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender an individual unless satisfied that the 
conditions awaiting him in the country of destination are in full accord with each of the safeguards of the 
Convention.” 
371 See for example Şirketi Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland, 45036/98, [GC] 
Judgment 30.06.2005 (also referred to as the Bosphorus case) 
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approach”.372 In order to ascertain the adequacy of the HRs protection, the ECtHR has 
developed the principle of equivalent effect. This was set out in Şirketi,373  
By “equivalent” the Court means “comparable”; any requirement that the 
organisation's protection be “identical” could run counter to the interest of 
international cooperation pursued (see paragraph 150 above). However, any 
such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to 
review in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights protection. 
Şirketi concerned the impounding of an aircraft in accordance with an EC regulation 
implementing an UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). Membership of 
international organisations and compliance with the obligations which flow from such 
membership, including the EU, is regarded the pursuit of a legitimate aim.
374
 The 
ECHR does not prohibit the transfer of sovereign power to an international organisation. 
The ECtHR will assess the protection mechanism of the international organisation, 
however it is the Contracting Party which remains responsible for HRs violations.
375
 
This is true even when the transfer to an international organisation alters the due process 
mechanism. 
156.  If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the 
organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the 
requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal 
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation. 
The Şirketi case creates a presumption that the EU provides equivalent protection of 
HRs in terms of both substantive and procedural guarantees.
376
 However the 
presumption is rebuttable if the protection is considered ‘manifestly deficient’. If this is 
the case the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the ECHR. 
There is therefore a two step test; (1) are HRs protected in a comparable way by the 
other regime, if they are the presumption is that the State acted incompliance with the 
                                               
372 Israel De Jesus Butler, Securing human rights in the face of international integration, ICLQ 2011, 
60(1), 125-65 
373 Şirketi (n371) §155 
374 Ibid §150, citing S.A. Dangeville v. France,  36677/97, Judgment 16.04.2002 
375 Ibid §152-4 
376 Ibid §159-65 
Chapter Six: Prohibited Treatment 
149 
 
ECHR;(2) has evidence been presented to show that the protection in the present case is 
‘manifestly deficient’, noting that the applicant must raise the issue .377 Further 
clarification has been set out in Biret, where the ECtHR held that an act of the MS is 
required in order for them to be complicit in any HRs interference.
378
 However where 
the case only concerns the act of the international organisation, the ECtHR will continue 
to identify a manifest deficiency of HRs protection where the complaint concerns a 
“structural deficit in the internal mechanism for conflict resolution”.379  
In EAW cases there is clearly an act of a MS, initially by the I-MS and possibly also by 
the E-MS. As we have seen there is a strong presumption that the EU provides an 
equivalent protection of HRs. However it is possible to rebut this presumption if in the 
particular case there was a manifest deficiency in the protection of HRs. Arguably there 
is a structural deficit in the internal mechanism, namely that MR prevents the E-MS 
from conducting a full ECtHR compliant assessment unless the high threshold is to 
rebut the MR presumption is first met. Additionally in part the reason why the Şirketi 
presumption in relation to the EU is relatively strong is because of the HRs protection 
offered by the CJEU. Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
380
 the adjudication 
of third pillar measures, including the EAWFD, was restricted. Post-Lisbon it continues 
to be restricted in relation to the UK.
381
 Arguably it should be easier to rebut the 
                                               
377 There have been a number of other cases which apply the equivalent protection principle however they 
concern obligations flowing from other international organisations (such as the UN and NATO) and as 
such do not add anything further to the presumption in relation to the EU. For example the cases of 
Behrami and Behrami v France ( 71412/01) and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, (78166/01, 
Admissibility Decision 2.05.2007 §151) were distinguished from Şirketi because the acts did not occur on 
the territory of the State but also because they concerned the acts of troops which the ECtHR held were 
attributable to the UN. The ECtHR specifically states that there was “a fundamental distinction...their 
actions were directly attributable to the UN, an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its 
imperative collective security objective.” 
378 In the present case the applicant was an importer of beef from the USA whose business dissolved 
because of two EU Directives banned the importation of USA beef because of the use of prohibited 
hormones. La Societe Etablissements Biret Et Cie S.A. Et La Societe Biret International c. 15 Etats, 
13762/04, Decision 09.12.2008 
379 Gasparini v Italy and Belgium,  10750/03, Decision 12.05.2009 
380 (n173) 
381 The UK negotiated Protocol 21 in the Treaty of Lisbon extending the opt-in procedure to include 
proposals under what had been Third Pillar provisions. Under the TFEU the jurisdiction of the CJEU has 
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presumption in relation to the UK’s implementation of the EAW. The reality is that the 
scrutiny conducted by the ECtHR is superficial and provided that the regime normally 
protects HRs and has the mechanism in place it will be satisfied of the required 
equivalence.
382
 
The CJEU has taken a giant leap forward, making it clear that international agreements 
and obligations need to be compliant with EU law and consequently also the ECHR.
383
 
The CJEU in the Kadi case was called to consider the potential conflict between a 
UNSCR and EU law which led to the freezing of assets belonging to a list people 
suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda.
384
 Mr Kadi and Mr Al Barakaat sought the 
annulment of the regulation on the basis of lack of competence and violation of their 
fundamental rights. The Court of First Instance
385
 dismissed the case on the basis that 
they lacked jurisdiction to review the claims given that UN law prevailed over EU law. 
On the other hand the CJEU found the opposite, whilst they could not review the 
lawfulness of the UNSCR, they were able to rule on the EU measure implementing the 
said UNSCR. The CJEU stated that not only did they have jurisdiction but they were 
under an obligation to ensure that all EU law was compatible with the constitutional 
values of the EU including the rule of law and fundamental rights, thus bypassing the 
principle of equivalent effect. 
                                                                                                                                         
been extended to AFSJ (Title V) measures. This extended jurisdiction is subject to a 5-year transitional 
period under Article 10 of Protocol 36 (which expires on 30 November 2014). During this time the 
powers of the CJEU in relation to Third Pillar measures adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon came into 
force remain the same as previously under the TEU. In relation to the UK this means that the CJEU has 
no jurisdiction to make preliminary rulings. See House of Lords, European Union Committee - Thirteenth 
Report, EU police and criminal justice measures: The UK's 2014 opt-out decision, 16 April 2013 
382 See Tobias Lock, Beyond Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the 
Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under the European Convention of 
Human Rights, HRLR 10 (2010), 529-45 
383 Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council [2005] ECR II-03533 and 
Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-03649. See also C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 
[2008] ECR I-06351 
384
 The applicants were designated by the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council for the 
purpose of Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000) and added to the list maintained by the UN Security 
Council. Implementing the UNSCR the EU adopted Regulation 467/2001, adding the names of the 2 
applicants to their list of designated persons, 
385 Yusuf (n383) and Kadi (n383) 
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It follows from the foregoing that the Community judicature must, in 
accordance with the powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty, ensure the 
review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Community acts 
in light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law, including review of Community measures 
which, like the contested regulation, are designed to give effect to the 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations. [§324] 
 
Taking into account the security concerns and aims of the UN, the CJEU distinguishes 
itself from the position adopted by the ECtHR in cases like Samrati and Behrami,
386
  
it is none the less the task of the Community judicature to apply, in the 
course of the judicial review it carries out, techniques which accommodate, 
on the one hand, legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources 
of information taken into account in the adoption of the act concerned and, 
on the other, the need to accord the individual a sufficient measure of 
procedural justice… 387 
 
The CJEU makes it clear that these do not displace the judicial review powers of the 
court and the need for individuals to have access to justice.
 388
  
                                               
386 Behrami; Saramati (n377) 
387 ibid §344 
388 There is vast literature on the Kadi Judgments, see , E. de Wet, ‘Holding the United Nations Security 
Council accountable for human rights violations through domestic and regional courts: a case of ‘be 
careful what you wish for'?’, in J. Farrall, K. Rubenstein, J. Farrall & K. Rubenstein (Eds.), Sanctions, 
accountability and governance in a globalised world, 2009, 143-168; S Besson, European Legal 
Pluralism after Kadi, EuConst 5 (2009); K.S Ziegler, Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting 
International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights, Human Rights 
Law Review (2009) 9 (2): 288-305; A Cuyvers, Case Comment: The Kadi II judgment of the General 
Court: the ECJ's predicament and the consequences for Member States, E.C.L. Review 481, 2011; J 
Kokott and C Sobotta,  The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Finding the 
Balance? EJIL 23 (2012), 1015–1024; M Tzanou, Casenote on Joined Cases C‐402/05 P & C‐415/05 
P Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union & 
Commission of the European Communities, German Law Journal, Vol. 10 No. 02 2009. For a 
consideration of the differing views of Advocate General Maduro and the CFI see, J Larik, Two Ships in 
the Night orin the Same Boat Together?Why the European Court of Justice Made the Right Choice in the 
Kadi Case, College of Europe EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2009 and T Tridimas and JA Gutierrez-Fonsy, EU 
Law, International Law, and Economic Sanctions Against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? 
Fordham International Law Journal Vol. 32: 660, 2009. On 18 July 2013 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU 
delivered a second judgment in favour of Mr Kadi (known as Kadi II). It held again that even where the 
UN is concerned, the EU is still required to ensure that a review of the lawfulness of the EU measure is 
conducted. Secondly it held that the judicial review of whether sufficient basis existed to list Mr Kadi had 
to be based on a “sufficiently solid factual basis” and that whilst not all evidence had to be produced, at 
least one sufficiently justified reason had to be presented. In holding this, it rejected Advocate General 
Bot’s opinion that judicial review of UN sanctions concerning counter-terrorism had to be “limited”. The 
CJEU concluded that none of the allegations had been supported by evidence and thus the Regulation 
listing Mr Kadi should be annulled. Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission, 
Council, United Kingdom v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, 18 July 2013  
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The strong stance in the face of UNSCR highlights the primacy of HRs and the rule of 
law within the EU legal framework. This goes some way in explaining why explicit 
provisions on HRs are not deemed necessary by the CJEU or the legislative bodies of 
the EU. The message is clear that all EU measures, including those addressing security 
threats, must comply with fundamental rights. The need to codify these obligations with 
specific relevance arises when conflicting messages are sent by central principles (such 
as MR) and primary aims of measures (such as combating serious cross-border crime). 
In theory, these, just like UNSCR, cannot undermine HRs and the ability of individuals 
to challenge the implementation of EU measures on this basis. In practice MSs require 
the occasional reminder and national courts require a specific mandate to displace the 
appearance that MR has primacy over fundamental rights. 
6.6 An Asylum Analogy 
The question is whether the EAWFD, the numerous EU proclamations of commitments 
to HRs and of course membership of the ECHR are a sufficient basis for MSs to dismiss 
their usual obligations under Article 3 (and other rights). This has in part been answered 
by both the ECtHR and the CJEU. Although these judgments were in the context of the 
EU asylum acquis, by analogy they can be applicable to MR measures in criminal 
matters.
389
 
                                               
389 Since 1999 the EU has been developing a common asylum Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) and by 2005 several legislative measures harmonising common minimum standards for asylum 
were adopted. In 2007 consultation begun to improve the CEAS, resulting in the adoption of revised 
legislation. Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national is replaced by Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person when it enters into 
force on 20 July 2015; Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards 
for the reception of asylum seekers is replaced by Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 
protection when it enters into force on 21 July 2015; Council Directive 2005/85/EC 
of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status is replaced by Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 
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With regards to the obligation on MSs to investigate prison conditions, lessons can be 
taken from the approach to the duty in relation to conditions that individuals will face 
upon deportation in the asylum context. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,
390
 the ECtHR 
held that states have a duty to investigate the reality that asylum seekers removed under 
the Dublin II Regulations would face. By returning individuals to Greece, where there 
was a real risk their Article 3 right would be violated, Belgium would be in violation of 
Article 3. The violations occurred both due to the detention conditions in Greece, and 
on the basis of the procedural inadequacies of the Greek system that put him at risk of 
onward deportation to Afghanistan where he faced a risk of ill-treatment. In M.S.S., the 
ECtHR held that existence of domestic laws and international treaties are not in 
themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection.  States continue to be under an 
obligation to investigate the circumstances asylum seekers will face upon return.   
In addition, the ECtHR maintained that the burden of presenting evidence of a risk of 
ill-treatment is not entirely on the individual; states must show reports of their 
investigation.  Reports that are framed in “stereotyped” terms will not be considered as 
evidence of a convincing investigation into the true circumstances. The ultimate test is 
the Osman
391
 formulation; whether a state knew or ought to have known that conditions 
                                                                                                                                         
when it enters into force on 21 July 2015; Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted is replaced 
by Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, 
and for the content of the protection granted when it enters into force on 21 December 2013; and Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention is replaced by 
Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation 
(EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by 
Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-
scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice when it enters into force on 20 July 2015. 
390 30696/09, [GC] Judgment 21.01.11 
391 Osman (n625) 
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of detention in another state would give rise to an Article 3 violation. If the answer is 
yes, the state will be in violation of Article 3 when sending an individual into those 
circumstances.  
In NS,
392
 the CJEU takes the baton from the ECtHR affirming its findings in M.S.S..  As 
with the EAWFD, the CJEU first observed that the system “was conceived in a context 
making it possible to assume that all the participating States, whether Member States or 
third States, observe fundamental rights... and that the Member States can have 
confidence in each other in that regard.”393 It went on to identify that at,  
“issue here is the raison d’être of the European Union and the creation of an 
area of freedom, security and justice...based on mutual confidence and a 
presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union 
law and, in particular, fundamental rights.”394 
The EAW is part of this AFSJ and as such the questions considered by the CJEU are of 
equal relevance to the EAW. 
MSs are obliged when preparing to send an asylum seeker to another MS to examine the 
practical reality of asylum procedures beyond nominal signature to EU treaties. It also 
clarified that a conclusive presumption (not admitting evidence to the contrary) could 
itself be considered as undermining EU safeguards which seek to ensure compliance 
with HRs. Adding that the presumption an asylum seeker’s rights would be respected in 
the receiving MS must be regarded as rebuttable.
395
 
It follows that the presumption that procedural guarantees and the rights of individuals 
will be respected once surrendered under an EAW must also be rebuttable. Mutual trust 
cannot be used as a barrier to effective consideration of allegations. 
                                               
392 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E., A. 
S. M., M. T., K. P., E. H. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, [2011] ECR 00000 
393 ibid §78 
394 ibid §83 
395 ibid §§99-105 
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The CJEU also affirmed that where a MS “cannot be unaware” of systemic procedural 
deficiencies or detention conditions, “this would amount to substantial grounds for 
believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the meaning of”396 Article 4 CFR and must not therefore be 
transferred. To this end MSs are under an obligation to review a wide range of 
information available to them prior to deciding whether to extradite or expel an 
individual to another country.
397
 
In relation to the existence of systemic issues, to take one case as an example the 
ECtHR has held that structural problems relating to pre-trial detention exist in Poland, 
leading to excessive lengths of detention on remand.
398
 According to CJEU 
jurisprudence, since it cannot be said that an E-MS is unaware of the pre-trial 
conditions, it may be liable if it surrenders an individual to Poland who then falls victim 
to such excessive detention. 
In many ways, in NS, the CJEU joins up many of the dots of a system which was 
developed without much joined up thinking. It takes into account the different 
Directives which the asylum acquis is composed of, as well as the EU Treaty and the 
CFR setting out that they are interrelated and that they must be read in compliance with 
the general principles of the EU and ECHR. 
Given the cross-over of applicable principles and issues, it is evident that the principles 
set out in both M.S.S. and N.S.in relation to the asylum acquis apply mutatis mutandis to 
other cross-border AFJS matters, including the operation of the EAW system. 
A line of jurisprudence demonstrates the dangers of over reliance on mutual trust or 
overzealous application of MR at the UK domestic level pre-M.S.S. and NS.  In 
                                               
396 ibid §106 
397 ibid §§90-94 
398 Kauczor v Poland,  45219/06, Judgment 3.02.2009 
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particular the excessive weight given in 3 judgments of the Administrative Court
399
 to 
the earlier ECtHR inadmissibility decision of K.R.S..
400
 
In K.R.S., the ECtHR had stated that in the context of a Dublin II transfer from the UK 
to Greece detention conditions in Greece were not the responsibility of the sending 
state. It is important to note that this case was declared inadmissible without it being 
communicated to the UK and there was therefore no opportunity for others to intervene 
including NGOs with knowledge of the situation on the ground in Greece. Subsequent 
events confirm that this decision was a blip in the jurisprudence and K.R.S. has since 
been deemed redundant by the Grand Chamber judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece. In this case a number of parties intervened including a several NGOs. The 
ECtHR had also invited UNHCR and also the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Mr Hammarberg (who exercised his power of intervention for the first 
time). 
In addition to the excessive weight placed on the K.R.S. decision, Mitting J wrongly 
ignored the general principles set out by the ECtHR in previous cases. In particular, the 
case of T.I. v. UK,
401
 which was recalled in K.R.S. In this decision the ECtHR clearly 
sets out that the UK could not automatically rely on the arrangements for responsibility 
in the Dublin Regulation. The establishment of international organisations or 
agreements in pursuit of cooperation could have implications for HRs and it would be 
incompatible with the ECHR for them to be absolved from their responsibilities under 
the ECHR in relation to such an attribution. “The Court observes, though, that the 
asylum regime so created protects fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive 
                                               
399
 The Queen on the Application of Jan Rot v District Court of Lublin, Poland [2010] EWHC 1820, 
Dabowski v Poland [2010] EWHC 1712 (Admin); and Klimas (n317) 
400 K.R.S. (n318) 
401   43844/98, Decision 7.03.2000. Decided under the Dublin Convention, the predecessor of the Dublin 
II Regulation 
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guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance.”402 Reliance upon 
instruments adopted outside the ECHR system will not automatically absolve MS from 
their responsibilities under the ECHR. The ECtHR will examine the obligations flowing 
from membership of the instrument and in particular the HRs protection it offers. Whilst 
the Court lacks jurisdiction to interpret the instrument, it has its supervisory jurisdiction 
under Article 19 ECHR as to whether the operation of this instrument compromises the 
ECHR standards.
403
  As set out above, this is further elaborated in Şirketi where the 
ECtHR states that there is a rebuttable presumption of “equivalent protection” of HRs 
offered by other regimes or instruments. Whilst this rebuttable presumption applies to 
EU instruments, including the EAWFD, it was entirely ignored. 
K.R.S. can be further distinguished on its facts, the UK had obtained an undertaking 
from Greece that there would be a right of appeal and that they would allow interim 
measures to be sought against any expulsion order. As the ECtHR stated in the absence 
of proof it must be presumed that Greece would respect its obligations and act 
accordingly towards any returnee. On this basis any Rule 39 application based on 
possible expulsion to Iran should be lodged against Greece and not the UK. 
Detention conditions are not the only concern under Article 3 in relation to extradition 
(or expulsion). The risk of onward returns or extradition was an issue also considered in 
K.R.S. and later rectified in M.S.S.. It is interesting to note that this issue had been 
resolved over a year before K.R.S. in Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey
404
 which was 
followed by subsequent cases. In particular the relationship between Articles 3 and 13 
and the need for a national remedy. 
For his part, Mitting J relied on the following paragraph in K.R.S., 
                                               
402  ibid. Decided under the Dublin Convention, the predecessor of the Dublin II Regulation. 
403 N.A. v. UK, App. No. 25904/07, judgment of 17.07.2008 
404  30471/08, judgment of 22.09.2009  
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... the Court finds that were any claim under the Convention to arise from 
those conditions, it should also be pursued first with the Greek domestic 
authorities and thereafter in an application to this Court.
405
 
However, where Mitting J was misled by K.R.S. in his understanding that this means 
transfer to the requesting state is automatic except in exceptional circumstances. The 
Mitting “wholly exceptional circumstances” (namely a military coup or revolution) test, 
is unrealistic and not in line with the ECHR. As previously stated the presumption that 
HRs would be protected is rebuttable by evidence.
406
 This starting point could not only 
lead to violations of the ECHR, but also in breach of section 6 HRA 1998. The Article 3 
prohibition is absolute and therefore raising the standard to exceptional circumstances in 
effect denies an individual a remedy at national level.  
The ECtHR was clear in Abdolkhani that Article 13 guarantees the availability of a 
remedy at the national level to enforce ECHR rights within the domestic legal order. 
The irreversible nature of the harm caused if the torture or ill-treatment alleged 
materialises together with the importance attached to Article 3 and the “notion of an 
effective remedy under Article 13 requires (i) independent and rigorous scrutiny of a 
claim that there exist substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk of 
treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of the applicant's expulsion to the country of 
destination, and (ii) a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.” 407 
It can be concluded that Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3 requires the E-MS 
court to ascertain whether the presumption is rebutted through scrutiny of the available 
evidence as to the risk. Disagreement with Mitting J can be seen in Agius
408
 where 
Sullivan J does not follow Mitting J. Taking into account the M.S.S. judgment, he states 
that the exceptional circumstances test goes too far. Whilst the presumption is in favour 
                                               
405
 K.R.S. (n318) 
406 In K.R.S. the presumption was not rebutted, whereas in M.S.S. there was clear evidence capable of 
rebutting the presumption. 
407 ibid (n404) §§106-7 
408 Agius v the Court of Magistrates, Malta [2011] EWHC 759 (Admin) 
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of the I-MS, if clear and cogent evidence is presented, the presumption is capable of 
displacement. 
Despite the evident applicability of the M.S.S. and N.S. judgments to the EAW and other 
MR measures, there is likely to be a time delay in extending these cases to the EAWFD 
by both the ECtHR and the CJEU. Ultimately reluctance to extend this jurisprudence is 
more about relationships between MSs rather than the law.  
It still remains difficult to displace the presumption that HRs would be respected, 
however these cases make it clear that an examination should occur and membership of 
the ECHR is not to be regarded as sufficient on its own. In M.S.S. the ECtHR added that 
any complaint of potential Article 3 prohibited treatment requires rigorous scrutiny. In 
other words MR does not equate to scrutiny and is therefore not sufficient. 
In Radu, the CJEU once again dodges the bullet, by narrowing the focus of their 
relevant jurisdiction.  Whilst the judgment only considers the need for an individual to 
have been heard by the I-MS as a condition for their surrender,
409
 this does not diminish 
in any way the broader opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston in the case. For those 
MSs willing to listen she is clear that the EAW can not only accommodate HRs but that 
it must do so.  
Sharpston states that the CFR form part of the primary law of the EU
410
 reminding us 
that the ECHR has played a role since 1969 to the present day.
411
 
41.      While the record of the Member States in complying with their 
human rights obligations may be commendable, it is also not pristine. There 
can be no assumption that, simply because the transfer of the requested 
                                               
409 The court finds that no such requirement exist in either prosecution or sentence EAWs. The Court held 
that “the executing judicial authorities cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant issued for the 
purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution on the ground that the requested person was not heard in 
the issuing Member State before that arrest warrant was issued.” (§43 Radu (n158)) 
410 Radu (n158) Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, §108 
411 Ibid §49 citing Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, §7; Case 11/70 Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, §4; Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491, §13; and Joined Cases C 
402/05 P and C 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat [2008] ECR I 6351, §335. 
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person is requested by another Member State, that person’s human rights 
will automatically be guaranteed on his arrival there.   There can, however, 
be a presumption of compliance which is rebuttable only on the clearest 
possible evidence. Such evidence must be specific; propositions of a general 
nature, however well supported, will not suffice. 
Sharpston states that there can be no automatic assumption that HRs will be protected in 
the I-MS; there can only be a rebuttable presumption that this will be the case. This is 
applying both the judgment in N.S. and the ECtHR jurisprudence which holds that 
evidence about the general situation will not normally suffice. Individuals are required 
to show evidence relating to their own personal circumstances.
412
 
Having ascertained that MSs must have regard to HRs when executing an EAW, 
Sharpston then considers when MSs must refuse to surrender and what factors they 
must take into account. The first step is to establish what interferences of rights are 
sufficient to prevent surrender. The ECtHR jurisprudence is clear that not every breach 
of the ECHR will justify refusal to extradite.
413
 Sharpston notes that there is no 
equivalent dicta from the CJEU and thus draws on the case of N.S. where “issues of a 
similar nature arose”.414 To this end both Courts are agreed that under Article 3 ECHR 
and Article 4 CFR, the Court must be satisfied that there are ‘substantial grounds for 
believing’ that there is a ‘real risk’ of a violation.  
Advocate-General Sharpston clearly states that HRs must be considered by the E-MS 
when deciding whether to execute an EAW. She agrees with the ECtHR test of a real 
risk for Article 3. However she reformulates the test for Article 6 from requiring a 
‘flagrant denial’ to whether the deficiency fundamentally destroys the trial as a whole. 
The standard for both Articles 6 and 5 is lowered to persuading the court of a well-
founded breach with the fact that a past breach can be remedied almost nullifying it as a 
                                               
412 Note the exception set out by the ECtHR in Salah Sheekh (n227) member of a minority clan in 
Somalia was sufficient, N.A. v UK (n403) being a Tamil Tiger was sufficient. 
413 See Soering (n177) and related case law. 
414 Radu (n158) Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, §§74-77 
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ground to resist surrender. Whilst the Opinion is not binding, it is advisory and states 
would do well to abide by the clear guidance. 
6.7 To Conclude 
The right set out under Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 CFR is absolute and there is no 
room for balancing it with the public interest. It creates negative and positive 
obligations for MSs. The negative obligations require states to simply not inflict 
treatment which is incompatible with Article 3. Positive obligations involve having in 
place preventative measures, and conduct investigations. It is not necessary for the 
threat of Article 3 prohibited treatment to stem from state actors, it can also flow from 
others, including private individuals (i.e.) the prison population.  
Turning to arrest, Article 3 permits the use of force as long as the force is necessary and 
warranted in the circumstance (i.e.) violent resistance of arrest would warrant more 
force than an un-resisted one. An example of a positive obligation related to the EAW is 
to provide arrested and detained individuals with appropriate medical treatment, with 
failure to do so a potential violation of Article 3.  These obligations are of equal 
applicability to the internal situations of the I-MS and E-MSs. 
Detention raises another set of issues relevant to the EAW, in particular the conditions 
of detention, such as overcrowding and the cumulative impact of other conditions, and 
prison regimes notably strip searches and solitary confinement. The case law of the 
ECtHR, together with reports from the CPT and CAT highlight the fact that this is of 
concern across the EU. However the vast majority of arguments based on these 
conditions to resist surrender fail. They fail because of the requirement for the risk to be 
specific to the individual and not a general nature, together with the acceptance of 
assurances of special treatment for the surrendered individual. This is as it should be, 
but not so rigorous as to nullify the buffer protection offered by the E-MS. For example 
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if it is shown that an individual will be detained in a prison whose standards violate 
Article 3, surrender should be refused. If it is shown that there is a practice by the I-MS 
of not fulfilling assurances, surrender should likewise be refused. 
Extradition and the EAW place these additional obligations on the E-MS to ensure that 
they are not sending an individual to face treatment contrary to Article 3. This extended 
responsibility was set out by the ECHR in Soering and reinforced by subsequent cases. 
Article 19(2) CFR codifies these decisions. There is an excessive burden on the 
individual to show beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a real risk he will suffer 
prohibited treatment on his return. The trend in recent judgments of both Courts shows 
an easing of this burden, requiring the state to also conduct an independent and rigorous 
scrutiny of the reality. In circumstances where the situation is unsatisfactory, assurances 
can be sought to protect the individual. 
At the domestic level, the threshold that the severity of the treatment has to reach is also 
extremely high. It appears that there is a bizarre alchemy, requiring a higher threshold to 
be satisfied if the claims are made during extradition proceedings. This raised threshold 
is partly due to mutual trust that is said to exist, however it is also a result of the 
distortion of ECHR jurisprudence and confusion in relation to domestic levels. Whilst 
states are free to restrict what is acceptable treatment in the domestic context, they 
cannot lower minimum standards of protection set by the ECtHR. If the treatment 
would be prohibited by Article 3 if imposed internally then the same treatment will also 
be contrary to Article 3 if imposed externally in the I-MS. 
Recent judgments in the field of asylum law are instructive as to the HRs obligations of 
states when implementing an EAW. Both M.S.S. and N.S. clearly state that international 
obligations (including Dublin II and the EAWFD) do no erase existing HRs obligations. 
Courts should not be concerned with the theoretical protection but rather with the 
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reality. Presumptions as to the HRs compliance of a state must be rebuttable and the 
burden is not entirely on the individual. These cases had the effect in England of 
realigning the overzealous application of MR. The line of cases reliant on the earlier 
ECtHR of K.R.S. and the requirement for “exceptional circumstances” was corrected 
following the M.S.S. judgment.  
Logically, the N.S. judgment should automatically apply to other measures within the 
AFSJ, such as the EAWFD. In her Opinion in Radu, Advocate-General Sharpston 
corroborates assertions that the above asylum cases are analogous to the application of 
the EAWFD.  She proposes a lower burden of proof for individuals making claims 
under Article 3 and also seeks to clarify that what is of concern in relation to Articles 5 
and 6, is not a ‘flagrant denial’ but rather the impact on the trial as a whole. Despite this 
caselaw, the reality is that national judges will be reluctant to rock the proverbial MR 
boat until they are given a green light from one of the regional courts or they are able to 
rely on EU measures.  
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Chapter Seven: Family and Private Life 
Engagement of the criminal justice system will inevitably involve an interference with 
the family and private life of individuals. Whether such interference amounts to a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR will depend on the circumstances of each individual case. 
The EAW undoubtedly interferes with an individual’s Article 8 rights, however as a 
qualified right, interferences are permitted if they satisfy the stated requirements.  
7.1 The Right 
The right guaranteed under Article 8 has four dimensions as reflected in Article 7 of the 
CFR “private and family life, home and communications.” Consideration in relation to 
the EAW will be restricted to the first two aspects. Article 7 CFR has the same scope 
and meaning as Article 8 ECHR and the caselaw of theECtHR on family life continues 
to instruct the CFR.
415
 
7.1.1 The Scope  
The concept of ‘family’ under the ECHR has an autonomous meaning and is not 
restricted to families based on marriage, rather “a number of factors may be relevant, 
including whether the couple live together, the length of their relationship and whether 
they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together or 
by any other means”.416 It also encompasses other relationships such as between parent 
and child,
 417
 siblings
418
 or grandparents and grandchildren.
419
 Remote relationships may 
also fall under the private life sphere of Article 8. 
                                               
415 The case law of theEU on family law is vast and touches a widerange of topics. The key EU cases and 
their ECHR counterparts are considered in greate detail in a recent publication on asylum. See: N Mole, C 
Meredith and M Akhavan-Tabib, Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and 
immigration, Fundamental Rights Agency, 2013 
416 X, Y and Z v UK,  21830/93, Judgment 22.04.1997 
417 Olsson v Sweden (No 1),  10465/83,  Judgment 24 March1988 
418 Moustaquim v Belgium,  12313/86, Judgment 18 February1991 
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The private life sphere is not defined but fact specific. Having evolved on a case by case 
basis, it now covers a relatively broad range of issues including: moral and physical 
integrity;
420
 identity;
421
 personal autonomy; sexual life; collection and access to 
personal data;
422
 and protection of reputation.
423
 Essentially it protects the right of an 
individual to develop their relations with others and the outside world. 
7.1.2 The Test 
Having ascertained that the facts disclose a protected right under Article 8 and that there 
is (or would be) an interference with that right a three part test is applied in order to 
assess whether the interference equates to a violation.
424
 This is set out in Article 8 and 
the courts will ask themselves whether the interference is: “in accordance with the law”; 
in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and “necessary in a democratic society”, in other words 
proportionate to the legitimate aim. 
The first part of the test simply ensures that the interference has a legal basis and that 
the relevant law is both accessible and foreseeable.
425
  
The ‘legitimate aims’ are listed within the text of the article; namely “in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
                                                                                                                                         
419 Marckx v Belgium,  6833/74, Judgment 13.06.1979 
420 This aspect of Article 8 has significant overlap with both Articles 3 and 5. For example the forceful 
administration of emetics to a suspected drug dealer fell within the scope of Article 8, but because of the 
severity of the treatment it was decided by the ECtHR under Article 3 (Jalloh v Germany, 54810/00, [GC] 
Judgment 11.07.2006). 
421 See Chapman v UK  27238/95, [GC] Judgment 18.01.2001  
422 For example Murray v UK (n682) information collected by the police; S and Marper v UK ( 30562/04, 
30566/04, [GC] Judgment 4.12.2008) fingerprints, DNA profiles, etc; Amman v Switzerland ( 27798/95, 
[GC] Judgment 16.02.2000) interception of calls; Peck v UK ( 44647/98, Judgment 28.01.2003) images 
captured by CCTV. 
423 See Rotaru v Romania,  28341/95, [GC] Judgment 4.05.2000 
424
 This is the same test which is applied to the rights guaranteed by Articles 8-11 ECHR. 
425 See Sunday Times v UK, 6538/74, Judgment 26.04.1979. See also Silver and Others v UK, s 5947/72 
and 6 others, Judgment 25.03.1983 (interference with the prisoner’s correspondence was based on 
internal and unpublished standing orders and circular instructions to prison governors from the Secretary 
of State for the Prison Service). 
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Whether a measure is necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR has stated that “the 
notion of necessity implies that an interference corresponds to a pressing social need, 
and in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued”.426 Other 
questions that may be considered include whether there is an alternative less intrusive 
option, if this has been considered and if sufficient reasons have been provided for 
rejecting it. As part of the assessment the existence and application of procedural 
safeguards are also important in order to avoid abuse.  Finally, thought will be given to 
whether the inference operates so as to “impair the very essence of the right”. 
In the EAW context Article 8 is mainly applicable to the E-MS, including the obligation 
to take into account the circumstances and potential violations in the I-MS. The first two 
parts of the test are generally uncontroversial in terms of the EAW and will rarely raise 
any issues. The execution of an EAW request is based on the national implementing law 
and depending on the circumstances of the particular case the interference can fit under 
one or more of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8(2); extradition to face trial or serve 
a sentence is a justified interference provided it is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of a legitimate aim.  
In relation to the EAW, issues will arise when the E-MS is determining the 
proportionality of any consequences of surrender on the individual’s family or private 
life. A balancing act is conducted between the compelling legitimate aims associated 
with extradition and the adverse impact on the individual. Particular weight is given to 
fulfillment of obligations flowing from international and bilateral extradition 
treaties/agreements, nevertheless the state must strive to protect, as far as possible, 
family or private life of individuals. 
                                               
426 Olsson (n417) 
Chapter Seven: Family and Private Life 
167 
 
The I-MS is subject to the same obligations to ensure that Article 8 rights are respected 
and form part of its decision-making.  
7.2 Family Life 
Proportionality refers to two aspects of the interference. Firstly whether means 
employed are proportionate to the ends sought; fin other words not using ‘a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut’. Secondly whether a fair balance has been struck between 
the competing interests is usually between the individual and the community. 
Absolute rights such as Article 3 ECHR involve no fair balance test, the real risk that an 
individual would be subjected to Article 3 prohibited treatment cannot be balanced with 
any competing interests no matter how undesirable a person or their conduct may be.
427
 
On the other hand the fair balance principle is applied to qualified rights such as Article 
8 ECHR.  For example, in Moustaquim
428
 the deportation following criminal conviction 
was disproportionate for someone who had been in the country for 20 years since the 
age of 2. Whilst a similar outcome was found in Beldjoudi v France
429
 it was not so in 
Boughanemi v France.
430
 The distinguishing facts were the seriousness of the offence 
committed and his apparent lack of desire to be French and in Benhebba v France
431
 it 
was because of the persistent commission of drug offences. 
Following criticism of what appeared to be arbitrary decisions by the ECtHR, it set out 
criteria in Boutlif 
432
 subsequently developed in Üner
433
 and Maslov.
434
 
In Maslov the ECtHR held that the imposition of a 10 year ban on a 16 year old who 
had lived for 10 years in Austria was disproportionate and thus in violation of Article 8. 
                                               
427 See Chahal (n246) and Soering (n177) 
428 (n418) 
429   12083/86, Judgment 26.03.1992 
430
  22070/93, Judgment 24.04.1996 
431  53441/99, Judgment 10.07.2003 
432 Boutlif v Switzerland,  54273/00, Judgment 2.08.2001  
433 Üner v the Netherlands,  46410/99, Judgment 18.10.2006 
434 Maslov v Austria,  1638/03, [GC] judgment 23.06.2008 
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The weight to be attached to particular criteria will be dependent on the particular 
circumstances of the case. In the present case the individual was young and had not 
established his own family life. In cases such as these the ECtHR stated that the relevant 
criteria are,  
–  the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; 
–  the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to 
be expelled; 
–  the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's 
conduct during that period; 
–  the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and 
with the country of destination.
435
 
Although the Boutlif criteria have been developed in relation to proposed expulsion of 
foreign nationals following conviction, they are of general applicability when assessing 
proportionality of an inference with Article 8 caused by an expulsion or extradition.
436
 
In Üner v the Netherlands the Court confirmed the criteria set out in Boultif, adding two 
further criteria: “the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the 
seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter 
in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and the solidity of social, cultural 
and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.”437  
The margin of appreciation granted by the ECtHR in expulsion/surrender cases of 
minors is narrower than that for adults.  
When deciding whether to surrender a court must have regard to the balancing of 
interests and the Boutlif criteria. It is this balancing act which means that not all 
interferences with a person’s private or family life will equate to a violation. On the 
                                               
435
 ibid §71 
436 Boutlif (n432) §48. In addition to those listed in Maslov, Boutlif also listed are: the nationalities of 
those concerned; their family situation (including the length of marriage, whether they have any children); 
the seriousness of difficulties family members would face in the receiving country. 
437 Üner (n433) §58 
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‘MR modified scales’, the obligation of states to respect treaty obligations (referring 
here to the EAWFD above the ECHR) and ensure that fugitives are brought to justice, 
weigh much more than rights of the individual. 
7.2.1 Exceptionality: The UK Courts and Article 8 
Given the importance placed on fulfilling the MR obligations, the EAWFD weighs in 
against the individual. As such the balancing needs to be re-calibrated to ensure that the 
individual’s rights are not nullified. 
The application of Article 8 considerations by the UK courts illustrates the difficulties 
encountered by judges when trying to grapple with the competing interests of the 
individual’s rights and the desire to facilitate justice and fulfill treaty obligations. 
Domestic and Foreign Cases  
Firstly, the UK Courts have adopted a ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ case distinction. This is 
set out by Lord Bingham in Ullah and Do. ‘Domestic cases’ are “where a state is said to 
have acted within its own territory in a way which infringes the enjoyment of a 
Convention right by a person within that territory.”438 These cases include family 
reunification cases.  
In ‘foreign cases’ the claim is not that the state complained of will violate the rights of 
the applicant, but , “that the conduct of the state in removing a person from its territory 
(whether by expulsion or extradition) to another territory will lead to a violation of the 
person's Convention rights in that other territory.”439 
Lord Bingham also refers to a third hybrid class,  
The removal of a person from country A to country B may both violate his 
right to respect for his private and family life in country A and also violate 
                                               
438 Regina Ex Parte Ullah v Special Adjudicator and Do v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] UKHL 26 §7 
439 ibid §9 
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the same right by depriving him of family life or impeding his enjoyment of 
private life in country B.
440
 
Cases involving family life are by their nature ‘domestic’, it is the act of deportation or 
extradition which breaks up the family and not the conditions in the receiving state. 
Extradition cases fall within the ‘foreign’ classification when the act of surrendering an 
individual exposes the individual to a violation of their rights in the territory of the I-
MS; for example in instances where there is a real risk of torture. However in 
extradition cases where other family members are involved, it is more likely to be 
considered a hybrid case.  
The appeal in Razgar
441
 was heard immediately after Ullah and Do and the House of 
Lords explicitly states that the opinions in the two judgments are to be read where 
relevant together. In Razgar Baroness Hale states that the distinction is important 
because in “a domestic case, the state must always act in a way which is compatible 
with the Convention rights. There is no threshold test related to the seriousness of the 
violation or the importance of the right involved.” In a foreign case this additional 
threshold exists, for example a ‘real risk’ or a ‘flagrant denial’. Lady Hale states that the 
hybrid cases described by Lord Bingham should remain domestic cases, in particular 
where there was strong social integration.  
There is no threshold test of enormity or humanitarian affront. But the right 
to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, which is 
protected by article 8, is a qualified right which may be interfered with if 
this is necessary in order to pursue a legitimate aim. What may happen in 
the foreign country is therefore relevant to the proportionality of the 
proposed expulsion.
442
 
                                               
440 ibid §18 
441 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) ex parte Razgar (FC) (Respndent) [2004] 
UKHL 27at §42 
442 ibid §43 
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The purpose of the threshold is to assist in the balancing act. The starting point is that 
extradition is to proceed unless evidence exists to the contrary. In order to tip the scales 
against extradition, the reasons need to be of a sufficiently serious nature. 
Exceptionality 
The word ‘exceptional’ can be found throughout the above cases, stating that 
exceptional circumstances need to be shown to prevent the breaking up of the family by 
the deportation or extradition. The reference to ‘exceptional circumstances’ flows from 
ECHR cases such as Launder v UK where it was stated that “it is only in exceptional 
circumstances that the extradition of a person to face trial on charges of serious offences 
committed in the requesting State would be held to be an unjustified or disproportionate 
interference with the right to respect for family life.”443  In this case D lived in Hong 
Kong for 10 years and for several years outside the UK; there were no clear bars to the 
family either moving or visiting him in Hong Kong. Considering the facts of this case, 
subsequent cases have stretched the phrase “exceptional”. The phrase refers to the 
circumstantial interference which is out of the ordinary, rather than setting a high 
evidential burden or a threshold test. 
The usefulness of the distinction between domestic and foreign is questioned by Laws 
LJ in R (Bermingham), who regards the test to be applied in both instances as stringent, 
holding that extradition could only be resisted where a “wholly exceptional case” is 
shown.
444
   
In Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department
445
 Lord Bingham further 
clarifies the term ‘exceptional’. He states that the removal will be disproportionate if it 
                                               
443 Ewan Quayle Launder v UK,  27279/95, Commission Decision 8.12.1997 
444
 R (on the application of Bermingham and others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office; Bermingham 
and others v Government of the United States of America [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin) §115, 118. In the 
present case the court found that there was nothing exceptional about the personal circumstances of the 
defendants for extradition to be refused on proportionality grounds. 
445 [2007] UKHL 11 
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“prejudices the family life of the applicant in a manner sufficiently serious to amount to 
a breach of the fundamental right” and continues to confirm that it is not a test of 
exceptionality. Whilst it is an expectation that only a small minority of cases will 
succeed with this argument, “was not purporting to lay down a legal test”.446 
Jaso v Madrid Central Court No 2,
447
 was one of the first cases to apply the clarified 
Article 8 test in the context of the EAW. In this case, the district judge held that the case 
was not a case “of wholly exceptional circumstances which could be held to be an 
unjustified or disproportionate interference with their article 8 rights”.448 In Jaso the 
Divisional Court stated that “it is wrong to apply an exceptionality test…as a formula 
for proportionality”.  Dyson LJ corrected this test, stating that in order for the interests 
of the individual to outweigh the “great weight...accorded to the legitimate aim of 
honouring extradition treaties… there will have to be striking and unusual facts to lead 
to the conclusion that it is disproportionate to interfere with an extraditee's art 8 
rights.”449 This case did not concern a family life in the UK but rather private life. The 
complaint was that his private life would be interfered with because of the 
incommunicado detention he would be subjected to in Spain upon surrender. 
So whilst the test is not of exceptionality, the threshold of the inference as a 
consequence of removal is nevertheless a high one. This was again confirmed by Lord 
Bingham in Ullah and Do,
450
 where he preferred the approach of the Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal in Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department,   
The reason why flagrant denial or gross violation is to be taken into account 
is that it is only in such a case - where the right will be completely denied or 
nullified in the destination country - that it can be said that removal will 
                                               
446 ibid §20. Exceptionality in this context is subsequently referred to by Sedley LJ in AG (Eritrea) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 801 as the “practical effect” and not the 
yardstick. 
447 [2007] EWHC 2983 (Admin) 
448 ibid §56 citing the judgment of the District Court §16. 
449 ibid §57 
450 (n438) 
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breach the treaty obligations of the signatory state however those 
obligations might be interpreted or whatever might be said by or on behalf 
of the destination state.
451
 
In the EAW context the question to be posed is whether surrender will nullify or 
completely deny the individual’s right to family life. It patently does on at least a 
temporary (immediate) time frame when the person is surrendered. These issues are 
further demonstrated in the case of Norris.
452
 
The Norris case concerned the extradition of the appellants to the USA, but is of equal 
application to the operation of the EAW. The House of Lords set out a test which has 
since been applied by courts to EAW cases. The test laid down by Lord Philips is that 
“the interference with HRs will have to be extremely serious if the public interest is to 
be outweighed”453 and that “only the gravest effects of interference with family life will 
be capable of rendering extradition disproportionate to the public interest that it 
servers.”454  
The first step for a judge is to consider the offence to ensure that the minimum sentence 
requirements are satisfied. The judge then considers whether any of the listed statutory 
bars apply. HRs are indirectly listed within these barriers, (i.e.) unjust or oppressive, 
passage of time, etc. Once these two steps are passed, the court will consider 
compatibility with the ECHR, as confirmed in numerous cases, this is a fact specific 
exercise. It is at this point where the court will assess whether “there are any relevant 
features that are unusually or exceptionally compelling...[if]... the nature or extent of the 
interference with article 8 rights is exceptionally serious, careful consideration must be 
given to whether such interference is justified.”455 
                                               
451 [2003] Imm AR 1, §111 
452
 Norris v Government of United States of America [2010] UKSC 9 
453 ibid §55 
454 ibid §82 In spite of stating that “exceptional circumstances” is not the legal test, reliance is still 
confusingly placed on the word exceptional by almost all judges. 
455 ibid §62 
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The gravity of the offence is relevant to the issue of proportionality. In particular if it is 
“at the bottom of the scale of gravity, this is capable of being one of a combination of 
features that may render extradition a disproportionate interference with human 
rights.”456 
Because the presumption is connected to MR; the threshold is higher for establishing 
that HRs of the individual will be violated if surrendered to another MS. However as 
shown in relation to Article 3, recent UK cases show an easing of the strict threshold of 
a Constitutional anomaly or revolutionary overthrow of government. It may now be 
possible or easier in the UK to resist surrender on the HRs ground found in Section 21 
of the EA 2003.  
7.3 Alternatives to interference with Art 8 
Whilst it is accepted that imprisonment will always interfere with Article 8, 
incarceration in a different country away from family substantially increases the 
interference. For example it makes visitation difficult if not impossible. This issue also 
relates to the fact that the imprisonment option cannot be viewed in isolation from other 
options which would guarantee the presence of the individual at trial or sentencing. The 
Article 8 rights of the family unit can also not be ignored; where there is room for such 
considerations, the balance concerns not only the impact on the extraditee but also the 
rights of innocent others.  As confirmed in Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department
457
 the court is to have regard to the family unit as a whole and each 
member individually.
458
  
The UK Supreme Court in Norris, makes it clear that the preservation of an effective 
extradition system is both an important and weighty factor which “in almost every 
                                               
456 ibid §63 
457 [2008] UKHL 39 
458 ibid §64 
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circumstance outweigh any article 8 argument.”459 The Supreme Court dismisses the 
possibility of the UK taking over the prosecution. The Court relies on a line of recent 
authorities which rejected arguments that the extraditee should be prosecuted in the UK. 
It stated that extradition proceedings were not the appropriate  
“occasion for a debate about the most convenient forum for criminal 
proceedings. Rarely, if ever, on an issue of proportionality, could the 
possibility of bringing criminal proceedings in this jurisdiction be capable of 
tipping the scales against extradition in accordance with this country’s treaty 
obligations. Unless the judge reaches the conclusion that the scales are 
finely balanced he should not enter into an enquiry as to the possibility of 
prosecution in this country.”460  
This stance may however be explained by the fact that a forum bar did not at the time 
exist in the EA. 
The ECtHR jurisprudence states that where there are viable alternatives which would be 
less intrusive on the individual’s family or private life they should be considered and the 
Court must consider it and give compelling reasons for dismissing it beyond 
maintaining good relations with the requesting state. They will also have a bearing on 
the proportionality of surrender.  
In Hatton and others v UK the ECtHR affirmed that States were “required to minimise, 
as far as possible, interference with Article 8 rights, by trying to find alternative 
solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in the least onerous way as 
regards human rights.”461 Less intrusive measures must not be dismissed too quickly 
and without first being given a proper consideration.
462
 It is “for the respondent State to 
                                               
459 ibid §136 per Lord Kerr 
460 ibid §§66-7 
461 36022/97, [GC] Judgment 8.07.2003, §86 (citing §97 of the Chamber's judgment) 
462 A.D. & O.D. v. UK,  28680/06, Judgment 16.03.2010 §89 
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establish that a careful assessment of the [...] possible alternatives to taking the child 
into public care was carried out prior to the implementation of such a measure.”463 
Within the EAW system there are a number of alternatives to surrender available to 
MSs contained both within the EAWFD and also in other measures.  
7.3.1 Option One: Where Wanted for Prosecution 
The presumption in favour of surrender respects not only the principle of MR but also 
relates to reciprocity considerations. The EAWFD provides an acceptable alternative to 
simple surrender which leaves untarnished MR. Where an individual is wanted for 
prosecution the E-MS has options to minimize interference with Article 8 rights 
including surrender conditional on the individual would be returned to serve any 
sentence of imprisonment. 
Under Article 5(3), where an individual is wanted for prosecution, surrender can be 
made conditional on the return of the individual to the E-MS at the conclusion of the 
criminal proceedings. If the individual is found guilty, the E-MS can undertake to 
execute any sentence handed down. In both circumstances justice is served in respect of 
the competing interests. The individual’s Article 8 right is not unnecessarily interfered 
with whilst not ‘escaping’ justice and requiring no judgment to be drawn on another 
MS’s system. 
As an optional ground, this provision has been implemented to varying degrees by MSs. 
Whilst 18 MSs have implemented this requirement they have done so with an array of 
conditions, restrictions and requirements. For example, it has been transposed as a 
                                               
463 Moser v Austria  12643/02, Judgment 21.09.2006 §66 citing P., C. and S. v. UK, 56547/00, Judgment 
16/07/2002, §116, and K. and T. v. Finland, 25702/94, [GC] Judgment 12.07.2001, §166 
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mandatory ground for nationals by 7 States and as an optional ground by 11 MSs for 
‘integrated residents’, residents who request it or persons staying in MSs.464  
This provision provides judges with a tool to protect the individual whilst not appearing 
to make judgment calls on the I-MS’s prisons. It is an option which protects the 
integrity of MR whilst also dealing with HRs concerns of national judges.  
7.3.2 Option Two: Where wanted to serve sentence 
Where the EAW is for the purposes of serving a sentence, the viable alternatives include 
transferring the prisoner under one of the existing measures or under Article 4(6) the E-
MS can undertake to execute any sentence passed by the I-MS instead of surrendering 
them. This is also similar to the operation of Art 3(2) Dublin II, for example the M.S.S. 
and N.S. cases in addition to the extraterritorial HRs obligations also rely on Article 3(2) 
which provides a mechanism enabling MSs to process an individual’s asylum 
application instead of removing them to the first country of entry.  
This too has been implemented to varying degrees by MSs; 7 MSs have transposed 
Article 4(6) as a mandatory ground with 6 reserving it only for their nationals. 11 have 
implemented it as an optional ground with 3 reserving this ground for their nationals 
alone and others extend the right to long-term residents.
465
   
In relation to Articles 4(6) and 5(3) it should be noted that the Lopes Da Silva Jorge 
case concerned the French implementing law which limited the application of Article 
4(6) to nationals. The CJEU held that MSs cannot under EU law restrict application of 
the ground to its own nationals. Amendments will thus need to be made by all MSs 
whose implementing law includes such discriminatory clauses.  
                                               
464 Commission, Commission Staff Working Document,  Annex to the Report From The Commission 
based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States, COM(2005) 63 final, 23.02.2005 
465 ibid 
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In the UK, the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee recommended that both Article 
4(6) and 5(3) be implemented into the EA 2003 to greatly reduce the impact on Article 
8 rights;
466
 a recommendation the UK government has yet to follow. Although the Scott 
Baker Report
467
 recommends amending the EA to allow judges to refuse surrender 
where the convicted person is requested to serve a sentence of less than 12 months; it 
found that implementation of these specific provisions was not necessary. The view was 
that the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (RPA) provided similar avenues for 
prisoners to be returned to the UK to serve their sentence and when coupled with the 
Framework 2008/909/JHA on mutual recognition of custodial sentences
468
 was 
sufficient. Given that the RPA option is in essence domestic grounds, questions could 
be asked about the negative impact on MR. The RPA requires a ‘warrant for transfer’ to 
be issued for the process to be engaged, it is not an automatic procedure. It is an 
external process and disconnected from the EAW. As such it cannot form part of the 
balancing act when deciding whether to surrender, unless the UK undertakes an 
assurance that it will issue such a transfer warrant upon sentencing by the I-MS. That 
said, the RPA contains some good safeguards, including the requirement for the person 
to consent to the transfer and a process for the revocation of a warrant. These could be 
incorporated into the provision implementing Article 4(6). 
Transfer of Prisoners 
There were a number of mechanisms operating within the EU regulating the transfer of 
prisoners between states, including the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer 
                                               
466 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Human Rights 
Implications of UK Extradition Policy, Fifteenth Report of Session 2010–12, HL Paper 156 HC 767, 
22.06.2011 §§181-2 
467 Sir Scott Baker, David Perry and Anand Doobay, A Review Of The United Kingdom’s Extradition 
Arrangements, presented to the Home Secretary on 30.09.2011 (Scott Baker Report) 
468 Article 26, Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or 
measures involving the deprivation of liberty for the purposes of their enforcement in the European 
Union, deadline for implementation 5.12.2012 (Prisoner Transfer FD)  
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of Sentenced Persons.
469
 In their application between EU MSs, these have now been 
replaced by Prisoner Transfer FD whose stated purpose is “facilitating the social 
rehabilitation of the sentenced person”.470 To this end the I-MS is invited to take into 
account factors such as the person’s attachment to the E-MS, “family, linguistic, 
cultural, social or economic and other links”. These are factors which would also be 
taken into account if Articles 4(6) and 5(3) were implemented by the UK, but which in 
any case are relevant when Article 8 ECHR is engaged.  
As a purely procedural matter, upon transfer the penalty imposed will remain the same, 
however conditions for early release can be those of the state where the sentence is 
being served.
471
 
Beyond the purely humanitarian considerations, the housing of prisoners is expensive, 
placing a substantial financial burden on states. For this reason it is preferable, if 
possible, for MSs to transfer prisoners to other MSs. Under the Prisoner Transfer FD, 
the costs are borne by the E-MS.
472
  
The reasons for having such transfer systems are important and have changed over time. 
Currently it is powered by motivations of states rather than reasons of the past, namely 
the individual’s ability to serve at home. Nevertheless, the Prisoner Transfer FD can 
provide a useful support mechanism to surrender under the EAW, by assisting with 
conditional surrender or as a mechanism engaged upon conviction and sentencing. 
                                               
469 Council of Europe, Treaty No.112, entered into force 1.07.1985. 
470 Prisoner Transfer FD (n468), Recital 9 and Article 3(1)  
471 See Giza v Poland, 1997/11, Decision 23.10.2012. In this case the applicant had been surrendered 
under an EAW to Belgium, on the condition that he would be returned to Poland to serve his sentence. 
Had he remained in Belgium he would be eligible to apply for conditional release after having served ⅓ 
of the total term of imprisonment; in Poland he had to serve ½ of his term. The Court held there was no 
violation of either Article 5 or 7. 
472 Prisoner Transfer FD (n468), Article 24 (except the costs of transfer). Within the EU it is arguable that 
the financial burden of improving prison conditions does not lie with individual Member States, but is 
rather in the EU’s collective long-term interests. 
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7.3.3 Option Three: Forum Bar 
Article 4(7)(a) EAWFD provides for a forum bar to surrender where the alleged offence 
was committed “in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member State.” 
Such a ground could increase protection of HRs, providing a less intrusive interference 
and make the preparation of a defence easier. Victim rights would still be considered 
since a determination would be made on a case by case basis.
473
 
This is one optional ground which the UK did not initially implement. Although a 
forum bar was later introduced into the EA 2003 by the Police and Justice Act 2006
474
 
providing a ground for the court to refuse surrender. The forum bar would operate 
where “a significant part of the conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offence is 
conduct in the United Kingdom”; and “in view of that and all the other circumstances, it 
would not be in the interests of justice for the person to be tried for the offence in the 
requesting territory.”  
In their Extradition review, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights agreed 
with many witnesses calling for the forum bar to be bought into force.
475
 The impact on 
MR would be slight since “a number of other European jurisdictions require forum to be 
considered”.476  
On the other hand the Scott Baker Report
477
 reaches a different conclusion that such a 
bar is not required and issues could be adequately dealt with by guidelines for 
prosecution decisions.
478
 The view is that prosecutors are better placed then judges to 
                                               
473 For the full consideration see Extradition Review (n466) §§89-101 
474 Para 5 Schedule 13 
475 Extradition Review (n466) §90 “These amendments were incorporated in the legislation alongside an 
additional clause that required a resolution of both Houses of Parliament to bring the amendments into 
force. This has never happened.” 
476
 Extradition Review (n466)§97, evidence of the Law Society. 
477 Scott Baker Report (n467), 205-230 
478 The CPS published interim guidelines to prosecutors on the handling of cases where the jurisdiction to 
prosecute is shared by prosecuting authorities here and overseas. The guidelines had immediate effect, but 
were the subject of review after a consultation period of three months, which concluded on 31.01.2013. 
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determine forum, coupled with the disadvantage of possible delays and the fact that the 
District Judges could not find a case decided to date which would have benefited from a 
forum bar. With due respect the grounds are not sufficiently compelling; just because no 
case has existed in the past, it does not mean that a case will never exist. In terms of 
potential delay this will be acceptable when serving the interests of justice and more 
importantly a forum bar is envisaged and permitted by the EAWFD and thus the 
negative impact on the EAW procedure would appear to be exaggerated. Additionally, 
there is nothing wrong with providing a double barreled protection by judges and 
prosecutors. The report itself acknowledges the fact that the forum bar is a ground for 
refusing surrender and not an order to prosecutors. When considering the ‘interests of 
justice’ test, judges will take into account any decision of the prosecutors.  
In the Government’s response to the Scott Baker Report,479 the Home Secretary 
announced that the forum bar would be introduced but legislated “afresh for a forum bar 
which will better balance the safeguards for defendants and delays to the extradition 
process which were predicted by Sir Scott Baker”. 480 
7.3.4 ESO 
Another area of concern is the pre-trial period between surrender and trial. As set out 
above, bail is often difficult to obtain for ‘foreign nationals’. This issue of bail together 
with the usual immediate surrender leads to a heighten interference with the person’s 
family and private life; an interference for which the ESO provides a viable alternative.  
An aim of the ESO measure is to minimise the inference with Article 8 beyond the 
usual consequences of imprisonment, in addition to the right to liberty and presumption 
                                               
479
 The Government Response to Sir Scott Baker’s Review of the United Kingdom’s Extradition 
Arrangements, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command 
of Her Majesty October 2012, Cm  8458 
480 The Crime and Courts Act 2013 received Royal assent 25.04.2013, Schedule 20 of which introduces a 
forum bar in both EAW and extradition cases. See Annex 7 for full text. 
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of innocence.
481
 However the ESO not only targets the cost to an individual (family life 
and impact on employment) but also the cost of pre-trial detention to MSs. From the 
available figures, the average percentage of pre-trial detainees across the EU is 24.7% 
and the average of non-national prisoners (including post-trial) is 24.9%.
482
 
Ljungquist recognizes the similarities between MSs, namely the applicable fundamental 
principles, but he also notes the key differences not covered by existing international 
measures. These include thresholds for pre-trial detention in terms of when it will be 
used and its maximum length.
483
 There are also limits to the ECHR, which was not 
drafted with “cross-border cases relating to mutual recognition of non-custodial pre-trial 
supervision measures” 484 in mind. Thus there exists a need for something beyond the 
ECHR to ensure complete protection.  
The ESO
485
 is far from a panacea for prison overcrowding or lengthy periods of pre-trial 
detention.  Like the EAWFD this also requires flanking measures in order to be fully 
effective. These include raising awareness amongst MSs of alternatives to pre-trial 
detention from electronic tagging, to the more invasive further harmonization of 
minimum standards such as maximum pre-trial detention periods. Nevertheless it is a 
positive step forward in fulfilling HRs obligations and providing the protection required 
in cross-border proceedings. It also provides a viable alternative for MSs to take into 
account when assessing the proportionality of Article 8. 
The E-MS therefore has a number of alternatives to unconditional surrender set out in 
the EAWFD itself. In addition to the forum bar and the option to take over the 
prosecution, as discussed above the E-MS can also undertake to execute a sentence. The 
                                               
481 ESOFD (n286), Recitals 4 and 5. 
482 Figures obtained from the International Centre for Prison Studies http://www.prisonstudies.org/ 
accessed on 10.05.2012. See Annex 4 for a consolidated table created by the author from these figures.  
483 Thomas Ljungquist, Mutual Recognition of Non-Custodial Pre-Trial Supervision Measures in the 
European Union, Rev.Int'l Dr.Penal, (2006) Vol.66, 170-175 
484 ibid,172 
485 See Annex 8 for key characteristics. 
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above three provisions work to protect the individual and to also promote cooperation 
between MSs together with other measures such as pre-trial the ESO and post-
sentencing the Prison Transfer FD. 
7.3.5 Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
MR which is part and parcel of the EAWFD in practice leads to the breakup of family 
units and the interference with private lives. The obligation to fulfill, coupled with the 
high thresholds mean that “family life” will almost always play second fiddle. Whilst in 
most instances this poses no problem, cases should be assessed on their own merits, 
taking into account all factors but also allowing these factors to trump treaty obligations 
when appropriate. 
One of the aims behind the ESO, the transfer of prisoner measures and the related EAW 
provisions as well as a reason for having a forum bar, is the encouragement for MSs to 
make use of alternatives to custody and to facilitate an individual’s interest to remain in 
their natural environment. The consequence of this is the positive impact on the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of the individual back into the EU society. 
 “Spending many years in prison may be a factor leading to desocialisation as it often 
destroys prisoners’ ties with their families, friends and the rest of society”,486 this is 
further aggravated if the family is in another country. The Parliamentary Assembly 
recommends that MSs ensure social reintegration is part of their prison policy, stating 
that this “is an important factor when it comes to assessing the functioning of 
democracy in Council of Europe member states.” It notes that failure to do this leads to 
high levels of reoffending because a several causes including “socialisation to prison 
culture; lack of family support; lack of education and vocational training; and social 
prejudices”. This recommendation is in part based on the Report by the Social, Health 
                                               
486 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1741 (2006)1 on Social reintegration 
of prisoners, adopted by the Assembly on 11.04.2006 (11th Sitting) 
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and Family Affairs Committee.
487
 The Committee stresses that family support “is also a 
very important factor in prisoners’ desire to return to a normal life upon release” and 
that in addition to “providing families with material and psychological support, efforts 
should be made to avoid geographical separation”.488 
The ECtHR has also recognised the importance of this. In Slivenko it noted that “the 
network of personal, social and economic relations that make up the private life of every 
human being”;489 this is also reflected in the jurisprudence of the CJEU. In Tsakourides 
the Advocate-General Bot states that social integration and rehabilitation are 
“indissociable from the concept of human dignity” and for this reason he was of the 
opinion that “it belongs to the family of general principles of Union law”.490 
It is evident that the long-term consideration of facilitating and easing the individual’s 
rehabilitation and related social reintegration, is an important factor for the courts of the 
E-MS to weigh up when considering viable alternatives to surrender. 
Contact and visitation by ‘family members’ plays a key role in rehabilitation. In 
Messina the ECtHR has held that prison authorities are to facilitate contact with close 
family, even though there was no violation in this mafia’s case when restricted to 2 
visits per month with his wife and daughter.
491
 In Boyle and Rice v UK,
492
 the ECtHR 
held that a degree of discretion must be left to the national authorities when regulating 
contact.  However in Lavents, where an absolute ban on visits by his wife and daughter 
was imposed this was found to be disproportionate and therefore a violation of Article 
                                               
487 Council of Europe, Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee, Report on Social reintegration of 
prisoners, Doc. 10838, 7.02.2006 
488 ibid §17, 19 
489
 Slivenko v Latvia,  48321/99, Judgment 9.10.2003 §96 
490 Case C-145/09, Land Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979, Advocate-
General Opinion, §50 
491 Messina v Italy (No 2),  25498/94, Judgment 28.09.2000 
492 9659/82 and 9658/82, Judgment 27.04.1988 
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8.
493
 So once again the number of visits is a balancing act depending on the individual 
circumstances. Visitation must be facilitated where a family’s breadwinner is 
incarcerated in a different country where visitation would be impossible. Thus when 
considering whether to surrender, states should have in mind the impact on the family 
and if there are viable alternatives such as conditional surrender or transfer. 
Rehabilitation and reintegration are part of any functioning criminal justice system and 
serve the public good by reducing the likelihood of re-offending. This boosts the 
importance of taking family life into account when surrendered. 
7.4 EU Citizens 
Depending on the nationality of the individual and their family members different 
factors will come into play when expelling or surrendering an individual. The rights of 
legal residents within the EU can be viewed as a ladder; at the top step are EU citizens 
and at the bottom are third country nationals who have no connection to an EU citizen. 
Depending on the particular circumstances of the individual they can either go up or 
down a step. This section does not profess to be an authoratitive consideration of the 
rights under the Citizens Directive or of the relationship between the EAW and the 
Directive – such indepth consideration is beyond the scope of this thesis. What this 
sections seeks to do is highlight the lack of joined up thinking that occurs at the EU 
level and also to emphasise that the rights set out in both the Treaty and the Citizens 
Directive need to be taken into account in the measures of both by the EU and Member 
States.
494
 
                                               
493Lavents v Latvia,  58442/00, Judgment 28.11.2002 
494 Amongst other cases, see Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, (Grand Chamber) of 25 July  
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7.4.1 The Key Rights 
The expulsion of EU citizens by MSs is set out in both the Treaty and the Citizens 
Directive.
495
 Articles 20 and 21 TFEU confer EU citizenship on nationals of MSs, 
thereby giving them the right to move freely within the territory of the EU. This right is 
both expanded and subject to limitations and conditions in EU measures adopted to give 
effect to them.  
The Citizens Directive sets out the rights of EU citizens together with the resident rights 
of their family members or dependents. It aims to facilitate and strengthen the 
individual’s right to move freely within the EU and “establishes a system of protection 
against expulsion measures which are based on the level of integration”.496 Protection 
against expulsion increases incrementally with the level of integration. In terms of 
protection against disproportionate expulsion or exclusion, it sets out an exhaustive list 
of grounds together with an expulsion scale.  
Article 27 sets out the grounds for restricting “the freedom of movement and residence 
of Union citizens and their family members, irrespective of nationality” these are 
“public policy, public security or public health”. Restrictions are only justified when 
one of these grounds exist and where the individual represents “a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”.  
After 5 years of continuous lawful residence in the host MS, an EU citizen and their 
family members can acquire permanent residence in accordance with Article 16. The 
residence rights of family members are acquired regardless of the nationality of the 
family members, they are reliant on the exercise of a treaty right by the EU citizen. 
Once permanent residence is obtained, Article 28(2) states that an individual with 
permanent residence cannot be expelled “except on serious grounds of public policy or 
                                               
495 Citizens Directive (n46)  
496 Tsakouridis (n490) §24-25 citing recitals 23 and 24 of the Citizens Directive. 
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public security”. Article 28(2) requires states to show that the grounds are ‘serious’ 
above and beyond the ‘serious threat’ threshold required for short-term residents. For 
those who have resided for 10 years and minors the state will need to show “imperative 
grounds of public policy” in order to justify their expulsion under Article 28(3). In 
Tsakouridis, the CJEU has clarified that this means “of a particularly high degree of 
seriousness”.497 In assessing a decision to expel, the CJEU states that it can only be 
justified if given the “exceptional seriousness of the threat”, it is necessary and no less 
intrusive means are available having regard to the “serious negative consequences” 
upon an individual who has become “genuinely integrated”.498 
The CJEU went on to say that a balance must be struck between the exceptional threat 
to the public and the effect on the “social rehabilitation” of the individual which is 
viewed as being in the interests of both them and the EU.
499
  
It is interesting to note that the criteria set out in the Citizens Directive to assess the 
proportionality of an expulsion are similar to those laid down by the ECtHR in Boutlif 
and subsequent cases. 
Article 28(1) states,  
Before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or public 
security, the host Member State shall take account of considerations such as 
how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, 
state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration 
into the host Member State and the extent of his/her links with the country 
of origin. 
Any measure which seeks to remove an individual must take into account their 
fundamental rights, the CJEU highlights as of particular relevance Article 8 ECHR and 
                                               
497 ibid §41 
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499 ibid §50 
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Article 7 CFR.
500
 The CJEU has previously identified the ECHR as being of “special 
significance” in the general principles of EU law.501  
The obligation for MSs to give careful and genuine consideration to the circumstances 
of an individual before surrendering them, flows not only from HRs but as we can see 
from EU law as well. As set out above consideration of alterative means is part of the 
balancing act, for those at the top of the ladder their right to remain in the E-MS is 
capable of overriding the interests of enforcing an EAW. In such instances, the 
reasoning of the MS for rejecting viable alternatives will need to be exceptional, “the 
level of justification required when assessing proportionality must be high”.502 
Alternatives of particular relevance include the ability to execute a sentence or 
conditional surrender on the basis that the individual would be returned to serve their 
sentence. On this basis an individual could have the right to insist that he can return at 
the conclusion of trial or his sentence. 
Whilst the reasons for expelling someone should be based on their individual conduct, 
others within the ‘family unit’ of the EU citizen must also be included in the equation. It 
will not only be a choice of whether they stay in the surrendering State without the 
surrendered person, but it may be that they have no free standing right to remain in the 
country and thus upon surrender of the individual the family members are also expelled. 
Individuals have a lot to lose and therefore MSs should not be too quick to surrender. 
 Imprisonment does not come within the definition of “exercising treaty rights” which is 
required in order for TCN and family members to be entitled to join an EU citizen. 
                                               
500 ibid. See also Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadasaki, The convergence of the European legal 
system in the treatment of third country nationals in Europe: the ECJ and ECtHR jurisprudence, EJIL, 
(2011) 22(4), 1071-1088, 1078 which highlights a number of other CJEU cases which emphasise the 
obligation of Member State authorities to take into account the right to family and private life. 
501 C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, [1991] ECR I-
02925 (ERT) 
502 ibid §§84-92 
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Furthermore a person imprisoned is not considered a ‘worker’. In the UK the ‘right to 
reside’ test will mean that their family will also lose their entitlement to social 
assistance.
503
 Furthermore, in relation to third country nationals, periods of time in 
prison do not count towards the calculation of days necessary to acquire increased rights 
in the host MS.
 504
 This should be encouraging news to MSs, since allowing a third 
country national to serve their sentence in the country where they were residing with 
their family, does not help them gain any further benefits in that state.  
However, serving a prison term cannot be classified as the exercise of a treaty right, it 
cannot automatically take rights away. The cases of Zambrano
505
 and Dereci
506
 make it 
clear that citizenship is not based on the exercise of a treaty right but rather a 
fundamental right including the right to reside. Mole
507
 believes that when surrendering 
an individual under an EAW, it is arguable that Article 16(3) Citizens Directive should 
be applied; otherwise the presumption of innocence would be violated. Article 16 
governs the rights of Union citizens who having legally resided for a continuous period 
of 5 years in a MS to acquire the right of permanent residence (this right also applies to 
third country national family members who legal resided with a Union citizen). Article 
16(3) states that the ‘continuity of residence’ cannot be effected “by temporary absences 
not exceeding a total of six months a year, or by absences of a longer duration for” a list 
of reasons (excluding to stand trial). This is a compelling argument. Pre-trial detention 
in some MSs can last for upwards of 6 months with the possibility that the case is 
dismissed or an individual is acquitted. An individual and their family members should 
not be punished for premature issuance of an EAW or a sub-standard investigation. 
                                               
503 The Commission has started infringement proceedings against the UK in relation to its ‘right to reside’ 
test in relation to social benefits. 
504 See the conjoined cases of Caesar Carvalho v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Omar Abdullah Omar [2010] EWCA Civ 1406 at §47 
505
 C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-01177, see also 
the Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston in Zambrano. 
506 Case C‑256/11, Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR 00000 
507 Nuala Mole, Founder of the AIRE, this view was exchanged during an informal discussion with the 
author in February 2013. 
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When states determine that it is appropriate to reduce procedural steps, they also need to 
compensate for such cuts, by ensuring that the new procedures run smoothly with other 
elements of the EU acquis without unintentionally reducing rights in other spheres. 
These are factors which should be considered when assessing the proportionality of 
surrender; in particular where the offence concerned is minor and where alternatives, 
such as the payment of a financial penalty, are available. 
As set out above the EAWFD itself provides alternatives. The implementation of the 
EAWFD is left to the MSs to determine, provided that they fulfill the objectives of the 
EAWFD. For this reason the CJEU showed flexibility in their adjudication of the Dutch 
implementation of Article 4(6) EAWFD in Wolzenburg.
508
 Mr Wolzenburg (a German 
national) had been lawfully residing in the Netherlands for 3 years when he was arrested 
pursuant to a German EAW requesting his return to serve a suspended sentence which 
had been revoked. He had been lawfully resident in Holland for 3 years when arrested. 
The issue before the CJEU was whether the Dutch national law implementing the 
EAWFD, was contrary to the non-discrimination provision of Art 12 EC Treaty. The 
Dutch law required nationals of another MS to have been lawfully residing in the 
Netherlands for a period of at least 5 years and in possession of a residence permit of 
indefinite duration, before it would consider opting to execute the custodial sentence 
itself.  
It concluded that where a MS had not placed additional criteria it was to follow the 
criteria as set out by the CJEU in Kozlowski, which requires an overall assessment of a 
person’s circumstances, are to be applied. However MSs are free to place additional 
criteria on the application of Article 4(6) EAWFD, holding that 5 years residence was 
not excessive and in line with other EU law, in particular the Citizen’s Directive. A 
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closer look at the Citizen’s Directive reveals that the requirement of 5 years is for 
obtaining ‘permanent residence’ whereas Article 4(6) EAWFD applies to a person 
simply ‘residing’ or ‘staying’ in the E-MS. There is no reference to permanence of 
residence in the EAWFD and certainly ‘staying’ requires less formalities then for 
‘residence’. Thus the question is whether the Dutch law imposing on non-nationals a 
requirement of 5 years residency is in the true spirit of the EAWFD.  
Whilst it is accepted that the central aim of the EAWFD is to facilitate the cross-border 
implementation of judicial decisions; the EAWFD falls within the AFSJ and as such 
must not only serve the interests of security but also of freedom and justice. In so doing, 
MSs must ensure that any additional criteria should not restrict further the rights of 
individuals. 
In addition it was clear that the Citizens Directive 2004/38 does not require a Union 
citizen who has acquired a right of permanent residence by virtue of Art 16(1) to apply 
or hold for a residence permit of indefinite duration. Under Art 4(6) FD 2002/584 a MS 
cannot therefore in addition to the duration of residence in that MS also require 
supplementary administrative requirements such as possession of a residence permit of 
indefinite duration. 
Marguery
509
 highlights one other issue dealt with by the CJEU in Wolzenburg the 
acceptability of discrimination between a MS’s own nationals and non-nationals. Article 
12 EC Treaty (now Article18 TFEU), clearly prohibits such discrimination. This 
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of nationality is echoed in Article 21(2) 
of the CFR. This prohibition is not however absolute and can be restricted under certain 
circumstances. In Wolzenburg it was accepted that the differentiation between Dutch 
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nationals and non-nationals was in the pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely that of 
reintegration of the convicted person, and proportionate.  
The Advocate-General Bot in this case disagreed with the requirement for non-nationals 
of 5 years residence. He was of the opinion that the duration of residence was only one 
factor to be taken into account together with the individual’s other personal 
circumstances which indicated the level of integration into the E-MS. The conclusive 
factor is not the duration of residence but whether the individual’s connections “appear 
to make execution of the sentence in the State necessary in order to facilitate his 
reintegration.”510 This view would appear to be more in line with the ECtHR 
jurisprudence. 
The EAW needs to be implemented respecting the rights of family members to ensure 
that they are not punished for the acts of another. The right to family life is not absolute 
and can be interfered with in circumstances envisaged by the EAWFD; as such 
surrender cannot be refused simply because there would be an interference with this 
right. However, any interference needs to be proportionate and in certain situations MSs 
will be required to make use of alternatives which would allow a person to serve their 
sentence in the same country as their family or ensuring that the sentence imposed is 
appropriate in all the circumstances. 
7.5 Children 
Following on from consideration of how the EAW impacts on family life, children will 
be amongst those who fall within the ‘collateral damage’ head. When considering 
whether to surrender, judges should have in mind the effect on any children involved. 
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7.5.1 Primary consideration 
Despite the fact that there is no specific mention of the “best interests of the child” in 
the text of Article 8, the ECtHR has read it into its jurisprudence as a primary 
consideration when assessing interferences with the right to family life. Separation of 
mother and child will engage Article 8 and needs to be necessary in a democratic 
society,
511
 it is “an interference of a very serious order to split up a family”.512 K and T v 
Finland concerned a mother with a long history of mental illness, having given birth in 
prison the baby was immediately taken away at delivery. The ECtHR held that there had 
been a violation of Article 8 because of the authorities’ failure to take steps towards 
reunification. It also considered the importance of genuinely taking the less intrusive 
measure available.
513
 From its jurisprudence it is clear that it considers the child’s best 
interest a primary consideration which must prevail in any balancing act.
514
 
In reaching its decisions, the ECtHR has regard to Article 3(1) of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC). This clearly states that “all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.”  
Of relevance to the EAW is that Article 24 of the CFR on the rights of the child 
replicates Articles 3, 9, 12 and 13 of the CRC. The CJEU has also confirmed the 
primacy of the child’s rights under both Article 25 and 7 of the CFR. The best way to 
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illustrate the CJEU’s approach to this issue in relation to MR is to consider the 
somewhat analogous Brussels II Regulation.
515
 
Brussels II is similar to the EAWFD. It aims to deal efficiently with questions about the 
custody of children and to speedily execute court decisions. In order to do this it relies 
on the principle of MR whereby the decision on custody is decided by the courts of one 
MS and automatically enforced and respected by other MSs. As with the EAWFD there 
is a lack of common standards by which the decisions are reached. Additionally HRs do 
not appear as an express ground for refusing to execute the decision.  
Zarraga v Pelz,
 516
 concerns a preliminary question from Germany asking the CJEU 
whether it was obliged to execute a decision of the Spanish courts when the manner in 
which it has been reached is a serious infringement of fundamental rights. Both 
Advocate-General Bot and the Court agreed that the German courts were to execute 
such a decision.  
Bot makes it clear that Brussels II takes MR to another level. Unlike the EAWFD which 
lists, albeit an exhaustive list, of grounds when surrender must or could be refused, 
Brussels II does not provide any such grounds. There is no scope for a dual review. 
However in a similar vain to the EAWFD the logic of this conclusion is that the relevant 
rights can “be safeguarded by the courts of the Member State of origin.”517 The case 
concerned whether the child had been heard in accordance with Article 42 of Brussels 
II. As the CJEU reminds us, Brussels II has built-in procedural guarantees and so the 
premise is that the MS courts respect the obligations imposed on them by Brussels II 
and the CFR. This in turn means that Article 42 is interpreted in light of Article 24 of 
the CFR. On this basis the Court was happy to conclude that whether the court of the 
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MS of origin infringed Article 42 of the Regulation fell solely within the jurisdiction of 
that court, “the court with jurisdiction in the Member State of enforcement cannot 
oppose the recognition and enforcement of that judgment, having regard to the 
certificate issued by the court concerned of the Member State of origin.”518 
The enforcing MS is prevented from safeguarding the rights and preventing further 
violations, and the CJEU has exclusive jurisdiction to assess compliance with EU law. 
In the present case it relies on MR, trusting in the ability of national courts to protect the 
individual. Where this appears to leave the individual is that they have to return to a MS 
which may have already once violated their rights and trust (or rather hope) that they 
will get it right second time.  
This said the CJEU’s approach in child abduction cases can be distinguished from the 
EAW in a number of ways. Brussels II takes MR to another level, the CJEU has made it 
clear that the E-MS cannot review the MS of origin for compliance with HRs. The 
EAWFD is not applied in such an automated manner, there is scope within the EAWFD 
to review the request. The rationale behind Brussels II is based on the purpose, namely 
to protect the best interests of the child by discouraging child abduction and avoiding 
lengthy delays. Whilst the EAWFD also seeks to speed up the surrender process, this is 
not critical to the purpose of the EAWFD which is to promote cooperation between 
MSs in criminal matters so that justice can be served. However Zarraga illustrates the 
balancing of interests that is involved between the best interests of the child to be heard 
and their best interest to avoid lengthy proceedings and the trauma of been ejected from 
an environment they have settled into during that period. The delicate balancing that is 
required in abduction cases boosts the argument that Zarraga and related jurisprudence 
is restricted to child abduction cases and does not have a broader application. In 
EAWFD cases the best interests of the child that are usually being balanced relate solely 
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to the separation from their parent. Thus the balancing act is between the interests of the 
child and the fulfillment of international obligations. 
The N.S. case, in the context of asylum, clearly places in certain circumstances an 
obligation on MSs to assess the HRs in the MS to which they are sending an individual. 
In the same case it also states that a presumption emanating from mutual trust cannot be 
absolute, but must be capable of rebuttal. This view is consistent with the ECtHR 
jurisprudence. 
The ECtHR approach to this procedure is interesting. The general position is that the 
national courts are best placed to assess the delicate balance, adding that it was not their 
role to interpret the application of other international treaties. The ECtHR’s assessment 
is not abstract but takes into account the legitimate purpose for interfering with a 
qualified right. On this basis, MSs have been given a wide margin of appreciation when 
implementing their obligations under the Hague Convention and the related Brussels 
II.
519
 Despite the wide margin of appreciation implementation of the measures is not 
devoid of procedural guarantees. 
The case of Neulinger and Shrunk,
520
 was critical of the automatic and mechanical 
application of the Hague Convention. In this case the mother had wrongfully taken the 
child from Israel to Switzerland. A key influencing factor was the father’s behaviour in 
joining a religious cult. In addition, the child had grown up in Switzerland from the age 
of 2 months (in total 5 years at the date of judgment) and uprooting him would have 
serious consequences.
521
 The ECtHR reaffirms that the consensus of international law is 
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that the child’s “best interests must be paramount”.522 It states that “a child's return 
cannot be ordered automatically or mechanically when the Hague Convention is 
applicable”. What was in the best interests of a child was reliant on a number of 
circumstances and the domestic authorities were best placed to make such 
assessment.
523
 An individual assessment was required in each case. 
Finally, the interrelationship between the EAWFD and the Citizens’ Directive should be 
noted. Where a child is concerned Article 28(3)(b) of the Citizens’ Directive states that 
there must be “imperative grounds” for expelling them, unless it is in the best interests 
of the child to do so. Where a custodial parent is being surrendered in accordance with 
an EAW, consideration has to be given to the simultaneous expulsion or separation of 
any child. Under the Citizens Directive this can only occur if it is in the best interests of 
the child.
524
 The EAWFD makes no mention of the impact on family members or 
children, although it is stated that it is to be read in compliance with the EU acquis 
comunitaire and so it follows that the impact on any children must be taken into 
account. 
7.5.2 UK 
The diversion into child abduction cases serves to set out the principles which have 
developed within their context. In the UK, the positioning of a child’s interests is made 
clear by Lady Hale in ZH (Tanzania), when “making the proportionality assessment 
under article 8, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration.”525 These 
are further reinforced by Lord Kerr who states that ‘a primacy of importance must be 
accorded’ to the best interest of a child effected by the decision. However, he went on to 
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say that this is not a “factor of limitless importance in the sense that it will prevail over 
all other considerations. It is a factor, however, that must rank higher than any other. It 
is not merely one consideration that weighs in the balance alongside other competing 
factors.”526 
This case concerned immigration, however as asserted above, the ECtHR has not drawn 
a distinction between expulsion and extradition in Article 8 cases. In addition as set out 
by the court in ZH (Tanzania) the obligation to make the best interests of a child a 
primary factor are also set out in domestic law.
527
 
The Supreme Court appeals of HH and PH v Italy and FK v Poland concerned requests 
for surrender under and EAW, in the joined cases of HH and PH, to Italy, and in FK, to 
Poland. The issue in all three was whether their surrender would violate the Article 8 
ECHR rights of Appellants’ children. As Lady Hale summarised “No-one seriously 
disputes that the impact upon the younger children of the removal of their primary 
carers and attachment figures will be devastating. The issue is the relevance of their 
interests in the extradition proceedings.”528 
The case of FK concerned a Polish mother of 5 (aged 21, 17, 13, 8 and 3). She and her 
husband had lived in the UK since 2002 where the youngest two children were born. 
Her husband is physically impaired and found to display signs of psychological 
disturbance, meaning that he would not be able to take care of the children. She was 
wanted for dishonesty offences which the court described as not trivial but of no great 
gravity either.
529
  Taking into account that there is no prosecutorial discretion in Poland 
and thus no proportionality test would have been conducted before issuing the EAW, 
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together with the considerable delays at all stages of the proceedings;
530
 the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that the public interest in extraditing FK did not justify the 
inevitable harm that it would cause to the lives of her children.
531
   
The case of HH and PH concerned what all judges described as the most difficult case. 
HH and PB are the mother and father of 3 children born in 2000, 2003 and 2009. The 
parents were arrested pursuant to an EAW from Italy to serve sentences of 
imprisonment. PH is the primary carer whilst the mother HH is also resisting surrender 
on the basis of her mental health. The accepted outcome of their surrender is that the 
children will go into care with no guarantee of staying together which will have a 
profound effect on their physical and emotional health. The lower courts
532
 did not 
accept that Norris was modified by ZH (Tanzania), both courts holding that to surrender 
both parents was not disproportionate to their rights or the rights of their children.  
The certified question for the Supreme Court was, “Where in proceedings under the EA 
the Article 8 rights of the children of the defendant are arguably engaged, how should 
their interests be safeguarded and to what extent, if at all, is it necessary to modify the 
Supreme Court’s approach in Norris v Government of USA (No 2) in light of ZH 
(Tanzania)?”  
The two aspects of Article 8 argued by the appellants are that the evolution of the test is 
faulty, that it was never meant to be set at such a high threshold and that the best 
interests of a child should be a primary consideration. It was argued that some courts 
misinterpreted Norris, Lady Hale states that by focusing on select words in Norris, such 
as “some quite exceptionally compelling feature”533 the focus has shifted from the 
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individual to a search for “out of the run of the mill” external factors. “Some 
particularly grave consequences are not out of the run of the mill at all. Once again, the 
test is always whether the gravity of the interference with family life is justified by the 
gravity of the public interest pursued”.534 The exceptionality referred to in Norris is a 
“description of the likely results of the extradition process” and not “as a forensic 
shorthand for the test.”535 
Norris considered the application of Article 8 in the context of extradition and whilst it 
concerned family rights of two healthy adults, useful principles can be elicited. These 
were summarized by Lady Hale where she states quite clearly that whilst there may be a 
closer analogy between extradition and domestic criminal proceedings rather than with 
deportation and extradition an examination of the interference with family life still 
needs to be carried out by the court. To this end there is ‘no test of exceptionality in 
either context’. As she sees it, the test is always whether the interference with the family 
life of the extraditee and other family members outweighs the public interest in 
extradition. The constant public interest in extradition is that those accused should be 
brought to trial, convicted persons should serve their sentences, the UK should honor 
her treaty obligations to other states and that it should not create a safe haven. This 
public interest will always be weighty,  
That public interest will always carry great weight, but the weight to be 
attached to it in the particular case does vary according to the nature and 
seriousness of the crime or crimes involved. 
The delay since the crimes were committed may both diminish the weight to 
be attached to the public interest and increase the impact upon private and 
family life. 
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Hence it is likely that the public interest in extradition will outweigh the 
article 8 rights of the family unless consequences of the interference with 
family life will be exceptionally severe.
536
 
Commenting on Wellington, the court in Norris reiterated that the “case underlines the 
weight that the desirability of extradition carries as an essential element in combating 
public disorder and crime.”537 It also noted it was a controversial decision which found 
that even though the treatment the individual would receive in the USA would be 
considered inhuman treatment in the domestic context (of the UK), his extradition was 
still desirable given that the alternative to facing Article 3 prohibited treatment would be 
him escaping justice altogether. It highlighted “the weight that the desirability of 
extradition carries as an essential element in combating public disorder and crime.” 
ZH (Tanzania) concerned the impact of a mothers deportation on her two children with 
the Supreme Court stating that a child’s interests are a primary consideration (not the 
primary or paramount consideration), although they could be outweighed by the 
cumulative effects of other considerations.
538
 
Extradition and the fulfillment of international obligations is a legitimate aim. However 
as pointed out by Lady Hale implementation of the EAWFD is subject to the need to 
respect human rights obligations and so the UK is not absolved of “the duty to weigh 
the competing interests as required by article 8.”539 
Built into the EAWFD is the need to respect HRs and as such the obligation to fulfill an 
EAW does not automatically or always outweigh HRs. A balance needs to take place. 
Lady Hale suggests that judges take an orderly approach to their assessment of Article 8 
in line with the ECtHR jurisprudence: 
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First, it asks whether there is or will be an interference with the right to 
respect for private and family life. Second, it asks whether that interference 
is in accordance with the law and pursues one or more of the legitimate aims 
within those listed in article 8.2. Third, it asks whether the interference is 
“necessary in a democratic society” in the sense of being a proportionate 
response to that legitimate aim. In answering that all-important question it 
will weigh the nature and gravity of the interference against the importance 
of the aims pursued. In other words, the balancing exercise is the same in 
each context: what may differ are the nature and weight of the interests to be 
put into each side of the scale.
540
  
It is clear that the balancing act according to Strasbourg standards is the same whether 
expulsion, extradition or domestic. This was stated in Norris, “there are [no] grounds 
for treating extradition cases as falling into a special category which diminishes the 
need to examine carefully the way the process will interfere with the individual’s right 
to respect for his family life”.541 Lady Hale also usefully sets out the procedure to be 
followed in extradition proceedings in order to ascertain whether in the interests of the 
child the extradition should be refused. This procedure includes taking into account 
alternatives to prosecution abroad or imprisonment in the I-MS.
542
 
Exactly because the consequences of the extradition decision are beyond the control and 
check of the E-MS there should be a heightened scrutiny of the potential impact on 
HRs. Fulfilling extradition treaties is not of more public interest then controlling 
immigration. 
Lord Judge comments that the UK judges should not impose their opinions on others.
543
 
This can be regarded as selective imposition. There is no problem enforcing the UK's 
opinion that the death penalty is wrong when extraditing individuals for capital offences 
to the USA. So what is different to imposing the UK views when children in our control 
are involved? True a proportionality test needs to be conducted and a balancing act 
needs to be played out; however is the fulfilment of international obligations (almost) 
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always going to trump the rights of the child? The current case of PH is one example 
where you have minor participation in a serious cross-border drug crime and in one 
where there are alternative sentences. You also have 4 children of which at least one is 
at an age when separation from both parents would have a devastating effect. If States 
can negotiate and obtain guarantees on behalf of alleged/convicted murderers then why 
do they feel unable to obtain guarantees or negotiate alternative sentences in order to 
minimise devastating effects on young children? As stated, in Italy it is possible for PH 
to serve his sentence at home caring for his children. Thus in negotiations, the UK 
would not be imposing opinions but simply obtaining assurances that the interests of the 
children would be protected. It appears that the reason why greater weight is given to 
extradition is because whereas expulsion is a unilateral act for which the state does not 
require to rely on any other state; extradition is a co-operative endeavour and for it to 
work it requires all those concerned to comply. In addition to reciprocity, within the 
EAW procedure there is also mutual trust that the I-MS has within its system safeguards 
which will take into account the interests of the children; seeking assurances concerns 
political more than legal relationships. 
Additionally whilst safe havens are undesirable, why do states not want to become a 
haven for those seeking HRs protection? 
Lady Hale dismissed the appeal of HH but allowed the appeals of PH and FK. However 
the majority dismissed the appeals of both HH and PH. Lord Judge held that given the 
nature of the crimes committed by PH, the public interest in extradition outweighs the 
interference with the rights of his children.
544
 This view was shared by Lord Hope;
545
 
Lord Brown;
546
 Lord Mance;
547
 Lord Kerr;
548
 and Lord Wilson.
549
 Lady Hale found that 
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the effect on the children, in particular the youngest, outweighed the desirability of 
extradition of the father in addition to the mother.
550
 
Had PH been sentenced in the UK he would (according to Lord Judge) receive 10 years. 
The difference between sentences in the UK (domestic) and in Italy is that if in the UK 
family visits could be more easily and frequently facilitated. The gravity of the offence 
is not disputed; however part of the consideration needs to be alternatives to 
surrendering an individual. 
In the South African case of M v The State, “what has to be considered is the triad 
consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of society”.551 Expanding on the 
classic test at §33 Sachs J talks about taking into account alternatives within the 
legitimate range. So again why does the UK refuse to negotiate assurances as to the 
sentence? The principle of MR suggests that sentencing is the concern of the I-MSs and 
that if a state were to start interfering with the sentencing of another state, they will do 
the same to theirs. However, where does this reciprocity argument leave the child? Lord 
Wilson
552
 states that in the UK they “do not start, as a “given”, with the “legitimate 
range of choices” and then fit the interests of the children into it; under article 8 their 
interests may, through the proportionality exercise, help to identify the legitimate 
range.” 
Pending the decision of the Supreme Court in the HH, PH and FK case, it had been 
argued before lower courts that consideration of cases raising the primacy of the child’s 
best interests as well as the threshold for Article 8 interferences should be postponed 
until the judgment was delivered. The lower courts did not entertain these requests and 
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instead opted to apply a lower threshold when assessing the proportionality of 
surrender. Despite this, appeals against surrender on Article 8 were not successful. This 
is an interesting fact which may indicate that irrespective of how the legal test is framed, 
the threshold applied by the UK courts in practice is particularly high and that even 
where taking the rights of the child as a paramount importance, it will not in the 
majority of cases act as a bulwark to extradition.
553
  
Another case from the UK, EB v UK
554
 is pending before the ECtHR on a similar point. 
EB is a single mother of 4 children arrested in pursuit of an EAW from Poland to stand 
trial for counts of insult, assault and threatening behaviour. The question posed to the 
parties by the ECtHR is, “[w]ould the applicant’s extradition to Poland and consequent 
separation from her children, including an infant whom she is breastfeeding, be in 
violation of Article 8?”  
7.6 Private Life 
As stated above those remote relationships which do not fall within the family life 
rubric are likely to be considered under the private life sphere. Private life arguments 
are relevant to those individuals who have established a life in the UK by staying for a 
long period, working or becoming part of the community. Such an interference with a 
person’s private life will occur in the same way as set out above in reference to family 
life.  
In addition to this kind of interference, there are other interferences which could fall 
under Article 8. These include improper searches of home (and workplaces
555
) and 
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disproportionate interception of communication and surveillance.
556
 In relation to the 
EAW, the question arises as to whether evidence of such practices which are 
incompatible with Article 8 should act as a bar to surrender. This will be considered in 
the context of criminal proceedings, together with Article 6 concerns which may mean 
that inappropriately obtained evidence will be used/admissible at trial. 
Given the wide margin of appreciation granted to MSs by the ECtHR, it is doubtful 
whether inappropriately obtained evidence will be sufficient to bar surrender. The same 
old reasoning of the availability of dual review will be applied. In other words setting 
aside any review the E-MS may conduct, the ECtHR will also take into account the 
assessment by the I-MS. The threshold will be high and unless there is a ‘flagrant 
denial’ of the guarantees or evidence of systematic violations in for example the 
obtaining and use of evidence, it is unlikely that the ECtHR will find a violation. 
7.6.1 Chemical Castration 
Article 8 also respects the physical and moral integrity of an individual. An interference 
with this is compulsory medical treatment.
557
 Related to this is the growing number of 
MSs employing chemical castration as part of sentence upon criminal conviction. As 
acceptance grows across the EU, what would it take to equate this to a violation of 
Article 8 (if not more appropriately of Article 3)? 
In 2012, the UK started running a pilot programme of voluntary chemical castration. In 
reply to the Guardian newspaper,
558
 the Ministry of Justice stated that the basis for their 
decision to support the programme were the guidelines of the World Federation of 
                                               
556
 Klass and others v Germany, 5029/71, Judgment 6.09.1978; Malone v UK, 8691/79, Judgment 
2.08.1984; Copland v UK, 62617/00, Judgment 3.04.2007 
557 Glass v UK, 61827/00, Judgment 9.03.2004 
558 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/reality-check-with-polly-curtis/2012/mar/13/prisons-and-
probation-criminal-justice accessed 11.05.2012. 
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Societies of Biological Psychiatry.
559
 The UK courts have held that provided the 
individual consents to chemical castration it will not violate his rights under Article 3. 
In Janiga,
 560
 surrender was being resisted on the basis that no consent was required 
before imposing chemical castration in the Czech Republic. Despite the presentation of 
CPT reports expressing concern about the imposition of such treatment, the Divisional 
Court was happy that in the particular circumstances consent was required; the choice 
being between treatment or prolonged imprisonment.  The CPT report cited in Janinga 
provides further guidance. It states, 
the CPT considers that anti-androgen treatment should always be based on a 
thorough individual psychiatric and medical assessment and that such 
medication should be given on a purely voluntary basis. As should be the 
case before starting any medical treatment, the patient should be fully 
informed of all the potential effects and side effects and should be able to 
withdraw his consent and have his treatment discontinued at any time. 
Further, the administration of anti-androgens should be combined with 
psychotherapy and other forms of counselling in order to further reduce the 
risk of reoffending. Also, anti-androgen treatment should not be a general 
condition for the release of sex-offenders, but administered to selected 
individuals based on an individual assessment.
561
 
As with other violations of HRs, the individual will need to provide evidence of a real 
risk to themselves and not only the general situation in order to successfully resist 
surrender. It also raises the question of whether MR is sufficient to deal with other 
peculiar sanctions. 
                                               
559 Florence Thibaut, Flora De La Barra, Harvey Gordon, Paul Cosyns, John M. W. Bradford and The 
WFSBP Task Force on Sexual Disorders, The World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry 
(WFSBP) Guidelines for the biological treatment of paraphilias, The World Journal of Biological 
Psychiatry, (2010) 11: 604–655 
560 Janiga v Ustinad Labem Regional Court Czech Republic [2011] EWHC 553 (Admin) 
561 CPT, Report to the Czech Government on the visit to the Czech Republic carried out by the CPT from 
25 March to 2 April 2008, CPT/Inf (2009) 8 §25 
Chapter Seven: Family and Private Life 
208 
 
7.7 The EAW and Family Life 
7.7.1 Passing the Buck 
The current practice flowing from mutual trust means that instead of preventing HRs 
violations at the first opportunity the responsibility for consideration of HRs arguments 
is being passed to the I-MS and if that fails to the ECtHR.  
In terms of Article 8 it is presumed that the I-MS would have conducted the balancing 
act before making the request. As we know this is not always the case, for example 
there is no prosecution discretion in Poland. Even where the MS conducted a 
proportionality test, the circumstances of an individual and his family change, when 
there has been a delay how does the I-MS know what the individual’s circumstances are 
in the E-MS? 
As clearly stated by both the ECtHR and CJEU in the M.S.S. and N.S. cases, MSs 
cannot simply make a presumption that HRs will be respected upon surrender. They 
need to give genuine consideration to evidence to the contrary. As reiterated by the 
ECtHR on countless times the rights need to be real and practical and not theoretical 
and illusory. In terms of Article 8 it can be violated as soon as the person leaves the 
shores of the E-MS and not only when they find themselves in the I-MS. 
7.7.2 Evidential Burden 
In terms of an individual, what must they show to satisfy the courts that they should not 
surrender the individual? As is evidenced by the jurisprudence, the UK sets an 
extremely high threshold with any flexibility being utilised to facilitate surrender. The 
ECtHR has fully dealt with the issue in relation to deportation but not extradition/EAW. 
One of the disputed areas between the UK authorities and defence lawyers is the 
relevance or weight of the “best interests of the child”. The jurisprudence is clear that all 
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factors need to be taken into account and where viable alternatives are available but are 
simply disregarded without genuine consideration and compelling reasons, the MS will 
be in violation of Article 8. 
Article 8 involves a balancing act. The same scales are used in all cases, what differs are 
the issues which are to be balanced. In EAW cases a constant will be the importance of 
fulfilling Treaty obligations, as well as the public interest for the individual to stand trial 
or serve a sentence. Other aspects of ‘public interest’ will vary depending on the 
seriousness of the crime and any delay since the alleged commission of the crime. On 
the other end of the scales, authorities are required to consider the individual 
circumstances and whether any less intrusive alternatives exist to surrender. As noted 
above some alternatives are provided by the EAWFD itself in addition to other MR 
measures, during pre-trial stages the ESO and post-trial the Transfer of Prisoners FD. 
Rehabilitation and reintegration have been recognized not only as significant elements 
of the criminal justice system, but also as important considerations during sentencing. 
Central to reintegration of an individual into society is their family and established 
private life. Thus this provides a further reason for taking into account family life when 
deciding whether to surrender an individual. Amongst the factors to be taken into 
account, the interest of any children will be a primary consideration. The HRs of the 
family life need to also marry up to the Treaty rights of EU Citizens. The rights 
acquired and the thresholds applied will depend on which step of the ladder the 
individual and their family are found, however states should ensure that innocent family 
members and children are not also punished for wrongdoings. 
The UK case law relating to EAWs and Article 8 is illustrative of how this balancing act 
will play out in practice. When consider Article 8, UK courts will distinguish between 
domestic and foreign cases, this distinction will not always be useful in EAW cases 
which will for the most part be a hybrid of the two.  Courts are clear that instances 
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where Article 8 rights will be found to outweigh the public interest are rare. A set of 
exceptional circumstances will need to be shown in order to tip the balance against 
surrender. In UK courts the word ‘exceptional’ is applied to circumstances where 
surrender would be refused. Following a number of confused cases, it is now clear that 
‘exceptional circumstances’ is not a test but relates to the factual circumstances (i.e.) not 
the normal consequences of arrest, detention or surrender.The threshold to be met is 
high and a minor interference will not be sufficient, in such cases the court will hold 
that the surrender is both necessary and proportionate. The principle of MR further 
raises the threshold to be met, however both the ECtHR and CJEU have made it clear 
(in the asylum context) that this kind of presumption must be rebuttable not only in 
theory but also in practice. 
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Chapter Eight: A Fair Trial 
 
The right to a fair hearing is guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR and Articles 47 and 48 
CFR. These rights can be broken down and applied at different points of criminal 
proceedings. They raise obligations for the I-MS and the E-MS in terms of its own 
proceedings as well as those of the I-MS.   
The right to a fair trial under Article 6 encompasses much more then the rights of the 
defendant, however, a major element of Article 6 is the provision of a real and effective 
opportunity to defend oneself to ensure the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. The 
focus of the discussion on the right to a fair trial in the context of the EAW shall also be 
on defence rights. 
A restriction of Article 6 is that it applies to civil or criminal proceedings as defined by 
the ECtHR with Articles 6(2) and (3) guarantees applying only to a ‘criminal charge’.  
The ECtHR treads carefully with Article 6 cases to ensure that it is not considered a 
court of fourth instance. Its role is not to double guess decisions of national courts, and 
it will not deal with errors of law or fact.  Its role is of a subsidiary nature which means 
that ideally HRs should ultimately be protected and redressed at the national levels. Its 
review of proceedings will only go as far as examining whether they have infringed the 
Convention rights.
562
  Although the Court is concerned with procedural irregularities, it 
will also take into account the effects of these on the findings on the merits.
563
 
                                               
562 Garcia Ruiz v Spain,  30544/96, Judgment 21.01.1999 
563 Khamidov v Russia,  72118/01, Judgment 15.11.2007 
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There are more complaints under Article 6 then under any other provision, with the vast 
majority concerning criminal proceedings.
564
 This means that there are a large number 
of cases from which to elicit the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The focus will be on the 
lead cases which summarize and develop this jurisprudence and those against EU MSs. 
8.1 Applicability to Extradition and the EAW 
It is essential to distinguish the applicability of Article 6 to the E-MS and to the I-MS. 
Article 6 applies to criminal proceedings before the I-MS. Applicability to the E-MS is 
not clear and depends on the interpretation of  a ‘determination of civil rights’ and a 
‘determination of a criminal charge’. This discussion is of relevance to the proceedings 
of the E-MS, in that they assist in assessing why Article 6 guarantees are applicable to 
the EAW proceedings.  
In the E-MS, under the ECHR, the EAW procedure is likened to extradition and 
therefore not considered a determination of a ‘civil right’ or a ‘criminal charge’ and as 
such Article 6 ECHR is not applicable.
565
 Extradition proceedings in the E-MS are not 
subject to Article 6 guarantees under the ECHR. However, it is clear that the right to a 
fair trial under the Charter extends beyond the restricted scope of the ECHR and the 
guarantees are capable of encompassing and applying to EAW proceedings. This 
highlights the inadequacy of solely relying on the ECHR at EU level. 
Besides this difference in scope, the current approach of the ECtHR to extradition under 
Article 6 is not sound.
 566
 When the ECHR was adopted, cross-border movement and 
transnational crimes were not the common phenomenon that they are nowadays. The 
                                               
564 According to ECtHR statistics, between 1959-2010 there were 8019 findings of a violation of Article 
6, the second highest number of violations found were 2414 of Article1 of Protocol 1. In 2010 the highest 
number of violations were of Article 6 (804 violations), the second highest were 315 violations of Article 
5, followed by 306 violations of Article 3. ECtHR, Annual Report 2010, Registry of the Court, (2011). 
565
 Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, Applications nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, [GC] Judgment 
4.02.2005; Olaechea Cahuas v Spain,  24668/03, Judgment10.08.2006 
566 A similar tracking of authorities on the non-applicability of Article 6 to extradition is carried out by 
Langford. See Peter Langford, Extradition and fundamental rights: the perspective of the European Court 
of Human Rights, I.J.H.R, (2009) 13:4, 512-29 
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scope of the ECHR has yet to catch up with modern living where the activities of 
individuals are rarely confined by the jurisdictional borders of one country. True to the 
spirit of the CFR, the widening of the scope in the CFR illustrates the EU’s recognition 
of the altered environment, requirements for HRs protection and of the impact 
extradition has on the rights and freedoms of individuals. A fresh approach needs to be 
taken as to the applicability of fair trial guarantees to the proceedings of the E-MS. 
Scrutinizing the EU approach to HRs through the CFR and other documents will 
explain how these guarantees are applicable to the E-MS proceedings. 
Beyond the restrictive view of proceedings in the E-MS, the ECtHR has recognized 
situations where a risk of facing a violation of a right may oblige a state to not fulfill an 
extradition request. The jurisprudence before the adoption of the principle of MR in the 
criminal sphere created obligations on the E-MS to give due consideration to whether 
there was a real risk that the individual would face or has faced a ‘flagrant denial’ of a 
fair trial in the I-MS. Failure to do so ordinarily means that they would be held 
complicit in a resulting violation.
 567
 The principle of MR appears to have brushed aside 
this obligation, trumping all previous jurisprudence. The line of argument from MSs is 
that a high level of confidence now exists between MSs to such a level that they should 
be blindly trusted and that no inquiry is necessary. Mutual trust exists that the systems 
of all MSs offer the same level of protection of HRs and respect for the rule of law.  
The current line of arguments from the ECtHR is that MSs are entitled to apply this 
mutual trust since all EU MSs are also Contracting Parties to the ECHR and thus the 
individual’s right to individual petition is preserved so that if things do ultimately go 
wrong they can still petition the ECtHR. Thus the ECtHR has made itself a reactionary 
court as opposed to a court actively promoting the prevention of HRs violations at the 
national levels, at the earliest opportunity. Reflecting on this jurisprudence together with 
                                               
567 Soering (n177); Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain,  12747/87, Judgment 26.06.1992 
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the altered application by both MSs and the ECtHR will show how this new approach is 
not justified, in the sense that it does not flow from the earlier jurisprudence. The 
missing steps need to be built-in before the principle of MR can be applied with such a 
high level of confidence.
568
  
The right to a fair trial, as provided for under Article 47 CFR, is wider in scope and 
applicability then Article 6 ECHR. According to the explanatory text, the right to a fair 
trial in Community law is “not confined to disputes relating to civil rights and 
obligations”. 569 Guarantees under Article 47 apply in the same way as those provided 
for by the ECHR, with the key differentiation being their scope. This difference is based 
in part on the fact that the EU is a community based on the rule of law as reflected in the 
case of Les Verts.
570
 The power to extend the scope of rights beyond the minimum 
standards established by the ECHR is also found in Article 52(3) which provides that 
Union law is not prevented from “providing more extensive protection”.  This broader 
EU scope under the CFR and applicability of procedural guarantees to the EAW are also 
confirmed by the EU elsewhere including within the Stockholm Roadmap and its 
measures.  
8.2 Applicability of Article 6 to the Executing Member State 
8.2.1 Autonomous Meaning of ‘civil rights’ 
The ECtHR has given ‘determination of civil rights and obligations’ an autonomous 
meaning, in the sense that the domestic definition is not decisive. As Judge Loucaides 
points out in his dissenting opinion in Maaiouia,
571
 the word ‘civil’ has not however 
been defined by the ECtHR. Taking a teleological approach he concludes that the 
                                               
568 These steps will be dealt with in later chapters. 
569
 EU, Text of the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter Text of the explanations 
relating to the complete text of the Charter as set out in CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50, CONVENT 
49 11.10.2000  
570 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament [1986] ECR 01339 
571 Joined by Judge Traja, Maaiouia v France,  39652/98, [GC], Judgment 5.10.2000, 18-23 
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drafters’ intention was for ‘civil’ to mean anything that was not ‘criminal’ and not only 
the private law domain. He supports this view with examples where the ECtHR has 
itself held that non-private law issues fall within the meaning of ‘civil’. On the basis of 
this line of interpretation, if extradition proceedings are not considered ‘criminal’ they 
are by default ‘civil’ and therefore the Article 6 guarantees applicable to ‘civil’ 
proceedings should also apply to them.  
This is not however the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which has laid down a set of not 
particularly helpful criteria. The words ‘determination of civil rights and obligations’ 
require a private law obligation, although an administrative or public law right will not 
automatically exclude the issue from the meaning of ‘civil’. In the same way a dispute 
between two individuals is more likely to be ‘civil’ although a dispute over a right with 
a public authority can also still be ‘civil’. In order to ascertain whether a particular 
proceeding is ‘civil’ a starting point would be the extensive ECtHR jurisprudence and 
whilst a range of proceedings have been held to be ‘civil’, neither extradition nor EAW 
proceedings have been placed under this head.
572
 
8.2.2 Autonomous Meaning of ‘criminal charge’ 
The ECtHR has also given ‘criminal charge’ an autonomous meaning and extradition 
proceedings do not fit within this definition either.  
What is ‘criminal’ is not definitively defined, but is rather dependant on the facts of 
individual cases. In Engel,
573
 the Court set out the 3 step test for determining whether 
proceedings concern a ‘criminal charge’. 
                                               
572 See Peter van Dijk and others, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
(2006) 513-28 
573 Engel  and Others v the Netherlands, 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72, Judgment 
8.06.1976 §82 
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The classification in domestic law is a starting point and the ECtHR may also under the 
second criteria also consider the procedures and the similarity to criminal offences in 
other MSs although neither are decisive.
574
   
The second criterion is considered more important than the first
575
. Certain factors can 
be elicited from the Court’s jurisprudence which are to be taken into account when 
determining this second criterion. These include: whether it is exclusively addressed to 
a particular group, or if it is of a generally binding character;
576
 who instituted the 
proceedings, for example, was it a public body with statutory powers of enforcement;
577
 
whether it has a punitive or deterrent purpose;
578
 whether the imposition of a penalty is 
dependent upon a finding of guilt;
579
 and although not decisive, how similar procedures 
are classified in other MSs.
580
 
This is related to the third criterion and the Court will have regard to the nature and 
purpose of the penalty “liable to be imposed”, in particular whether it acts as a deterrent 
and is punitive. It is important to note that what is relevant is the sentence available and 
not the actually penalty imposed. 
In Campbell and Fell,
581
 the Court applied the criteria as set out in Engel to determine 
that disciplinary proceedings in that case constituted a “criminal charge”. The decision 
was based on the “especially grave” character of the offences charged and the nature 
and severity of the penalty that he risked incurring. The Court stated that where the 
                                               
574 Campbell and Fell v UK, 7819/77, 7878/77, Judgment 28 June1984. 
575 Jussila v. Finland, 73053/01, [GC] Judgment 23.11.2006 §38 
576 Bendenoun v. France, 12547/86, Judgment 24.02.1994 §47 
577
 Benham v. UK, 19380/92, Judgment 10.06.1996  §56 
578 Öztürk v. Germany, 8544/79 , Judgment 21.02.1984 §53 
579 Benham v UK, 19380/92, Judgment 10.06.1996 §56 
580 Öztürk (n578) §53 
581 Campbell and Fell (n574) 
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penalty liable to be imposed was the deprivation of liberty, it belongs to the criminal 
sphere.
582
 
“Charge” has an autonomous meaning and is crucial in determining the point at which 
Article 6 is engaged. It has been described as “the official notification given to an 
individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal 
offence” or some act which carries similar implications where the situation of the 
individual is “substantially affected”.583 
In Öztürk , the Court held that the lack of seriousness of a charge/offence does not take 
away criminal categorization. It reiterated that the national classification of an offence is 
not decisive. It went on to hold that if states were able to exclude the operation of 
Articles 6 and 7 by classification, “the application of these provisions would be 
subordinated to their sovereign will.  A latitude extending thus far might lead to results 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.”584 
The guarantees under Article 6 apply from the moment an individual is ‘charged’ within 
the ECHR meaning, which may be before the national authorities consider a person 
‘charged’. Criminal proceedings are not necessary for Article 6 to be engaged.585 These 
guarantees include the guarantee for an independent and impartial tribunal,
586
 the right 
to participate effectively,
587
 a public hearing,
588
 and reasonable length of proceedings.
589
 
                                               
582 Ibid, §27 
583 Deweer v Belgium, 6903/75, Judgment 27.02.1980 §46 
584 Öztürk (n578) §49 
585 Deweer (n583) 
586
 Hauschildt v Denmark,10486/83, Judgment  24 May1989 
587 T. v UK, 24724/94, [GC] Judgment 16.12.1999; V v UK,  24888/94, [GC] Judgment 16.12.1999 
588 Unless the right is waived. Hakansson and Sturesson v Sweden,  11855/85, Judgment  21 
February1990 
589 Eckle v Germany, 8130/78, Judgment 15 July1982 
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Although the pre-trial stage is most relevant to the EAW, it should be noted that in 
Hornsby,
590
 the Court held that the execution of judgments is an integral part of the 
‘trial’ and therefore Article 6 is applicable at this stage. 
The cases of Campbell and the others cited above are some examples of the criteria 
being applied by the ECtHR, giving us an idea of the ECtHR’s thoughts of what will be 
considered a ‘criminal charge’. However as will be illustrated, the principles have never 
been directly applied to extradition or the EAW with any adequate level of 
consideration. 
8.2.3 Exclusion of Extradition from the Scope of Article 6 
As already stated, for the purposes of the ECHR, extradition procedures themselves are 
not considered to fall within the criminal procedures in the E-MS. The ECtHR has 
deployed two different lines of authorities in making this statement. The first relates to 
the opinion that extradition proceedings are not regarded as a determination of a 
criminal charge, they are not: an investigation of a criminal offence; or an investigation 
of facts that are likely to corroborate a reasonable suspicion that an offence was 
committed. Recently, by way of a simple proclamation it has been added that they are 
also not the determination of civil rights or obligations.   
The second line of authorities relied upon stem from immigration cases and is based on 
the state’s right to determine the status and stay of aliens within its sovereign territory. 
Here the ECtHR simply refers to its case law on immigration and asylum to support its 
proposition that extradition proceedings do not fall within Article 6. 
8.2.4 Determination of a criminal charge (or civil rights) 
In Salgado,
591
 the Court held that decisions on extradition requests are not criminal. The 
Court recalled that the right not to be extradited is not, as such, among the rights and 
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freedoms set forth in the ECHR.
592
 It stated that the extradition process does not dispute 
the applicant's civil rights and obligations, or the determination of the merits of a 
criminal charge against him within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR.
593
  
Mr Salgado’s extradition to Ecuador had been ordered by Lebanon and he was to be 
returned via France. Upon arrival in France, the applicant informed the authorities that 
he had sought asylum in Spain (where he had moved to from Ecuador). France returned 
him to Spain under the Dublin II Convention. Having rejected his asylum application 
the Audiencia Nacional held that the order of extradition from Lebanon was an act of 
sovereignty and as a passive extradition on Spain’s part, which Spain could not revise or 
interfere with the extradition in transit. Before the ECtHR, the applicant relying on 
Article 6 ECHR complained that Spanish courts did not consider the merits of the 
extradition proceedings or the circumstances in which Ecuador demanded the 
extradition from Lebanon (via a document whose translation into Arabic was distorted). 
Given that the fairness of an extradition procedure followed in a State Party to the 
ECHR does not fall under the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, it held that an extradition 
process in Lebanon could also not be considered by the Spanish Courts.
594
 What is 
lacking from this decision is any analysis whereby the principles are applied to 
extradition proceedings.  
In Salgado the ECtHR makes reference to a list of cases which in turn refer to earlier 
judgments as authority for the statement. It is worth considering these cases in turn to 
illustrate the jurisprudential weakness of the current stance.  The cases are considered in 
chronological order, starting with the earliest cited. 
                                                                                                                                         
591 José Alejandro Peñafiel Salgado v. Spain, 65964/01, Decision 16.04.2002 
592 K and F v UK, 12543/86, Decision 2.12.1986, 272 
593
 Quoting by example, RAF v Spain, 53652/00, Decision 21.11.2000, and  Farmakopoulos v. Belgium, 
11683/85, Decision 8 February1990, P., R.H. and L.L, 15776/89, Decision 12.05.1989 and Raidl v. 
Austria, 25342/94, Decision 4.09.1995 
594 As seen above, it was however the obligation of Spain to ensure that his rights guaranteed by Articles 
2 and 3 of the Convention would be respected in Ecuador. 
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In Whitehead,
595
 the Commission only considered that extradition proceedings did not 
concern a ‘determination of a criminal charge’. It defined ‘determination’596 as referring 
to “a complete process of examination of the guilt or innocence of an individual charged 
with an offence, and not just the determination of whether or not an individual may or 
may not be extradited to another country”.597 This is taken word for word from its 
earlier decision in H
598
 and it is to this case that the line of jurisprudence can be traced. 
The Commission held that since the Audiencia Nacional specifically stated it could not 
examine the merits of the charges against Mr H in the US, but only whether the formal 
extradition requirements, the extradition proceedings did not involve the determination 
of a criminal charge against the applicant within the meaning of Article 6(1). The 
Commission in Farmakopoulos,
599
 also only affirmed that extradition proceedings do 
not concern the determination of a criminal charge. In Raidl,
600
 the complaint under 
Article 6 was that important decisions were not served on counsel until late, again a 
simple sentence states that Article 6 is not applicable because it does not concern the 
determination of a criminal charge.  
The RAF
601
 decision sees for the first time the inclusion within the usual statement that 
extradition is not a determination of a criminal charge that it is also not a dispute “over 
an applicant’s civil rights and obligations”. In doing so it refers to the previous 
jurisprudence, none of which dealt with the question of civil rights and obligations in 
the context of extradition proceedings. 
                                               
595 Whitehead v Italy, 13930/88, Decision 11.03.1989 
596 The term ‘detremination’ is ‘décider’ in French. 
597
 Whitehead (n595) 272 
598 H v Spain, 10227/82, Decision 15.12.1983, 93 
599 Farmakopoulos (n593) 52 
600 Raidl (n593) 134 
601 RAF (n593)  
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In Kirkwood v UK,
602
 the Commission states that the determination of guilt or 
innocence will be determined by separate proceedings in the I-MS and the extradition 
hearing does not form part of these proceedings, they do not involve the determination 
of a ‘criminal charge’.603 The main line of reasoning by the Commission in Kirkwood 
appears to be that extradition proceedings were similar to committal proceedings, mere 
preliminary proceedings in the criminal process and considered “wholly inappropriate” 
for them to attract “the full panoply” of procedural guarantees under Article 6. X v 
Norway
604
 is where the full definition is found of what is meant by “proceedings as a 
whole…that is after they have been concluded”. This particular phrase is also used to 
assess the general fairness of a trial. It recognizes that some breaches can be remedied 
during the course of proceedings without being fatal to the proceedings as a whole. 
However, the Commission in this case went on to state that “it cannot be excluded that a 
particular aspect of the proceedings which may be assessed in advance, can be of such 
importance as to be decisive to the assessment even at an earlier stage”.  It is pertinent 
to add that the ECtHR has only recently confirmed not only the applicability, but also 
the importance of, procedural guarantees at the pre-trial stages.
605
 By analogy, if 
extradition proceedings are to be considered equivalent to such pre-trial stages, then it is 
of equal importance that the guarantees are applicable to extradition hearings.  
Extradition proceedings are capable of being assessed in advance, that is before the 
conclusion of the entire criminal justice procedure. More importantly, aspects of the 
extradition proceedings which could be regarded as unfair cannot be rectified in any 
subsequent hearing in the I-MS. For these reasons it is important that procedural 
guarantees are respected during the EAW procedure in the E-MS. This point is 
                                               
602  10479/83, Decision 12.03.1984, 158 
603  Ibid, 191 
604  7945/77, Decision 4 July1978, 228 
605 Salduz v Turkey, 36391/02, [GC] Judgment 27.11.2008 
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considered in greater detail when examining the extension of the presumption of 
innocence to extradition proceedings. 
8.2.5 Application to the EAW 
The recent decisions dealing specifically with the EAW highlight the defective 
reasoning of the ECtHR. In its decision in Angora,
606
 the ECtHR asserts that the right 
not to be extradited does not exist and that extradition is not a determination of civil 
rights or a criminal charge. This statement is made solely by the reiteration of its words 
from the Salgado decision as set out above. Its justification for applying its previous 
jurisprudence on extradition to the EAW is made in three points. Firstly, EAW 
proceedings replace extradition proceedings in the EU, serving the same purpose, 
namely surrendering to the authorities of the I-MS a person who is suspected of having 
committed an offence, or who has been convicted by a final decision and requested to 
serve a sentence. In the ECtHR’s logic, it therefore follows that the EAW and 
extradition are equivalent. Next, the implementation of the EAW is virtually automatic: 
the judiciary does not conduct a review of the EAW for compliance with its own 
internal laws, and refusal to surrender is based on an exhaustive list of grounds set out 
in the law. According to the ECtHR, it follows that the EAW procedure does not 
concern the determination of a ‘criminal charge’.  
As already shown the implementation and functioning of the EAW is not as simple as 
this, with many MSs introducing into their implementing laws additional grounds for 
refusal; including the need to review requests and their consequences for compatibility 
with their own national laws, Constitutions and international obligations. Further, whilst 
the EAW may replace extradition between EU MSs, the EU has gone to great lengths to 
highlight that it is a different creature which changes dramatically the cross-border 
                                               
606 Monedero Angora v Spain, 41138/05, Decision, 7.10.2008 
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dynamics of criminal justice systems within the EU – something the ECtHR has so far 
chosen to ignore. 
The cases of Salgado and Angora illustrate how the ECtHR has to date formulated its 
treatment of extradition and EAW proceedings under Article 6. Its conclusion that the 
procedural guarantees are not applicable to proceedings of the E-MS have to date only 
been based on unexplained proclamations or as it will now be shown, citation of 
authorities relating to asylum proceedings.  
8.2.6 Aliens 
The ECtHR’s reliance on jurisprudence which stems from asylum proceedings is 
questionable. In Mamatkulov, the ECtHR states that Article 6 is not applicable to 
extradition proceedings (relying on a deportation case of Maaouaia
607
) “decisions 
regarding the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do not concern the determination of 
an applicant's civil rights or obligations or of a criminal charge against him, within the 
meaning of Article 6§1 of the Convention.”608 It is worth noting that whilst an analogy 
with deportation cases may be inappropriate, this case concerned individuals who could 
be regarded as neither resident nor nationals of the respondent countries,
609
 in this 
respects the ECtHR may have been correct in basing its statement on the fact that the 
individuals could be referred to as ‘aliens’. It is interesting to note that whilst Mr 
Salgado was an asylum seeker in Spain, the ECtHR in that case did not rely on an 
analogy with deportation cases. Mr Ismailov was also an ‘alien’ which indicates that 
there may not be an exact science to the logic of the ECtHR. Nevertheless, Langford
610
 
makes some valid points in relation to the deportation analogy. The main line of 
criticism is that in making these statements the ECtHR simply reconfirms previous 
                                               
607
 Maaiouia v France, 39652/98, [GC] Judgment 5.10.2000  
608 Mamatkulov (n565) §82 
609 Mr Mamatkulov was in Turkey on a tourist visa and Mr Abdurasulovic had entered Turkey on a false 
passport. 
610 Langford (n566), 524 
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cases, which did not concern extradition proceedings, without giving any contextual 
consideration. This analogy between deportation and extradition is undermined by the 
fact that the relationship between states in extradition proceedings exist due to bilateral 
treaties, whereas deportation is based on an entirely unilateral act and “the state is the 
sole determinant of the decision to initiate”611 and as such could be characterized as an 
administrative procedure.  
A point which follows on from this distinction is that in deportation cases the state is 
acting on its own initiative based on their sovereignty to control entry, residence and 
expulsion in their territory in accordance with its own laws and procedures which are 
subject to the checks of their own Constitutional rights and guarantees as assessed by its 
own authorities and judiciary. In the case of extradition, the state is exercising qualified 
sovereignty to enforce (by prior agreement) a decision of another MS made in 
accordance with their laws and procedures which the E-MS has no control over. In the 
case of an EAW request there is also a restraint placed on the internal checks and 
balances of the E-MS. This means it is crucial that during the EAW process in the E-MS 
procedural guarantees are respected so that the limited protection it can offer is 
maximised. 
These points illustrate the defective jump from deportation to extradition. A link clearly 
distanced by the Council of Europe itself in Protocol 7 which is applicable only to 
deportation and explicitly excludes extradition. This was also a line of thinking adopted 
in the Maaouia case for concluding that Article 6 does not apply to deportation cases.
612
 
The characteristics of extradition and the acceptance of I-MS systems, means that 
procedural guarantees are an important check. 
                                               
611 Langford (n566) 
612 Maaiouia (n607) §§36-9. See also the Concurring opinion of Judge Costa joined by Judges Hedigan 
and Panţîru and the Concurring opinion of Sir Nicolas Bratza who whilst agreeing with the conclusion 
that Article 6 is not applicable, disagree with the basis for reaching that conclusion. 
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8.2.7 Defective Reasoning 
In terms of the applicability of Article 6 to the EAW, the position is not clear under 
ECHR jurisprudence. There is no evidence in the authorities that the argument 
extradition is not a determination of a criminal charge or a dispute concerning civil 
rights or obligations has been well thought out or authoritatively considered. As shown, 
one line of authorities are based on an analogy with deportation cases and the other is 
based on a series of proclamations. 
The following unusual statement by the ECtHR introduces further doubt as to the 
soundness and consistency of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. In Ismailov, the ECtHR was 
considering whether statements made during a decision to extradite the applicant had an 
impact on his presumption of innocence. Despite first concluding that the “extradition 
proceedings against them did not concern the determination of a criminal charge, within 
the meaning of Article 6”,613 the ECtHR applied the reasoning in the earlier case of 
Zollmann,
614
 to ascertain “whether there was any close link, in legislation, practice or 
fact, between the impugned statements made in the context of the extradition 
proceedings and the criminal proceedings pending against the applicants in Uzbekistan 
which might be regarded as sufficient to render the applicants “charged with a criminal 
offence” within the meaning of Article 6 § 2”.615 The Court concluded that,  
the applicants’ extradition was ordered for the purpose of their criminal 
prosecution. The extradition proceedings were therefore a direct 
consequence, and the concomitant, of the criminal investigation pending 
against the applicants in Uzbekistan. The Court therefore considers that 
there was a close link between the criminal proceedings in Uzbekistan and 
the extradition proceedings justifying the extension of the scope of the 
application of Article 6 § 2 to the latter. Moreover, the wording of the 
extradition decisions clearly shows that the prosecutor regarded the 
                                               
613 ibid, §162 
614 Zollmann v UK, 62902/00, judgment 27.11.2003 
615 Ismailov and others v Russia, 2947/06, Judgment 24.04.2008 §163  
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applicants as “charged with criminal offences” which is in itself sufficient to 
bring into play the applicability of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.
616 
 
It is questionable why an explicit decision is required to conclude that the requested 
individuals were charged with a criminal offence in order to justify the application of 
Article 6 to the extradition proceedings. It is also not clear why this reasoning is not 
applicable in all extradition proceedings. Under the EAWFD a person must either be 
wanted to stand trial (in other words charged with a criminal offence) or to serve their 
sentence which again is closely related to the criminal charge. These factors seem to 
satisfy the autonomous meaning of ‘criminal charge’ as defined by the ECtHR. 
The consideration in Angora, of the EAW being equivalent to extradition simply 
because it replaces that system is also not compelling. The analogy in Mamatkulov, with 
immigration is for the reasons set out above not persuasive either. However as will be 
revealed the position is becoming clearer under EU law.  
8.2.8 EU 
The relevance as to whether the ECHR will consider Article 6 applicable to EAW 
proceedings in the E-MS is important to the extent that the relationship between the 
ECHR and the EU remains uncertain. Negotiations and working groups are currently in 
progress to determine the terms and parameters of this relationship and this is an aspect 
considered in later sections.   
In the meantime the extended scope of Article 47 CFR has already been noted and when 
considering the Stockholm Roadmap measures, the EU’s own interpretation of what 
rights are applicable to EAW proceedings will be further noted. 
                                               
616Ismoilov (n615) §164. See also the case of P., R.H. and L.L. (n593) 269 where the Commission 
considered the applicants awaiting extradition from Austria to the United States as also being “charged 
with a criminal offence” within the meaning of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 
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If considering in a strict sense the applicability of Article 6 to EAW proceedings, it is 
arguable that according to existing jurisprudence it is not applicable. The nature of 
EAW proceedings are automatic, the review conducted is limited, the grounds for 
refusal are also limited, the decision is not a determination of a criminal charge but on 
the contrary it would appear that proceedings are more akin to an administrative 
process.  On the other hand great lengths have been taken to clarify that the EAW is 
different to extradition, at the very least an individual requested under an EAW is 
charged with an offence as in Ismailov or otherwise already convicted of a criminal 
offence. Whilst in determining whether a procedure falls within the scope of Article 6, 
the ECtHR will take the domestic classification only as a starting point; this is not 
however decisive, with the scope being determined on the basis of the Court’s own 
autonomous meaning. It is unclear what weight will be given to the EU’s own 
classification of EAW procedures as falling within the scope of Article 6 when the 
ECtHR is asked to adjudicate on this specific question.   
Despite the fact that, according to the current ECtHR principles, Article 6 is not 
applicable to extradition – the EU policy is that Article 6 procedural guarantees are 
applicable to EAW proceedings. In the following Chapter the analysis of the measures, 
adopted or drafted under the Stockholm Roadmap to protect defence rights, clearly 
shows the express inclusion of EAW proceedings within their scope. 
Given the erroneous asylum analogies, the un-explained proclamations and the 
contradictions in the ECtHR jurisprudence, the HRs considerations of the EAW 
proceedings will proceed on the basis of EU interpretation that Article 6 is applicable in 
its entirety to proceedings in the E-MS.
617
  
                                               
617 This extension of the applicability of Article 6 guarantees is further considered in the section on the 
presumption of innocence. 
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8.3 A Flagrant Denial? 
Less controversial is the applicability of Article 6 to criminal proceedings in the I-MS. 
The I-MS must ensure their criminal proceedings are compliant with the obligations set 
out in Article 6.  
In relation to the criminal proceedings of the I-MS, the E-MS is also obliged to review 
and assess these proceedings with the aim of ensuring an individual who leaves their 
effective control will not be subjected to a ‘flagrant denial’ of their fair trial rights. This 
obligation is not one which requires a MS to act on its own motion, but would appear to 
be engaged whether the courts can be said to have known or ought to have known of the 
risk that a flagrant denial would be faced. 
In Soering,
618
 the Court stated Article 6 holds a prominent place in a democratic society 
and in particular of the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings.  It did not exclude the 
possibility that an extradition decision may exceptionally raise an issue under Article 6. 
It went on to identify this as a situation “where the fugitive has suffered or risks 
suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country...”619  
The E-MS is not asked to examine and verify the I-MS proceedings, however if a 
‘flagrant denial of justice’ is shown it is obliged to refuse surrender, or otherwise 
become complicit in the violation.
620 
The term ‘flagrant’ depends on the circumstances 
of individual cases. Whilst there has yet to be a definitive definition, the case law shows 
the threshold is high and an understanding can be gained of what situations are and are 
not considered to fit the bill.
621
  
                                               
618
 Soering (n177) 
619 ibid,§113 
620 ibid 
621 Mamatkulov (n565); Olaechea (n565); Mohammed Ali Hassan Al-Moayad v Germany,  35865/03, 
Decision 20.02.2007; Bader and Kanbor v Sweden,  13284/04, Judgment 8 November 
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In Mamatkulov,
622
 although the Court found no violation under Article 6, it is 
interesting to consider their approach. The Court noted the two applicants had been held 
incommunicado, had been assigned a lawyer by the prosecutor and had not been able to 
obtain legal representation of their choice, it reiterated its judgment in Soering noting 
that “the risk of a flagrant denial of justice in the country of destination must primarily 
be assessed by reference to the facts which the Contracting State knew or should have 
known when it extradited the persons concerned…[in] light of the information available 
to the Court when it considers the case”.623 It held that there may have been reasons to 
doubt whether they would receive a fair trial in the receiving State, however sufficient 
evidence did not exist to show the trial irregularities would reach the threshold of a 
‘flagrant denial’.624   
The Osman
625
 test should be applied to determine whether a violation has occurred on 
the basis of a situation amounting to a ‘flagrant denial’. In Al-Moayad,626 the Court 
restated the test along this formula, “the risk of a flagrant denial of justice in the country 
of destination must primarily be assessed by reference to the facts which the 
Contracting State knew or should have known when it extradited the person 
concerned.”627 In declaring the application inadmissible, the Court usefully elaborates 
on the meaning of ‘flagrant denial of justice’ and illustrates how the obtaining of 
assurances from the receiving State could eliminate any such concerns. It states that, 
“…the legitimate aim of protecting the community as a whole from serious threats it 
faces by international terrorism cannot justify measures which extinguish the essence of 
a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6”.628  
                                               
622 Mamatkulov (n565) 
623 Soering (n177) §90 
624
 Further consideration of this case will be given in the section on Rule 39. 
625 Osman v UK,  87/1997/871/1083, Judgment 28.10.1998 
626 Al-Moayad (n621) 
627 Al-Moayad (n621) §100. See also see Mamatkulov (n565) §90; and Olaechea Cahuas (n565) §61. 
628 Al-Moayad (n621) §101 
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This is a pertinent point to take on board given the origins of the impetus which saw the 
super-fast adoption of the EAWFD – the threat posed by terrorism. It is also worthy to 
note that even a serious threat of international terrorism is not enough to displace 
significantly these rights. Yet the manner in which the EAWFD was adopted sends out 
the signal that fighting crime
629
 and security come first and that HRs concerns should 
not be permitted by MSs to interfere with creating an area of security.  
Whilst the EAWFD does make reference to and preserves HRs obligations, the rejection 
of its partner Framework Decision on procedural guarantees cannot be ignored. When 
this fact is coupled with the trumping of HRs allegations by MR, it is this that causes 
legitimate concern to observers that a HRs deficit exists. 
An example of a flagrant denial of a fair trial and thereby a denial of justice, is where a 
person is detained on suspicion without, 
 access to an independent and impartial tribunal to have the legality of his or 
her detention reviewed and, if the suspicions do not prove to be well-
founded, to obtain release … a deliberate and systematic refusal of access to 
a lawyer to defend oneself, especially when the person concerned is 
detained in a foreign country, must be considered to amount to a flagrant 
denial of a fair trial.
630
 
In Al-Moayad, when considering whether a violation had occurred, importance was 
attached to the meticulous examination of the circumstances by the German authorities 
and courts. Of relevance was also their “long standing experience of extraditions to the 
USA, and in particular to the fact that the assurances given to them up to that point had 
been respected in practice.”631 On this basis it was held there was no violation. 
An additional example of what may be considered a “flagrant denial” can be found in 
Bader and Kanbor where the Court held deportation of the applicants to Syria would 
violate their rights under Article 2 and 3. It also noted,  
                                               
629 Not restricted to terrorist offences but other types of offences which encompass minor offences. 
630 Al-Moayad (n621) §101 
631 ibid, §104 
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…in the instant case, it transpires from the Syrian judgment that no oral 
evidence was taken at the hearing, that all the evidence examined was 
submitted by the prosecutor and that neither the accused nor even his 
defence lawyer was present at the hearing. The Court finds that, because of 
their summary nature and the total disregard of the rights of the defence, the 
proceedings must be regarded as a flagrant denial of a fair trial.
632
  
Relevant to considerations whether a ‘flagrant denial of justice’ may be faced upon 
surrender is whether due process can be assumed to exist in the I-MS. The EAWFD 
itself relies on the national laws of MSs to guarantee this due process.
633
 When 
determining whether due process will be followed in the I-MS, consideration is to be 
given to the guarantees under Article 6 ECHR.  
Based on the principle of MR, refusal to surrender an individual could not in theory be 
based on the risk that there will be a flagrant denial of justice in the I-MS since each MS 
is to have mutual trust in the other’s justice system. However, as already known, the 
practice is different. In addition to MR, MSs also have an overarching and supreme duty 
to respect and protect HRs. This is no different in the implementation of the European 
criminal justice or the EAW. Membership of the EU and ECHR and the principle of 
MR, act as assurances that rights will be respected in the relevant MS. The case-law to 
date indicates that MR alone is enough to let the E-MS off the hook in terms of 
complicity in sending the individual to the I-MS where they may face a ‘flagrant denial 
of justice’. The fact the individual also maintains their right to individual petition to the 
ECtHR is seen as an additional safeguard. In this situation, mutual trust is sufficient 
with no further assessment required. 
Whilst in Radu, Sharpston accepts that resistance against surrenders on the basis of 
Article 6 should remain rare, she takes issue with two aspects of the ECtHR test. Firstly 
the use of the word ‘flagrant’ to describe the requisite violation of Article 6; a term she 
regards as too undefined and vague to ensure consistent application. She prefers instead 
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an assessment of the trial as a whole to establish if the particular deficiency 
fundamentally destroys the fairness of the trial process.
634
 
Secondly, she does not accept the very high standard of proof which has a place in 
criminal prosecutions. The ECtHR states that the burden of proof is on the individual to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
635
 Sympathising with the position of some strapped 
individuals who may be forced to rely on State assistance to prove their case she 
dismisses the high burden as having no role to play when an individual is seeking to 
show the court that a threat to their rights exist. Instead she prefers a lower threshold, 
requiring the individual to persuade the court that they have a well-founded fear or case. 
Following consideration of the appropriate test for ‘future breaches’, she moves on to 
consider the position for ‘past breaches’. Essentially she regards them to be the same 
with the assessment required being whether it ‘fundamentally destroys the fairness of 
the trial process’ as a whole. Provided that the past breaches are ‘remediable’ there 
should be no reason to not surrender the individual. This test is of equal application to 
both Articles 6 and 5 ECHR. Sharpston’s interpretation of what is meant when courts 
state that ‘notional breaches’ of HRs will not be enough to resist surrender is also 
sound; essentially it concerns its impact on the trial as a whole and whether the breach 
can be remedied.
636
 
Having established the applicability of the guarantees to the EAW proceedings in both 
the I-MS and the E-MS, these guarantees will now be set out in turn and be assessed in 
light of the issues raised by the EAW. 
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The right to a fair trial encompasses three aspects: fairness; defence rights; and the right 
of participation. The guarantees set out under Article 6 will be considered within each 
of these aspects. 
8.4 Fairness 
Article 6(1) provides the requisites for a fair hearing.
637
  In Perez v France,
638
 the 
ECtHR stressed once again that “the right to a fair trial holds so prominent a place in a 
democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6(1) 
restrictively”.  It is one that cannot be set aside for expedience and an essential element 
of the rule of law. 
In Teixeria de Castro,
639
 the Court reiterated that the admissibility and assessment of 
evidence is primarily a matter for the national law and courts to regulate.
640
 The focus of 
Article 6 is not justice, but it is primarily concerned with fairness. Whilst the guarantees 
apply specifically to criminal proceedings, the ECtHR has considered them as implicit 
for a fair trial even beyond the criminal sphere.
641
 Aspects of fairness include equality 
of arms, an adversarial approach and immediacy. The appearance of fair justice being 
done is of equal importance. Proceedings will be considered as a whole and omission of 
a defence right will not mean an automatic finding of unfairness.
642
 
                                               
637 See Annex 2. 
638 47287/99, [GC] judgment 12.02.04 
639 Teixeria de Castro v Portugal, 25829/94, Judgment 9.06.1998 
640 The Court's task is not to assess whether evidence was properly admitted, but to ascertain whether the 
proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair. In the present case it 
held that the proceedings were tainted from the beginning by the fact that the evidence obtained by police 
incitement went beyond the activities of passive undercover agents. 
641
 Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, 7299/75, 7496/76, Judgment 10.02.1983 
642 The independence and impartiality of a trial is a core element of fairness and with appearance being as 
important as the reality. The case of Hauschildt (n586) is authority on this right and illustrates how 
underlying issues may arise between the common and civil systems of adversarial and inquisitorial 
proceedings. 
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8.4.1 Within a Reasonable Time 
In Eckle,
643
 reiterating the caselaw of both the Commission and ECtHR, set out the 3 
criteria by which it is to be assessed whether a reasonable time has been exceeded. 
Firstly the “complexity of the case as a whole”, secondly the handling of the case by the 
national authorities and courts and thirdly, “the applicant’s own conduct.”644 Each case 
will be considered on its own facts in order to ascertain whether the trial has been 
within a reasonable time. The text of Article 47 of the CFR provides for a “fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal”. This 
will be judged on the basis of the standards set by the ECtHR.
645
 
Article 17 EAWFD sets the time limits for EAW proceedings which appear to satisfy 
the ECHR standards. However not all MSs respect the limits at the appeal stage. For 
example in the UK there is no special track for EAW appeals to be heard and so they 
join the queue with appeals on all other matters.
646
 The right to a trial within a 
reasonable time is also relevant in cases where the alleged crime occurred many years 
earlier. At the outset the EAW was to be considered as an urgent procedure. In addition 
to justifying the strict time limits, the urgency is also a reflection of the drafters’ 
original intention for its use as a fast-track procedure for serious and organised crimes. 
Besides the clear obligation for MSs to ensure that this right is respected within their 
own jurisdiction, it should also be a consideration for E-MSs when determining whether 
surrender would lead to a flagrant denial of a fair trial. It will be in exceptional 
circumstances where a breach of this right alone would amount to a violation, 
                                               
643 H and M Eckle v Federal Republic of Germany,  8130/78, Commission Report 11.12.1980. The points 
at issue were whether the two sets of proceedings, in Cologne and Trier, exceeded a reasonable time 
under Article 6. 
644
 ibid,§154 
645 Consideration will be given to the treatment of such cases as urgent before the CJEU and in particular 
the PPU. 
646 Although it should be noted that the time taken on appeal in the UK has not been found to violate 
Article 6 by the ECtHR. 
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nevertheless states are under an obligation to ensure that the rights of those leaving their 
jurisdiction continue to be respected.  
8.4.2 Presumption of Innocence 
Article 6(2) provides the presumption of innocence guarantee providing that before an 
individual has had the opportunity to present their defence and is proven guilty 
according to law they must be presumed to be innocent. This means a judicial decision 
cannot reflect an assumption that he is guilty.
647
 In Telfner,
648
 the Court added that legal 
presumptions are not in principle incompatible with Article 6 and neither is the drawing 
of inferences from the accused’s silence.649 
Article 6(2) has been held to be applicable to extradition proceedings where they are a 
direct consequence, and the concomitant, of the criminal investigation pending against 
an individual. As set out above, in Ismoilov,
650
 the Prosecutor declared the applicants 
should be extradited because they had “committed” acts of terrorism and other criminal 
offences in Uzbekistan.
651
 It concluded that extradition was the concomitant of the 
criminal investigation and therefore justified the extended scope of Article 6(2).
652
 
Having established Article 6(2) applies to the extradition proceedings the reasoning 
applied to find a violation of this right is worth analysing. The ECtHR decision to 
                                               
647 Geerings v the Netherlands, 30810/03, Judgment 1.03.2007. The case of Geerings concerned the 
confiscation order imposed on the applicant and whether it infringed his right to be presumed innocent 
under Article 6(2) since it was based on a judicial finding based on offences for which he had been 
acquitted in the substantive criminal proceedings that had been brought against him. Given this fact, the 
order is based on a presumption of guilt. “It amounts to a determination of the applicant's guilt without 
the applicant having been “found guilty according to law” (§50). The Court reiterated that this applies to 
both judicial decisions and statements by public officials (Daktaras v Lithuania, 42095/98, Judgment 
10.10.2000). This right also has implications to ensure that a person’s guilt is determined through a fair 
trial. This means that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove on the basis of evidence and not 
mere assumptions. 
648 Telfner v Austria, 33501/96, Judgment 20.03.2001 
649 The present case concerned speculations by the District Court and the Regional Court that the 
applicant was under the influence of alcohol. This the Court held contributed to the impression that the 
courts had a preconceived view of the applicant’s guilt. 
650 Ismoilov (n615). See also Gaforov v Russia, 25404/09, judgment 21.10.2010 §208 referring to 
Ismoilov. 
651 Ismoilov (n615). §168 
652 ibid, §164 
Chapter Eight: A Fair Hearing 
236 
 
extradite is not itself in breach of the presumption of innocence
653
 and this was not what 
the applicants complained of but rather the reasoning contained in the extradition 
decisions. In the present case the ECtHR considered “the wording of the extradition 
decisions amounted to a declaration of the applicants' guilt which could encourage the 
public to believe them guilty and which prejudged the assessment of the facts by the 
competent judicial authority in Uzbekistan”654 and for these reasons violated Article 
6(2) . 
In Hammern,
655
 whilst again the ECtHR did not consider the compensation proceedings 
as concerning a criminal charge, the issue was whether they were “nevertheless was 
linked to the criminal trial in such a way as to fall within the scope of Article 6 § 2”. 
The willingness seen in the ECtHR extending the scope of Article 6(2) is fascinating, 
least of all because of the manner in which it has reasoned the extension. The first step 
is finding that the proceedings did not fall within the autonomous meaning of ‘criminal 
charge’ thereby meaning Article 6 was not applicable to them. Despite this the ECtHR 
then proceeds to find that in fact, a guarantee under Article 6 is applicable on the sole 
basis that a close link is found to exist. To be precise extradition proceedings were a 
direct consequence and the concomitant, of the criminal investigation pending against 
the applicants. It is curious why this line of reasoning has not been extended to the other 
guarantees set out under Article 6. There is no reason why it cannot be. Extradition 
proceedings will always have a close link to the criminal proceedings since they are a 
direct consequence of them. As such any disregard of the guarantees set out by Article 6 
could be deemed to affect the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. Whether it is the 
lack of legal assistance upon arrest under the EAW which is now required by Salduz, or 
                                               
653 ibid, §167 citing X. v. Austria, 1918/63, Commission decision of 18.12.1963, 492 
654 Ismoilov (n615)§169 
655 Hammern v. Norway, 30287/96, 11.02.2003 §42. See also Y v. Norway, 56568/00, Judgment 
11.02.2003 
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the lack of participation permitted at the hearing, it all has a close link to the criminal 
proceedings and to the fairness of the proceedings. 
In relation to the EAW, the criminal justice systems of the MSs are merged so that the 
processes are integrated to deal with transnational criminals. EAW proceedings are 
regarded as an integral part of the criminal proceedings; EAWs are treated in the same 
way as a domestic arrest warrant. This integrated system furthers the argument for 
procedural guarantees to apply to EAW proceedings. As will be shown in the next part, 
the measures adopted under the Stockholm Roadmap have explicitly extended the scope 
of some of these rights to the EAW proceedings. 
8.4.3 Right to Silence 
It may come as a surprise to some that the right to silence, and the related right not to 
incriminate oneself, are not expressly stated in the ECHR. It has however been read into 
Article 6(2) by the ECtHR and is regarded as lying “at the heart of the notion of a fair 
procedure”. In Funke,656 the Court found a violation of Article 6, stating that, special 
features of national law cannot justify infringement of the right of those charged with a 
criminal offence to remain silent and to not incriminate themselves. 
 The right to silence is linked to the prevention of improper compulsion or coercive 
measures being used against an individual to solicit incriminating evidence. The Court 
will take a close look at whether the essence of the right has been extinguished through 
the acts of the authorities. In the case law, the court has distinguished between 
compelling an individual to incriminate oneself and drawing inferences from silence.
657
 
In assessing whether the right has been breached, the court will have regard to the whole 
process, taking into account the safeguards in place and the extent to which the evidence 
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obtained is used in subsequent proceedings.
658
 On this point it should be noted that the 
material obtained in such a manner need not be used in proceedings for a breach of the 
right against self-incrimination to be found.
659
  
The relationship between the right to silence and a fair trial is summarized in 
Panovits
660
 where the Court acknowledged that, “contributing to the avoidance of 
miscarriages of justice…the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are 
generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair 
procedure under Article 6.” It provides that it protects against improper compulsion by 
authorities
661
 and presupposes that the prosecution will prove their case without 
resorting to obtaining evidence through coercive or oppressive methods.  
At the EU level, the presumption of innocence is clearly set out in Article 48(1) CFR. It 
is also listed amongst the rights of which individuals must be informed in the letter of 
rights introduced under the Stockholm Roadmap.
662
 Interestingly the right to silence 
was not included in the original draft of the Directive on the right to information which 
introduced the letter of rights requirement. The reason for this was because of a 
misconception that it did not exist in all MSs and therefore the entire Directive would 
not be supported. In particular the misconception existed in relation to the UK, where 
the right exists but as in other MSs it is not absolute.
663
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The Commission in its Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal for the 
Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings,
664
 explicitly states that 
“the Directive makes applicable the procedural guarantees contained in Articles 47 and 
48 of the Charter and Articles 5 and 6 ECHR to surrender proceedings based on a 
European Arrest Warrant”.665 
Thus if any doubt existed as to the application of Article 6(2) to the EAW, it is 
explicitly stated in the Directive. Besides the obvious application to the EAW as set out 
above, this right is also related to the right to legal assistance, to prevent self-
incrimination by coercion and to enable a defendant to make an informed decision as to 
whether to remain silent. Such statements are likely to be made upon arrest, which in 
the instance of an EAW will be by the E-MS, further highlighting the importance of its 
respect at all stages of the proceedings.  
8.5 Defence Rights  
8.5.1 Art 6(3) 
Also related to the assessment of whether a “flagrant denial” exists, is the respect for 
defence rights.  These are set out in Article 6(3) and many of them are reflected in the 
CFR as well as being encompassed into the Stockholm Roadmap. 
The right of defence is set out in Article 48(2) CFR and is explained as having the same 
meaning as Article 6(2) and (3) ECHR. As previously established, the defence rights set 
out under the ECHR, although under the ECHR jurisprudence these only apply to 
proceedings determining a ‘criminal charge’,  within the EU legal order these 
guarantees have an extended scope applying to MR measures such as the EAWFD. This 
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is further confirmed by the Stockholm Roadmap and subsequent measures which 
embark on setting down these defence rights as minimum EU-wide standards.  
8.5.2 Right to be Informed 
The right to understand the charge against you is found under Article 6(3)(a) ECHR and 
reflected in Article 48 CFR. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on this point also includes 
the language of the accused
666
and details of the accusation.
667
 The right to be informed 
is related to the need for adequate time to prepare. Reid lists the key information which 
is to be included as the material facts and the legal classification.
668
  
The right to information encompasses the right to know the reasons for the arrest, the 
right to legal assistance and the right to access the case documents. Needless to say all 
these rights are imperative for the effective preparation of one’s defence. With respects 
to information for the reason of their arrest, it should be noted that there is a positive 
obligation on the authorities to provide this and not in a passive manner, ensuring the 
individual understands the information. However, the manner in which this information 
is provided, is largely left to the national authorities to decide for themselves. It is this 
discretion which leads to discrepancies in reality. 
In Mattoccia,
669
 the Court stated that, there is the need to pay special attention to the 
notification of the accusation since it is from this point that an individual is put on 
notice “of the factual and legal basis of the charges against him”. Additionally, the 
accused must be informed “promptly” and “in detail” of the material facts “which are at 
the basis of the accusation, and of the nature of the accusation, namely, the legal 
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qualification”. This is considered by the ECtHR as an essential prerequisite for ensuring 
that the proceedings are fair. 
With respects to the right be informed of their defence rights, this is not provided for in 
the ECHR itself, but the obligations are clearly set out in the case law of the ECtHR. 
Individuals must be informed of their right to legal assistance and, where applicable, to 
legal aid. It is not enough for this information to be provided in writing alone, since the 
individual must also understand their rights.
670
 In Panovits,
671
 the ECtHR noted that the 
passive approach taken by the authorities was not sufficient to fulfill their positive 
obligation to provide the applicant with the necessary information enabling him to 
access legal representation. The ECtHR accordingly found that especially since he was 
a minor at the time and not assisted by a guardian during questioning, the lack of 
sufficient information on his right to consult a lawyer before being questioned , was a 
breach of his defence rights.
672
  
Finally, under this heading, is the issue of disclosure. It is clear that an individual has 
the right to access documents held by the prosecution both in his favour and against 
him.
673
 What is less clear is the exact point at which he should have access during the 
proceedings. The reality is that this will be determined on a case by case basis with the 
essential determining factor being whether sufficient time was allowed for the 
preparation of his defence. This right also applies to pre-trial stages and is also found 
under Article 5 in terms of challenging the lawfulness of their detention.
674
 This right is 
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not absolute and can be restricted in the interests of national security, to protect 
witnesses and other such grounds.
675
 
Article 6(3) also requires that an individual is kept informed and given advance notice 
of any events so as to avoid being subjected to anxiety or uncertainty.
676
 The right to be 
informed of one’s rights is not explicitly required by the ECHR, however the 
Commission research has concluded that it would make “a considerable difference if 
information was given to all suspects and accused person throughout the EU in a similar 
way”.677 MSs have already refused to surrender individuals on the ground that there was 
a likelihood their right to a fair trial would be violated.
678
 In its impact assessment, the 
Commission sets out the current problem of insufficient information and the related 
consequences. It bases its conclusions on research reports
679
 and CPT reports
680
 as well 
as ECHR jurisprudence.
681
  
The description of the facts in an EAW should be sufficient so that the requested person 
can “understand, the essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if 
he sees fit, to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness”.682 Due to the inevitable 
delays in obtaining additional information from the I-MSs, Ginter believes that an EAW 
“should face stricter standards than have been applied by the Court to the information 
provided in domestic cases. In domestic cases there is normally less hardship for the 
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person arrested and there are more swift avenues for providing extra information”.683 
Article 11 of the EAWFD provides that the rights of the requested person include the 
right to be informed of the EAW and of its contents. Additionally, the text of the 
EAWFD itself under Article 8 requires amongst other things to include the nature and 
legal classification of the offence, together with a description of the circumstances in 
which the offence was committed. This complies with the ECHR standards, however 
the practice and case law show that this has been interpreted and implemented in a way 
which is contrary to the ECHR.  
Related to the description of facts is also the question of whether the full text of the 
relevant provisions for which the person is requested should also be included. The 
German,
684
 Dutch
685
 and UK
686
 Courts have all ruled that provision numbers are 
sufficient because to require the full text would be counter to the aims of the EAW to 
simplify and speed up the process as well as being detrimental to mutual trust.  
However, Ginter is of the opinion that listing the provision number alone is not 
sufficient to satisfy the ECHR jurisprudence which requires that a person be told in 
“non-technical language that he can understand”.687  
The question is not only whether the requested person can understand what he is 
accused of, but also his lawyer, who in all likelihood will not possess the linguistic 
capabilities to find, read and comprehend the offence relating to the provision number 
provided. 
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8.5.3 Adequate time 
 Article 6(3)(b) sets out the need for adequate time and facilities. A criminal charge 
needs to be bought before this provision is engaged. The Court has held that procedural 
guarantees such as adequate time and facilities to prepare are elements necessary for a 
fair trial as a whole, together with the principles of equality of arms and the ability to 
participate effectively. As such procedural guarantees are relevant to all judicial 
proceedings.  
The case law indicates that whether adequate time has been given will be assessed on 
the facts of individual cases. In Öcalan
688
 the Court found a violation where the 
applicant had been given only 2 weeks to prepare for a complex trial with a 17 000 page 
file. In contrast, in Kremzow
689
 the Court found that 3 weeks to draft reply to 47 page 
document was adequate time.
690
  
The short timeframe set out by the EAW may in fact interfere with the right to adequate 
time to prepare ones defence. However in practice the Courts in the UK at least appear 
willing to grant extensions/stays where necessary.
691
 
8.5.4 Legal Representation and Legal Aid 
Article 6(3)(c) provides for the right to legal representation and if appropriate legal aid 
and Article 48 CFR guarantees the right to defend oneself. This right applies to the trial, 
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in particular where without it accessibility to justice would be “theoretical and 
illusory”.692 Factors to be taken into account include the complexity of the case.  
As will be shown Article 6 and in particular the right to legal representation and 
assistance, is of equal importance at the initial stages of proceedings as it is during the 
trial stage.
693
 This includes the right to confidential communication with one’s lawyer. 
In Brennan, the Court held that the presence of a police officer “during the applicant’s 
first consultation with his solicitor infringed his right to an effective exercise of his 
defence rights and that there has been, in that respect”.694 
Consultation with ones lawyer should be in private.
695
 The individual has a right not 
only to communicate with his lawyer, but also with his family members, employer and 
consular authorities.
696
   
The right to legal assistance also includes the right to defend oneself, to choose one’s 
own lawyer and in certain circumstances the right to legal aid. In Biba
697
 the Court held 
that where necessary a legal representative should be provided for free. This does not 
prohibit the possibility that the defendant may have to repay later or upon conviction; 
free means free at the time of trial. In Croissant
698
 the Court held that an order to 
reimburse the costs of the applicant’s lawyer was not incompatible with Article 6. A 
lawyer must be provided to a defendant where there is financial eligibility – this is 
generally for domestic authorities to evaluate although the ECtHR will review to see if 
it is arbitrary.
699
 The right to defend oneself is not absolute and if the circumstances of 
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the case require it a lawyer can be appointed.
700
 In Artico,
701
 where the Court held that if 
the interests of justice so command, legal assistance should also be provided for free.  
Given the economic impact of this right, MSs are largely allowed to set their own limits 
and rates for the legal aid they offer. These decisions must however be guided by the 
ECtHR principles.  
In Pischalnikov
702
 the Court determined that the right to a lawyer can be waived by the 
individual, but it must be both voluntary and informed. Further, whilst individuals have 
a right to choose their lawyer when they are paying for them, this right is not extended 
to a legal aid lawyer. 
Consultation with ones’ lawyer and others is also reflected in the “Letter of Rights” 
under Measure B of the Stockholm Roadmap. The right to legal representation and legal 
aid is to be addressed by Measure C under the Stockholm Roadmap.  
Article 11 EAWFD provides that the requested person “shall have the right to be 
assisted by legal counsel…in accordance with the national law of the executing Member 
State.”  The focus of the EAWFD is not the practical reality of this right in a MS, but 
rather the theoretical reliance on the national law. This would suggest that even if the 
right as applied by a MS falls below the ECHR standards set out above, this concern 
does not fall within the framework of the EAW. By way of example, the Salduz case 
discussed below together with the reactions and responses of certain MSs, would 
suggest that legal assistance will be available at different stages of the EAW procedure 
and in some MSs certainly not from the first interrogation by police. 
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8.6 Pre-Trial 
After years of uncertainty as to the point from which an individual has a right to legal 
assistance,
703
 has gone some way in clarifying the situation. Referring to the CPT 
recommendations the ECtHR noted the importance of having legal assistance during 
police interrogation as a safeguard against ill-treatment and also self-incrimination. 
Individuals have a right to legal assistance from the moment they become suspects.  
In Salduz,
704
 the applicant complained that his defence rights had been violated because 
he had been denied access to a lawyer during his police custody. The Court reiterated 
that, national laws can attach “consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial 
stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence in any 
subsequent criminal proceedings.”705 
The ECtHR underlined the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of 
the criminal proceedings. At this stage an accused finds themselves in a vulnerable 
situation, amplified by the complexity of the rules governing evidence gathering. In the 
ECtHR’s view “this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by 
the assistance of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help to ensure respect 
of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself.” The ECtHR also noted the 
recommendations of the CPT where it “repeatedly stated that the right of a detainee to 
have access to legal advice is a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment.”  Any 
restriction should be “clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time.” 
It highlighted that this is of particular importance in cases of serious charges.
706
 
The ECtHR thus concluded that to ensure the right to a fair trial remains practical and 
effective “as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation 
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of a suspect by the police”.  The right can be exceptionally restricted, however it must 
not “unduly prejudice the rights of the accused”.707 For example, defence rights would 
be irretrievably prejudiced where an incriminating statement is made during 
interrogation in the absence of a lawyer is used for a conviction. 
In Pishalnikov,
708
 one of the complaints of the applicant concerned legal representation, 
in particular the denial of access to a lawyer during the first few days of his police 
custody; the ineffective representation provided during the trial by the legal aid counsel; 
and the lack of legal assistance before the court of appeal. Citing its decision in Salduz 
the ECtHR held that Article 6 is applicable to pre-trial stages in particular where the 
fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply.
709
  
The ECHR rights are dynamic and continuingly evolving; the right to a lawyer under 
Article 6(3) has now been extended to include having one present during police 
interrogation. Salduz,
710
 Panovitis
711
 and Pishchalnikov
712
 highlight the importance of 
guaranteeing a fair trial from the start of the process, including the first time an 
individual is interrogated as a suspect by the police.  
Salduz,
713
 has been adopted by the EU as the benchmark and this is reflected in the 
‘letter of rights’ under the Stockholm Roadmap. Salduz clarified this position, stating 
that the guarantees applied at the pre-trial stages and relying on CPT reports to highlight 
the importance of them being respected at the early stages and the irreparable damages 
which may occur in their absence because of the vulnerable situation an individual finds 
themselves. These are only heightened when they are arrested in a foreign country 
whose language and legal system they may not understand. 
                                               
707 ibid, §55  
708 Pishchalnikov (n670) 
709
 Pishchalnikov (n670). See also John Murray (n657) and Magee (n693) 
710 Salduz (n605) 
711 Panovits (n660) 
712 Pishchalnikov (n670) 
713 Recently confirmed in the case of Hüseyin Habip Taşkin v Turkey, 5289/06, Judgment 11.02.2011 
Chapter Eight: A Fair Hearing 
249 
 
For an individual their involvement in the EU criminal justice procedure will often 
begin at the point of arrest or questioning by the E-MS. This is the first time they are 
likely to be aware that an arrest warrant has been issued for them. For this reason their 
right to be informed promptly and in a language they understand the reason for their 
arrest is important. It is of equal importance that they are entitled to legal assistance 
before any questioning by the police. A decision to agree to surrender has a number of 
implications which an individual may not fully appreciate without legal advice. Article 
13 EAWFD provides that consent to surrender must be made “voluntarily and in full 
awareness of the consequences”. Given that such a decision may not be revoked, unless 
MS provides otherwise, it is important for such a decision to be made with legal 
assistance. To this end the right to legal counsel is provided for in Article 13(2) and this 
time without the usual qualification – ‘in accordance with national law’. However there 
is no mention of the right to legal aid to cover the cost of counsel and as such the right 
in practice may in fact be illusory. 
8.7 Right to Participate 
As has been see above, cases concerning trials in absentia are related to the issue of 
effective participation. An individual must be given the opportunity to plead his case in 
court. Effective participation is key to the practical implementation of defence rights. 
Cape divides the relevant rights into four categories,  
the right to investigate facts, or to seek exculpatory evidence; the right to 
participate in the proceedings, for example, by being present at during 
investigative acts and hearings, which is closely related to the equality of 
arms requirement; the right to adequate time and facilities for preparation of 
the defence; and the right to examine witnesses and experts.
714
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In Artico
715
 the ECtHR held that participation in proceedings needs to be practical and 
effective. The right to be present in the court is not an absolute right,
716
 so where only 
points of law are heard and the hearing is attended by their lawyer this will not be a 
violation.
717
 
In Timergaliyev,
718
 the ECtHR stated that, the right to be present at one’s trial is 
intimately connected with the ability to effectively participate in the proceedings, not 
only by being present but also to hear and follow proceedings. Effective participation 
presupposes that the accused understands the nature of proceedings and what is at stake. 
He should be able to relay to his lawyer his own version of events, points of 
disagreement and raise points to be put forward in his defence. 
Alternatively if the individual has either waived this right by deliberately not attending 
the trial, this is also not necessarily a violation. However, a lawyer appointed to 
represent the accused must be afforded the opportunity to do so. In Lala
719
 the applicant 
complained that his lawyer was not allowed to conduct the defence in his absence (the 
trial having been held in absentia). The ECtHR found that there had been a violation of 
Article 6 since the right to defend oneself through legal assistance is not only for 
defendants who are themselves present at the trial but includes allowing their lawyers to 
present their defence. 
8.7.1 Equality of arms 
Equality of arms is an element of the right to a fair trial, requiring that both sides are 
given an equal opportunity to present their case including having access to the case 
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documents and to question witnesses. As stated by the Court in Salduz, these guarantees 
are of equal importance in pre-trial stages.  
The case of Edwards and Lewis,
720
 concerned entrapment and non-disclosure, on public 
interest grounds, of pertinent evidence
721
 which would have assisted the applicants in 
proving entrapment. The ECtHR stated that the “…right to an adversarial trial means, in 
a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have 
knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the 
other party.”722 Reiterating that it was not the ECtHR’s role to assess decisions on the 
admissibility of evidence by national courts, it was still in a position to,  
…scrutinise the decision-making procedure to ensure that, as far as possible, 
the procedure complied with the requirements to provide adversarial 
proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to 
protect the interests of the accused.
723
 
In Öcalan,
724
 the chain of events which lead to the applicant’s eventual appearance 
before the Turkish courts are well known. The case is a prime example of a lack in 
equality of arms. The ECtHR held that it could not “…accept that the replacement of the 
military judge before the end of the proceedings dispelled the applicant's reasonably 
held concern about the trial court's independence and impartiality”.725 The applicant 
complained that Article 6 (1)-(3) had been infringed, because of the difficulties in 
obtaining assistance from his lawyers, gaining access to the case file and other 
information from the prosecution and difficulty in calling defence witnesses. There were 
also allegations of the judges being influenced by the media.
726
 The security forces, a 
public prosecutor and a judge of the National Security Court refused the applicant a 
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lawyer during police questioning whilst in police custody for seven days; during which 
time he made several incriminating statements which later became crucial elements of 
the prosecutor’s charge and a significant contributors to his conviction. Despite not 
waiving his right to a lawyer and his lawyers seeking permission to visit, the authorities 
refused access. The ECtHR held that “to deny access to a lawyer for such a long period 
and in a situation where the rights of the defence might well be irretrievably prejudiced 
is detrimental to the rights of the defence to which the accused is entitled by virtue of 
Article 6.” 
Once access to a lawyer was permitted, meetings between the applicant and his lawyers 
were within hearing range of the security forces. The ECtHR stated that given an aim of 
the ECHR was to guarantee practical and effective rights, the inability of a lawyer to 
confer with his client, receive instructions confidentially and to provide assistance 
without surveillance meant that much of the usefulness of his assistance was lost. 
Although the right is not absolute, in the present case the Court found that his defence 
rights had been infringed. 
Restrictions were placed on the frequency of visits from his lawyers to two one-hour 
visits per week. The Court held that on the basis of the complexity of the case and the 
voluminous case files, it was not justified. In addition Mr Öcalan, had 20 days to 
examine a case file containing 17,000 pages and his lawyers were not able to provide 
him with any documents before submitting their comments on the prosecution evidence. 
The Court held that this added to the difficulties he encountered in preparing his defence 
for the above reasons the ECtHR held that the trial was unfair and “that the overall 
effect of these difficulties taken as a whole so restricted the rights of the defence that the 
principle of a fair trial”.727 
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Whilst the unfortunate chain of events that occurred in Mr Ocalan’s case will rarely be 
reproduced in proceedings before the courts of MSs, it highlights the different elements 
that can go wrong. Some of these are tackled by the Stockholm Roadmap and in 
particular Measure B in terms of the right to access the case documents and also 
Measure C on the right to a lawyer. 
8.8 Trials in Absentia 
In Einhorn,
 728
  the applicant had been arrested in 1979 on suspicion that he had 
murdered his girlfriend, whose mummified body had been found in his home 2 years 
after she had gone missing. In 1981, whilst the proceedings were taking place he left the 
US. A trial was held in his absence and in 1993 he was found guilty. In 1997 the US 
asked France to extradite him so that he could serve his sentence of life imprisonment. 
In the present case, the law was in place which in principle provided that he would have 
a retrial and the applicant failed to show “substantial grounds for believing” that the 
denial of justice he would face would be “flagrant” and the US “cannot be said not to be 
a State based on the rule of law”. France could in good faith extradite the applicant. The 
ECtHR confirmed that a denial of justice undoubtedly occurs where an individual 
convicted in absentia, is not able to obtain a fresh determination of the charge (in fact 
and law), when it has not been unequivocally shown that they waived their right to be 
present and defend themselves.
729
 
 Other guarantees inherent in a fair trial such as equality of arms
730
 and the right to 
participate in the trial,
731
 are inherently missing from a trial in absentia where relevant 
due process has not been followed.  
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731 Sejdovic v Italy, 56581/00, [GC] Judgment 1.03.2006, the right to participate can only be waived in an 
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In Sejdovic,
732
 the applicant had been convicted in absentia and complained that he had 
not been given the opportunity to present his defence. The applicant had not been 
formally informed of the trial since he had become untraceable before the authorities 
had even had the opportunity to detain him, and as such could not be considered as 
having unequivocally waived his right to trial. A lawyer was appointed to represent him 
at the trial but he was absent. A trial in absentia will not be automatically contrary to 
Article 6 if the individual is entitled to a retrial with a fresh determination on the facts 
and law. The ECtHR gives states a wide margin of appreciation to determine the means 
as the result is achieved, with the right to be present at either the original or re-trial 
hearing ranking as one of the essential requirements of Article 6. As such,  
…the refusal to reopen proceedings conducted in the accused's absence, 
without any indication that the accused has waived his or her right to be 
present during the trial, has been found to be a “flagrant denial of justice” 
rendering the proceedings manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 
or the principles embodied therein.
733
 
In the present case the Court held that, it could not be shown that he had waived his 
right and did not have the opportunity of obtaining a fresh determination of the merits of 
the charges against him by a court which had heard him in accordance with his defence 
rights. Accordingly a violation of Article 6 was found. 
As stated above the ECtHR requires that a fresh determination of the merits is available 
in all instances where the trial was held in absentia without the defendant’s knowledge. 
Article 5(1) EAWFD addressed the issue of trials in absentia, it states that where a 
person has been convicted when he had not been informed of the date and time of the 
hearing, his surrender may be subject to the I-MS giving an assurance that he will have 
the opportunity to apply for a re-trial of the case.  This has been deleted and the 
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EAWFD amended by the Council Framework Decision relating to trials in absentia
734
 
which inserts Article 4a. This sets out the grounds for non-recognition of decisions 
rendered following a trial in absentia and the conditions for its application. 
It is clear that the conditions required by Article 5(1) EAWFD fell below the standards 
the ECtHR demands. Obtaining an assurance, as indicated by the “may be subject to”, is 
optional and building upon the principle of MR, under EU law, it is acceptable if the 
opportunity exists in the national law. This availability of the “opportunity to apply for a 
retrial” also falls below ECHR standards, since what is required is the entitlement to a 
retrial with a fresh determination on the facts and law. 
The amended EAWFD has taken a step in the right direction in that the I-MS has to 
confirm that the individual will be “expressly informed of his or her right to a retrial or 
appeal, in which he or she has the right to participate and which allows the merits of the 
case, including fresh evidence, to be re-examined, and which may lead to the original 
decision being reversed”. However this assurance found in the amended EAW request 
form has a narrower scope then anticipated by the ECHR in that the E-MS has no ability 
or opportunity to assess the realities which will be faced by the individual upon 
surrender. They are to trust the assurance given by the I-MS through a simple tick on 
the request form. 
The CJEU sends a number of messages through its judgment in Melloni.
735
 The case 
concerned an EAW request for the execution of a judgment in absentia, the referring 
court wanted to know whether Article 4a(1) precludes national judicial authorities from 
making a surrender conditional on the conviction being open for review in order to 
ensure that their defence rights are guaranteed. If this is the case, is the provision 
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compatible with the right to a fair trial under the CFR and if so does Article 53 CFR not 
then allow a state to afford greater protection by making surrender conditional. 
The CJEU ruled that, the EAWFD harmonized the grounds for non-execution and the 
exhaustive list provided in Article 4a(1) “is incompatible with any retention of the 
possibility for the executing judicial authority to make the execution conditional on the 
conviction in question being open to review in order to guarantee the rights of the 
defence of the person concerned.”736 Referring to the Opinion of the Advocate-General, 
the CJEU concludes that this does not infringe the defendant’s rights. The reasoning of 
the Advocate-General is that the adoption of Framework Decision 2009/299 sought to 
remedy the defects in Article 5(1), including the enhancement of procedural rights. 
However it is also clear that the actual focus of the amendment was legal certainty, 
allowing the E-MS to determine the adequacy of the assurance created uncertainty 
which may reduce the effectiveness of the MR mechanism. Thus the need to refine the 
definition of common grounds and whilst permitting surrender in spite of a trial in 
absentia it respects defence rights.
737
 For these reasons the E-MS is (according to the 
CJEU) precluded from making a surrender conditional on the conviction rendered in 
absentia being open to review. The problem with sub-sections (a) and (b) is the nature 
of the preclusion; it is mandatory.
738
 This then begs the question of where are the 
additional safeguards (besides the free will of a waiver) set out in the opinion, “if it is to 
be effective for [ECHR] purposes, a waiver of the right to take part in the trial must be 
established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards 
commensurate to its importance[...]Furthermore, it must not run counter to any 
important public interest.”739 It is equally important to show that the consequences of 
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the waiver could be reasonably foreseen. The focus of the CJEU is sub-sections (a) or 
(b) where the individual was aware of the trial and voluntarily and unambiguously 
waived his right to be present. From the Opinion it is evident that only two extremes are 
considered, at the one end the mandatory preclusion of any additional conditions and at 
the other “making the right to a retrial an absolute requirement irrespective of the 
conduct of the person concerned”.740 Sub-section (c) concerns where the individual is 
again aware of the decision but either expressly states that they do not contest it or does 
not request a re-trial. The main concern of compatibility with the right to a fair trial of 
Article 4a(1) lies in sub-section (d) which does not go far enough, being merely 
informed is not the same as having the opportunity; again we are faced with a 
theoretical versus a practical right. The shortcomings of (d) are not discussed in the 
judgment or opinion other than to highlight the differences between the old provision 
and the new. Specifically under Article 5 it “was for the executing judicial authority to 
assess whether those assurances were adequate”,741 whereas under Article 4a(1), the 
discretion is removed and replaced with reliance on the information provided in the 
EAW. However, where the CJEU surpasses itself is in its interpretation of Article 53. 
The Spanish court envisages that Article 53 authorizes it to apply a higher standard of 
protection so as not to adversely affect its constitutional rights. The CJEU responds that 
such,  
interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter would undermine the principle of 
the primacy of EU law inasmuch as it would allow a Member State to 
disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance with the Charter 
where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State’s 
constitution. 
Does EU primacy also trump HRs which go above the minimum standards set by the 
EU? Article 53, together with Article 52, calls for national authorities to remain free to 
apply higher standards of rights is now subject to the following “that the level of 
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protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised”.742 Given that the 
freedom to set higher levels of protection flows from EU law, how does it then 
undermine EU primacy, unless EU law signifies ceiling standards rather than minimum 
standards. The Opinion goes on to say that MSs remain free to set higher standards 
where there is no EU nexus.
743
 This introduces yet another tier of HRs at the national 
level. 
This judgment not only affects Spain but also other MSs including the UK who under 
section 21 EA provides that in circumstances covered by Article 4a(1)(a) and (b) the 
executing court must consider whether the surrender is compatible with the individual’s 
ECHR rights. If there is no entitlement to a retrial or a review which equates to a retrial 
then the individual cannot be surrendered. This provision is read in line with Article 
6(3) ECHR requiring the individual to have a right to defend himself or by a legal 
representative (legally aided where necessary) and the ability to examine witnesses. 
This safeguard is absent from Article 4a(1)(d), lowering the right of an individual to 
have the merits reconsidered with the right to be informed of the opportunity and 
relegating to trust that the opportunity will be a real one. 
It appears that where HRs standards are set out by the EU in a measure, this lowest 
common denominator as agreed by all states is the applicable right. Allowing states to 
go beyond this protection would cast “doubt on the uniformity of the standards of 
protection” undermining the principles of mutual trust and recognition and 
compromising the ‘efficacy’ of the framework decision.744  
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This restrictive reading of HRs within the EU is also a message to MSs, the European 
Parliament and Commission to aim high when setting down common defence rights. 
The Advocate-General explicitly states that “the definition at European Union level of a 
common, high degree of protection for the rights of the defence increases the confidence 
placed by the executing judicial authority in the quality of the procedure applicable in 
the issuing Member State.”745 This is unfortunately qualified with a statement that 
procedural guarantees should not be used to place an individual outside the reach of the 
law or in ‘the cross-border dimension’ of the AFSJ “to hinder the execution of legal 
decisions.”746  
8.9 Right to Interpretation and Translation 
Under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR, the right to interpretation is absolute, free and costs cannot 
be re-claimed from a defendant even if convicted
747
 irrespective of the financial 
situation of the accused.
748
 It is intrinsically linked to the ability to participate 
effectively.  
Whilst the provision refers to “interpreter”, the right has been held to also include the 
right to translation of necessary documents but not necessarily all documents, in some 
instances oral assistance in understanding the documents may be enough.
749
 The 
assistance provided by the interpreter should be sufficient “to enable the defendant to 
have knowledge of the case against him and to defend himself, notably by being able to 
put before the court his version of the events.”750 
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The rights of the requested person as set out in Article 11 EAWFD include the right to 
assistance from an interpreter, although this is subject to the MR caveat – in accordance 
with national law. Measure A of the Stockholm Roadmap clarifies and extends both the 
scope and entitlements of this right under EU law. The right applies from the first police 
questioning and also includes a right to translation.  
8.10 Appeal 
There is no right to appeal and thus mode, scope and availability of appeals can be 
restricted. But where the judicial system provides for it, Article 6 guarantees apply. The 
extent of Article 6 applicability will depend on the features of the proceeding: powers, 
functions in law and practice, the manner interests of parties are presented and 
protected. In Monnell and Morris
751
 the Court held that there was no need for applicant 
to be present since prosecution was not represented and it did not involve the re-
examination of witnesses. In contrast, in Granger
752
 the Court held a violation where a 
full appeal hearing was held where the applicant had no legal representative present but 
the prosecution was present. 
In Ekbatrin,
753
 the ECtHR considered whether the absence of the applicant from the 
proceedings determining his appeal were contrary to Article 6. The ECtHR noted that 
the guarantee of equality of arms was met since neither the applicant nor was a 
representative of the prosecution were present, and that the Court of Appeal was 
restricted and could not impose a harsher sentence. However, the procedure did involve 
a full review to determine the applicant’s guilt and the sentence imposed. The Court 
also had the power to reduce the fine or acquit and in undertaking its functions it 
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considered both points of law and fact. Since its judgment was not “based solely on 
objective conclusions” a violation of Article 6(1) was held.754 
Whilst the issue of appeal has limited application to the EAW, appeal rights vary. For 
example the Netherlands only has one instance in EAW hearings before the Amsterdam 
Court with no further appeal. As illustrated by the ECtHR jurisprudence there is no right 
to appeal and so the Dutch process is in compliance with the ECtHR. On the other hand 
in the UK EAWs can be appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. Of relevance at this 
point is also notification of the decision to surrender. Article 19 EAWFD provides that 
the issuing authority is immediately notified of the decision. There is however no 
parallel obligation to notify the requested person. From the text of the EAWFD itself it 
is not clear how this affects the ability of the individual to challenge or appeal a decision 
which will be dealt with in accordance with the national law of the E-MS. These 
disparities create opportunities for distrust to creep in, however interference with their 
appeals system would not be welcomed by MSs and it would in any case be sufficiently 
dealt with by ensuing that the procedural guarantees are respected. 
8.11 Is the Right to a Fair Hearing Relevant to the EAWFD? 
According to the ECtHR, Article 6 is not applicable to EAW proceedings in the E-MS 
since these replace extradition between MSs and therefore are analogous. As set out 
above the reasoning by the ECtHR that extradition hearings are not a ‘determination of 
a criminal charge’ or a civil right is defective. In one line of cases no detailed 
considerations has accompanied these declarations and in the other unjustified 
comparisons are made to immigration cases. Beyond this, under the EAW system of 
MR the playing field has been altered, the integrated criminal justice system which 
permits the enforcement of ‘foreign’ orders without requiring any internalization has 
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changed what is to be regarded ‘as a whole’. The proceedings are no longer segregated, 
measures from one state flow into another without any additional checks or processes. 
The EAWFD proceedings in the E-MS are attached to the I-MS procedures. Thus whilst 
some HRs violations can be redressed at later stages of the proceedings, other violations 
should either be prevented or addressed in advance at the first opportunity. These 
violations are those which would result in what is termed a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.   
In order for this to be possible the national courts of the E-MS are required to be 
genuinely open to arguments on HRs points. 
As is known, the phrase ‘flagrant denial’ originated from the Soering case and whilst 
the ECtHR has not provided a definition its case law is littered with examples of what 
will and will not equate to this high standard.  When judging the decision of an E-MS 
the test applied is that crystallized in Osman; did the E-MS know or ought to have 
known when surrendering an individual of the risk of a flagrant denial of justice in the 
I-MS.
755
 
Within the EU, the CFR permits the extended scope of Article 6 ECHR and in the next 
Part (which will consider the Stockholm Roadmap measures), it can be seen that the 
Commission has taken care to emphasise that the relevant procedural guarantees apply 
to the EAWFD, this reinforces the EU’s position that Article 6 ECHR is applicable to 
the EAW and MR measures more generally.  
Before recapping what these procedural guarantees encompass, it is important to note 
that underlying these is ensuring the fairness of a trial. This includes the presumption of 
innocence and the related right to silence, both of which are reflected in the defence 
rights Directives adopted under the Stockholm Roadmap. In addition the case law on 
the presumption of innocence provides a useful line of argument which states that 
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extradition is connected to and concomitant to criminal proceedings and for this reason 
Article 6(2) applies to extradition proceedings. It follows that given the changing nature 
of extradition in the EU, the integrated system and the transnational nature of criminals 
and their crimes, all the proceedings are to be considered as one with Article 6 applying 
at all stages. Another aspect of fairness is reasonable time; this relates to the time taken 
to surrender an individual, the time taken to conclude the trial as well as the time taken 
to bring proceedings. 
What has been discovered is that on the one hand, at the EU level the scope of Article 6 
ECHR guarantees have been extended to cover EAW proceedings in the E-MS. On the 
other hand the EU seems to have relegated the significance of the obligation not to 
surrender when the individual faces a real risk of a ‘flagrant denial’ of justice in 
preference to mutual trust and the promotion of MR and judicial cooperation.  
The defence rights are largely set out in the Stockholm Roadmap and include the right 
to be informed in a language the accused understand, adequate time to prepare their 
defence and the right to legal representation and legal aid. The need for these additional 
Directives on defence rights (beyond the ECHR) is to translate the theoretical rights into 
a practical reality in all MS national laws. 
It will be interesting to see if the ECtHR’s position of allowing mutual trust to be 
prioritized will be maintained or if it will change as the EU adopts measures which 
extend the application of procedural guarantees to EAW proceedings and other MR 
measures. 
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Chapter Nine: Human Rights Conclusions 
The practical impact of the EAWFD on HRs is best seen through consideration of three 
cases which draw together the various HRs matters that have been raised in the 
preceding chapters. What is clear is that such heavy reliance on MR was premature. 
9.1.1 Stapelton  
The first case is a good illustration of the tension that exists at national level between a 
judge’s natural instinct to protect HRs and their duty to abide by the principle of MR. 
Ultimately it is disappointing that the ECtHR failed to take the opportunity presented to 
it to reinforce and remind EU MS of their continuing obligations under the ECHR, in 
spite of the vows of MR that MSs have taken.  
The case of Stapelton, considers the application of the obligation of a state not to 
surrender an individual where there is a real risk that they would face a flagrant denial 
of justice. Mr Stapelton had lived in the UK until 1985 when he moved to Spain, then 
France and then Ireland in 1994. In March 2004 a UK Magistrate Court issued an arrest 
warrant for him and a year later the UK issued an EAW for 30 counts of fraud allegedly 
committed between 1978-82. In September 2005 he was arrested by the Irish police 
pursuant to the UK EAW. 
One of the points of issue between the Irish courts themselves was not only who was 
better placed to consider the HRs complaint but also whether the HRs issue should be 
considered at the first occasion it was raised (namely before the Irish Courts during the 
EAW proceedings) or if it should be left to the courts of the I-MS or failing that the 
ECtHR.  
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Judge Peart of the Irish High Court was of the opinion that the notion that a high level 
of confidence existed created a presumption that the other MSs will act in accordance 
with expectations that they respect the rule of law and HRs. However, that it was also 
not disproportionate to give the wanted person an opportunity to show that the 
presumption was unwarranted under the circumstances. Peart J states that whilst 
admittance of evidence is a decision for the trial judge in the I-MS and that the right to 
due process was available in the UK, Section 37 of the Irish implementing laws still 
meant that no surrender should occur if it would breach either the ECHR or the Irish 
Constitution. In his opinion, it was not appropriate to expose individual to a “hazard that 
his rights might not be vindicated there in the same manner in which they would in my 
view in this jurisdiction”. This was not an indication of a lacking in the aspirational high 
confidence on the part of the judiciary, although this aspiration was not regarded a 
sufficient safeguard by the legislature, leading to the inclusion of section 37, where 
Ireland was not alone in including such provisions in their implementing laws.  
Peart J maintains that the simplification of the ‘extradition’ process was not an intention 
to diminish individual rights. It was not contemplated that there would be less 
protection on offer. He proceeded to refuse surrender of Mr Stapelton asserting that 27 
years go “way beyond any time by which a fair trial within a reasonable time can take 
place in respect of these offences.” His decision was overturned by the Supreme Court 
who fulfilled the EAW request for surrender of Mr Stapelton to the UK. The Supreme 
Court in allowing the appeal relied on Pupino to interpret as far as possible section 37 in 
line with the EAWFD. It also relied on the principle of MR and the assumption of 
respect for HRs. 
The ECtHR took the same position as the Supreme Court stating that the UK has a 
“common law jurisdiction to stay proceedings for alleged unfairness caused by delay on 
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the grounds of abuse of process”,756 that Mr Stapleton could make this challenge at the 
first opportunity and if unsuccessful he was able to apply to the ECtHR itself. The 
ECtHR concludes that in the present case that there were no substantial grounds 
disclosing a real risk. Importantly it notes that the UK is a contracting party signing up 
to “abide by its Convention obligations” which it has incorporated into domestic law via 
the Human Rights Act 1998. It also regards consideration of the 28 years delay in 
initiating the trial as a complex issue and that the UK (the I-MS) was best placed to 
assess fairness associated with this delay. 
A question not considered by the ECtHR or the Supreme Court was whether the UK 
authorities had given consideration to the delay before proceeding in issuing the arrest 
warrant and what their reasoning was for continuing to issue the EAW despite the Irish 
High Court determining that the delay went way above the threshold required for a 
breach. 
A schism can be seen between the ECtHR’s longstanding jurisprudence requiring 
national authorities to act as the first port of call for HRs protection and their approach 
taken with the EAW. Whilst approving of the currently foundationless mutual trust in 
MS legal systems, it also displaces the traditional obligations from the MS whose 
jurisdiction the person is located, to the responsibility of the I-MS and ultimately 
putting itself at the bottom of the cliff as a safety net. 
9.1.2 Assange 
The high profile case of Julian Assange raises valid criticisms of the operation of the 
EAWFD. The way in which the complaints of Mr Assange are set out in the City of 
Westminster District Court judgment
757
 makes them appear like sensationalised tabloid 
accusations. For example, one reads that the Swedish prosecutor is “biased against 
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men...that she has lost her balance...[and] is in favour of locking up innocent men”. 
Another complaint quotes the Swedish lawyer as calling Mr Assange a coward for not 
returning. Assange’s skeleton argument is however more logical and amongst the 
complaints there are some good legal points which highlight the inefficiencies and 
dangers of the EAWFD.
758
 In particular these include the disproportionate use of the 
EAW; the blurring between investigation and prosecution; the potential to use the EAW 
for political reasons; the issues with mutual trust and the presumption. 
Having been satisfied that the offences are extradition offences and that none of the 
section 11 bars are raised or found,  Riddle DJ goes on to consider the allegations of 
abuse of process and extraneous considerations (namely HRs). The crux of Riddle DJ’s 
judgment as to why surrender should proceed can be summarised as follows. First, 
mutual respect and confidence underpins the EAW system and for this reason when 
ambiguities arise, the first port of call for clarification will be the judicial authority of 
the I-MS. There is “a strong presumption” in favour of having confidence in the I-MS, 
however Riddle DJ accepts that it “can be rebutted by other evidence”. Second, the 
disproportionate use of the EAW is “not a free-standing bar to extradition”. Finally, 
Riddle DJ is of the opinion that any irregularities which may have occurred in Sweden 
are best rectified during the trial in Sweden. Related to this point, he notes that whilst 
there are allegations that Assange would not receive a public hearing and therefore a fair 
trial, he was not referred to “any significant body of European court cases” other than 
the case of Fejde v Sweden.
759
 In fact there are over 100 cases against Sweden in which 
the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6 in relation to the lack of a public hearing.  
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On appeal to the High Court Assange made four submissions.
760
 First on double 
criminality and the fact that the first 3 allegations of sexual molestation by the two 
women, which are not EAWFD offences, do not satisfy the dual criminality test and that 
the fourth would not equate to rape under the law of England and Wales had it been 
fairly and accurately described. Thomas LJ first ascertained that it is only in exceptional 
circumstances appropriate for a court to have regard to extraneous material in order to 
determine the accuracy of the description of the conduct,
761
 the purpose of which was 
solely to ensure the fairness and accuracy of the described facts and not an enquiry into 
the decision to prosecute a certain offence. No exceptional circumstances were found to 
exist in Assange’s case. Nevertheless having had the material placed before them the 
court did express their view as to whether it would have made any difference had they 
taken it into account. For offences 1-3 Thomas LJ held that the descriptions were fair 
and accurate and that dual criminality was made out. For Offence 4 the Court held that 
the description was fair and accurate but that in any case, it is the law of the I-MS which 
governs the classification of rape. Under the EAWFD for 32 offences dual criminality is 
abolished (including for rape) and us such an enquiry like this is not ordinarily part of 
the EAW process. The only question is whether the offence is classified as rape in the I-
MS. This is not to say that a real issue does not exist and in fact the Assange case 
reignites a criticism of the EAW and MR, the potential abuse that is created with the 
abolition of dual criminality without any agreed definition of the 32 offences. For non-
EAWFD offences the UK requires dual criminality to be exist although it will presume 
that the facts and offence are as set out in the EAW, unless evidence is adduced to the 
contrary.  
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This is related to the second submission, namely that the details set out in the EAW 
were not specific enough as required by the EAWFD to ensure that the case is not 
subsequently broadened thereby not enabling the specialty rule to be asserted.  The key 
HRs concern related to the possibility of onward extradition to the US. The EAWFD 
provides a thin layer of protection against such action – in the form of a watered down 
specialty rule. 
Third on the issuance of an EAW before the commencement of a criminal prosecution, 
under the EA there is the additional safeguard of requiring the wanted person to be an 
‘accused’ person.762 Related to this is also the alleged disproportionate use of the EAW 
when the Swedish prosecutors could more appropriately engage with the mutual legal 
assistance mechanism. It was argued that there was no ‘charge’ in Sweden; in other 
words Assange was not wanted for prosecution but for investigation. This could be a 
potential conflict between accusatorial and inquisitorial systems. At what point does 
‘investigation’ in inquisitorial systems cross the line into a prosecution? Ultimately it is 
a question to be determined by the I-MS whose decision the E-MS is to trust unless 
strong evidence is presented to the contrary. That said, instances where there is a strong 
suspicion of such misuse, authorities opt for more diplomatic routes to refuse surrender. 
The preferred method is to request further information from the I-MS.
763
 
Finally, a public prosecutor cannot be a judicial authority because they are not an 
independent body as envisaged under the EA. Reliance was placed on the Cando Arms 
case which stated that a deliberate deviation from the EAWFD was to ensure that an 
individual is protected “against an unlawful infringement of the right to liberty”.764 
Delivering the judgment, Thomas LJ stated that the EAWFD leaves it for individual 
MSs to designate which authority is competent to issue and EAW. “It is therefore 
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entirely consistent with the principles of mutual recognition and mutual confidence to 
recognise as valid an EAW issued by a prosecuting authority designated under Article 
6.”765 Nevertheless he also recognises the importance of maintaining public confidence 
and mutual confidence of citizens with judges of the MSs. It for this reason that Thomas 
LJ accepts the need for “more intense scrutiny...where a warrant is issued by a “judicial 
authority” who is not a judge.”766 In the case of Assange, even though the EAW was 
issued by a prosecutor, Swedish courts had scrutinised the decision and this was 
sufficient to trust due process had been followed. This again was an assertion that had 
already been dealt with by the courts of other MSs (i.e. Cyprus).
767
 The EAWFD is also 
clear on this point, it is up to each MS to designate their own ‘judicial authority’. Whilst 
MSs are expected to work together some of their decisions are ring-fenced from 
assessment by other MSs and in particular the E-MS. The UK provides for additional 
protection where the EAW is not issued by a judicial authority and has not been 
subjected to consideration by an independent authority. In these circumstances the UK 
judges are permitted to consider the decision to issue an EAW. 
Before the High Court, determination of the submissions was largely predetermined by 
the EAWFD itself, not leaving much (if any) scope for the UK courts. The courts did 
raise valid criticism of the EAWFD; however with the current allegiance to the principle 
of MR, they were issues which could not be corrected by the judiciary, but only by 
Parliament.  
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court
768
 the only issue left to be determined 
was the meaning of ‘judicial authority’ in the EAWFD and the EA. The majority 
accepted that a prosecutor fell within the meaning of a ‘judicial authority’. In reaching 
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this conclusion the court took into account the wider meaning of the French text and the 
fact that the designation of prosecutors for the role in 11 MSs had not attracted any 
criticism from the Commission. The inclusion of a definition in the original draft of the 
EAWFD (which included prosecutors) and the subsequent removal of the definition in 
favour of the competent authority according to the law of each MS was discussed before 
the Court. The preferred interpretation of Lord Phillips was that the final version 
broadened the scope of a ‘judicial authority’, allowing MSs to designate whichever 
authority they saw fit. Lord Dyson and Lord Mance (in the absence of evidence) both 
disagreed with this view. Lord Mance stated that the final text of Article 6(1) EAWFD 
in all probability reflected the inability of MSs to agree upon the definition. However he 
went on to say that it was not for the Supreme Court to determine this but instead to 
“focus on the final Framework Decision and seek to make sense of its text in the light of 
its purpose, the principles underlying it and general principles of European law”. The 
suitability of designated authorities was a question to be determined by the CJEU; 
however the hands of the UK judges remain tied with their inability to refer preliminary 
questions on these matters.
769
 Lord Kerr stated that given the traditional role of the 
prosecutor to issue extradition warrants, had the intention being to exclude them from 
the process it would have been explicitly stated in the EAWFD. Is the acceptance that a 
prosecutor can decide on the issuance of an EAW a move away from what was 
envisaged by the EAWFD, in particular the reliance on judges to be the guardian of 
rights? Or is it recognition of the blurred line that exists between prosecutors and judges 
in civil law countries? What about the need to ensure that the decision was made after 
impartial and independent scrutiny? 
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The Assange decision has wider implications on the interpretation of EU law. In his 
dissenting opinion Lord Mance overturns Dabas and the revised view (which all judges 
agreed with) is that Pupino does not apply to the EAWFD. Lord Mance found that 
measures adopted under the third pillar fall outside section 2.
770
 Nevertheless, the UK 
courts were obliged under common law to fulfil their EU obligations. 
9.1.3 Campbell 
In the third case, Liam Campbell was arrested in Ireland pursuant to an EAW issued by 
Lithuania. In breach of bail he skipped over to Northern Ireland where he was soon 
arrested again on the basis of the EAW. Once the Divisional Court in Northern Ireland 
asserted that it had jurisdiction to consider the case, Lithuania withdrew the application 
in Ireland. The crux of Mr Campbell’s argument was that on surrender to Lithuania he 
would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by virtue of the prison 
conditions. The High Court judgment,
771
 which includes an account of the process 
followed by Burgess J, is a neat example of how the HRs ground for refusal could and 
should operate. 
The ‘high hurdle’ that had to be overcome to establish that there was a risk of a flagrant 
denial of Article 6, was not satisfied. However Burgess J held that the surrender would 
violate Article 3 and be in breach of section 21 EA. In reaching this conclusion the 
judge applied the Soering test, “posing for himself the question whether there were 
substantial grounds for believing that the requested person, if extradited to the 
requesting state (Lithuania), would be faced by a real risk of exposure to inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by Article 3.”772 He acknowledged that 
the test involved an assessment of the conditions and placed liability on the E-MS 
because the ‘exposure’ of the individual to such treatment was a ‘direct consequence’ of 
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its actions. Extensive evidence was considered including CPT reports, testimony of an 
expert with an impressive CV and firsthand experience of Lithuanian prisons including 
the relevant prison (Lukiskes Prison) and the ECtHR judgment
773
 which found a breach 
of Article 3 against Lithuania in respect of prison conditions. The High Court follows a 
similar reasoning. 
The key element of the case is the evidence adduced. The expert was independent and 
reputable and the testimony was up to date and specific to the conditions (and prison) 
the individual would face. This was supported by CPT reports and ECtHR judgment. 
The case signifies the winds of change where prosecutors are having a harder time 
convincing courts by relying on well versed arguments relating to the importance of 
fulfilling extradition obligations and the near absolute presumption of trust. Defence 
counsel on the other hand have gradually, through case law, obtained a clear indication 
of what the courts require for the presumption to be rebutted. On this occasion they 
fulfilled the requirements with case specific evidence. 
The disingenuous reliance on K.R.S. v UK and other distinguishable cases are dealt with 
head on by the court which also included Mitting J’s approach to the presumption. In a 
way this case confirms that the relativist approach to the nature of Article 3 treatment is 
of limited applicability. It is applicable in cases concerning the use of strip searches or 
slopping out, aspects which on their own may be justified in the circumstance, even 
though in other instances they would equate to a violation of Article 3. However prison 
conditions such as overcrowding or a culmination of issues found to fall short of the 
permitted treatment are universal in their violation, irrespective of factors such as the 
desirability of extradition.  
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9.2 Rule 39 Interim Measure 
The three cases also reflect the warped application of the ECtHR mechanism and what 
appears to be the part suspension of Rule 39 to EAW proceedings. It is not only within 
the national judicial protection that HRs may not be adequately accommodated. There is 
“a weakness in the ECtHR’s regulation of the formal procedure of extradition”.774 
Having characterised extradition proceedings as administrative, the protection of the 
individual’s rights is exclusively concentrated on their “potential future treatment” 
through the determination of a real risk.
775
 The serious impact on the individual is 
currently not balanced sufficiently by coverage of ECHR standards. Langford believes 
that this weak regulation by the ECtHR of extradition is substituted by the applicability 
of interim measures.
776
 This is an interesting thesis. The granting of a Rule 39 interim 
measure, compels the MSs to act and ensure that the individual will be protected upon 
surrender. It is normally a precursor to the finding of a violation and in a way can be 
regarded as an opportunity for the MS to act at their domestic level in order to avoid the 
finding of a violation against them.
777
 In its consideration of Article 34, in Soering, the 
Court went on to hold, where it is plausibly asserted that there is a risk of “irreparable 
damage to the enjoyment…of the core rights under the Convention, the object of an 
interim measure is to maintain the status quo pending the Court's determination of the 
justification for the measure.”778 The interim measure goes to the substance of the 
Convention complaint and the applicant’s desire to preserve the right before irreparable 
damage is done.  
Consequently, the interim measure is sought by the applicant, and granted by the Court, 
in order to facilitate the “effective exercise” of the right of individual petition under 
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777 The Rule 39 procedure is designed to ensure that, once the ECtHR has been seized of a complaint no 
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Article 34 ECHR in the sense of preserving the subject matter of the application when 
that is judged to be at risk of irreparable damage through the acts or omissions of the 
respondent State.
779
 
Whilst Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court falls within the procedural framework of the 
ECHR (as opposed to the substantive rights), the threshold applied by the ECtHR is 
lower than that applied for substantive rights. A threefold test requires to be satisfied by 
those seeking a Rule 39.  It must be shown to the ECtHR that: (1) there is a threat of 
irreparable harm of a very serious nature; (2) the harm is imminent and irremediable; 
and (3) there must be an arguable (prima facie) case. A prime example which would 
satisfy the test is where an individual is threatened with removal to a situation where 
their life or physical safety would be at risk contrary to Article 2 or 3.  
The guidance on making a Rule 39 application
780
 together with the general practice
781
 
suggests that that applications are to be supported by sound independent evidence (and 
not just the applicant's assertions) of the grave harm which the individual will be 
subjected to if deported. The evidence supplied must be sufficient to convince the 
ECtHR that serious irreparable damage will occur if they do not intervene. Such 
evidence has included in the past background reports about the HRs situation in the 
country of destination such as those from UNHCR, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch and other NGOs, and although these may strengthen an application, they 
will not be sufficient in the absence of solid evidence to link the applicant with a threat 
of immediate danger. This can be shown by domestic decisions (including letters) and 
evidence of past (and indications of future) ill-treatment against the applicant. As 
previously stated, it is important to remember that almost always a personal danger to 
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the individual concerned must be shown. Although following Salah Sheekh
782
 it may be 
sufficient to show that others in the applicant’s situation/particular group have been 
subjected to Article 3 prohibited treatment. It will always be a stronger case if it can be 
shown that the applicant himself has and/or will face such treatment. 
It is arguable that a similar threshold should be applied by domestic courts in order for 
them to be moved to scrutinise the situation in the I-MS, as opposed to simply passing 
the buck to the I-MS and then to the ECtHR or to require the individual to carry the full 
burden of proving a real risk exists. 
It is interesting to note that despite holding this power, the ECtHR has only recently 
agreed for the first time to issue a Rule 39 interim measure in cases concerning 
EAWs.
783
 The reasoning for previous refusals to grant Rule 39s was not entirely sound 
and is based on the fact that an individual, when being surrendered to a Council of 
Europe MS, maintains the right to individual petition and their complaint can continue 
to be considered by the ECtHR. However its own jurisprudence highlights that the 
importance of a Rule 39 is to avoid irreparable damage such as treatment contrary to 
Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. It is therefore irrelevant whether a person’s individual petition 
is effected or not by the surrender. Rather the question the ECtHR should consider is 
whether the individual will suffer irreparable harm.
784
 
As in any other area, in criminal matters and in MR measures the importance of HRs 
cannot be underestimated. At first glance it may appear that the principle of MR 
displaces HRs in an almost absolute manner. At closer inspection it is evident that HRs 
are a vital partner and a crucial support system for MR in criminal matters. As set out 
above, the principle of MR relies on mutual trust between MSs. The fact that MSs have 
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refused to surrender individuals illustrates that neither are absolute, but rather that the 
principle is a rebuttable judicial presumption. Evidence of a real risk of a HRs violation 
is one instance of when the presumption will be rebutted. However, even where 
surrender is not refused, the issues and criticisms raised by judges shows a level of 
judicial frustration coupled with genuine concerns which require the attention of the 
national and regional legislators. 
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Part III: EU Defence Rights and the EAW 
In Part 1 explored the issues raised by both the use of MR in criminal matters and the 
implementation of the EAWFD. Part 2 reviewed the HRs relevant to the application of 
the EAW, setting out the applicable minimum standards, the shortcomings of the 
ECtHR and EU law, the impact of the EAWFD and the gaps accentuated by its use. 
Both parts highlighted the discrepancies which exist between the implementation of the 
EAWFD and of HRs, particularly in relation to the grounds for refusal and the implied 
notion of HRs. As shown, implementation of ECHR standards differs between MSs and 
fundamentally between protection in theory and in practice. The focus of Part 3 will be 
on the steps taken by the EU to protect and reinforce defence rights at the EU level. It is 
anticipated that entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, together with the renewed will 
shown under the Stockholm Presidency
785
 will help avoid past failings in attempts to 
adopt minimum procedural guarantees. 
Chapter Ten: The Lisbon Effect 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
786
 in December 2009, the constitutional 
arrangements of the EU changed,
787
 of particular relevance to the AFSJ being the 
elimination of the 3
rd
 pillar – the intergovernmental domain. The first and third pillars 
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have been merged and all AFSJ legislation is now made under Title V of Part 3 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters is found under Chapter 4.  
Pre-Lisbon the AFSJ (including criminal justice) sat under the 3rd pillar of the EU, 
where the adoption of policy and measures was distinct in terms of their mode
788
 
requiring adoption by unanimity of the Council. A democratic deficit existed due to 
both the lack of parliamentary scrutiny and judicial accountability. Under Lisbon, the 
3rd pillar and its mechanisms disappear and are replaced with the ordinary EU 
legislative process of qualified majority voting in the Council and instead of only a 
consultative role for the European Parliament they have co-decision. The right of 
legislative initiative continues to be held by the Commission but no longer by single 
MSs; a MS legislative proposal needs to be made by a group consisting of at least ¼ 
MSs. Together with the introduction of preliminary review of legislative proposals by 
MS national parliament, the changes intend to ensure that time is not lost working on 
measures which are not supported by MSs and make the legislative process more 
democratic. Under Lisbon, competence to legislate on criminal matters is treatisized. 
Article 82 relates to criminal procedure including the adoption of minimum rules such 
as the rights of individuals. Article 83 relates to substantive criminal law such as the 
adoption of minimum rules defining serious crimes with a cross-border dimension and 
related sanctions.  
The principle of MR is enshrined in Articles 67(4) and 82(1) TFEU; of relevance to the 
principle of MR in the criminal sphere, is also Article 31 which provides for the ability 
to undertake common action to ensure the compatibility of rules applicable to MSs 
where necessary to improve judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Such measures 
include those aimed at increasing the level of mutual trust. Finally Lisbon elevates the 
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status of the CFR which is now both binding and judiciable vis a vis EU law. It is clear 
that the changes will make it easier to legislate in the area and less likely to be held 
hostage by a handful of dissenting MSs. There is one caveat on this positive note, under 
Lisbon the basis of power to legislate on HRs is for the promotion of MR and therefore 
such legislation runs the risk of being framed for the interests of MSs.  
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Chapter Eleven: Approximation of Procedural Guarantees 
MR is based on the presumption that the criminal justice systems of all EU MSs respect 
HRs and the rule of law. This should not however excuse the one-sided nature of 
measures adopted on criminal matters at the EU level. Until recently the measures 
adopted in this sphere have been advantageous to the security interests of MSs. A prime 
example is of course the EAWFD which has statistically increased the efficiency of 
cross-border transfers for police forces and prosecutors across Europe. In evidence 
given to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights both Commander Gibson, 
representing the Association of Chief of Police Officers (ACPO) and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, agreed that the EAWFD had made the process 
easier, simpler and quicker than the previous system.
789
 
However when speaking of its successes, the elephant in the room was for a long time 
the absence of any matching proficiency in the protection of HRs beyond the 
presumption of mutual trust. Critics believe that at the very least harmonisation of 
minimum standards of procedural guarantees should have been part and parcel of the 
EAWFD; reflected in a sister Framework Decision on procedural safeguards in criminal 
proceedings.  This was tabled on 28 April 2004
790
 and whilst it was considered at the 
time by some as too little too late, political agreement was not reached and the proposal 
was withdrawn in June 2007. It is nevertheless worth considering the Commission’s 
reasoning for why such a measure was needed and what it regarded as necessary to 
address, since as we shall see both the Commission reasoning and the proposed contents 
formed the basis for the Stockholm measures which will be considered below.  
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The first step is to rewind and understand the role of HRs in the EU. Before 1996, it is 
not clear that the EU had jurisdiction over HRs, the Rome Treaty made no reference to 
HRs. Over the years, the ECJ had taken a number of opportunities
791
 to proclaim the 
important relationship and relevance of HRs to Community legislation and as part of the 
EU general principles. However it was not until the Maastricht Treaty that HRs 
compliance was treatisized.
792
  In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty saw HRs further 
elevated with Article 6 expressly stating that HRs would be respected and Article 7 
setting out the sanctions for serious breaches.
793
 
11.1 The Need 
In 1998 the Commission, in setting out its vision for an AFSJ,
 794
 stated that a 
“minimum standard of protection for individual rights was the necessary counterbalance 
to judicial cooperation measures that enhanced the powers of prosecutors, courts and 
investigating officers.”795 In 2000 signing of the CFR further entrenched the position 
and role of HRs within the EU and contained many provisions relevant in criminal 
matters. In 2001, the Programme of Measures to Implement the Principle of Mutual 
Recognition of Decisions in Criminal Matters,
796
 stated that “mutual recognition is very 
much dependent on a number of parameters which determine its effectiveness”. These 
include “mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of third parties, victims and 
suspects…the definition of minimum common standards necessary to facilitate 
application of the principle of mutual recognition”. 
On 19 February 2003, the Commission issued the next step in the consultation process 
to achieve minimum common standards of procedural safeguards, its Green Paper on 
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Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout 
the EU.
797
 The Commission considered that membership of the ECHR by all MSs, 
meant the mechanism was already in place, it was simply a matter of reconfirming the 
standard of procedural safeguards in a single document. The minimum standards set by 
the ECtHR are applicable to all MSs of the Council of Europe, some of which are years 
behind in terms of the development of their legal systems when compared to the EU 
MSs. These minimum standards are therefore not enough to instill trust within the EU in 
each other’s systems. Additionally, whilst the ECtHR minimum standards are often 
satisfactorily “translated” into national procedures, it is the “divergent practices [which] 
run the risk of hindering mutual trust and confidence which is the basis of mutual 
recognition”.798 The Commission viewed the confirmation of the rights as “desirable” 
so as to make their operation in practice more visible and to ensure equivalence. 
Equivalence as we have seen above was a key element which secured the success of 
MR in the internal market and which is missing from criminal matters. The Green Paper 
sought not to replace the ECHR’s role, but rather to ensure consistent and uniform 
application of the rights across the EU. For this reason the Commission considered that 
regular and continuous assessments of compliance were equally important and that the 
ECtHR could not be relied on to act as a safety net, but rather MSs needed to develop a 
means to remedy breaches on their own motion;
799
 evaluation and monitoring “is an 
essential component in order to achieve common minimum standards and to promote 
trust”800 the intention being to “promote compliance at a consistent standard”.801 It is 
important for the level of compliance to be “demonstrably high” so that MSs can have 
confidence in the compliance by other MSs. Genuine mutual trust needs to be 
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established not only in the perceptions of governments but also “the minds of 
representatives of the media, practitioners, law enforcement officers and all those that 
will administer decisions based on mutual recognition on a daily basis.”802  
Approximation of HRs is also an attempt to form a uniform understanding of applicable 
rights and where appropriate the creation of autonomous meanings within the EU. 
Whilst attempts in other areas of the EU can be charted further back (in the context of 
the CJEU’s role in protecting HRs), the 2004 proposals can be said to mark the start of 
endeavours in the criminal law sphere. 
When determining the HRs to be addressed, the whole picture needs to be kept in mind. 
At one corner of the frame is the image of a foreign national snatched into an alien 
system whose procedures are conducted in a language foreign to him and who is kept in 
pre-trial detention for an extended period, denied bail because of his lack of connections 
to the MS as a non-national (or non-resident). At the other corner is an individual tried 
in his home country but with violations of his rights ranging from a trial in absentia to a 
trial with insufficient legal assistance or someone wanted by their home country to 
either stand trial or serve a sentence in circumstances which would violate their rights. 
These individuals and all those in between, have varying needs and differing rights 
which need to be addressed. 
11.2 The 2004 Proposal 
The Green Paper was itself preceded by a review of procedural safeguards carried out 
by the Commission by way of a broad Consultation Paper open to all interested parties 
and a questionnaire sent to the MSs. Both of these formed the basis of identifying the 
five areas to be immediately addressed. These were listed as: access to legal 
representation; access to interpretation and translation; a “Letter of Rights”; ensuring 
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proper protection of vulnerable suspects and the provision of consular assistance. It was 
decided that bail and detention conditions were to be considered together and set out in 
a separate measure.   
In summary, access to interpretation and translation were regarded as important since 
being able to understand the proceedings against you are vital to ensuring that they are 
fair. The cross-border nexus increases the likelihood that the individual concerned will 
not be in their country of origin and therefore may not be competent in the official 
language of the proceedings. The provision of a “letter of rights” is noted as important 
since rights are meaningless if individuals do not know what their rights are. Provision 
of consular assistance is related to the above rights. It is the ability to speak to an 
individual who speaks your language, who can explain your rights, assist you and above 
all someone who shares similar values. 
The 2004 Proposal set out the minimum standards in relation to each of the above listed 
rights. The starting point for all was the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
with the Commission occasionally filling in any gaps with the assistance of the CFR, 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU and findings from its own consultation and research.  
11.3 The Objections 
Given the basis of the provisions, it was not their content which MSs objected to. 
Despite the UK originally backing the proposed Framework Decision, at the end of its 
Presidency, in December 2005, their position changed. According to Professor Spencer, 
although the change of heart was never officially announced, he believes a key reason 
was a change in the UK civil servant negotiating in Brussels and government policy 
wanting to appear hard on crime and standing up against Brussels wanting to give even 
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more rights to criminals.
803
 In their endeavours to block the measure, the UK was joined 
by the Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Republic of Ireland and Slovakia. Reasons 
for the objections ranged from the EU’s lack of competency to the unnecessary 
doubling up on the existing ECHR obligations.   
The Commission had chosen Article 31(1)(c) EU as the legal basis, however the MSs 
listed above refused to accept this since the proposal would also apply in internal cases 
with no cross-border nexus or judicial cooperation.  The proposed legal basis (Article 
31) allowed common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters to be taken in 
order to ensure the compatibility of rules in MSs as necessary to improve judicial 
cooperation in the field. The Commission further added that it was a necessary 
complement to the MR measures adopted to aid the prosecution.   
Their view was that no competence had been conferred or no Treaty basis existed for 
the EU to interfere with the integrity of their domestic criminal justice systems by 
legislating on defence rights or criminal procedure.
804
 At the time the UK and others 
expressed their willingness to support a measure whose application was limited to 
cross-border cases. However such a restrictive measure would not sufficiently promote 
mutual trust or confidence in MSs’ systems. Individual will be subjected to the criminal 
justice systems of states as a whole and not only the cross-border measures. 
The central constitutional objection was that there was no express legal basis in the 
Treaty. This argument would appear to be supported by the fact that such an express 
legal basis was later introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in Article 82(2). However the 
Commission was of the view that an express legal basis was not necessary but was 
                                               
803 See, John Spencer, EU Fair Trial Rights - Progress at Last, New Journal of European Criminal Law, 
(2010)Volume 1, Number 4, 447 and John Spencer, ‘EU Criminal Law – the Past and the Future?’, in 
Anthony Arnull, Catherine Barnard, Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa (Eds),  A Constitutional 
Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood, Hart Publishing, 2011 
804 See: House of Lords EU Committee, Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 1st Report, Session 
2004–05. 
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implicit. It was also felt that the notion of ‘trust’ which the measure sought to promote 
was too subjective to be measured and thus not a legitimate objective to justify the 
measure.
805
 
Additionally, it was regarded that the proposed measure fell foul of the subsidiarity 
principle.  The subsidiarity principle dictates that the EU is to legislate if the ends 
sought cannot be achieved by the MSs themselves. In 2004 MSs were confident that 
they were able to adequately protect HRs in both legislation and practice and that the 
adoption of EU common standards was not necessary. As Professor Spencer charts the 
changing positions of the UK he points out that the 2005 U-turn was not a complete 
block but a delay since between 2005 and 2009 the UK had once again changed their 
mind.  
What changed their mind, for them to then accept the Stockholm Roadmap (pre-
Lisbon)? Perchance it was the success of the EAW and the desire to keep it working as 
efficiently. The 2004 proposed FD was in anticipation of the implementation of the 
EAW, the Commission foresaw that HRs protection in practice could threaten the 
application of MR to this area and therefore sought to build a solid foundation for the 
mutual trust. The MSs did not have an appetite for further loss of sovereignty or any 
infringement into their criminal justice systems which they regarded as capable of 
protecting rights without outside interference. Perhaps they also felt that the principle of 
MR and the practice of non-inquiry would also protect their systems from outside 
scrutiny.  
What is evident is that the Commission was correct in their conviction that EU 
measures safeguarding HRs are needed. The developments can be depicted with the 
MSs acting like children who only when faced with the possibility of losing their toys 
                                               
805 See: Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Constitutional Implications Of Mutual Recognition In Criminal Matters 
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(the EAWFD and other MR measures) agree to share the benefits of mutual trust with 
those EU citizens caught up in the MR web. It is not only important for authorities and 
judges to have true mutual trust in one another, but it is of equal importance that EU 
citizens have confidence that their rights will be protected across the EU. 
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Chapter Twelve: Stockholm 
In 2004 the Commission opted for an instrument focusing on the basic safeguards rather 
than a wide-ranging instrument covering all rights. The view was that whilst a single 
instrument would have more coherence and consistency, it would be covering such a 
wide spectrum of issues that it would become complex and thus difficult to understand 
and implement.
806
  In order to set down the EU common standards a more scientific 
approach is required in this field. Aspects of the criminal justice systems need to be 
taken in manageable chunks. The current criminal justice systems of the MSs first need 
to be researched and reported on, before these can be synthesized together with the 
minimum standards as set by the ECtHR. This is the new approach being taken by the 
Commission. 
At the end of 2009, under the Swedish Presidency, procedural guarantees were placed 
firmly back on the agenda with the UK and other’s backing the plan. The Stockholm 
Roadmap
807
, as it is referred to, adopted a different mode to that of the 2004 proposal. 
Instead of setting out all the rights in a single measure, each right would be considered 
in turn (in accordance with the ‘Roadmap’) and a separate measure adopted for each.  In 
total five measures were set out reflecting the essential rights as identified by the 
Commission in their 2004 proposal: (A) Translation and Interpretation; (B) Information 
on Rights and Information about Charges (“Letter of Rights”); (C) Legal Advice and 
Legal Aid; (D) Communication with Relatives, Employers and Consular Authorities; 
and (E) A Green Paper on Pre-Trial Detention. The rights whilst similar to those 
contained in the 2004 proposal, are broken down into manageable portions which it was 
                                               
806 Extended Impact Assessment, (n800) 17 
807 Stockholm Roadmap (n662), forms part of the Stockholm Programme which is the third in line of 
programmes after Tampere (1999-2004) and Hague (2004-2009) which seeks to further the EUs priorities 
in the AFSJ. 
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hoped MSs are capable of digesting. The progress of each measure will be considered in 
greater detail in the following section together with their compliance with HRs. 
The reason as to why defence rights need to be additionally protected at the EU level 
remains the same. The Commission has recognized that insufficient levels of mutual 
trust exists between MSs and that if a State has “any doubts about the consistent and 
comprehensive compliance with fair trial rights...judges and prosecutors may be 
unwilling to allow the surrender of someone”.808 If these doubts are not effectively dealt 
with, they risk destabilizing the system of MR. 
12.1 Measure A 
Measure A of the Stockholm Roadmap focuses on the right to interpretation and 
translation. The Commission had drafted their proposed Framework Directive for 
Measure A, however before it could be considered the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 
Using the new mechanism introduced by Lisbon MSs tabled an initiative, their draft 
Directive largely based on the Commission proposed FD. This has resulted in the 
adoption of the Directive on the rights to interpretation and translation.
809
  It requires 
MSs to implement legislation by 27 October 2013. The Directive obliges MSs to ensure 
that a suspected or accused person is provided, without delay, interpretation during 
criminal proceedings. The scope of proceedings begins at police questioning and 
continues until the conclusion of the proceedings. In addition to interpretation, 
individuals are also entitled to translation of essential documents within a reasonable 
period of time. It is left for the competent authorities to decide which other document is 
essential. The aim of both is to ensure that the individual understands the reasons for his 
arrest and the allegations against him in order to exercise their right of defence.  
                                               
808
 Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right to information in criminal 
proceedings, COM(2010) 392 final SEC(2010) 908, Brussels 20.7.2010 SEC(2010)907, 7 
809 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right 
to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. 
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This right is based on Article 6 and the ECtHR jurisprudence which act as minimum 
standards but are extended to apply in EAW procedures. For example, in Kamasinski v 
Austria
810
, the ECtHR stated that Article 6(3)(e) signifies that a person has the right to 
free assistance from an interpreter to translate the documents in the proceeding against 
him which are necessary for him to understand to benefit from a fair trial.  This right 
does not extend to “a written translation of all items of written evidence or official 
documents in the procedure”.811 The assistance provided should enable the individual to 
understand the case against him and be able to put his defence forward. 
 Article 2 of the Directive provides that individuals are entitled to interpretation during 
criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial authorities, including during 
police questioning, all court hearings and any necessary interim hearings. Additionally, 
Article 3 of the Directive provides that suspects will be entitled to written translations of 
all documents which are essential to ensure that they are able to exercise their right of 
defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, including: any decision 
depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment.  This 
provision fills in silence on the part of ECtHR as to the right to translation. Article 3(6) 
sets out the situation for EAW requiring only the translation of the EAW itself.  
In order to ensure that these rights are effective in reality, MSs are required to ensure 
that the interpretation and translation is of sufficient quality. To this end they are 
required to establish a register of appropriately qualified interpreters and translators. 
The interpretation and translation is to be provided free of charge, even in the event of 
his conviction. The ECtHR has made it clear that an individual who does not understand 
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the language is entitled to this service “without subsequently having claimed back from 
him payment of the costs thereby incurred”. 812 
Given that the Directive went beyond the ECtHR minimum standards, it could be 
considered ambitious and also testing the willingness of MSs to not only reconfirm the 
rights but to also adopt higher standards. Whilst MSs have appeared willing to do so, 
the Directive itself also provides some flexibility to MSs in its interpretation. For 
example the requirement that all judgments are translated relies on a MSs own 
interpretation of what is a judgment; in the UK, the decision of the Magistrates Court on 
the EAW surrender is not considered a judgment. The UK has opted-in to this Directive 
but has yet to implement it. 
12.2 Measure B 
The Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings
813
 sets out a “letter of 
rights” has also been adopted under Measure B encompassing many of the defence 
rights set out above. 
The Letter of Rights contains practical details about the accused persons’ right to 
information about their procedural rights including information about the charges. The 
right to information about rights is not explicitly stated in the ECHR but has been 
implied in the ECtHR’s case-law.  
Article 3 lists the procedural rights of which an accused or suspect must be informed of 
promptly orally or in writing. The other rights are (a) the right of access to a lawyer;
 814
 
(b) any entitlement to free legal advice and the conditions for obtaining such advice; (c) 
                                               
812 Luedicke (n747) §46  
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 EU, Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right 
to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142/1 of 1 June 2012. Member States have until April 2014 
to implement the Directive. The Draft was published in July 2010 and endorsed by the Council of the EU 
on 3.12.2010.  
814 Largely following the ECtHR judgment in Salduz (n605) 
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the right to be informed of the accusation, in accordance with Article 6; (d) the right to 
interpretation and translation. 
In addition to those rights listed in Article 3, Article 4 sets out the rights to be included 
in the “Letter of Rights” as they apply under national law. These rights are (a) the right 
of access to the materials of the case; (b) the right to have consular authorities and one 
person informed; (c) the right of access to urgent medical assistance; and (d) the 
maximum number of hours or days suspects or accused persons may be deprived of 
liberty before being brought before a judicial authority. It should also include basic 
information about challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and detention.  This right 
exists under the ECHR (Articles 5 and 6) and has been made an express right at EU 
level. It is interesting to note the changes introduced at the trialogue meeting between 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. They included the addition 
of the right to silence, an additional provision setting out the need to take into account 
vulnerabilities and the extension of rights to apply not only to those arrested but also 
those detained.
815
 
The details highlight the difficulties which have to be dealt with when negotiating 
standards to be applied across different systems. One stumbling block was the original 
choice of words access to the ‘case file’. The UK objected to this because in their 
system the documents individuals have access to are not referred to as such. Eventually 
agreement was reached on the phrase “material of the case”. In anticipating objections 
the Commission also originally excluded the right to silence in the mistaken belief that 
such right did not exist in the UK. On the contrary the UK does have the right to 
                                               
815 For the proposed changes see: European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE), Rapporteur: Birgit Sippel, DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the right to information in criminal proceedings, 
2010/0215(COD), 20.12.2010. 
Chapter Twelve: Stockholm 
294 
 
silence, even though it is qualified by the caution that an officer gives when arresting an 
individual.
816
 
Consultation with ones’ lawyer and others is also reflected under Measure B which 
provides that the individual must be informed of their right to contact an employer, a 
lawyer and their family. 
Whilst these rights already exist either expressly or implied under the ECHR, their 
implementation is left to MSs. A study
817
 into the provision of information about rights 
and the case confirmed that there are substantial differences between MSs in terms of 
the nature and amount of information they provide. These included the simple UK letter 
of rights to the dense legal text in the Czech Republic and in some jurisdiction nothing 
was provided in writing. This differing practice threatens the operation of mutual trust 
which requires rights to not only exist but to also be visible and apply in practice. As set 
out above, the Commission also regards the setting down of minimum standards as 
promoting MR. 
The proposed “Letter of Rights” is to be provided (whether asked for or not) in writing 
or orally in the language understood by the accused, using simple everyday language 
(avoiding legal terminology). Two Model “Letter of Rights” are provided as part of the 
Directive. Annex I is for criminal proceedings and Annex II is specifically applicable in 
EAW cases. MSs are however invited to draft their own versions and to include 
additional rights beyond the 4 core rights set out in the models. 
EAW proceedings are explicitly covered, the Directive makes applicable the procedural 
guarantees contained in Articles 47 and 48 CFR and Articles 5 and 6 ECHR to 
surrender proceedings based on an EAW. Article 5 of the Directive states that the 
                                               
816 For a good overview of the early debate which led to this misconception see Steven Greer, The Right 
to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate, MLR Volume 53 No 6, November 1990. 
817 Taru Spronken, An EU-Wide Letter of Rights, Towards Best Practice (Ius Commune Europaeum), 
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“Letter of Rights” to be given to those arrested pursuant to an EAW is to list the rights 
laid down in the EAWFD. The list of information to be given is taken from the EAWFD 
in order to maintain consistency at the EU level. These specifically include the right to 
be informed about the content of the EAW; confidential assistance of a lawyer; the right 
to interpretation and translation of the EAW; information about the possibility to 
consent to surrender including the consequences such as speeding up of proceedings 
and in some states the impossibility of changing it; and that if not consenting to 
surrender the right to a hearing. 
It is not clear when the Annex II model ‘letter of rights’ changed for the EAW, the draft 
as adopted by the European Parliament contained an extensive list of rights, many of 
which are excluded in the final draft. One right which was deleted from the European 
Parliament amendment is the right to be released if not surrendered within 10 days of 
the court decision to surrender you, a right which is contained in the EAWFD. Perhaps 
the fact an arrested person has access to a lawyer is sufficient, thus relying on the 
lawyer to inform them of this right at the later stages of the proceedings. Other rights 
excluded include the right to remain silent and to be informed of the maximum 
detention period. This may indicate that the “Letter of Rights” set out in Annex I should 
also be applicable to those arrested under an EAW. Recital 39 of the Directive clearly 
states that the “right to written information about rights on arrest provided for in this 
Directive should also apply, mutatis mutandis, to persons arrested for the purpose of the 
execution of a European Arrest Warrant… a Letter of Rights for such persons, a model 
is provided in Annex II.” However Recital 21 defines the meaning of ‘suspects or 
accused persons’ as those deprived of their liberty “within the meaning of Article 
5(1)(c) ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”. 
This appears to restrict the scope of those provisions to only those arrested for the 
purposes of being prosecuted whilst not making explicit reference to the EAW. 
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Those arrested under an EAW, are arrested pursuant to a decision of the I-MS. 
Nevertheless it is often the case that their arrest by the E-MS is the first time they are 
made aware of the alleged offences. This arrest should therefore be treated in the same 
way as an arrest under a domestic arrest and the person should be informed of their right 
to silence thereby protecting them from making self-incriminating statements without 
the advice of a lawyer. However, having extended the applicability of Article 6 rights to 
EAW proceedings, the Directive on the right to information presents a schizophrenic 
stance, reverting back to the restrictive scope of the ECHR where certain rights do not 
apply to the EAW because of its similarity with extradition. 
The UK letter of rights given to individuals was held up as a model example due to its 
simplicity and ease of understanding. It thus comes as no surprise that the UK has 
opted-in to this Directive. 
12.3 Measures C and D 
The right to legal representation and legal aid was to be addressed together by Measure 
C. They will now be considered separately. The right to legal aid will be considered 
once a study into the workings of legal aid across the MSs is completed.  
The right to legal representation has been merged with Measure D. Measure D concerns 
communication with relatives, employers and Consular Authorities. The right to 
notification of family members is covered by Article 8 ECHR. The right of an arrested 
person to have their consulate informed of their detention and to receive visits from 
consular officials is not set out in the ECHR but is provided for in the 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations. 
A draft Directive on the right to legal representation titled Directive on the right of 
access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon 
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arrest,
818
 was presented by the Commission on 8 June 2011. Justifications for the 
adoption of this measure are set out in the impact assessment.
819
 They include widely 
accepted reasons such as the practice of MSs as reflected in both the ECtHR cases and 
the CPT reports; which illustrate that in spite of the ECtHR setting out minimum 
standards they are implemented to differing levels. The Directive seeks to set out 
common standards in terms of the temporal scope (when the right to a lawyer starts) and 
the material scope (what activities the lawyer can carry out). 
The Council draft under Article 6 introduces the right to communicate with consular or 
diplomatic authorities in line with the Directive on the right to information. However in 
other respects the Directive had been substantially watered down by the Council.  
Following the Commission proposal on 22 September 2011, the Council of the EU 
exchanged its first views on the draft.
820
 At its meeting on 28 October 2011
821
 it was 
updated on the state of play and considered the Presidency report.
822
 The report 
highlighted the following 3 issues for further discussion: the scope of the directive (as to 
the nature of legal assistance), the situation when the right arises and remedies. On 7 
December 2011, the European Economic and Social Committee adopted its opinion 
highlighting that the inclusion of the right to ‘suspects’ was a main contribution of the 
draft Directive, as well as the importance of confidentiality.
823
 At its meeting on 13 
December 2011,
824
 the Council noted that the UK and Ireland had decided not to opt-in 
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819 Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment Accompanying The Proposal For 
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687 final. See also Commission Staff Working Paper, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, 
SEC(2011) 687, 8.6.2011 
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822 EU, Presidency, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right 
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to the Directive. It went on to consider the Presidency Report
825
 and noted the following 
issues for discussion: the scope, the applicable situation, possible derogations, 
information upon deprivation of liberty, access to a lawyer for EAWs and remedies. On 
8 June 2012
826
 the Council adopted a general approach
827
 and begun negotiations with 
the European Parliament. 
In the meantime, on 5 July 2011, LIBE was designated the Parliamentary Committee 
responsible for the Directive. It requested an Opinion from the Legal Affairs Committee 
on 15 September 2011 whose final report was adopted on 20 December 2011.
828
 It also 
invited the Council of Europe Secretariat to comment on the draft which it did on 9 
November 2011.
829
 The Draft report of the LIBE Rapporteur was presented on 7 
February 2012
830
 and the amendments tabled on 21 March 2012.
831
 On 11 July 2012 
LIBE, voted in favour of the draft Directive with only minor changes to the original 
Commission 2011 draft. Access to places of detention by the lawyer in order to assess 
the conditions was deleted by LIBE. Their view is that the control of detention 
conditions should be left to the public authorities. Regardless of whether a suspect is 
under arrest, they must be provided with legal advice as soon as possible and before 
being questioned by police. The right to communicate with their family or employer and 
their consulate is also retained by LIBE.  
During the Council debate
832
 on the measure Spain and Italy expressed concern about 
the derogations permitted from the confidentiality of meetings with a lawyer which they 
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consider a key pillar of the HRs of the person concerned.  Together with Portugal they 
believe that as a matter of principle the application of derogations should be restricted 
and subject to law and judicial control in order to establish a high level of protection of 
HRs. They all share concerns about the exclusion of minor offences from the scope of 
the proposed Directive. These derogations are likely to be concessions made to entice as 
many MSs as possible to sign up. However, the derogations undermine a key objective 
of the adoption of such measures by creating a space for divergent practices to emerge.  
Article 10 had previously provided for this right together with the prohibition of using 
“any statement made by such person before he is made aware that he is a suspect or an 
accused person” against them. The gap that this creates is where a suspect is labelled by 
the MS authorities as a witness but during questioning he becomes a suspect however 
continues to be questioned as a witness.
833
 Whilst the ECtHR has set out a number of 
indicators to be used to determine if a person is’ charged, it will be determined case by 
case. Unchanged this would have been in line with the ECtHR jurisprudence which 
makes clear that the designation of an individual by the authorities is not decisive. The 
introduction of the term “official interview” is another dangerous Council amendment. 
It opens another gap for authorities to ‘informally’ question those they suspect. 
The Council ammendement to Article 4(2) also limited the right to confidential 
meetings between client and lawyer, allowing it to be circumvented in exceptional 
circumstances where: 
(a) there is an urgent need to prevent a serious crime; or 
(b) there is sufficient reason to believe that the lawyer concerned is involved in a 
criminal offence with the suspect or accused person. 
This again fell below the minimum standards set by the ECtHR. The ECtHR 
jurisprudence makes it clear that the right to legal assistance includes the ability to 
communicate with a lawyer ‘out of hearing of a third person’. Whilst this right can be 
restricted it should not deprive the applicant of a fair hearing. In Brennan,
834
 a police 
officer was present at the first meeting in order to prevent information being passed on 
to suspects at large. The ECtHR found that there was no compelling reason for the 
restriction and although of a restricted period it was at the first meeting with great 
importance to his defence, Article 6(3)(c) was violated. Article 4(2) of the draft 
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Directive leaves the determination of whether these circumstances exist and if they 
warrant a restriction on the confidentiality of lawyer meetings to the national authorities.  
Salduz together with other ECtHR cases indicate that incriminating statements obtained 
without the presence or previous consultation with a lawyer should not be used to 
convict a person. Where his right to a lawyer has been violated the remedy should put 
him back in the position he would have been had the breach not occurred. On this basis 
the Commission draft had in effect prohibited the use of such statements. The Council 
proposed Article 11 in conjunction with Recital 37 appears to have regressed this 
protection and offered a lower level of protection, it stated “should be determined by 
that court being responsible for ensuring the overall fairness of the proceedings, in 
accordance with national legal procedures”. In other words the door was reopened for 
their admissibility and possible reliance to convict an individual. 
The original draft Directive under Article 2 explicitly covers EAW proceedings. Of 
particular interest is the dual representation envisaged in Article 11 of the EC proposal, 
with the individual’s right to a lawyer extended to cover both the issuing and E-MS 
under Article 11 to run concurrently. Citing the Salduz line of authorities, the right to a 
lawyer exists from the moment that the individual is informed they are a suspect or 
accused until the conclusion of proceedings and must be granted at questioning.  
This aspect was removed by the Council, providing only for legal representation in the 
E-MS. Over the years, best practice has developed amongst lawyers and NGOs which 
means that that those representing individuals in cross-border cases will often seek out 
the assistance of colleagues in the other MS, especially if they lack knowledge of the 
language and the laws. This ensures that that the rights are not only better safeguarded 
but that the case also proceeds more efficiently. It also provides continuity in legal 
assistance ensuring that this right flows as easily across State borders as the decision 
and EAW seeks to enforce. 
Article 11(1) saw the word “promptly” removed and instead the phrase “in any event as 
soon as practically possible after the deprivation of liberty” inserted into Article 9(2). 
The right to ‘meet’ previously set out in Article 11(2) was replaced with the right to 
‘communicate’ in Article 9(2). “The duration, frequency and means of communications 
between the requested person and his lawyer may be regulated in national law and 
procedures” when previously Article 11(2) stipulated that the right to meet “shall not be 
limited in any way that may prejudice the exercise of his rights under” the EAWFD. 
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The delegation to the national laws further restricted the right and leaves the door open 
for continued inconsistencies between the practice across MSs. Article 11(2) also 
provided for the lawyer to not only be present at questioning and hearings but also to 
“ask questions, request clarification and make statements”. Under Article 9(2) the role 
of the lawyer is once again restricted to that permitted by the national laws and 
procedures of the E-MS. 
Under the Council draft Article 9(3) stated that the derogations permitted from the 
confidentiality of meetings with  lawyers under Article 4(2) and the right to have a third 
party informed under Article 5(3) together with Article 7 applied mutatis mutandis to 
EAW proceedings. The waiver of the mandatory presence or assistance of a lawyer 
under Article 8 also applied to those arrested under an EAW. 
On 21 March 2013, the Presidency of the Council requested Corper
835
 to consider two 
issues in order to assist with reaching an agreement with the Parliament.
836
 Firstly the 
Presidency proposes the deletion of the derogations added by the Council in their 
general approach. In doing so they note the importance attached to confidentiality by the 
Parliament and several MSs, the fact that the ECtHR has already identified it as a key 
principle, as has the CJEU. Secondly, the Presidency having noted the keenness of the 
Parliament for a right to legal assistance from a lawyer in the I-MS, it resubmitted the 
issue to MSs.  It appears that MSs were ‘more favourably disposed’ to include such a 
provision. The Presidency proposal is the inclusion of the right to legal assistance from 
a lawyer in the I-MS, who would assist the lawyer in the E-MS by providing 
information and advice. 
As set out above, the Council draft of the Directive made a series of significant 
amendments, following the trialogue on 28 May 2013, LIBE voted through key 
amendments on 19 June 2013.
837
 The Council had removed the guarantees afforded to 
those other then suspects or accused from the text of the Directive, it has now been re-
introduced by Article 2a for those “who in the course of questioning…become suspects 
or accused”. 
                                               
835
 Permanent Representatives Committee (Article 240 TFEU) 
836 Presidency of the Council, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon arrest 
[First reading] – Questions on selected issues 7564/13, COPEN41, 21.03.2013 
837 European Parliament, LIBE, Amendment 178, 20011/0154(COD), 6.6.2013 
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The prohibition of using statements made without legal assistance has been 
strengthened by Article 13(3) and also Recital 27 which re-states the ECtHR principle 
that “the rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when 
incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer 
are used for a conviction”. Although it is not clear what the phrase “without prejudice to 
national rules or systems regarding admissibility of evidence” which appears in both 
will mean in practice. This is a view shared by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe 
who recalls that “the repeated reference to national law may affect the effectiveness of 
these instruments”.838 
Council amendments to Article 3(3)(b), introduced a considerable restriction to the 
practical use of access to a lawyer before questioning however the right to a lawyer 
without undue delay has been re-introduced. Article 3(2) lists specific moments 
stipulating that access should be at the earliest of these moments.  
Article 4(2) had also limited the right to confidential meetings between client and 
lawyer. Confidentiality (without derogation) has been re-introduced in Article 4.  
The original draft Directive included dual representation in EAW proceedings. This 
aspect had been removed by the Council. Article 11(2)(b)-(d) once again re-introduces 
this right. 
In the UK, the proposal was considered by the European Scrutiny Committee
839
 and 
whilst supportive of the measure, the recommendation was for the UK to not opt in to 
the measure from the outset. Whilst expressing that the UK has a high standard of legal 
                                               
838 Secretariat of the Council of Europe, Opinion on the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on “the right to access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and 
on the right to communicate upon arrest”, Strasbourg, 9.11.2011 
839 Access to a lawyer, HC Deb 7.09.2011, Columns 502- 516, available at: 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110907/debtext/110907-
0005.htm#11090767000002> European Scrutiny Committee, 36th Report together with formal minutes, 
(HC 2010–12, 428-xxxii), 20-30 (Right of access to a lawyer and right to communicate on arrest), 
available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-
xxxii/428xxxii.pdf>  
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representation access beyond most other MSs, the UK government has a number of 
concerns with the current text. These include the absolute nature of confidentiality of 
meetings with their lawyer, the requirement for legal representation at investigatory 
stages such as search of property which goes beyond the ECHR requirements and with 
cost being the key concern. During the debate a number of oppositions to the motion to 
not opt in were expressed. The end result was that the UK will not opt in at this stage, 
but hopes that through negotiations, it will be in a position to opt in to the final 
Directive.  
The indicative Parliament plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single reading is 10 
September 2013.  
12.4  Measure E 
Measure E concerns special safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are 
vulnerable with the short explanation stating, 
In order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, it is important that 
special attention is shown to suspected or accused persons who cannot 
understand or follow the content or the meaning of the proceedings, owing, 
for example, to their age, mental or physical condition.  
Work on this measure will follow the conclusion of a study into the issues.
840
 However, 
the particular needs of vulnerable individuals are already being taken into account when 
working on the other measures. In its Green Paper,
841
 the European Commission 
suggests a ‘non-exhaustive’ list which includes: foreign nationals, vulnerable because of 
their nationality, linguistic disadvantage and other factors; children (under 18); persons 
with children or dependants; those who cannot read or write; those with a refugee 
status; and addicts. Defining the vulnerabilities enables proceedings to be adapted 
                                               
840 This study is being conducted by Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services on behalf of the 
Commission 
841 European Commission, Green Paper on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in 
Criminal Proceedings Throughout the EU, COM(2003) 75 final, 19.2.2003 
Chapter Twelve: Stockholm 
304 
 
accordingly so as to enable effective participation. For example in the case of foreign 
nationals, to ensure that it is in a language they understand. Any definition needs to 
remain sufficently flexible to accommodate the unique requirements of each case, which 
may for example also include vulnerabilities connected to the nature of the offence or 
the impact on family members. A proposal on this measure is expected in 2013. 
12.5 Measure F 
Measure F is the production of a Green Paper on Pre-Trial Detention the short 
explanation asserts that the different periods of pre-trial detention and the excessively 
long periods are not only prejudicial to the individual but can threaten judicial 
cooperation and are not compliant with EU standards. 
On 14 June 2011, the Commission launched a consultation "Strengthening mutual trust 
in the European judicial area – A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice 
legislation in the field of detention".
842
 The purpose of the Green Paper was to explore 
the extent to which detention issues impact on mutual trust, MR and judicial 
cooperation. The consultation covers both pre- and post-trial detention as well as 
detention related to the EAWFD and issues such as duration, conditions and provisions 
for children and the vulnerable. 
From the summary of replies,
843
 it can be concluded that MSs do not have an appetite 
for legislative measures on detention. The general feeling is that existing measures and 
standards are sufficient and that adverse detention conditions have not been raised as 
stumbling blocks for the EAW. Nevertheless non-state actors who replied (international 
organizations, NGOs, professional associations and academics) support some legislative 
                                               
842
 COM(2011) 327 final, Brussels, 14.6.2011. The consultation closed on 30.11.2011. All the replies can 
be found here: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/criminal/opinion/110614_en.htm> 
843 The following summary and conclusions on the Consultation are taken from: Commission, Analysis of 
the Replies to the Green Paper on the Application of EU Criminal Justice Legislation in the Field of 
Detention, 2012  
Chapter Twelve: Stockholm 
305 
 
measures. These organizations are well placed to know what is needed because most 
work on the frontline, seeing on a daily basis the realities of policies and how these 
existing standards are translated into the practice of MSs. 
In terms of non-custodial alternatives to both pre- and post-trial detention, MSs were of 
the view that the ESO should be assessed before new legal measures were adopted (pre-
trial), they supported instead non-legislative initiatives such as exchange of best 
practice. The other respondents emphasized the value of alternatives and the need for 
non-legislative measures to promote a wide range of alternatives. As noted above, 
detention should be a measure of last resort and MSs are under an obligation to consider 
less intrusive measures. The promotion of such alternatives to custodial sentences 
would be in line with HRs obligations. 
Concerning the obligation to release an individual unless overriding reasons existed, 
according to all MSs restrictions on the use of pre-trial detention were in place and 
subject to safeguards. On the contrary the other respondents underlined the gap between 
the law and the excessive use of pre-trial detention in practice. In particular a number of 
issues were highlighted including overcrowded remand facilities and the excessive pre-
trial detention of non-nationals. These are issues highlighted above in the review of 
HRs, including the CPT reports and bail. 
Some MSs supported the adoption of shared
844
 common standards relating to the regular 
review of pre-trial detention which they felt that such measures could enhance mutual 
trust and lead to more efficient judicial cooperation. But they did not support the setting 
of maximum periods of pre-trial detention. Duration according to them was subject to a 
number of parameters (such as the judicial system, crime rates and national penalties) 
and they wanted to avoid automatic release once the maximum had been exceeded. The 
                                               
844 The disparity between terminology and practices was highlighted by some organisations. 
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other half of MSs did not support the adoption of common rules and preferred the 
acceptance of the differences that exist between regimes within the existing parameters 
set by the ECHR and CFR. Thus one half are content to permit indefinite detention due 
to delays in national systems, whilst the other half misses the point that these 
differences do threaten the operation of the EAW. Neither group supports legislative 
measures. 
The other respondents recognize that the different national practices are an obstacle to 
mutual trust and that the creation of a more uniform system of pre-trial detention across 
the EU through the adoption of minimum rules was required. A strong majority of these 
also supported the setting of a maximum period for pre-trial detention as well as 
standards on reviewing the lawfulness of continued detention. 
In relation to whether detention conditions may undermine mutual trust and 
consequently the functioning of the EAW, the MSs are split. Some recognize that this is 
a possibility and that when raised they should be investigated before surrender, although 
most, on the basis of their case law, did not regard it as an issue. The other half are of 
the view that inadequate prison conditions should only be applied as a ground of refusal 
in exceptional circumstances. On the impact on the Transfer of Prisoners Framework, 
the majority of states reserved judgment until it was in force in all MSs, 10 MSs 
affirmed that detention conditions may adversely affect its proper functioning, whilst 
the UK alone was of the view that poor detention conditions should negatively affect its 
operation. A large majority of other respondents recognized that inadequate detention 
conditions could affect the proper functioning of the EAW. Some of these called upon 
MSs to assess detention conditions that an individual will face after surrender, in doing 
so they drew instructions from the obligation of states to investigate the realities which 
asylum seekers returned under the Dublin II Regulation would face; the same would 
apply to the Transfer of Prisoners FD. NGOs stressed the need to adopt common 
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minimum standards of detention and for information on prison conditions in the EU to 
be made more readily accessible. The adoption of EU minimum standards on detention 
conditions was also believed to assist in raising the standards, although some warned 
against the dilution of standards caused by duplication. However if common standards 
are to be adopted they should be aimed higher than existing rules. Either way, they 
should be complimentary to existing mechanisms and need to be further supported by 
EU measures to guarantee implementation in practice of common minimum standards. 
This will not involve duplication but rather include closer collaboration between the EU 
and Council of Europe. The implementation of common standards in pre-trial detention 
will also support MR measures such as the EAW and the ESO. 
As set out above, whilst cases resisting surrender based on detention conditions are rare, 
this does not mean that it will remain to be the case. Even if unsuccessful the seed of 
concern is planted into judges every time this issue is raised and fails because the 
evidence of the risk was not specific to the individual or if assurances were obtained. 
Minimum standards of detention conditions need to be adopted and enforced so that 
judges are reassured and mutual trust can continue. 
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Chapter Thirteen: Added Value of EU Legislation 
There exists a two layer protection of HRs between the EU and its MSs.  The concerns 
over MS practice inadequately respecting HRs do not arise only in the cross-border 
elements, but relate to every aspect of the criminal justice system. The CFR is only 
applicable to MSs only when implementing EU law, for example the CFR is not 
applicable to the decision to issue a domestic arrest warrant for its own national located 
within its territory, however the CFR is applicable to the issuance of an EAW. Thus 
adoption of EU measures such as the Stockholm Directives has the effect of extending 
the scope of the CFR, i.e. not only to the implementation of the EAWFD but to criminal 
proceedings in general. The Directives adopted to date on the right to interpretation and 
translation as well as the right to information apply explicitly to EAW proceedings but 
also set out minimum standards which are applicable to the domestic criminal 
proceedings of MSs whether a cross-border nexus exists or not. This has the effect of 
creating uniformity across the EU MS criminal justice systems. It has the potential to 
reassure judges that due process will be followed and the procedural guarantees of an 
individual they surrender will be respected.   
13.1.1 Enforcement and Evaluation 
These new measures adopted as Directives will benefit from doctrines of supremacy, 
direct and indirect effect as well as state liability. Whilst the ECtHR has done a 
commendable job of promoting and protecting HRs across the Council of Europe, its 
mechanism is not ideal. Apart from reliance on political will for the enforcement of 
judgments, the process itself takes a long time. Before making an application to the 
ECtHR, individuals must first exhaust the effective domestic remedies available. 
Depending on the nature of the proceedings this may take a good number of years. 
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Whereas the financial costs of taking such proceedings are substantial, thus by the time 
individuals have exhausted the domestic remedies they be disheartened and unable to 
pay any further legal costs. Those who do make an application to the ECtHR then face 
long delays as the ECtHR attempts to grapple with the backlog of cases pending before 
it. The statistics for a successful case are also not on the side of the individual since only 
5% of applications lead to a finding of a violation, with the vast majority of cases 
declared inadmissible.
845
 The mechanisms introduced by Protocol 14 to deal with the 
backlog do not increase the odds of succeeding.  
On the other hand protection of rights set out in an EU measure is quicker. National 
Courts can make a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU to the CJEU during 
the course of national proceedings, thus removing the need to first exhaust domestic 
remedies. The timescale for delivery of CJEU judgments is faster, on average just over 
16 months for preliminary references and 15-20 months for infringement proceedings 
and appeals to the General Court. Additionally in Article 267 TFEU provides for 
accelerated proceedings where the referred cases concern migration or security 
issues.
846
 This urgent procedure known by its French acronym PPU (procedure 
prejudicielle d'urgence), fast tracks preliminary references which require a prompt 
decision because they concern a person in custody, a vulnerable person or child. The 
turnaround of such cases is 3 months and it has been applied to a number of EAW 
cases. 
As is evident from other areas, the CJEU has the power and potential to play a key role 
in the development of EU principles such as MR. Pre-Lisbon Treaty, in the AFSJ, MSs 
felt it necessary to limit the effect of the EU on their sovereignty. For this reason, an 
                                               
845
 Council of Europe, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, 2011 
846 An accelerated procedure was introduced by the CJEU in March 2008 and has already been used in a 
number of cases. Council Decision of 20 December 2007 amending the Protocol on the Statute of the 
Court of Justice, OJ L 24 of 29 January 2008, p. 42; Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court 
of Justice, OJ L 24 of 29 January 2008, p. 39, and OJ L 92 of 13 April 2010, p. 12. 
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opt-in was given to MSs as to whether preliminary references concerning Third Pillar 
measures, could be made and by which courts.
847
 It is interesting to note that even if a 
MS opted not to grant jurisdiction to the CJEU, it was still entitled to intervene as a 
third party in cases from other MSs. 
By restricting access to the CJEU, MSs felt that they could maintain control over the 
scope of MR within their criminal law. Nascimbe considers this restriction as a 
shortcoming in the protection of individuals within European judicial cooperation. He 
considers the “a la carte (or ‘variable geometry’) regime” as hindering “the uniform 
interpretation and application of European Community law in the member states and 
consequently jeopardises the main objective of the judicial protection system itself.”848 
The CJEU has however adapted its jurisdiction and previous jurisprudence so as to 
extend its judicial protection to police and judicial cooperation.
849
 Reiterating that the 
purpose of a preliminary reference is to ensure uniform application of EU legislation 
across all MSs, it has given some words and phrases in Third Pillar measures an 
autonomous meaning.  This uniform application also furthers the MR ambitions. 
Gözütok and Brügge was the first case in which the CJEU was called upon to interpret a 
third pillar measure.
850
 The case is the first in a long line of cases asking the CJEU to 
clarify the meaning and application of Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (CISA).
851
 Article 54 concerns the application of the ne bis in 
                                               
847 Under Article 35 of the EU Treaty (introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam), MS needed to confer 
jurisdiction upon the CJEU to make preliminary rulings on the validity of measures implemented under 
Title VI. Those MS who granted jurisdiction could restrict which courts could refer to only their courts of 
final instance. 
848 Bruno Nascimbene, European judicial cooperation in criminal matters: What protection for 
individuals under the Lisbon Treaty?, ERA Forum (2009) 10: 397–407 
849 See Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 and see also Case 
C-355/04 P Segi et al v Council [2007] ECR I-1579 for the extension of procedural guarantees. For a 
consideration of the two cases see Nascimbene (n848) 
850 Jurisdiction was not an issue given that the referring Member States (Germany and Belgium) had both 
conferred jurisdiction to the CJEU under Article 35. 
851 CISA (n63) 
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idem principle (principle of double jeopardy)
852
. Its treatment of this area is useful to 
elicit principles of general application. Firstly that it is important to ensure uniform 
application of EU law across MSs and that the CJEU has a central role in this task. 
Secondly, that the purpose of Article 2 EU Treaty was to establish an AFSJ within 
which the free movement of individuals was promoted. The ne bis in idem principle 
achieved this by seeking to avoid impeding this free movement through fear that an 
individual could be prosecuted for the same acts in a number of MSs. To this end it was 
deemed necessary by the CJEU to give the phrase “same acts” an autonomous meaning, 
referring to the nature of the act and not their legal classification under the national laws 
of MSs. In its own way this can be viewed as a shift away or at the very least a 
modification of the principle of MR.
853
  
Some of the shortcomings flowing from the restrictions placed on the CJEU within the 
third pillar have been addressed by the Lisbon Treaty.
854
 In addition to the abolition of 
the pillar system, the suppression of the distinction between first and third pillar and the 
changes in the legislative sphere, the same legal remedies are now available.
855
 
Preliminary references from the national courts to the CJEU can include whether the 
HRs point at issue is appropriate for consideration within the framework of the 
particular EU law. For example as seen above in the case of IB,
856
 one of the questions 
referred to the CJEU was whether HRs are to be considered as a ground for refusing to 
                                               
852 Gözütok and Brügge (n31); C-469/03 Criminal proceedings against Filomeno Mario Miraglia [2005] 
ECR I-02009, on the effect of initial proceedings being stopped; Van Esbroeck (n32) on meaning of 
“same acts”; Gasparini (n379) on effect of time bars; C-150/05 Jean Leon Van Straaten v Staat der 
Nederlanden and Republiek Italië [2006] ECR I-09327 on applicability to  acquittals as well as 
convictions and the definition on of “same acts”; C-288/05 Criminal proceedings against Jürgen 
Kretzinger [2007] ECR I-06441 on meaning of “same acts” and also the stage of sentencing; C-367/05 
Criminal proceedings against Norma Kraaijenbrink [2007] ECR I-06619 on meaning of “same acts”; C-
297/07 Klaus Bourquain [2008] ECR I-09425 on amnesty laws. 
853 In a similar vain the CJEU dealt with the related questions on the meaning of “finally disposed of” 
under Article 54 CISA (n63) 
854
 Lisbon Treaty (n173) 
855 There is a transitional period of 5 years with respects to the measures adopted in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters before the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Article 6 
Lisbon Treaty). 
856 I.B.(n118) 
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surrender an individual. Unfortunately this was a question to be answered in the 
alternative to a previous question and the CJEU did not deem it necessary to answer. 
Nevertheless it remains an avenue open for use.  
The competence of the CJEU to examine HRs can be summarized as follows: the 
compatibility of EU legislation with HRs;
857
 the compatibility of national implementing 
measures with HRs;
858
 when MSs invoke HRs as derogation from an obligation under 
EU law;
859
 and where the EU legislation concerns HRs.
860
 The EAWFD can fall under 
the first three categories. For example, the Melloni
861
 case discussed above, asked the 
CJEU whether MSs relying on the CFR can offer greater protection of rights in relation 
to those requested under an EAW following a trial in absentia. The referring court noted 
that Article 4a in the EAWFD fell short of the protection offered under their 
Constitution and asked whether they could derogate from the grounds set out in the 
EAWFD. This was answered in the negative, with the CJEU turning the tables on the 
relevance of uniformity. Uniformity was in this instance important to protect MR, rather 
than HRs. In Radu
862
 the CJEU was asked to rule on the compatibility of EAWFD 
obligations with the ECHR and CFR. The CJEU shies away from the broader question, 
despite the detailed Opinion from Advocate-General Sharpston. What can be taken from 
these two cases is that the CJEU on the one hand is giving an opportunity for measures 
to be adopted before it interprets particular rights, whilst on the other hand it is 
indicating that it is important for the adopted measures to reflect the highest acceptable 
common standards otherwise such measures will not serve their full potential of 
creating uniformity and certainty across the EU. 
                                               
857 Kadi(n383) 
858
 Wachauf (n184) and ERT (n501) 
859 Omega (n189) 
860 Case C-465/07 Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-00921 
861 Melloni (n122) 
862 Radu (n158) 
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The CJEU is increasingly called upon by national courts to interpret HRs under the 
CFR. The cases referring questions relating to the CFR are increasing year on year and 
the CJEU continues to emphasize that under Lisbon the CFR is given equal legal value 
to the Treaties and EU measures are to be assessed in light of the CFR.
863
 Whilst 
Melloni and Radu were disappointing in terms of their avoidance of dealing face on 
with the broader HRs issues, this appears to be more to do with treading carefully 
around the principle of MR whilst it is in its infancy in criminal matters rather than with 
the CJEU mandate on HRs. 
The adoption of Directives on procedural safeguards under the Lisbon Treaty means 
that the CJEU also enjoys full jurisprudence enabling courts of all MSs to refer 
preliminary questions to consider conformity with primary law and the CFR. It can also 
consider conformity of national law including with respect to self-executing provisions. 
It can also be asked to interpret the scope or application of a particular right which 
might otherwise not have fallen within its competence. 
Of most importance is perhaps the enforcement mechanism of the EU in comparison 
with the purely politically reliant enforcement system of the Council of Europe.
864
 This 
key difference is one reason why EU measures on HRs can promote judicial 
cooperation and MR measures. Whilst ECHR standards provide a useful starting point 
for setting EU-wide minimum standards and continues to act as a safety net, the 
enforcement mechanism of the EU is more powerful and can also lead to serious 
financial and institutional implications. The EU mechanism also aims to ensure 
uniformity of standards across the EU, which is what gives coherence to the EU system 
                                               
863
 For one example see the Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR [2010] 
ECR I-11063. Other cases include: Case C-555/07 Kucukdeveci [2010] ECR I-0000, §22; Case C-135/08 
Rottman [2010] ECR I-0000; Case C-578/08 Chakroun [2010] ECRI-0000, §44 
864 Once an ECtHR judgment is final, monitoring of its implementation passes to the Committee of 
Ministers, a body composed of representatives from the Member States. 
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and reassures judicial authorities that those who leave their control will continue to have 
their rights respected. 
The Commission has its full powers including the bringing of infringements 
proceedings before the CJEU against MSs who fail to implement in full or correctly the 
Directive
865
 or are identified as falling short of standards set out in a Directive. Unlike 
ECHR judgments, these are binding and supported by strong enforcement mechanisms. 
Additionally, if a MS is found to not be complying with a particular Directive, the 
CJEU will impose a fine against them.  
As set out above, the EAWFD is a measure which has proven extremely useful for MSs 
in their fight against crime. The ultimate sanction is suspension from the particular 
aspect of the acquis or if sufficiently serious from the EU as a whole. In addition to 
non-compliance with a Directive, Article 7 provides a political oversight of compliance 
by MSs, providing for suspension of a MS from the EU if its HRs standards fall short of 
the minimum standards acceptable to the EU.  
The TFEU sets out a number of provisions relating to assessment and evaluation within 
the EU. The working methods, outcomes, effects and sanctions of these are not set out 
in detail the provisions.
866
  
The CJEU will continue to play a significant role in re-aligning MS standards and 
ensuring compliance with obligations. Schecke
867
 underlines the fact that for 
                                               
865 Under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU. See Annex 6. 
866 Detailed consideration of these is beyond the scope of this research. It is enough to note that whilst 
extensive mechanisms exist, these are not a panacea. For example, Article 70 TFEU provides for Member 
State assessment together with the Commission, however the relationship between the two in this 
assessment is not clear. Participation of the Fundamental Rights Agency in Article 70 assessments is also 
not clear and neither is the relationship between the two evaluations. Other questions include what 
principles/criteria will be used to evaluate and who decides these; whether the reports will be made 
public; what sanctions could be imposed following a finding of non-conformity, Article 70 specifies that 
the evaluation is without prejudice to Articles 258-60 infringement proceedings and so the Commission 
may bring infringement proceedings following a negative evaluation, Article 7 is also not excluded; and 
whether the Commission’s role as ‘watchdog’ will be compromised in favour of Member State evaluation. 
867 Schecke (n863) also the Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston. 
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proportionality to be effectively respected it needs to be reinforced by assessments “of 
less intrusive policy alternatives and by internal processes guaranteeing that such an 
assessment is in fact carried out and documented”.868 This obligation is placed on the 
EU and its institutions as well as the implementing MS.
869
 
                                               
868 Clemens Ladenburger, FIDE 2012 – Session on "Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon – The 
interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights and 
National Constitutions", Institutional Report, 2012 
869 In Schecke (n863) this included the requirement, provided for in the Directive, for Member States to 
conduct ‘prior checks’ to determine the processing operations likely to present specific risks to the rights 
and freedoms of data subjects. 
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Part IV: Final Conclusions 
Chapter Fourteen: Hysteron Proteron 
As the Ancient Greeks would put it, the application of MR in criminal matters and the 
EAW is arguably an example of hysteron proteron.
870
 The EAW and MR measures in 
criminal matters cannot survive on the basis of presumptions alone. It is important to 
first ensure that the common standards relied on for mutual trust exist in practice. The 
importance of reinforcing HRs within the EAW system and criminal matters more 
generally is no longer a grey area but is set out in black and white not only by the 
Commission, practitioners, academics and NGOs but also by national courts and 
institutions of the MSs as well as the CJEU. HRs are the key to promoting mutual trust 
and thus protecting the principle of MR. 
The real dangers of the EAW is that an individual could be surrended on the basis of 
evidence obtained by practices not accepted in the E-MS. They could remain in pre-trial 
detention for periods intolerable in the E-MS with no likelihood of obtaining bail as a 
non-resident and kept in sub-standard conditions. However, according to MR, all these 
risks are minimised because the I-MS is a signatory to the ECHR and if they fail to 
protect HRs either the first time or the second time (to ECHR standards), the individual 
can apply to the ECtHR for a remedy. 
14.1 Common standards first 
The contention and justification for MR is that it is sufficient for HRs to be mentioned 
in the MR instruments. It is clear that the required protection is not, as originally 
believed by the MSs, sufficed through proclamations and membership of the ECHR. A 
mere declaration of HRs in recitals is sufficient to make the implementation of a 
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measure compliant for the legislator but necessitates a more concrete foundation; these 
common standards need to exist in practice and not only in theory. The practice of MSs 
needs to be supported and recorded by a monitoring and enforcement mechanism more 
efficient then the ECHR. 
States have individually subscribed to obligations under HRs treaties however, “the 
structure of international society is changing. The State is no longer the exclusive 
decision-maker and administrator over its territory because to varying degrees, it has 
come to share these roles”.871 The existing legal landscape within the EU has changed 
too; aspects of the criminal justice systems of MSs are fusing together, there exists 
overlapping jurisdiction and intersecting obligations. As illustrated by the EAWFD, 
cooperation is no longer bilateral or territorial; it follows that the protection of HRs 
within the EU cannot be ring-fenced by sovereignty, territory or mutual trust.
872
 In the 
single AFSJ, all MSs share in the responsibility for HRs protection within the “area”. 
Built-in HRs safeguards which exist in traditional extradition have been omitted from 
the EAWFD (political offence exception, abolition of dual criminality and HRs). The 
UN Model Extradition Treaty includes mandatory grounds of a non-discrimination 
provision and a free-standing HRs ground.
873
 The exclusion of these grounds is a 
symptom of MR, with mutual trust alone expected to fill the gap. 
Justice can be evaluated objectively; however trust is a more subjective concept. When 
referring to ‘mutual trust’ what is meant? Does it take on its ordinary meaning? What is 
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 Butler (n372) 125 
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 Extraterritorial jurisdiction for human rights violations in Soering following Ng v Canada, 
CCPR/C/49/D/496/1991 (1993) 
873
 Article 3, UN Model Treaty on Extradition (A/RES/45/116, 68th plenary meeting, 14.12.1990):  
“...(b)  If the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been 
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion, 
nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions, sex or status, or that that person's position may be prejudiced 
for any of those reasons;  [...] 
“(f)  If the person whose extradition is requested has been or would be subjected in the requesting State to 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or if that person has not received or  
would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, as contained in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14;” 
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being trusted; the judges, the respect for HRs, the respect for the rule of law, the 
procedural guarantees, the criminal justice system? By whom do they need to be 
trusted? At what level does this trust reach and when is it rebuttable?  
As a term ‘mutual trust’ is nebulous, open to different understandings and difficult to 
assess, it is not a legal term, but rather falls within the more capricious area of politics. 
Uniform standards are absent; nevertheless, despite all the above, mutual trust is a 
necessary and crucial component of MR in criminal matters. Judges are being asked to 
trust (blindly) all of the above, but with sweeping distrust existing under the veil of MR. 
Whilst the law can support trust building and provide remedies; it cannot create on its 
own the requisite trust. This flows from the practice and the building of relationships 
between not only the judges, but also the other state institutions as well as the citizens 
themselves. Judicial networks are mechanisms capable of building trust and once trust is 
established between judicial authorities it needs to be trickled down to authorities and 
citizens. 
One cannot help but wonder whether mutual trust is a replacement for the ability of the 
executive to turn a blind eye under the previous extradition system. Whereas the ECtHR 
principle of equivalent protection applies, MR appears to nullify it through the policy of 
non-inquiry. The principle of non-inquiry is applied strictly, following a similar line of 
argument; that the I-MS is best placed to deal with any complaints and that its criminal 
justice system is trusted to respect HRs. The principle of non-inquiry is neither new nor 
unique to the EAW, but has been applied to varying degrees by states in the guise of 
international comity.
874
  In practice courts have been hesitant to sweep aside mutual 
trust and the presumption has been extremely difficult to rebut. However, almost a 
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decade of implementing the EAWFD, judges are slowly releasing the mutual trust 
noose.  
The role of the judges, as both gate-keepers and guardians, is to keep the system moving 
whilst at the same time ensuring that the rule of law is respected. What they have been 
doing one pigeon-step at a time is trying to determine at what level MSs can accept 
doubts and challenges to mutual trust without the MR programme being undermined. 
The boundaries have been broached within the asylum acquis with judges receiving 
their instructions to conduct effective and not merely cursory reviews and to use their 
margin of discretion to determine whether the presumption of trust is rebutted. Dublin II 
provided a specific provision whereby a state could elect to consider an asylum 
application instead of sending the individual back to the first MS. The EAWFD 
provides the space for MSs to take over the prosecution of individuals in certain 
circumstances, to take over the execution of a sentence or to make surrender conditional 
upon the individual being returned to serve their sentence if convicted. N.S. provided 
the opportunity to the CJEU to send a message to the politicians
875
 and to open the door 
for national judges to look at HRs without threatening the relationship between MSs. 
The EAW system could reflect the N.S. judgment, enabling MSs to request further 
evidence and to obtain assurances when alerted to potential HRs violation, without 
jeopardising the reciprocity integral to MR.  Over the past decades HRs as a branch of 
international law has grown in terms of acceptability and respect. The danger is that the 
unmodified application of MR through the EAWFD and other instruments may now 
relegate HRs; the need for more active protection in practice cannot be ignored. Failure 
to improve the EAW system could mean that a similar judgment may be awaiting the 
criminal justice area. 
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The CJEU’s view is that the system is workable without harmonization but requires 
respect for autonomous and uniform application of rules. It was always envisaged that 
MR measures would be accompanied by HR in the AFSJ to include justice for all. 
Standardisation of common minimum standards relating to procedural guarantees and 
HRs is required to support MR.  
The key rights considered in Part II all occupy an important position in the MR 
mechanism. They illustrate the vulnerabilities of both the individual concerned and the 
MS criminal justice systems. Despite this they are not adequately (if at all) provided for 
in the EAWFD. Whilst the obligations emanating from some rights are clearly stated 
and restated by the ECtHR they are trumped in the enforcement of EAWs by strict 
obedience to the principle MR. Amongst them is the extraterritorial reach of HRs 
obligations when surrendering an individual from their control to face HRs violations.  
Existing HRs obligations cannot be ignored, trumped or nullified by MR measures such 
as the EAWFD. Within the EU there is a 3-fold protection system: (1) CFR; (2) ECHR; 
(3) principles resulting from common Constitutional rights of MSs. These may be 
common values but they are not commonly adhered to across the MS. All is not rosy in 
the Union as illustrated by the ECtHR case-law and the distrust shown to the newly 
acceded MSs (Romania and Bulgaria) who are subjected to periodic evaluations post-
accession in their fight against corruption and organised crime respectively.
876
   
The UK is one example of implementation which goes beyond the EAWFD grounds, 
notably in the transposition of Recital 12, additional grounds of ‘extraneous 
considerations’ and passage of time, a human rights compliance requirements and 
protection of those tried in absentia. Trials in absentia are not adequately covered even 
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by the amended EAWFD. Whilst the UK guarantees surpass the EAW requirements, the 
CJEU in Melloni prohibits MSs from going beyond the guarantees provided for in EU 
law and by extension from refusing surrender on the basis that a flagrant denial would 
occur. This is inconsistent with the notion that these are ordinarily minimum standards 
and MSs are encouraged to aim higher. 
In other respects, fair trial rights under Article 6 ECHR do not go far enough for the EU 
context and its new landscape. Extradition does not come within the autonomous 
meaning of a ‘criminal charge’ before the ECHR and therefore not all guarantees are 
applicable to the E-MS proceedings. The ECtHR reasoning is defective, relying on mere 
proclamations or analogies with aliens. However, the scope has been explicitly extended 
to cover EAW proceedings by the CJEU, Articles 47 and 49 CFR and the adopted 
Stockholm measures.   
The prohibition under Article 3 is absolute, carrying negative and positive obligations 
for both the I-MS and E-MS. It applies to an EAW arrest in the E-MS with Soering 
extending the obligation to cover the internal situation of the I-MS. Currently the 
burden of proof is on the individual and the threshold is high with the alchemy 
increasing the threshold when extradition is added to the formula. Recent cases show a 
shift towards sharing the burden with a duty on the courts to actively consider 
allegations of real risks. The principles elucidated in MSS and NS are arguably 
applicable to the AFSJ acquis including the EAW and the opinion of Advocate-General 
Sharpston in Radu (although not braved by the CJEU) provides good guidance on the 
application of the appropriate test to the EAW.  
Whilst some regard the EAW as being implemented automatically, this is not entirely 
accurate. Execution of an EAW “cannot be applied automatically but must, on the 
contrary, be viewed in the light of the personal and human context of the individual 
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situation underlying each request”.877 The appearance of automaticity stems from the 
high presumption associated with mutual recognition. Checks and controls are at least in 
theory available in the form of the exhaustive list of grounds for refusal, human rights 
obligations of Member States and adjudication by the independent judiciary. These may 
be limited but they alter MR which in other spheres operates with automaticity.  
These grounds are being gradually given autonomous meanings by the CJEU. The 
caselaw indicates that the CJEU is prepared to give a wide margin of discretion to MSs. 
For example it has shown leniency towards E-MSs when the issue relates to their own 
nationals and those in their territory. This may be because such cases do not have any 
bearing on reciprocity and mutual trust and are implemented under the guise of 
protecting the rights of individuals with a good reason to remain in the country 
(nationality, residence or staying). On the contrary cases relating to trials in absentia and 
concerns about human rights in the issuing state directly effect on reciprocity and 
mutual trust and the CJEU has so far taken a narrow approach.  
The implementation of the EAWFD in practice has turned into a conveyer belt, placing 
almost all the emphasis on the I-MS and failing that the ECtHR to ensure respect for 
HRs. MR trumps HRs obligations in the eyes of many judges, requiring the production 
of exceptionally strong evidence that an individual’s rights risked being violated before 
the presumption can be rebutted. However, this hard-line shows signs of softening. 
National judges are finding it harder to rely on MR to dispel HRs arguments. MR has its 
limits and as its fog slowly fades through litigation and reports, mutual trust will need to 
be supported by more concrete measures – both legislative and non-legislative. 
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14.2 Mutual Recognition Second 
Under EU law the relationship between state and individual is one of citizenship and 
territory, whereas under human rights it is one of jurisdiction and control. In antithesis 
however to Europe’s dissolving internal borders, MR territorially ring-fences MS’s 
criminal justice system from external scrutiny. The tension thus appears to be between 
fulfilment of human rights obligations and respect for MR. 
What is common to all of these grounds is a lack of trust in these authorities. 
If our courts were to accede to such arguments, they would be defeating the 
assumption which underpins the Framework Decision that member states 
should trust the integrity and fairness of each other's judicial institutions. 
This is a course that we should not take.
878
 
The position of the UK Supreme Court is telling of the goliath struggle individuals face 
in attempting to rebut the presumption of mutual trust. 
MR is not only recognition but requires a presumption that the decision was reached 
following due process and that it is trustworthy. MR gives domestic criminal laws and 
procedures of I-MSs extraterritorial reach and transnational application, impacting on 
the power of the E-MS and on the liberty of the individual. This needs to be matched 
with extraterritoriality of their HRs obligations which are attached to these procedures. 
To some extent this need has been recognised by the EU itself; an illustration is the 
EU’s extended scope of the right to a fair trial which under the CFR applies to EAW 
proceedings in the E-MS. 
Since the judiciary has been left in charge, they should be empowered to assess human 
rights at the point when the issue is first raised; whether this is before the I-MS or E-MS. 
The buck can only be passed if it is evident that it would be appropriate and not because 
of the principle of mutual recognition, the possibility of undermining mutual trust and 
concerns about reciprocity. 
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14.3 Are Amendments to the EAWFD Required? 
As illustrated in the following graph, extradition proceedings across the EU have been 
fast-tracked under the EAW system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Average days taken to extradite or surrender 
 
The EAWFD objective to speed up and simplify the process is no excuse for diluting 
the protection provided under Article 6
879
 or any other right. The deletion of the bar on 
surrendering own nationals is another reason/incentive for MSs to prevent exposure to 
sub-standard treatment/conditions in other MSs. It is both in their interests and their 
obligation to ensure that the treatment/conditions they are sending, not only their own 
nationals to but others within their jurisdiction, to are not sub-standard. 
Between 2005-2009, MSs issued 54,689 EAWs leading to a total of 11,630 
surrenders;
880
 thus proving useful in both the fight against crime and the promotion of 
internal security in the EU. In recognizing its success, the Commission also 
acknowledges that the EAW’s efficacy is being threatened by anxiety over HRs respect 
including its disproportionate deployment. In their report on the UK’s opt-out decision, 
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the EU committee recognises the EAW as the ‘single most important pre-Lisbon’ 
measure. Whilst accepting the criticisms and problems encountered in its 
implementation, it concludes that these will not be addressed by alternative extradition 
measures and that the injustices were not a direct consequence of the EAW but rather of 
wider issues in the criminal justice systems and prisons of Member States.
881
 
Whilst similarities exist with extradition, the EAW is a new generation of cross-border 
cooperation, deleting the pre-existing ‘muddle’, introducing a fast-tracked and 
standardised system of ‘criminal’ exchange. Its features exemplify MR and mutual trust, 
such as abolition of dual criminality for 32 offences. Given that the EAWFD was 
adopted as part of the fight against terrorism, these offences have a tedious link to 
terrorism, they lack an intrinsic cross-border nexus and there is a lack of common 
understanding of what some of the offences entail. Whilst harmonization of all these 
offences is not currently possible, the creation of a matrix comprising the elements of 
the offences for each MS will go a long way in aiding both the central authorities, courts 
and counsel. Although not legally binding, it can be used as a tool to assist with 
linguistic difficulties as well as promoting understanding and thereby mutual trust. 
At the end of the 5 year transitional period will a Lisbon-ised EAW measure be 
adopted?
882
 There are strong reasons for the EAW to be reviewed in light of almost a 
decade of day to day implementation by MSs. It is likely that there will be strong 
resistance from MSs to change a system which to date continues to serve their needs 
with minimum obstacles.  
MR and the EAWFD have created the need for additional protection and action by the 
EU which did not previously exist. Under the earlier system extradition operated within 
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different parameters, MR and the EAWFD now trump all of these. As the EU expands 
its reach into individual liberty, it needs to balance its increased scope with additional 
protection within the EU. It is evident that the effects of the EAW on HRs cannot be 
adequately covered by the ECHR. The following are proposed amendments to the 
EAWFD will facilitate increased compliance with HRs and trust-building. 
14.3.1 Proportionality 
The E-MS bears an obligation to conduct a proportionality test where a potential 
violation of a (qualified) HR is bought to their attention. Whether an explicit or implicit 
HRs ground exists in the EAW context, HRs obligations under the ECHR, CFR and 
national Constitutions will come into play as well as their obligation under Article 6 EU 
Treaty. This means that at a judicial level, judges are already obliged to conduct a 
proportionality test when HRs are sufficiently raised. However, MR has made them 
hesitant to do so or deflated the weight to be given to HRs. 
The introduction of a dual proportionality test will assist in the reduction of unfair 
EAWs. Proportionality may pose a problem given that the triviality of an offence is 
largely cultural, in the sense that the stealing of livestock may be of greater seriousness 
in an agricultural reliant society as opposed to an urban society. However, appropriate 
consideration of all factors, including the seriousness of the offence, would avoid such 
situations. The initial assessment of proportionality will lie with the I-MSs, requiring 
them to consider proportionality before issuing an EAW.  The current problem is that 
some MSs do not have a proportionality test in their domestic systems. The introduction 
of it into EAW proceedings would leave their national systems unaffected, but when 
engaging with an international mechanism the proportionality of doing so will need to 
be considered.  
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Although some may regard it as non-compliant with the principle of MR for the E-MS 
to determine the proportionality of a request, is a commonly accepted principle amongst 
MSs and a general principle of the EU which has been added to the amended EAW 
Handbook.
 883
 The proportionality principle is also set out in Articles 49(3) and 52(1) 
CFR. It could thus be added, in line with EU law, to the EAW form and whilst a simple 
tick box will not be sufficient on its own, it will mean that some thought would have 
been given and also opens the door for E-MSs to query an EAW on the issue of 
proportionality. Proportionality checks are already included in the implementing laws of 
several MSs (Ireland, Cyprus, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg and Austria).
884
  
The second assessment by the E-MS is particularly important where the wanted person 
has been living for a long time in the E-MS, since they will be in a better position to 
assess their situation, in particular when Article 8 ECHR is engaged. If there is no 
political appetite amongst MSs for the secondary proportionality review, an option 
could be to introduce a procedure whereby the proportionality of requests is challenged 
in the I-MS, including the submission of evidence on the person’s current situation in 
the E-MS. 
14.3.2 Failed EAWs 
The deletion or withdrawal of EAWs is another mechanism which needs to be 
introduced. This mechanism can be based on the MR of the E-MS’s decision. Currently 
when an EAW surrender is refused by one MS there is nothing preventing the 
individual from being arrested under the same EAW in the remaining 25 MSs (i.e.) 
                                               
883 The principle of proportionality in both the ECtHR jurisprudence and the EU883 has neither a uniform 
definition nor a uniform application. .  See Takis Tridimas, Proportionality in Community Law: Searching 
for the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny, in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality, 1999. It 
differs depending on the circumstances and subject matter under consideration. To this end guidelines (or 
extending the EAW Handbook) would be of use to ensure consistency. 
884 Mariana Sotto Maior, Chapter 12: The Principle of Proportionality: Alternative measures to the EAW, 
in Keijzer and van Sliedregt (n81) 221 
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decision is not recognized in other MSs and the EAW request is not and cannot be 
automatically deleted.  
This is illustrated by the case of Deborah Dark who was arrested in Turkey, Spain and 
the UK under an arrest warrant issued by France for a 20 year old conviction she knew 
nothing about. Despite the fact that 2 MSs, had both refused to surrender her on the 
basis that it would be unjust to do so, France refused to remove the EAW request. On 
May 2010 following intense campaigning France agreed to remove the EAW.
885
 It is 
worth noting that the withdrawal of the EAW was not as a direct result of the legal 
decisions of the 2 MSs or judicial cooperation, but rather due to lobbying campaigns 
conducted by NGOs and others. In addition to withdrawal of an EAW, a requirement 
for I-MSs to review and re-issue EAWs after a certain time period (e.g. every 2-3 years) 
could also be added, streamlining the EAW system. 
14.4 Is the ECHR Enough or are Additional EU measures Required? 
Hodgson
886
 regards the margin of appreciation as the problem leading to the differing 
HRs protection across the EU. However, even when the margin of appreciation is 
activated, MSs are still expected to respect the minimum standards, the problem may be 
that the minimum standards are too low for the EU. The delays in the enforcement 
mechanisms of the ECHR increase the need for more immediate measures to fall in line 
with the new fast track ‘extradition’ process. EU MSs would benefit from best practice 
guides on how to fulfil their obligations, EU standards can also assist in mutual trust by 
making the standards visible and introducing an additional enforcement mechanism.  
The 3 cases studied in detail illustrate the impact of the EAW in practice. Stapelton 
highlights the tension between MR and judicial instinct to protect and prevent HRs 
                                               
885 Further details can be on the Fair Trials International website, found at: 
<www.fairtrials.net/cases/spotlight/deborah_dark/>  
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 Jacqueline Hodgson, Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, NCLR, 
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violations at the first opportunity. Assange concerned a multifaceted attack on the 
EAWFD, showing the reliance on the I-MS definition of the 32 EAW offences, the 
watered down specialty rule when the description of the offence is permitted to be 
vague,
887
 the potential abuse by using the EAW for investigation rather than prosecution 
purposes and the deferral to the I-MS to determine the appropriate ‘judicial authority’. It 
underlines the practice of non-inquiry and non-interference. Campbell provides the ray 
of hope for human rights and illustrates a synergy between the courts and lawyers which 
resulted in the successful resistance of surrender through the fulfilment of the relevant 
test by provision of sufficient evidence. 
MR measures in criminal matters are one–sided with the successful and effective 
EAWFD at the helm. The elephant in the room was for a long time the absence of HRs 
reinforcement. The EAWFD sister Framework Decision (the 2004 proposal) failed due 
to lack of support based on a misguided belief that the national laws of MSs were 
adequate and arguments of it lacking legality. Nevertheless the needs set out in the 2004 
proposal (to counterbalance judicial cooperation, for divergent practices to be more 
visibly equivalent and for their uniform application) remain the same for the Stockholm 
Roadmap. The Lisbon Treaty supports increased HRs protection through the altered 
legislative process, removal of the democratic deficit and the elevation of the CFR. EU 
accession to the ECHR is progressing and will allow external scrutiny, although it is not 
clear how this will interact with the principle of equivalent protection. The added value 
of EU measures on HRs is primarily the enforcement an evaluation mechanisms which 
include the bringing of infringement proceedings and the CJEU jurisdiction. It is also 
hoped that they will create uniform protection of HRs in practice. 
                                               
887 Some appeals have been successful on this point, for example where the EAW is so vague that it is not 
even clear whether the person is wanted for trial or has already been convicted of the offence, see: Moulai 
v Deputy Public Prosecutor of Creteil, France [2009] EWHC 1030 (Admin) 
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Obligations in Recitals 12 and 13 and Article 1(3) EAWFD are uncontroversial and 
generally accepted by the MSs, it should therefore not be controversial for them to be 
elevated within the EAWFD. This would at least lead to consistency of protection 
amongst MSs and HRs would be safeguarded, including in accordance with the E-MS’s 
HRs obligations.
888
 The amendments should be in line with the adopted Stockholm 
measures, whilst leaving scope for future improvements. 
General thresholds can be elicited from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as summarized 
by Lord Bingham in Ullah. Under Article 3 a real risk needs to be shown (an evidential 
burden). Article 6 requires a flagrant denial of the right before a potential interference 
can equate to a violation and in turn a bar on surrender. The benchmark to be met needs 
to be established, including what evidence is acceptable, required and sufficient. The 
ECHR standards exist, it is simply a matter of the national courts translating them into 
practice and applying them to the EAW. In the asylum context both the CJEU and the 
ECtHR have indicated what this may be and should act as further guidance for those 
implementing the MR in criminal matters programme.  The considerations which, 
centre on security issues, combine to give extradition its profound importance leaving 
no room for the individual.
889
 The reciprocity factor within the EAWFD is the ability to 
bring suspects to justice. The reciprocity factor across the EU should also be to protect 
the HRs of one another’s citizens and acting in good faith. 
When assessing potential HRs violations, the Courts refer to the need for exceptional 
circumstances. The reality is that it would be exceptional if HRs protection existed at 
the mythical level which MSs are expected to trust it does. HRs are protected at varying 
degrees and violations do occur in all EU MSs as recorded in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR.  “One of the problems with the way in which a lot of European criminal justice 
                                               
888 Soering (n177) 
889 In Gomes v Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21 (36) cited in HH, 
PH and F-K (n528)  
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has emerged is that it presupposes a kind of mutual confidence and common standards 
that actually don’t exist.”890 Visible and tangible respect for the rights of those 
individuals caught up in the MR machinery is the key to its success. 
14.5 Has the EU law Adequately Addressed the Challenges? 
In theory HRs are protected at international, regional and national level, however, MR 
and mutual trust displace this protection in practice. It is not necessarily that no regard 
has been given to human rights but rather the manner in which it has. Human rights 
protection was based on presumptions, that human rights are protected across the EU 
are analogous with an empty box whose shell enables the fast tracked and near 
automatic surrender of individuals. The actual protection is not sufficiently detailed to 
create the requisite clarity and certainty for mutual trust.  
The lack of a HRs ground in the EAWFD has not prevented the inclusion or 
development of HRs grounds of refusals in the implementation of the EAWFD by MSs. 
What it has led to is the development of inconsistent HRs grounds across MSs. Some 
grounds are explicit with some applying a higher threshold test, others are disguised as 
proportionality or ‘oppressive’ tests, some have adopted only partial HRs grounds 
implementing Recitals 12 or 13 as grounds whilst others have no HRs ground at all.
891
  
Croatia is an interesting case study to consider on this point. As a candidate country, it 
was obliged to implement EU measures strictly before becoming a Member State and 
did so in relation to the EAWFD and other MR measures. In response to the FIDE 2012 
questionnaires the Croatian Rapporteurs state that in fulfilling its obligations to 
implement these measures it has led to a lowering of HRs protection. In relation to the 
                                               
890 Lord Justice Thomas, Transcript of oral evidence given to the Scott-Baker Enquiry, Evidence given on 
7.04.2011, p.2127. Available online at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police/oral-evidence/  
891 The Czech Republic and Estonia. 
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EAWFD they state in particular that Article 4(a) dealing with trials in absentia does not 
meet either the ECHR or the Croatian standards.
892
 
The catch up game being played via the Stockholm Roadmap shows that the theoretical 
presumptions made were not sufficient and that before such presumptions are relied on 
it is important for these rights to harmonised. The minimum standards need to be 
uniform across the EU. The protection mechanisms in MSs need to be all on par with 
effective implementation of these standards.  
As set out in the recitals of the Directives adopted to date following the Stockholm 
Roadmap, the justification is promotion of MR through increased mutual trust. This 
enables the ability to consider decisions equivalent and trusting that the protection of 
procedural guarantees has been applied sufficiently. The latest Directive discussed goes 
further by making a direct link between the setting of common minimum standards, 
efficient judicial cooperation, mutual trust and the promotion of a culture of human 
rights in the EU. 
The Stockholm Roadmap breaks the procedural guarantees down to 5 measures. Work 
on them has progressed and for the most part these measures are a step forward, 
however they are not without their shortcomings. 
The Directive adopted for Measure A provides for the right to interpretation (in line 
with the ECHR) and the right to translation which goes beyond the text of the ECHR 
taking a dynamic view and codifying ECtHR jurisprudence. However, in terms of the 
EAW, the national authorities are left to determine what is ‘necessary’ and whether a 
decision to surrender is in fact a ‘judgment’ to be translated. 
                                               
892 Valsamis Mitsilegas, General Report: The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from Amsterdam to 
Lisbon, Challenges of Implementation, Constitutionality and Fundamental Rights, FIDE 2012, 4 
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Measure B’s Directive on the right to information encompasses many of the defence 
rights set out above. There is a division between those rights governed by the Directive 
(Article 3) and those left to the national laws (Article 4). When compared its recitals and 
provisions exhibit a schizophrenic approach to the extent of rights applicable to EAWs. 
Measures C and D on legal representation and communication with certain individuals, 
was watered it down by the Council. However, following the tripartite discussions, the 
standards were restored including in relation to the right to dual representation in both 
E-MS and I-MS, the deletion of derogations from confidentiality of lawyer-client 
meetings and the use of statements made during the initial police questioning in the 
absence of legal advice. 
With the consultation on pre-trial detention for Measure F complete, it appears that MSs 
have no appetite for legislation on alternatives to custody, believing that their national 
laws can cope. On the other hand, civil society feels that the practice is inconsistent and 
would benefit from EU legislation. There are also mixed views on common standards 
for pre-trial-detention, MSs do not want maximum periods set whereas NGOs regard 
this as desirable. On whether detention conditions could be a ground to refuse surrender, 
MS agree that it could, but only in exceptional circumstances and the caselaw does not 
supported the claim that it is an issue. Overall NGOs are supportive of adopting 
common standards to promote uniform practice and support MR, a point most MSs 
seem to miss. 
Whilst commendable, the Stockholm measures are not in themselves a panacea and 
cannot redress the balance alone. They address the essential procedural guarantees, but 
for obvious reasons they did not attempt to tackle all aspects. A prime example is the 
provision of bail and specifically the conditions which, MSs and citizens need to be 
confident will not be implemented in a discriminatory manner.  The length of pre-trial 
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detention varies dramatically across the EU MSs and although MSs may not want the 
length of time to be harmonized, minimum standards regulating review of detention and 
the granting of bail will need to work in parallel with the ESO. 
When assessing the fairness of proceedings they are ordinarily considered as a whole. 
However, in cross border cases the proceedings are broken up into parts which although 
closely linked (with the individual and offence being the common factor), they are at the 
same time separate. MR and mutual trust erect the barriers permitting only the extended 
reach of the I-MS’s decisions.  
European criminal law “creates a space that is neither one jurisdiction nor another, but 
an infinite set of combinations and amalgamations”.893 Arguably what it creates is an 
infinite combination and amalgamations of spaces within which requested individuals 
are placed. The result is that any given case will be subjected to a pick and mix of 
investigations, arrests, questioning, cautions and trials. As Hodgson sets out, national 
criminal justice systems normally focus on certain stages of the proceedings and 
inadequacies at one stage are balanced by safeguards at another stage. When a case is 
subjected to different jurisdictions, these inadequacies risk not been balanced. These 
differences are most obvious, but not exclusively, between adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems.
894
 Access to a lawyer, in particular at the preliminary stages is a difference that 
has been highlighted recently. In the common law system where the police investigation 
is not subject to external supervision, defence rights are strong with access to a lawyer 
guaranteed and police questioning always tape recorded.  
This staggering or division of criminal proceedings means that guarantees need to apply 
at all stages. Each stage is capable of being compartmentalized. Currently the I-MS and 
E-MS only partner up to facilitate the crime fighting and not the HRs protection. Each 
                                               
893 Hodgson (n886) 
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 These differences are set out by Hodgson (n886)  
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national system has its own means by which to rectify interferences with procedural 
guarantees. In the I-MS they may come into effect at different stages of the proceedings 
and may not be able to be applied to interferences which occurred extraterritorially and 
which they did not commit – despite their ability to extend the reach of their criminal 
law extraterritorially. 
The standardisation of safeguards at all stages of the criminal proceedings at the EU 
level will assist in promoting the integrity of the criminal procedure as a whole in the 
new transnational landscape. Stronger safeguards can only increase the credibility of the 
criminal justice systems and strengthen cooperation between MSs.  
The EAW does not function in isolation, it lies at the heart of criminal proceedings with 
a cross-border nexus (the offence or the individual). As such the EAWFD should never 
have been a standalone measure, by its nature it needs to be part of a package. In 
addition to HRs, flaking measures are necessary. To date those adopted cover the full 
scope of criminal proceedings from pre-trial to post-trial. Overcrowding plaguing 
prisons of most MSs is likely to make it hard to resist surrender on the basis of general 
detention conditions. However, as alternatives are increasingly available through the 
ESO, Transfer of Prisoners FD and Financial Penalties FD, individuals will have access 
to a modified surrender enabling them to serve their sentence near family or to pay a 
financial penalty or be supervised pre-trial instead of having to leave their life (and 
employment). The important object is to ensure that the theory behind these measures is 
effective in practice. 
Family rights can also be facilitated through alternatives available to surrender and 
custody. Under the EAWFD three alternatives are offered, the conditional surrender 
with return to serve any sentence imposed or the takeover of a sentence already handed 
down. The forum bar is another alternative and at pre-trial stages the ESO is also 
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available. The EU needs to continue working on joining the dots between treaty rights 
and MR measures, taking into account the rights of EU citizens and the scales for 
expulsion set out in the Citizens Directive. 
Given that the EAWFD was adopted to counter serious transnational crime, it has been 
deployed for less serious crimes and to an extent which the drafters could not have 
predicted.
895
 With the expanding MR portfolio the EAWFD is only part of the HRs 
lacunae. EU HRs measures need to delve deeper into the system safeguards, in line with 
the ECtHR principle of equivalent protection, the EU has the responsibility to ensure 
that the necessary safeguards are put in place to balance the increased powers over the 
individual. 
The ‘let's take their word for it now and deal with the consequences later’ approach, is 
not of much use to individuals who are separated from their families, lose their jobs, are 
detained in Art 3 prohibited treatment or are subjected to an unfair hearings. HRs must 
be protected and violations prevented at the first opportunity, rights cannot be recalled 
at a later date when the system fails a quality control test. Individuals are not products 
and the consequences of their ill treatment cannot always be isolated but may also 
impact innocent individuals. “Reports of the Council of Europe on European prisons 
show that prisons are not equally crowded”896 and as such depending on which MS an 
individual serves their sentence the conditions will not be equally degrading across the 
EU. MR provides a veil behind which MSs can hide to avoid both investigation by other 
MSs but also to turn a blind eye ignoring their obligations under the ECHR. 
The calls for reform of a system which effects thousands a year has come from all 
quarters. At a regional level they have come from the Council of Europe and EU 
                                               
895
 The available statistics are interestingly analysed in Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Nicholas Hernanz, 
Europe’s most wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System, CEPS Special 
Reports, 29.03.2013 
896 Marguery (n509) 91 
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institutions. At a national level, the UK Judicial Committee on HRs also calls for 
reform, including the adoption of a proportionality test and to avoid the rubber stamping 
of decisions by other MSs. 
The current legislation and practice places MR above HRs, a rebalance of the system is 
required. Judges make their decisions independent of the government policies of the 
day.
897
 Despite the fact that governments may be keen to apply MR, judges are also 
aware of the HRs burden placed on their shoulders. 
MR functions to regulate the underworld of the Union, reflecting the other side of the 
EU. Within this ‘fifth freedom’ individuals seek to exploit the dissolving borders for 
their own criminal activities. To deal with those taking advantage of this clandestine 
fifth freedom the EU’s adoption of MR in criminal matters also flips the freedoms in 
their favour and thereby engaging them to the detriment of individuals. Whilst there is 
no doubt that in order to protect the internal security of the EU, measures with a cross-
border nexus are required, MSs should strive to ensure that in their implementation of 
the measures they continue to uphold the general principles and values which are 
common to them and form the foundation of the Union. These ensure respect for the 
rule of law and for HRs. In doing so a high level of confidence can develop between all 
actors in the Union including authorities, judges and citizens. Such confidence will 
assist in the free flow of goods, services, people, decisions and sanctions. 
The missing link between justice and Mutual Trust is the gap between paper and 
practice. MR is not as easy to implement in criminal law because the subject matter is 
not a glass bottle or an alcoholic drink but human beings. The adoption of minimum 
rules set out at EU level will go some way in closing this gap. However, if the EU and 
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 A recent reminder of this fact can be found in the words of the Court of Appeal;  
Public policy, as contemplated in the Regulation, cannot be determined by the current thinking 
of the government of the day as to what is an expedient foreign policy.  To allow that would 
itself be a breach of a rule of law essential in the legal order of the United Kingdom (Krombach). 
Meletios Apostolides v David Charles Orams and Linda Elizabeth Orams  [2010] EWCA Civ 9 at §66 
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MSs want their ‘star’ measure to continue to shine brightly they need to ensure that its 
implementation enriches not only the arsenal of judicial enforcement but also of citizen 
protection. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Extracts from the TFEU  
Article 67 (ex Article 61 TEC and ex Article 29 TEU) 
1. The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for 
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States. 
2. It shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity 
between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For the purpose 
of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals. 
3. The Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to 
prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia, and through measures for 
coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other 
competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgments in 
criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws. 
 
Article 82 TFEU  
1. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on 
the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and 
shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 and in Article 83.  
[…] 
2. To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and 
judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and the Council 
may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into 
account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the 
Member States. 
They shall concern: 
(a) mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; 
(b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; 
(c) the rights of victims of crime; 
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(d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has 
identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the 
Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
Adoption of the minimum rules referred to in this paragraph shall not 
prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing a higher level of 
protection for individuals. 
 
Extracts from the Lisbon Treaty relating to enforcement mechanisms 
Article 258 (ex Article 226 TEC) 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an 
obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid 
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 
Article 260 (ex Article 228 TEC) 
1. If the Court of Justice of the European Union finds that a Member State has 
failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties, the State shall be required to 
take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. 
2. If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken 
the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court, it may bring 
the case before the Court after giving that State the opportunity to submit its 
observations. It shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to 
be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
If the Court finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with its 
judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it. 
This procedure shall be without prejudice to Article 259. 
3. When the Commission brings a case before the Court pursuant to Article 258 
on the grounds that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfill its 
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obligation to notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative 
procedure, it may, when it deems appropriate, specify the amount of the lump 
sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
If the Court finds that there is an infringement it may impose a lump sum or 
penalty payment on the Member State concerned not exceeding the amount 
specified by the Commission. The payment obligation shall take effect on the 
date set by the Court in its judgment. 
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Annex 2: Extracts from the ECHR 
Article 3 Prohibition of torture 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
Article 5 Right to liberty and security 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent 
court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the 
lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any 
obligation prescribed by law; 
c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable 
suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing 
after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of 
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
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3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled 
to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of 
the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
Article 6 Right to a fair trial 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in 
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to 
be given it free when the interests of justice so require; 
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(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court. 
Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  
Article 13 Right to an effective remedy 
Everyone hose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
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Annex 3: Extracts from the Extradition Act 2003 
Section 2  
(4)The statement is one that—  
(a) particulars of the person’s identity; 
(b) particulars of any other warrant issued in the category 1 territory for the 
person’s arrest in respect of the offence; 
(c)particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged to have committed 
the offence, including the conduct alleged to constitute the offence, the time and 
place at which he is alleged to have committed the offence and any provision of the 
law of the category 1 territory under which the conduct is alleged to constitute an 
offence; 
(d) particulars of the sentence which may be imposed under the law of the category 
1 territory in respect of the offence if the person is convicted of it. 
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Annex 4: Table on prison populations across the EU  
 
EU Member State On Remand (%) 
Total non-
national prisoners 
(%) 
Austria  21.2 46.4 
Belgium  35 41.1 
Bulgaria 9.9 41.1 
Cyprus (Republic of)  44.6 58.9 
Czech Republic 10.5 7.2 
Denmark average 24.15 21.7 
Estonia  20.3 40.3 
Finland  18.1 13.3 
France  21.6 17.8 
Germany 15.8 26.7 
Greece  31.2 57.1 
Hungary  28.3 3.4 
Ireland (Republic of) 16 13.6 
Italy  40.4 36.2 
Latvia  30 1.3 
Lithuania 13.1 1.1 
Luxembourg  38.2 68.7 
Malta  64 40.1 
Netherlands  40.6 26.2 
Poland  9.4 0.7 
Portugal  20 20 
Romania  10.8 0.7 
Slovakia  14.6 2 
Slovenia  22.7 11.7 
Spain  15.8 34.1 
Sweden  22.8 27.6 
UK average 27.68 13.5 
      
Total 666.73 672.5 
Average 24.6937037 24.90740741 
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Annex 5: Extracts from the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Article 4 Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
Article 6 Right to liberty and security 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
Article 7 Respect for private and family life 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications. 
Article 21 Non-discrimination 
1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or 
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or 
sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 
2. Within the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of 
their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited. 
Article 24 The rights of the child 
1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for 
their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken 
into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age 
and maturity. 
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or 
private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration. 
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is 
contrary to his or her interests. 
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Article 45 Freedom of movement and of residence 
1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States. 
2. Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the 
Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a 
Member State.  
Article 47 Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with 
the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far 
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 
Article 48 Presumption of innocence and right of defence 
1. Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
2. Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be 
guaranteed. 
Article 49 Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties 
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national law or 
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty 
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was 
committed. If, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law 
provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable. 
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2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any 
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles recognised by the community of nations. 
3. The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.  
Article 50 Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same 
criminal offence 
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for 
an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted 
within the Union in accordance with the law.  
Article 51 Field of application 
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to 
the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall 
therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application 
thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of 
the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties. 
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or 
modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties. 
Article 52 Scope and interpretation of rights and principles 
1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
2. Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties 
shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those 
Treaties. 
3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection. 
4. In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be 
interpreted in harmony with those traditions.  
5. The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented 
by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are 
implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall 
be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling 
on their legality. 
6. Full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this 
Charter. 
7. The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the 
interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the courts of the 
Union and of the Member States. 
Article 53 Level of protection 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields 
of application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions. 
Article 54 Prohibition of abuse of rights 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for herein.   
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Annex 7: Extracts from the Crime and Courts Act 2013 – the Forum Bar 
SCHEDULE 20 Extradition 
Part 1 Forum 
Extradition to category 1 territories 
1Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 (extradition to category 1 territories) is 
amended as follows. 
2In section 11 (bars to extradition)— 
(a) at the end of subsection (1) insert— 
“(j) forum.”; 
(b) after subsection (1) insert— 
“(1A)But the judge is to decide whether the person’s extradition is barred by 
reason of forum only in a case where the Part 1 warrant contains the statement 
referred to in section 2(3) (warrant issued for purposes of prosecution for 
offence in category 1 territory).”; 
(c) in subsection (2), for the words from “12” to “apply” substitute “12 to 19F 
apply”. 
3 After section 19A insert— 
“19BForum 
(1)The extradition of a person (“D”) to a category 1 territory is barred by reason 
of forum if the extradition would not be in the interests of justice. 
(2)For the purposes of this section, the extradition would not be in the interests 
of justice if the judge— 
(a) decides that a substantial measure of D’s relevant activity was performed in 
the United Kingdom; and 
(b) decides, having regard to the specified matters relating to the interests of 
justice (and only those matters), that the extradition should not take place. 
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(3)These are the specified matters relating to the interests of justice— 
(a) the place where most of the loss or harm resulting from the extradition 
offence occurred or was intended to occur; 
(b) the interests of any victims of the extradition offence; 
(c)any belief of a prosecutor that the United Kingdom, or a particular part of the 
United Kingdom, is not the most appropriate jurisdiction in which to prosecute 
D in respect of the conduct constituting the extradition offence; 
(d)were D to be prosecuted in a part of the United Kingdom for an offence that 
corresponds to the extradition offence, whether evidence necessary to prove the 
offence is or could be made available in the United Kingdom; 
(e) any delay that might result from proceeding in one jurisdiction rather than 
another; 
(f) the desirability and practicability of all prosecutions relating to the 
extradition offence taking place in one jurisdiction, having regard (in particular) 
to— 
(i) the jurisdictions in which witnesses, co-defendants and other suspects are 
located, and 
(ii) the practicability of the evidence of such persons being given in the United 
Kingdom or in jurisdictions outside the United Kingdom; 
(g)D’s connections with the United Kingdom. 
(4)In deciding whether the extradition would not be in the interests of justice, 
the judge must have regard to the desirability of not requiring the disclosure of 
material which is subject to restrictions on disclosure in the category 1 territory 
concerned. 
(5)If, on an application by a prosecutor, it appears to the judge that the 
prosecutor has considered the offences for which D could be prosecuted in the 
United Kingdom, or a part of the United Kingdom, in respect of the conduct 
constituting the extradition offence, the judge must make that prosecutor a party 
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to the proceedings on the question of whether D’s extradition is barred by reason 
of forum. 
(6)In this section “D’s relevant activity” means activity which is material to the 
commission of the extradition offence and which is alleged to have been 
performed by D. 
 
19C Effect of prosecutor’s certificates on forum proceedings 
(1)The judge hearing proceedings under section 19B (the “forum proceedings”) 
must decide that the extradition is not barred by reason of forum if (at a time 
when the judge has not yet decided the proceedings) the judge receives a 
prosecutor’s certificate relating to the extradition. 
(2)That duty to decide the forum proceedings in that way is subject to the 
determination of any question relating to the prosecutor’s certificate raised in 
accordance with section 19E. 
(3)A designated prosecutor may apply for the forum proceedings to be 
adjourned for the purpose of assisting that or any other designated prosecutor— 
(a) in considering whether to give a prosecutor’s certificate relating to the 
extradition, 
(b) in giving such a certificate, or 
(c) in sending such a certificate to the judge. 
(4)If such an application is made, the judge must— 
(a) adjourn the forum proceedings until the application is decided; and 
(b) continue the adjournment, for such period as appears to the judge to be 
reasonable, if the application is granted. 
(5)But the judge must end the adjournment if the application is not granted. 
 
19D Prosecutor’s certificates 
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(1)A “prosecutor’s certificate” is a certificate given by a designated prosecutor 
which— 
(a) certifies both matter A and matter B, and 
(b) certifies either matter C or matter D. 
(2)Matter A is that a responsible prosecutor has considered the offences for 
which D could be prosecuted in the United Kingdom, or a part of the United 
Kingdom, in respect of the conduct constituting the extradition offence. 
(3)Matter B is that the responsible prosecutor has decided that there are one or 
more such offences that correspond to the extradition offence (the 
“corresponding offences”). 
(4)Matter C is that— 
(a) the responsible prosecutor has made a formal decision as to the prosecution 
of D for the corresponding offences, 
(b) that decision is that D should not be prosecuted for the corresponding 
offences, and 
(c) the reason for that decision is a belief that— 
(i) there would be insufficient admissible evidence for the prosecution; or 
(ii) the prosecution would not be in the public interest. 
(5)Matter D is that the responsible prosecutor believes that D should not be 
prosecuted for the corresponding offences because there are concerns about the 
disclosure of sensitive material in— 
(a) the prosecution of D for the corresponding offences, or 
(b) any other proceedings. 
(6)In relation to the extradition of any person to a category 1 territory, neither 
this section nor any other rule of law (whether or not contained in an enactment) 
may require a designated prosecutor— 
(a) to consider any matter relevant to giving a prosecutor’s certificate; or 
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(b) to consider whether to give a prosecutor’s certificate. 
(7)In this section “sensitive material” means material which appears to the 
responsible prosecutor to be sensitive, including material appearing to be 
sensitive on grounds relating to— 
(a) national security, 
(b) international relations, or 
(c)the prevention or detection of crime (including grounds relating to the 
identification or activities of witnesses, informants or any other persons 
supplying information to the police or any other law enforcement agency who 
may be in danger if their identities are revealed). 
 
19E Questioning of prosecutor’s certificate 
(1)No decision of a designated prosecutor relating to a prosecutor’s certificate in 
respect of D’s extradition (a “relevant certification decision”) may be questioned 
except on an appeal under section 26 against an order for that extradition. 
(2)In England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, for the purpose of— 
(a) determining whether to give permission for a relevant certification decision 
to be questioned, and 
(b) determining any such question (if that permission is given), the High Court 
must apply the procedures and principles which would be applied by it on an 
application for judicial review. 
(3)In Scotland, for the purpose of determining any questioning of a relevant 
certification decision, the High Court must apply the procedures and principles 
that would be applied by it on an application for judicial review. 
(4)In a case where the High Court quashes a prosecutor’s certificate, the High 
Court is to decide the question of whether or not the extradition is barred by 
reason of forum. 
(5)Where the High Court is required to decide that question by virtue of 
subsection (4)— 
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(a)sections 19B to 19D and this section apply in relation to that decision (with 
the appropriate modifications) as they apply to a decision by a judge; and 
(b) in particular— 
(i) a reference in this section to an appeal under section 26 has effect as a 
reference to an appeal under section 32 to the Supreme Court; 
(ii) a reference in this section to the High Court has effect as a reference to the 
Supreme Court. 
 
19F Interpretation of sections 19B to 19E 
(1)This section applies for the purposes of sections 19B to 19E (and this section). 
(2)These expressions have the meanings given— 
“D” has the meaning given in section 19B(1); 
“designated prosecutor” means— 
(a) a member of the Crown Prosecution Service, or 
(b) any other person who— 
(i) is a prosecutor designated for the purposes of this section by order made by 
the Secretary of State, or 
(ii) is within a description of prosecutors so designated; 
“extradition offence” means the offence specified in the Part 1 warrant 
(including the conduct that constitutes the extradition offence); 
“forum proceedings” has the meaning given in section 19C(1); 
“part of the United Kingdom” means— 
(a)England and Wales; 
(b)Scotland; 
(c)Northern Ireland; 
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“prosecutor” means a person who has responsibility for prosecuting offences in 
any part of the United Kingdom (whether or not the person also has other 
responsibilities); 
“prosecutor’s certificate” has the meaning given in section 19D(1); 
“responsible prosecutor”, in relation to a prosecutor’s certificate, means— 
(a) the designated prosecutor giving the certificate, or 
(b) another designated prosecutor. 
(3)In determining for any purpose whether an offence corresponds to the 
extradition offence, regard must be had, in particular, to the nature and 
seriousness of the two offences. 
(4)A reference to a formal decision as to the prosecution of D for an offence is a 
reference to a decision (made after complying with, in particular, any applicable 
requirement concerning a code of practice) that D should, or should not, be 
prosecuted for the offence.” 
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Annex 8: Key Characteristics of the European Supervisory Order 
The ESO states that it lays down rules for the MR of a decision on supervision measures, 
for the monitoring of such measures and the surrender of the person should they breach 
any of the measures (Article 1).  
These measures are listed and include restrictions on movement and contact (Article 8).  
In recognition of the different supervision measures across the EU, it permits the 
executing MS to adapt measures, but must ensure that they correspond as far as possible 
(Article 13). 
The list of 32 offences for which dual criminality must not be verified, is the same as 
the EAWFD, however they must be punishable for at least 3 years in the issuing MS 
(Article 14). 
An exhaustive list of grounds for non-recognition is also set out (Article 15).  
The issuing MS maintains competence for subsequent decisions on the measures such 
as whether to renew, review, withdrawal, modify or to issue an EAW. It should be noted 
that it is not compulsory for a MS to use the ESO and the individual concerned has no 
right for the ESO to be used in the course of criminal proceedings against them (Article 
2(2)). 
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